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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about how television intersects with the everyday lives of women in 
transitional Korea, and how the experience of television is further implicated in the 
formation and transformation of identities. Within the larger socio-historical context 
of Korean modernity, it explores how_women deal with social change and make sense 
of their lives and identities with the cultural experience of television in everyday life, 
mediated by generation and class. This empirical work overall demonstrates the 
reflexive workings of popular television culture in its multifold manifestations. It 
reveals how critical ordinary women are in their engagement with television and how 
reflexivity actually operates in the variegated settings of their everyday lives. The 
thesis therefore argues for reflexivity at work: Reflexivity is constitutive of the 
experience of modem television. The practice of reflexivity is a defining characteristic 
of the experience of television, and television culture today has become a critical 
condition for reflexivity. Specifically, the thesis emphasizes the social dynamics of 
different forms of reflexivity with which to organize the project of self-identity, and 
the significant role of television as a resource for reflexivity. Reflexivity is organized 
around the axis of generation oriented toward different directions, which are the 
tradition-directed, the inner-directed, and the other-directed. The dialectical nature of 
the reflexivities of each generation is a push-and-pull of different tendencies towards 
modernity. Tradition in everyday life is now under threat, beginning to dissolve by the 
experience of modernity. As a consequence, the reflexive organization of the self 
becomes an inevitable unfinishable project to be worked at, and television, as 
historically-situated cultural experience, is integrated into the project of the self 
Television is an important resource for reflexivity in modem everyday life, which 
stimulates ordinary women to research their own lives and identities for a journey of 
hope. 
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Chapter 1 Women, Television, and Everyday Life 
This thesis is about how television intersects with the everyday lives of women in 
transitional Korea, and how the experience of television is further implicated in the 
formation and transformation of identities. This study initially evolved out of my 
observation and personal reflections on the historically unprecedented rate of divorce 
and the social fear about the dissolution of the traditional family system with the 
coming of modernity.1 The Korean divorce rate is rising rapidly, although it is still 
low as compared with Western countries. It has increased from 5.8% in 1980, to 
11.1 % in 1990, 16.8% in 1995 (KWDI, 1998), and today, one out of three married 
couples is divorcing (KBS News, July 1, 1999). It is a dramatic indicator of the crisis 
of identity, both individual and social, in the push-and-pull of different influences of 
modernity. The identity crisis basically posed a question: How do people deal with the 
continuous, unsettling social transitions around them, and what kind of role does 
media play in this process? This question consequently arising from the social 
conditions of modernity prompted me to explore in detail women's changing lives and 
identities in relation to the impact of the most popular media culture in everyday life -
television.2 
Specifically, how do Korean women perceive, interpret, and use television in 
the course of everyday life, in the creation of identity? Does television intersect with 
imagining different lives and identities for women? What are the distinctive features 
of women's relationships to television? Are women's relationships to television 
significantly influenced by their age and class position? I am primarily concerned 
with the ways in which different generations of women relate to television, however, 
the dimension of class will also be considered to see if cultural patterns of television 
experience are determined by class differences.3 Overall, the objective of this study is 
to understand how Korean women deal with social change and make sense of their 
everyday lives and identities with the cultural experience of television mediated by 
generation and class. Women's experience of television in everyday life cannot be 
separated from its links to the larger socio-historical context in which television is 
received and understood. Importantly, this study therefore approaches women, 
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television, and everyday life in the historically-specific social conditions of Korean 
modernity. 
For the framework of this study I mainly refer to Western theoretical and 
empirical work on women as audiences. This is because, in examining relationships 
between women and media culture, Korean feminist television studies have been 
predominantly concerned with the issues of women as "representations" and women 
as "creators", but have not approached women as "audiences". Despite the fact that 
Koreans spend 4/5 of their leisure time on television consumption (KBI, 1996), hence, 
television is an integral part of everyday leisure life, any exploratory research on what 
people do with television is largely absent. The absence of audience reception studies 
inevitably leads me to rely on existing Western knowledge. In an attempt to identify 
how my work can intervene and bridge the gap of knowledge, in this chapter I will 
fully review both Korean literature and Western literature, mostly Anglo-American 
studies on television and women audiences. 
Section (1) on the review of Western literature traces a historical context within 
which feminist television audience studies have developed, and assesses their 
evolving perspectives about women as audiences. How have they perceived, and 
situated, women as audiences? I intend to recognize each study's strengths and unique 
contributions to collaborating and cumulating knowledge, and at the same time, point 
out their collective weaknesses and limitations. In this section I will highlight three 
crucial limitations. First, existing feminist audience studies have not comprehensively 
considered the conceptual frameworks on women as audiences embedded in everyday 
life, therefore, the questions as to the specific ways in which television is related to 
women's everyday social lives and experiences remain under-researched. They have 
not closely approximated the day-to-day lived experiences of audiences to provide the 
kind of vibrant knowledge for understanding the complex phenomena and specifities 
of women audiencehood embedded within larger socio-historical contexts. Second, 
this limitation raises questions about the politics of feminist research. How can 
existing knowledge contribute not only epistemologically, but also crucially, 
politically? Finally, insufficient attention to women of color and differences is a 
general tendency that can be found throughout the history of the Western feminist 
researchers' monolithic perceptions of, and imaginative analyses of, women as 
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audiences. This is precisely the point where my study intervenes. The consideration of 
these limitations, together with the strengths of existing Western studies to be 
addressed in this section, forms the basis of my study and leads it to a ground work 
which has not been extensively explored. 
Section (2) on the review of Korean literature emphasizes a different paradigm, 
which means that the development of feminist scholarship in Korea is relatively 
recent, compared with the established legacy of Western scholarship, and a dominant 
model of television media research is a political economy approach. Since emerging 
around the mid 1980's Korean feminist television studies in general have not moved 
beyond textual and production analyses. Based on the limited existing literature, this 
section therefore attempts to draw a descriptive sketch of the relationship between 
women and television in South Korea. It will introduce the Korean television system, 
and explain the representation of women and two popular genres - Korean drama and 
Western movies - that are particularly enjoyed by women audiences. Although there 
exists a productive body of knowledge on the socio-economic position ofwomen as I 
have reviewed in Chapter 2, Korean feminist scholarship has not critically 
incorporated the parameter of popular media culture into the overarching paradigm of 
gender relations, and not yet specifically examined how women's lives and identities 
are intersected with the everyday experience of the most popular media, television, 
from sociological and cultural perspectives.4 No attempt has been made to explore 
such cultural phenomena through the integrative framework drawn upon by women's 
studies, television media studies, sociology and cultural studies. Given the substantial 
limitations of existing literature, my study can be placed as an original work. It is my 
hope that this thesis with the inevitable import of Western knowledge- but carefully, 
not blindly - will open a dialogue and bridge a gap between the Western and the non-
Western imagination towards each Other's Other. 
Section (1) Western Literature 
From text to audience 
To show the historical context from which feminist television audience studies have 
emerged, it is necessary to address questions arising from the earlier feminist media 
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studies on the texts of women's magazines, advertising and film, and mark a shift 
from the predominantly text-based analysesto the need for empirical investigation of 
the audience in the real world. To begin with magazines, a key influential work was 
originated by Angela McRobbie in the late 1970's.5 Her pioneering work, Jackie: An 
Ideology of Adolescent Femininity (1978), analyzes anjllternal structuring and 
signifying system of the text as a bearer of the ideology of adolescent femininity. 
McRobbie argues that Jackie, through a unified system of connoting codes of 
romance, persona1Jdomestic life, fashionlbeauty and pop music, shapes teenage girls 
into a claustrophobic mould of feminine knowledge which is predicated upon future 
roles as ''wives and mothers". The text asserts a kind of false unity that assumes a 
common experience of womanhood or girlhood, and teenage girls are subjected to an 
explicit attempt to win consent to the dominant order in terms of femininity, leisure 
and consumption, at the level of culture. A similar argument is raised in Janice 
Winship'S work, A Woman's World: Woman - an Ideology of Femininity (1978). 
Drawing upon Althusser's theory of ideology and Marxist critique of commodity 
capitalism, Winship also perceives women's magazines as the work of ideology 
organized through an imaginary relation wherein it produces false consciousness. She 
argues that this ideological production constructs a feminine subjectivity of 
"motherhood" as a universal female experience and champions the needs of the 
patriarchal and capitalist structure. 6 
Underpinning both McRobbie's and Winship's works is the dominant 
ideology thesis with its assumed textual determinism - the relatively limitless and 
unmediated power of the text to influence a universal feminine subjectivity. Two 
empirical questions arise here. First, are girls/women audiences subjected to the 
ideology of femininity in the preferred way as the dominant discourse hails or 
interpellates them as wives and mothers? As McRobbie (1991: 131) later states, 
"Until we have a much clearer idea of how girls read Jackie and encounter its 
ideological force, our analysis remains one-sided". Second, given the pessimism of 
the ideology thesis premised on the imaginary relation and false consciousness, how 
can we explain the apparently simple fact of pleasure in the women's reading of 
popular media? Does the notion of pleasure not have any significance beyond it?? 
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Among the early feminist studies on advertising, perhaps the most 
sophisticated and complicated use of the theories of ideology is Judith Williamson's 
analysis, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (1978). 
Incorporating Marx's idea of commodity fetishism and structuralist semiology 
(Saussure, Barthes and Levi-Strauss), Williamson deconstructs the ideological process 
wherein objects acquire symbolic, cultural exchange value by creating structures of 
meaning capable of transforming the language of objects to that of people, and in so 
operating, advertising functions not only to sell products but also to perpetuate social, 
political and economic ideology of capitalism. As advertisement images translate the 
world of objects (e.g. diamond) into human statements (e.g. eternal love) through the 
exchangeable partnership in signification and interpellate us as a certain kind of 
person, the structures of meaning establish an individual identity. Williamson thus 
argues that the ideology of advertising is selling us something else besides 
commodities, it is selling us ourselves - an imaginary and false sense of real selves. 
However sophisticated, Williamsop's decontextualized analysis is based on the 
\:!t/~ 
assumption that all meaning i~ "in" the text - in the mythology of the signifier and the 
structure of signs - and the text solely determines the meaning of advertisements. It 
shows ~~'dictiollaryJ~l1acy~ (Pateman, 1983) whereby we audiences are not invited to 
interpret the meaning of advertisements, but only advertisements enter us to mean. 
Crucially, Williamson's textual analysis of ideology to the exclusion of socio-
cultural contexts runs the risk of reproducing deterministic and universal claims. Her 
conception of femininity is monolithic, gendered and fixed, transcultural and even 
Eurocentric. Here are specific examples. First, Williamson analyzes that the meaning 
of Chanel No.5 perfume is based on what the face of Catherine Deneuve means to us, 
and Chanel only has the meaning that it shares with Deneuve signifying "glamour and 
beauty" as a fait accompli (1978: 25). However, for those outside Europe (e.g. Asian 
women) who hold no prior knowledge or familiarity with Catherine Deneuve or who 
possess a different set of aesthetic criteria, this signifier of French glamour and beauty 
may mean something different or even something meaningless to them. Second, in 
another advertisement Williamson analyzes a female picture with the meaning "as a 
woman", who wears a slinky blouse with her lips parted invitingly and her facial 
expression geared to a male spectator (p. 58-59), hence, the femininity signifies 
precisely "sexiness". However, this image of sexiness embedded in the sexually-
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oriented Western culture may not be taken up in the same way by those women who 
have socially, culturally acquired in their construction of femininity more principled 
and repressed notions of female sexuality and more rigid standards of sexual morality. 
Is sexiness a transcultural, universal meaning of femininity? Finally, Williamson's 
semiological textuality based on the dichotomous hegemony of gender does not 
permit female spectatorship and pleasure: "Her dress is unbuttoned provocatively, 
indicating beyond doubt that the invisible character is male ... She is doomed to see 
herself through his eyes" (p. 80). It raises a question, whether and how are female 
spectatorship and female pleasure conceivable? 
The question of pleasure was a key object of feminist film studies within 
psychoanalytic frameworks. Laura Mulvey's influential essay, Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema (1975), conceptualizes the ways in which gender identity and 
pleasure are constructed in the film texts. From a feminist viewpoint, Mulvey 
conceives the pre-existing phallocentric order as a root of women's oppression, and 
the use of psychoanalytic theory as a political weapon to demonstrate the way the 
unconscious of patriarchal ideology has structured visual pleasure. Conditions of 
screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of looking in on a 
private world, both producing a sense of playing on their voyeuristic fantasy and 
allowing them to identify with powerful ego ideals produced on the screen. In a world 
ordered by sexual imbalance, however, pleasure in looking has been split between 
active/male/look-at-ness and passive/female/to-be-looked-at-ness, argues Mulvey. 
The active male protagonist becomes the ego ideal with whom the (male) spectator 
can identify, while the passive image of the female figure functions as an erotic object 
for the gaze of the active (male) spectator. It is thus inferred that female spectatorship 
and pleasure are inconceivable within the theoretical order of patriarchal ideology.8 
Two problems arise here. First, early feminist film studies, like Mulvey's, 
focused too excessively on the male psyche and pleasure and left little room for 
theorizing female spectatorship and pleasure. Are female voyeuristic fantasy and 
identification structurally impossible? Can a female not look at a male figure as an 
erotic object and take up an active spectator position? According to Mary Ann Doane 
(1982), this reversal remains locked within the same logic: For example, a male 
striptease or a gigolo signifies an "aberration" whose acknowledgement simply 
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reinforces the dommant system of sexual difference, and identification with the active 
hero entails ''masculinization'' of spectatorship. Second, even if active female 
protagonists are made to control the cinematic fantasy one question still remains. 
Would women spectators in different socio-cultural contexts (e.g. race, class, 
individual history, sexuality) identify with, and derive the same sort of pleasure from 
the White images of femininity prevalent in Anglo-American film? 
Feminist film studies importantly draw attention to the notion of pleasure, 
nonetheless, they tend to be essentialist. Prior to the workings of socio-cultural 
determinants, the experience of visual pleasure and identification is already doomed 
to be predetermined according to gender difference - the binary oppositions between 
male and female, activity and passivity, masculinity and femininity. The ahistorical, 
universal, deterministic and powerless perception of female subject/spectator/pleasure 
is a common tendency of the early feminist approach to the text-based analyses of 
women's magazines, advertising and film.9 Femmist textual analyses had the 
proclivity to explain how mass-mediated cultural forms work to audiences, who were 
assumed as textual subjects, positioned in and produced by the text. But where is the 
evidence?lO A significant shift away from the preoccupation with media texts as sole 
producers of meaning for audiences was marked by the emergence of television 
audience studies in the early 1980's. 
Theoretical inception 
There was not any intensive feminist work on television until the early 1980's both in 
Britain and America as television cultural studies had difficulty in being accepted as a 
legitimate academic subject, whereas film was able to gain such acceptance through 
its claims to be "art" (Kaplan, 1992). The status of television programming, especially 
soap operas popular among women audiences, was perceived as the very epitome of 
low culture and received with disdain by the popular press and "serious" academics. 
"Given the antipathy of most literary critics to mass culture in general, television 
more specifically, and soap operas in particular, it is hardly surprising that it was not 
until the 1980's that soap operas began to be taken seriously as texts" (Allen, 1995: 
6). Throughout the 1970's feminist scholars made significant advances on theorizing 
film, but involved relatively little with critical writings on television. The lack of 
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intellectual enthusiasm was in part due to the condition that ''the low academic 
standing of television, together with the frequent disregard in which American 
programming was held, made women - who already had a difficult time getting ahead 
in academic humanities departments - reluctant to engage with the form" (Kaplan, 
1992: 249). However, in the wake of the maturation of film studies in the early 1980's 
female film scholars pioneered critical analyses of popular women's television 
programs such as soap operas, and feminist television audience studies fmally 
burgeoned within film and British cultural studies tradition. 
Tania Modleski's (1979) pioneering work Loving with a Vengeance is not an 
audience-focused analysis, but I consider it as a starting point because her insightful 
dissection ofthe textual inscription of a female subject/spectator in American daytime 
soap operas triggers curious questions for feminist audience research. Contrary to the 
classic Hollywood film analyses which essentially privilege masculine desire and 
pleasure (Mulvey, 1975), Modleski argues that soap operas construct woman-oriented 
narrative and pleasure. The narrative patterns and structures of soaps neatly accord 
with the rhythms of women's domestic work as an endless sequence of repetition and 
interruption, and the soaps' preoccupation with female skills in dealing with private 
and familial matters is meshed with the qualities placed upon women within 
patriarchal capitalism. The soaps' multiple narrative structure demands multiple 
identification on the part of the viewer, and thus constitutes the viewer as "ideal 
mother, who possesses greater wisdom than all her children, whose sympathy is large 
enough to encompass the conflicting claims of her family (she identifies with them 
all), and who has no demands or claims of her own" (1979: 92). 
However, Modleski's conception of ideal mother as a textually inscribed 
position, does not assume or open up any possibilities for a variety of reader 
responses. The assumption of the all-powerful text and the creation of feminine 
passivity disregard the ways in which the text could be interpreted differently by 
different socio-economic categories of women in broader ideological frameworks. For 
example, the spectator position as ideal mother may imply the image of a (White) 
middle-class married woman, to whom the daytime domestic life can be exquisitely or 
idly pleasurable in line of expectation and waiting "whether for her phone to ring, for 
the baby to take its nap, or for the family to be reunited shortly" (1979: 88). Would 
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the actual audiences, such as working-class single mothers, necessarily take up this 
position constructed by the text? Who would be likely to accept the intended textual 
meaning and who would not? Can the soap text not be enjoyable to women other than 
housewives and mothers? As Modleski argues, if soaps position their female readers 
differently than male-oriented texts and deliver different pleasures and meanings, then 
specifically what would be those "different" pleasures and meanings experienced by 
women audiences? As Modleski's inspiring work stimulates curious theoretical and 
empirical questions, I take it as a point of departure toward feminist television 
audience studies. 
Extending Modleski's notion of ideal mother, Charlotte Brunsdon further 
develops the conception of female audience in her extra-textual analysis of British 
soap opera Crossroads (1981, reprinted in 1997). Brunsdon emphasizes the notion of 
competencies by arguing that the soap text foregrounds the traditionally feminine 
competencies associated with the responsibility for managing the sphere of personal 
life, so in order to experience pleasure from the radical discontinuities of the text, 
female viewers are demanded to engage extensively with the text and have 
competencies to make sense of it. Such competencies are not biologically pre-given, 
but women are socially constructed to possess such skills through inscription in the 
ideological and moral frameworks, the rules, of romance, marriage and family life 
(1997: 17-18). However, some questions can be posed regarding the working of 
competencies in the actual viewing context. Do women audiences necessarily need 
the competencies to derive pleasure? Can soap opera viewing not be pleasurable 
without exercising the competencies (e.g. the uneducated, distracted female or male, 
first-time viewers)? To what extent are the competencies and viewing pleasure related 
with each other? The operational defmition of competencies is uncertain and needs to 
be further investigated. 
Like Modleski, Brunsdon also recognizes the text's ideological construction of 
subject positions, however, her underlying argument about the text-audience relation 
is dramatically different in that the only possible positions inscribed by the text may 
not be occupied straight, since female viewers or "social audience" (Kuhn, 1984) use 
skills and competencies in the extensive engagement with the text and have a 
potential to produce their own meanings, including differential and resistive ones. 
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"We can usefully analyze the 'you' or 'yous' that the text as discourse 
constructs, but we cannot assume that any individual audience member will 
necessarily occupy these positions. The relation ofthe audience to the text will 
be determined not solely by that text but also by positionalities in relation to a 
whole range of other discourses - discourses of motherhood, romance and 
sexuality for example". (Bruns don, 1997: 13) 
In Brunsdon's argument, several advances can be found on the perceptions of women 
as audiences: Audiences are not in an isolated relationship with one text; audiences in 
different social and discursive positions may have acquired different extra-textual 
skills; each audience occupies a different subject position in a different social context; 
and audiences may interpret the text differently as their referential discourses change 
over time. These theoretical advances allow a better understanding of the audiences' 
relationship to the text which is not fixed and definitive, but conditioned upon their 
different socio-cultural contexts. Contrary to Modleski's textual determinism (film 
theory), Brunsdon recognizes the significance of the inter-discursive character of 
audience interpretation (British cultural studies). 
Empirical collaborations 
Since the early 1980's there has been an increasing interest and development in 
feminist approaches to television audiences, and this would have been impossible 
without earlier researchers' endeavors. "Research is always collaborative, always 
cumulative: an understanding of prior arguments is essential in order to comprehend 
new ones" (Kaplan, 1992: 250). It is precisely in this intent that I will attempt to 
identify collective weaknesses and limitations of existing research for the coming new 
fellows to further complement, augment and "empower" knowledge of feminist 
audience studies. Before doing this, I will first highlight the existing works' 
conceptions of women audiences, their main arguments and unique contributions to 
feminist television scholarship. 
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The frrst feminist qualitative study on television audiences was conducted by 
Dorothy Hobson (1982) who investigated the production and consumption of the soap 
opera Crossroads in Britain. Although her work covers more about the institutional 
conditions of program production than about audience interpretations, I nonetheless 
fmd Hobson's empirical audience research useful to test the theories proposed by 
Mod1eski and Brunsdon. Similar to Mod1eski's analysis, Hobson's study demonstrates 
that women's domestic work is closely intertwined with soap opera viewing and the 
women audiences incorporate enjoyment of the program into their hectic household 
activities by creating space to follow the soap narrative. However, contrary to 
Mod1eski's textual determinism, Hobson's women audiences "do not sit there 
watching and taking it all in without any mental activity or creativity" (1982: 135). 
Hobson argues that the women audiences are not passive recipients of the program 
but active creators of the text, to the extent that "they strip the storyline to the idea 
behind it and construct an understanding on the skeleton that is left" (p. 136). 
Consistent with Brunsdon's argument, Hobson's women viewers bring their 
knowledge and competencies to augment the text: ''Viewers are critical, in that the 
viewers possess a level of knowledge about the storylines, the sets and the characters 
which few professional critics would be able to match" (1982: 126), and "viewers 
have a remarkable amount of knowledge of what has happened in the serial and make 
judgements about it" (p. 129). However, Hobson's empirical study reveals that the 
extensive engagement with the text is not a necessary precondition for deriving 
pleasure from viewing Crossroads. Clearly, even though the women audiences -
housewives and young mothers in this case - cannot give the program their full 
attention due to their domestic chi1dcare roles, they can still enjoy it. l1 The original 
contribution of Hobson's study lies precisely in the accentuation of the domestic 
"dynamics" of women audiences, who are not to be delicately examined in a tranquil 
academic setting, but are unpredictable, fragmented in the frantic domestic context. 
Despite the distracted environment, women audiences still make their own meanings, 
as Hobson argues that "there are as many different Crossroads as there are viewers" 
(p. 136). The detailed exploration about those meanings and pleasures is, however, 
largely absent in Hobson's work. 
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The exploration of the complicated nature of pleasures in popular serial 
viewing was the focus ofIen Ang's work Watching Dallas (1985). Her research data 
are forty-two letters from Dutch Dallas viewers solicited through an advertisement in 
a woman's magazine, hence there is no referential contexts about those audiences 
except for their names and addresses. Despite the material absence of the actual 
viewing contexts, Ang's symptomatic reading of the women letter-writers elicits a 
perspective challenging the widely-held derogatory belief that women are unable to 
distinguish soap opera fiction from real life. A unique strength of Ang's analysis is 
found in the identification of women audiences as not simply being nestled in fantasy 
or escape, but being caught in complexity, contradiction and ambivalence. Such 
verbatims as ''real'', ''realistic'' and "taken from life" are surprisingly mentioned by 
many women audiences in their viewing of the extravagant and glamorous Dallas, 
because they perceive the stories and judge the characters not in terms of empirical 
realism but in terms of "emotional realism", as Ang argues that "what is recognized as 
real is not knowledge of the world, but a subjective experience of the world" (1985: 
45). 
Contrary to the "false consciousness" thesis, Ang argues that women are 
critical enough to discern the symbolic pleasures of soaps at an emotional level from 
the circumstances of real life at an empirical level, thereby they derive quite complex 
emotional pleasures. For example, some women audiences do not always associate 
with the inscribed subject positions but constantly alternate identification with the 
text, or distance from it, depending upon the negotiation of multiple tensions; other 
women audiences do not enjoy Dallas at all but take ironic and contradictory 
pleasures in watching the program in order to condemn and ridicule it (1985: 96-102). 
According to Ang's symptomatic analysis, women audiences' contradictory position 
between recognizing the dominant ideology of mass culture and at the same time 
experiencing pleasure from it is resolved in an ingenious manner through employing 
mockery or satire, which is an ironical and ambivalent sense of subversion. 
Women audiences' subversive readings of dominant ideology may suggest a 
progressive potential to feminist socio-political activities, and some enthusiasts of 
(post)modern subcultures studies put forward such an ambitious claim that the 
pleasure of television viewing often comes from resisting dominant ideology, from 
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defining one's self or one's subculture as different, and in this sense television 
reinforces the power to be different and therefore, the possibility for change (Fiske, 
1989). However, such liberating discussion on the politics of pleasure and the 
possibility for change has no substantial foundation on empirical evidence. It is 
fraught with an overly optimistic assumption that women audiences are fully 
autonomous, critical and competent in constructing their own meanings. Empirical 
evidence for the women's critical ability to contest dominant ideology is still very 
sparse. Oppositional and negotiated readings require more work and competencies of 
viewers than do dominant readings, so the likelihood of these types of decodings can 
be more difficult and less common (Budd, Entman and Steinman, 1990).12 Here arise 
some sociological questions. Who is likely to accept most elements of dominant 
ideology, while who is likely to resist it? How do women in different socio-economic 
positions interpret television? For example, are there any significant differences in 
interpretation by working-class women and middle-class women, or by an older 
generation of women and a younger generation of women? Do their critical readings 
or resistive pleasures, if any, go beyond the text and spill into the fabric of everyday 
life? Women audiences may not be passive, but it is equally important for feminist 
researchers to be cautious, rather than holding a romantic faith, that women may not 
be necessarily critical readers against the society's dominant ideology. In the absence 
of concrete evidence about the ways in which women's actual readings take place in 
the ongoing social life, the political implications of semiotic resistive pleasure remain 
abstract. 
The actual process of reading in the ongoing social life of women was 
accentuated in Janice Radway's work Reading the Romance (1987) in America. 
Although this is not about television audiences, I want to include it here because 
Radway's conceptual transfonnation deserves close attention, and the consequent 
progress from that flexibility has enabled her to produce, in my view, the most 
extensive work among existing feminist empirical studies. Coming from a literary 
criticism background, Radway originally conceived of reading in a limited fashion as 
differential interpretation of texts, but her field research infonnants "surprised" and 
taught her by repeatedly talking about the meaning of their romance reading as a 
social event in the familial context. This accidental discovery transfonned Radway to 
develop the conception of women readers as individual, social and cultural entities 
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(1987: 7), which eventually came closer to the perspectives of the British television 
studies by Brunsdon and Hobson. 
Radway's women readers - predominantly middle-class wives and mothers -
view their act of reading as a declaration of independence that claims time and space 
away from their primary roles as family caregivers.13 Women's reading pleasure can 
be seen as a hidden protest against the dominant structures of everyday life, but at the 
same time, as Radway argues, fulfillment through heterosexual romance eventually 
restores women back to the patriarchal status quo. Radway made a significant 
contribution in terms ofperceiving the women readers as situated in the actual social 
processes of reading activity. However, I still view her study incomplete because the 
romance phenomena concerned are generally analyzed without considering in a 
detailed way the everyday real-life conditions under which the romance is received. In 
other words, there are not detailed descriptions on the women's real-life relationships 
with their husbands and children which indeed are closely interrelated with their 
pursuit of pleasure in the romance reading. Her study offers no vivid picture about the 
women's actual domestic lives as an important context within which the specific 
meanings and role ofthe women's reading pleasure can be better understood. 14 
How is women's reading pleasure related to their actual domestic lives and 
family relationships? Some adequate insight can be gained from Ann Gray's (1987) 
research on women watching VCR together. The useful perspective which Gray 
contributed to feminist audience scholarship is the conception of women audiences in 
relation to the domestic gender-power issues. Her study shows the impact of domestic 
power relation on women's viewing pleasure in that men (husbands and sons) 
downgrade the kinds of films and soap operas pleasurable to women, and drive these 
women to consume the programs in secret or with other women during the day when 
men are out of the house. Gray's research is similar to David Morley's (1986) which 
focuses on the effectiveness of gender as an influence on viewing behavior. Morley 
explains that women seldom have control over the television set to view their favorite 
programs, such as "nice weepies", so they can only feel free to indulge in viewing 
when the rest of the family is not there. Gray argues that women's viewing together 
"forms an important part of their friendship and association in their everyday lives 
and gives a focus to an almost separate female culture which they can share together 
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within the constraints of their positions as wives and mothers" (1987: 49). Gray 
importantly recognizes the women audiences as situated in social and familial 
contexts, however, her women audiences are homogeneous - housewives and mothers 
with school age children, presumably of middle-class. This is the typical sample 
considered in feminist audience studies. Then, how do women in a different social 
position and different domestic environment construct meanings? 
Having realized the academics' tendency to study predominantly middle-class 
audiences, Ellen Seiter et at (1989) focused on how working-class women (albeit all 
White) engage with television programs in the twenty-six interviews with American 
viewers. Rather than limiting the audience choice to the specific shows (e.g. 
Crossroads, Dallas) for the research ends, Seiter et at took a more ''real-life'' 
approach by allowing the audiences to determine the texts from their own 
perspectives and by focusing on meaning negotiations generated through an entire 
genre of television programming. By testing Modleski's theory that the pleasure of 
watching soap opera comes from viewers' internal contestation between sympathy for 
the ideal mother character and the villainess as an outlet for feminine anger (1979: 
97), Seiter et at reveal that this ideal mother position is consciously resisted and 
vehemently rejected by the working-class women. Working-class women audiences 
criticize the ideal mother character for her powerless suffering despite her middle-
class privileges; on the contrary, they express pleasure in watching powerful female 
characters who attempt to transgress, subvert or destroy the dominant patriarchal 
ideology of television texts (1989: 237-240). 
Women's class position was also a central focus of Andrea Press's (1991) 
research on American viewers of the prime-time serial Dynasty. Yet her conclusion 
reveals a difference from Seiter et aI's in that working-class women are non-critical as 
they speak mostly about similarities and very little about differences between the 
show characters and themselves, whereas middle-class women often adopt a critical 
viewing style by questioning the morality of the upper-class wealthy characters. 
Besides the class variable, Press also examined generational differences between 
older women over the age of sixty and young women under the age of twenty-nine, 
although her comparison was based on the unbalanced sample size; six older women 
and twenty-three young women (p. 208). In comparing the cultural meaning of 
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television reception, Press suggests that older women respond more positively to the 
images of women at the workplace because their own experience in non-traditional 
careers has been limited; on the contrary, young women exhibit a sharply emotional 
response to television's idealized family images due to their relative lack of real1ife 
experience in the happy family. Press's work is unique in terms of analyzing the 
women's different reception of television determined by the sociological differences 
of class and generation. However, Press confessed that "some interviews yielded little 
information of value for the study, unfortunately, in part because of the open ended 
format I used" (p. 180). This confession reveals a problematic issue in doing 
qualitative research. lithe real data were poor, what was the basis of her analysis? 
So far, the existing studies have mainly perceived women audiences within the 
domestic, immediate viewing context. Dorothy Hobson's (1989, 1990) later projects, 
however, recognize the trajectory of television talk from the domestic to a social set 
of workplace. She documents the ways in which British soap opera viewers take 
pleasures in collaborative readings of the television text with colleagues and bring 
their interests of the private sphere into the public domain. Women audiences 
interweave the narratives of programs with their own lives and interests, and the lives 
of their families and friends, and in so doing "form the basis for sharing their 
experiences and opinions and creating their own culture within their workplace" 
(1990: 71). In a similar vein, Mary Ellen Brown (1990, 1994) theoretically conceives 
of women's soap opera gossip network as a locus of empowerment where women can 
fully discuss their own personal and social issues, express their own brand of 
pleasure, and resist aesthetic hierarchies affected by male domination. Brown argues 
that the gossip network provides the social support to carry out women's issues in 
practice, therefore, "politics can be reconceptualized on the level of culture where 
soap opera gossip networks can be thought of as not only political but perhaps even 
subversive" (1994: 171). 
Here, I want to emphasize a potentially significant role of "TV talk" which is 
an important insight gained from Hobson's and Brown's works. TV talk can be a 
crucial forum for experimentation with identities as it is possible to say things in TV 
talk which would be otherwise difficult or embarrassing (Gillespie, 1995). I assume it 
highly plausible that women's talk about television content can serve as unique 
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resources for the "reflexive" exploration of women's central preoccupations that 
intimately concern their lives. Crucially, women's TV talk can reveal clues about 
which meanings in the television texts are being mobilized in their everyday lives. 
However, I want to equally emphasize that theorizing coherently the issues of whether 
and how TV talk has a liberating political potential for women, not simply at the 
spontaneous and fleeting "gossip" moment but in the substantial and sustainable 
terms, must entail more than sporadic anecdotal evidence. "The relations between 
textual experience, social experience, and subjectivity are perhaps the most 
methodologically inaccessible; but theoretically and politically, they are among the 
most important of all", argues John Fiske (1989: 67). To be precise, is it 
methodologically daunting, or is it due to the academic researchers' disposition to 
imagination and lack of experimentalism to engage closely with "ordinary" people 
outside in a real world? 
Limitations 
The existing feminist audience studies have crucially failed to approximate the day-
to-day lived experiences of audiences and to provide the kind of vibrant knowledge 
for understanding the complex phenomena and specifities of women audiencehood 
embedded in a broader social context. A substantial limitation in the conceptual 
frameworks of feminist audience studies is, if I adopt Roger Silverstone's terms, "an 
absence of a sense of the individual as located within a political, economic and 
ideological world which is neither necessarily visible, nor expressed in daily patterns 
of interaction" (1994: 145). Much of the existing research has tended to neglect what 
Silverstone (1990: 174) calls "the embedded audience", or similarly what John 
Thompson (1995: 38-39) describes as a "situated, mundane character of receptive 
activity", a routine, practical activity which individuals carry out as an integral part of 
their everyday lives in social-historical contexts. The neglect of the social contexts 
within which women live out their everyday lives, therefore, the substantial absence 
of integrative frameworks on the embedded audiencehood, is a crucial limitation that 
can be found throughout the history of feminist television audience studies. 
Reviewing throughout the feminist approaches to ''women as audiences", I reach the 
conclusion that there are not explicit and detailed descriptions on the ways in which 
women's particular social positions and experiences intersect with their construction 
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of meanings from television viewing in the course of everyday life, and the ways in 
which women's viewing pleasures are further dispersed into the fabric of everyday 
lives and practices. In other words, none of the exemplary feminist researchers have 
adequately and comprehensively explored how the process of making sense of and 
taking pleasure from television intersects with women's particular socio-cultural and 
historical conditions, and whether and how viewing pleasure is integrated into the 
shaping and re-creation of women's lives and identities. Existing feminist audience 
studies have collectively failed to explain the nature of women's relationships to 
television embedded in the social context of everyday life. 
In my view, part of the reasons for that failure and limitation can be ascribed 
to the original purpose of the audience studies tradition. Early feminist studies on 
women audiences predominantly focused on uncovering the kinds of different 
pleasures and meanings that women derived from the immediate viewing of popular 
gynocentric forms, and were sympathetically concerned with validating the notion of 
women's pleasure which had been largely scorned, trivialized and neglected in a 
mainstream. In a strict sense, the departing point of feminist audience research was 
not from women (audiences) as diverse and unique individuals, but from popular 
genres (e.g. soap opera, romance fiction) or programs (e.g. Crossroads, Dallas, 
Dynasty) overwhelmingly pleasurable to women. Such tendencies directed the focus 
of feminist audience research to lean towards understanding the reasons for the 
popularity of those forms and the pleasurable or unpleasurable characteristics of the 
texts, simply through borrowing the voices of women audiences. "I hoped that they 
[women audiences] would indicate the reasons for the popularity of the program 
[Crossroads] and also areas where they may have been critical" (Hobson, 1982: 105). 
Ang's main inquiry was ''why do people watch Dallas? What are the characteristics 
of Dallas that organize the viewer's pleasure?" (1985: 9). Radway's goal was that "in 
order to understand why romances are selling so well, we must know what romance 
readers make of the words they fmd on the page" (1987: 11). More recent audience 
research carried out by Lyn Thomas (1995) also centered on a highly successful 
British television series Inspector Morse, and female and male fan cultures 
surrounding it. The enormous commercial success of particular television texts and 
the feminist concern with ordinary women's pleasure initially sparked feminist 
researchers to unveil a variety of pleasures and meanings that women audiences 
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constructed straight from the popular texts. Yet their research quest did not extend 
further to embrace the fine-grained intricacies of women audiencehood in relation to 
the broader social context of their lives. 
This crucial limitation leads me to question the politics of feminist research 
and viability of existing knowledge. What are the ultimate goals of feminist 
approaches to women audiences? What has been gained in our knowledge of the 
phenomena feminist audience studies claim to explain? Who would eventually benefit 
from such inquires as to why this particular television genre or program is popular 
among female viewers and what kinds of pleasures or displeasures are experienced by 
the primary audiences? How can this type of knowledge be beneficial on behalf of 
"ordinary" women or various feminist groups? Or would this type of academic 
research more serve the needs of the media institutions which produce those popular 
programs and plan new clones? In the media institutions' point of view, feminist 
qualitative studies on women audiences may be received as value-added, free and 
fuller information that can complement their quantitative audience demographics. In 
this way, academic feminist audience research runs the risk of being perceived as 
complicit with the television media institutions and as colonized by the influence of 
their institutional point of view about audiences. I5 
To avoid such risk, it seems necessary for academic audience researchers to go 
back to the fundamental question: What is an audience? What are the conditions to be 
adequately defmed as an audience? The term "audience(s)" should not be taken as a 
conceptually unproblematic and self-evident category. The original usage of the word 
"audience" was referred to an individual act of hearing in face-to-face verbal 
communication where a producer and a receiver of sound were co-present in a shared 
physical space. This term was later adopted by the electronic media as an aggregate 
label for their consumers who are geographically dispersed and embedded in 
multifaceted settings. The boundaries and conditions of audiences become infinite, 
unstable, and as a consequence, the task of defining audiences is conceptually 
insuperable if not impossible. Then, how have we come to accept and use this elusive 
and inexplicable concept so naturally in the modern society? John Hartley (1987) 
argues that the term "audiences" is the invisible fiction produced by institutional 
systems for imaging the unimaginable and for controlling the uncontrollable: 
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"Audiences are not just constructs; they are the invisible fictions that are 
produced institutionally in order for various institutions to take charge of the 
mechanisms of their own survival. Audiences may be imagined empirically, 
theoretically or politically, but in all cases the product is a fiction that serves 
the needs of the imagining institution. In no case is the audience 'real', or 
external to its discursive construction". (Hartley, 1987: 125) 
The concept of audiences has been a keen interest of television media institutions, and 
constructed from their institutional point of view in imagining the existence of such 
identifiable objects. However, the reason I am quoting Hartley's provocative 
statement is not to advocate helpless or cynical rejection of the phantom concept of 
audiences, but to foreground the latent admonition; to pose critical questions about the 
institutional views of audiences to the academic researchers who attempt to 
investigate women audiences for their own specific purposes. Against the institutional 
point of view which constrains and sets limits to the substance of knowledge about 
audiences, as len Ang (1991) later encourages, what we need are ethnographic 
understandings of the social world of dynamic audiencehood enacted by women in 
their everyday lives, their multifarious experiences, and the complexity of the social, 
cultural and historical practices. I intend to propose that the essence of women 
audiencehood in everyday life is to be a key search in feminist television audience 
studies. Are feminist studies also limiting the pursuit of knowledge about women 
audiences? How significantly are their conceptions about women audiences different 
from the television institution' point of view? What does the existing body of feminist 
knowledge tell about the fine-grained intricacies of women audiencehood in their 
everyday lives? 
Since the early 1980's feminist audience studies have sympathetically 
attempted to recognize the existence of women's invisible subcultures and make them 
a legitimate part of history, yet pressing questions have remained unresolved. How 
can academic audience studies contribute in favor of overarching feminist issues and 
movements? If the feminist quest is centered around the immediate television-
audience viewing contexts, what is the significance of understanding women's 
semiotic pleasure right off from the popular texts? What relevance can such 
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understandings have outside the epistemological realm of feminist scholarship, and 
how can we effectively pursue the political and cultural meanings based on the 
existing understandings of "plausibly but relatively impotent transcendent pleasure" 
(Silverstone, 1994: 146) that women in a patriarchal society derive from popular 
culture? Or is each notion of "popular pleasure" and "feminist politics" non-related, 
mutually exclusive?16 How can audience studies be more adequately related to 
feminist politics? In short, how can existing knowledge contribute not only 
epistemologically, but also crucially, politically? 
I suggest that if we are interested in the way in which the politics of pleasure 
operates, then we must go out and scrutinize any possibilities of the workings of 
pleasure in the alive, contested, day-to-day context within which women struggle to 
craft their lives and identities. Without evidence, talking about the politics of pleasure 
around an academic table is purely theoretical. Feminist audience research needs to 
critically examine whether and how these symbolic, semiotic pleasures are being 
released, mobilized and even perpetuated in the specific social contexts within which 
women live out their everyday lives, and equally importantly what kinds of 
contradictions, tensions and negotiations that women in particular social positions 
experience when trying out oppositional, subversive meanings against dominant 
ideology. This appears to me to be the key task scarcely tackled by the prior feminist 
audience research, hence left for new inquisitive fellows. Judging from the historical 
assessment of feminist audience studies, I argue that what is fundamentally missing is 
a detailed and dauntless empirical engagement with the dynamic specificities of 
audiencehood enacted by different, individual womans in their social contexts of 
everyday lives. 17 
Unfortunately however, the neglect of women of color and differences has been a 
pronounced tendency throughout the history of the Western feminist scholarship's 
monolithic perceptions ofwomen as audiences. The definition of women as audiences 
assumed by prior feminist researchers is homogeneous, domestically confined and 
even "claustrophobic" (Nightingale, 1990: 28) like the television institution's view of 
audiences, which means "women as housewives and mothers". The women audiences 
included within the imagination of Western academic researchers are predominantly 
"White middle-class housewives and mothers".18 Women of color are excluded, 
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almost non-existent as an empirical phenomenon. Are the White middle-class 
housewives and mothers presumed representative for women audiences, or is it due to 
the researchers' complacent disposition to contact easily available samples within 
their imaginable scope? I would dare to infer that such claustrophobic perception may 
be a cumulative net result of the ivory-tower researchers' lack of experimentalism to 
engage closely with ordinary people outside in a wider world. The failure to contact 
women of color for the interviews is a serious limitation of the existing audience 
scholarship. I am thus tempted to question whether differences really matter to 
Western feminist (audience) knowledge, and if so, then why the exclusion of women 
of color happens as a normative research practice. All-White bias is not something 
that just happens, as Jacqueline Bobo and Ellen Seiter (1991) rightly criticize:19 
"In cultural studies work on audience, samples have tended overwhelmingly to 
be white. This fact deserves a closer look: it is too frequent an occurrence to 
be shunted aside or excused by the brief apologies which attribute white 
samples to limited funding or scope. It is not something that 'just happens', 
not simply a case of sampling error, nor of the failure of individual researchers 
to be sufficiently diligent in making contacts, although these are certainly 
factors that contribute to the problem". (Bobo and Seiter, 1991: 287) 
In searching for the essence of colorful women audiencehood socio-politically 
differentiated from the limited institutional knowledge, new feminist audience 
research should avoid the problematic assumption inherent in the existing studies that 
women (audiences) are one aggregate, universal category distinguished from men 
(audiences), hence, "gender" itself is a key sociological parameter that determines 
meanings and dynamics of women audiencehood. The existing audience studies' 
exclusive preoccupation with gender may have been historically affected, in my view, 
by the feminist movement's overall tendency to emphasize the "commonalities" of 
women's oppression against dominant male ideology, and this collective and strategic 
emphasis has resulted in the neglect of "differences" among women and their 
different relationships to television determined by other important sociological 
parameters. Feminist approaches to women audiences can be more effectively 
pursued by "employing the somewhat discredited discipline of sociology for the 
understanding of communication in particular socio-cultural contexts", as proposed by 
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David Morley (1989: 40). I would forcefully argue that it is important to consider a 
more sociological dimension and input - a limitation inherent in cultural studies. In 
conjunction with the sociological perspective, a more sensitive ethnographic 
approach, as importantly recognized and practiced by Marie Gillespie (1995), can 
provide detailed data about the micro-processes of women's everyday lives which are 
crucial to our understanding of the ways in which television impinges upon, and 
becomes integrated into, the lives of women. New feminist audience research, which 
intends to understand differences among women and their different social realities and 
relationships to television media, can benefit from an integrative framework drawn 
upon the more differentiated critical feminist scholarship, the sociological perspective 
and the ethnographic cultural approach. The conceptual framework integrating 
television media studies, critical feminist studies, sociology and cultural studies can 
allow us to expand the monolithic perception of women as audiences, to recognize 
differences among women as constructed through different socio-cultural and 
historical contexts, and to deliver the fine-grained intricacies of colorful women 
audiencehood as enacted in their everyday lives. 
Section (2) Korean Literature 
Dearth of research 
The penetration of television in South Korea is 99.9% and television occupies a high 
proportion of Koreans' everyday leisure life. On average, Koreans' everyday leisure 
time is estimated around 4 hours, among which television viewing occupies 3 hours 
and 12 minutes (KBI, 1996). This means that Koreans spend 4/5 of their leisure time 
on television consumption, hence, television is an integral part of everyday leisure 
life. Comparatively, more women than men, and lower-income families tend to rely 
on television as a main source of leisure enjoyment. According to Korean women's 
leisure patterns, media consumption at home constitutes the majority of leisure 
activities - watching television and video (52.3%), reading magazines or newspaper 
(10.7%), and listening to music (10.7%). On the contrary, women's out-of-home 
leisure is substantially low, as shown in their most favored activities such as mountain 
hiking (3.3%), movie/concert/art going (2.5%), and exercising (1.5%). In short, the 
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majority of Korean women have a "cocooned" home-centered leisure life, in which 
they consume television most of all. 
Despite the apparent phenomenon that television consumption is a major 
leisure activity among Korean women, there is a dearth of research on television 
media in relation to women audiences. Academic research on women and television 
in Korea emerged around the mid 1980's, but its focus has been largely limited to the 
analyses of television texts and production conditions. The most dominant research is 
a somewhat simplistic form of content analysis on the representations of women on 
television programs, including drama, advertising, and news. In-depth exploratory 
research on women and television is virtually hard to find, and audience reception 
studies from this qualitative approach are almost absent. Korean feminist television 
media studies have not taken a diversity of starting points when examining 
relationships between women and popular media culture. They have been mainly 
concerned with the issues of women's representations and women as creators, but 
failed to approach women as audiences. In short, the existing Korean television 
studies have not yet moved beyond textual and production analyses. Based on the 
limited existing literature, this section therefore attempts to draw a descriptive sketch 
on the relationship between women and television in South Korea. It will introduce 
the Korean television system, and describe the representation of women and two 
popular genres - Korean drama and Western movie - that are overwhelmingly 
enjoyed by women audiences. 
Korean television system 
Korean television has developed under the strong influence of the state, and the state 
is still a major force in media control today, although its power has gradually 
decreased with the emergence of big capital and the television companies' increasing 
dependence on advertising revenue (Park et al., 2000). Korean television has 
historically developed in symbiosis with the state's political power, representing its 
dominant ideology and ruling structures. Since the establishment of the Korean 
government in 1948, television has been actively appropriated as a propaganda tool 
for social integration and legitimization of the state power. In the post-war conditions, 
the imperative role of television was assumed to rebuild the nation. Since the early 
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1960's television has been used, in the guidance of the state's modernization policy, 
as an important educational tool for achieving rapid industrialization, economic 
growth, and modernization of everyday life. In this political context the Korean 
television system of public broadcasting service was established, operating under 
national principles. It was only in the late 1980's that the state's absolute control over 
television started to weaken, in the face of both the rising public voices for political 
liberalization and the strengthening of the monopolistic capital power and television 
fmance's inevitable attraction to advertising income. The Korean television system is 
primarily national, government-controlled, and fmanced through some combination of 
taxes, license fees and increasingly, advertising income (Jun and Kim, 1995). 
In 1991 when the government finally licensed commercial television 
companies, two major public broadcasting - KBS1 / KBS2, and MBC - started to 
contend with a newly introduced commercial channel SBS that covers the Seoul 
metropolitan area. Eight other commercial channels were launched throughout the 
nation between 1995 and 1997. Twenty-nine cable channels were launched in 1995, 
providing 24-hour services covering the vast global entertainment of movies, travel, 
music, sports, and home shopping. 44% of the total households of 11.5 millions in 
South Korea subscribe to the cable television services, and 4% are estimated to be 
equipped with satellite broadcasting facilities (KBI, 1994). Starting with the 
introduction of Japan's BS-2 satellite in 1989 and Hong Kong's Star TV in 1991, 
there are eight satellite channels including CNN and BBC (Won, 1993). Besides, 
there is a terrestrial broadcasting for the transmission of American popular culture, 
which is AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) launched in 1957 after the Korean 
War. 
Among all television networks mentioned above, three major Korean 
terrestrial broadcastings - KBS 1 / KBS2, MBC, and SBS - dominate the television 
market as they are overwhelmingly popular among Korean audiences. Although there 
exist many television channels in Korea, in terms of viewership, Korean television has 
been maintained by a small number of nationwide major networks, and an intense 
competition for ratings between the major networks has produced a supply of similar 
programs, thereby a homogenization and standardization of culture (Park et al., 2000). 
The major Korean television networks are largely conservative in their leanings 
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towards dominant ideology. Although the social role of television, especially public 
broadcasting, is expected to provide channels through which diverse groups can claim 
their status and identity, Korean television has not adequately represented the voices 
of different ideologies, including the voices of women. 
Representation of women 
The Korean television system is a male-centered organization, operating in an 
extremely traditional social environment without being strictly regulated by anti-
discrimination laws (Y ong-sang Park, 1987). In the absence of detailed investigation 
into the inner world of television, statistics alone show that the structure of human 
resources in the mass media is evidently male-powered. The ratio of men and women 
in the television companies is 88.2% (15,957) to 11.8% (2,131), and women's 
participation in the media-related governmental committee is minimal as only 5 seats 
out of the total 121 go to women (Hyo-seon Kim, 1997). A study on the status of 
female employees in three major television networks reveals that: (1) women make up 
8.3% of all employees in KBS, 9.8% in MBC, and 15.4% in SBS, (2) the percentage 
of female producers, reporters and announcers is 10.2%, but women are rarely 
positioned in the important sections dealing with political and economic issues, and 
(3) female staff in an executive position are almost nonexistent (He-yeong Lee, 1994). 
The age of female employees is heavily concentrated ''between 21 and 30", meaning 
that the professional sustainability of women in the television media is substantially 
low. This is mainly due to the women's demanding "dual role as a professional and 
housekeeper" (Y ong-sang Park, 1987),zo 
The male-centered institutional character of Korean television can be held 
partly responsible for the sexist content produced, as prime-time television dramas 
and commercials visibly demonstrate. Despite a changing trend in the women's social 
and economic position, images of television commercials present an extreme level of 
sexual and occupational stereotyping (Leung, 1995). Women are usually presented in 
the home as mother and homemaker and rarely portrayed as professionals and 
workers.21 This, however, does not mean that Korean men are usually depicted in 
occupational settings with non-domestic association. It is interesting to note that 
contemporary Korean commercials tend to present men, as obvious breadwinners, 
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more often at home than in the workplace. A possible explanation for this presentation 
is that Korean men increasingly fmd no time to fulfil their role as husband and father 
due to the long-working hours and consequently come to lose their position in the 
modern family, so the imaginary commercials project men's yearning to be at home 
with the family. This represents a small shift in contemporary commercials, but the 
traditional gender-role stereotyping has shown no significant change. 
The representative images of women in prime-time dramas have virtually not 
changed over the last decades. Common findings can be summed up as follows (Yoo-
jae Song, 1984, 1990; Yong-sang Park, 1987; Sun-nam Kim, 1997). First, women 
appear in far smaller numbers than men and their roles are not central enough to 
constitute an important factor in the story development. Second, contemporary 
television drama persistently revives the traditional gender-role image that paid work 
is for men and the proper place for women is in the home. Women are always shown 
chattering about personal and family affairs, and men engaging with non-personal 
social affairs. By depicting an ideal female image in the matrimonial context, 
television highly emphasizes the traditional female role of raising children and 
managing a household. Third, although more and more working women appear on 
television drama, their images are seriously distorted in the sense that unfeminine and 
selfish images of professional women are the nonn. Finally, male characters tend to 
be presented as reasonable, independent, strong and dominating, while female 
characters are portrayed as emotional, dependent, weak and obedient. The existing 
studies overall show that Korean television drama - the most popular genre among 
women audiences - continues to reproduce and reinforce the traditional female roles 
in the family context. 
Korean drama 
The most watched program genres by Korean audiences are news and drama (KBI, 
1994). According to 1-5 scale research, news (4.1) and Korean drama (3.7) are ranked 
as the most favored, followed by foreign movies (3.4) and sports (3.4), comedy (3.3), 
and variety shows and entertainment (3.1). Korean drama is most preferred by older 
women over their 50s, while foreign movies are overwhelmingly enjoyed by younger 
women in their 20s and teens. Korean drama has recorded the highest rating over the 
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seasons, yet why it is consistently achieving a phenomenal success has remained 
unexplored. The popularity of drama is reflected in the program allotment schemes by 
major television networks (KBI, 1999). Korean drama accounts for about 20% of all 
programs aired by major television channels, except for the public broadcasting 
channel KBS1 which prioritizes news (30%) and documentaries (14.5%). The 
proportion of drama goes far higher during the primetime, occupying 41.7% in MBC 
and 36.5% in SBS. 
<Program allotment (%) by major television networks: 1999> 
KBS1 KBS2 MBC SBS 
Drama 10.0 19.9 24.1 20.1 
News 30.0 8.7 23.4 12.1 
Variety show 6.6 12.4 11.3 13.6 
Living info. 10.0 12.3 7.0 16.2 
Sports 5.7 5.9 6.1 12.3 
Documentaries 14.5 10.0 5.4 4.0 
Movies 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.1 
The most popular and dominant type of television drama in Korea is the so-
called "home drama" or "family drama". Home/family drama was first introduced in 
the 1960's in the context of public enlightenment to educate and sustain the cultural 
significance of the home and family. In 1976 the Korean government intervened in 
the drama content and scheduling by specifically requiring that sound and healthy 
"home/family drama" should be aired for the entire family viewing in the prime time 
of 8:00pm (Choe and Yu, 1999). Home/family drama has been established as a 
leading genre in Korean television, with the intervention of the government politics 
and the growth of the national economy. The economic factors such as the growth of 
GNP and (female) consumer buying power and the increase of advertising revenue 
have contributed to the development of drama production. Even today, home/family 
drama is broadcast in the most prime time; at 8:30-9:00pm every weekday and at 
8:00-9:00pm every weekend, followed directly by the most watched 9:00 News. The 
nationwide popularity of the primetime home/family drama is overwhelming as its 
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remarkable rating of 50% testifies. The primetime drama is deemed most crucial by 
the major television networks because of its lead-in effect that influences the rating of 
the following 9:00 News. Therefore, Korean television networks are competitively 
attuned to the production of primetime drama. 
Besides home/family drama, another popular format of Korean drama is the 
so-called "mini-series drama". Since mini-series drama was first introduced by MBC 
in 1987, it has been enormously popular particularly among a younger group of 
women audiences (Hee-ae Kim, 1992). This new variation consists of 12-16 episodes, 
running for 2-3 months in the primetime after the 9:00 News. Unlike the home/family 
drama centering on the everyday domestic lives of housewives and mothers, mini-
series drama presents a variety of modem themes by introducing more and more 
working women and addressing women's changing roles and desires. A recent good 
example is a feminist voice raised by a lawyer character in The Last War.22 This small 
yet significant change in the themes of television drama has occurred only recently 
since the 1990's, with upcoming young women writers labeled as generation-X 
(ChungAng Ilbo, 17th September, 1999). Since the 1990's a younger generation of 
women writers in their late 20s and early 30s have started to lead Korean television 
drama. Nowadays, the percentage of women writers in television drama almost triples 
that of men writers, 75% to 25% respectively (Yoon-kyung Jung, 1998). Although 
men still make up 80% among the senior writers aged over 50, the total number of 
men writers has been dwindling, while that of women writers is steadily increasing as 
more and more educated young women are entering the field of drama writing. 
However, young women writers are not autonomous as their work conditions 
are heavily influenced by the control of senior male producers (Yoon-kyung Jung, 
1998). This implies that the overall orientation and content of drama are still 
determined by the dominant frame of patriarchal ideology. A more fundamental issue 
of control lies in the fact that both female writers and male producers of drama are 
influenced by the extremely competitive television networks' key concern with the 
audience rating and advertising revenue. Working under the tremendous pressure for 
the rating and the capitalist market principle, women writers are often requested to 
change the theme and content of drama in order to meet what the "general (women) 
audiences" want. Then, what do the general women audiences want? The answer is 
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found in the dominant proportion of romance drama and its phenomenal popularity. 
Recent good examples of popular romances are All About Eve and Legend of Love. 
Melodrama oflove and romance is still predominant, making up more than 80% of all 
dramas aired by major television networks (KBI, 1999). Despite the public criticism 
against romance drama for its lack of realism and perceived low-quality, it has been 
thriving, enjoyed overwhelmingly by women audiences. One study reveals that 40% 
of Korean women audiences criticize and ridicule romance drama, but at the same 
time they admit that they have not missed a single episode (Soon-sik Choi, 1996). Yet 
the question of why women continue to derive pleasure from romance drama has not 
been hitherto explored in Korean television studies.23 
Western movies 
Contemporary Korean television is a mixture of traditional and Western forms. The 
most popular Western form is movie, mostly American, which is favored particularly 
by young women in their 20s and teens (KBI, 1994). According to one early study 
(Hee-dong Kim, 1985) on the Korean university students' reception of an English 
speaking channel, the most watched Western programs are movies (34.5%), followed 
by variety shows and entertainment (18.8%), and their strongest motive for watching 
Western programs is ''to learn the English language" (42.5%). Today, more and more 
Korean young people routinely watch Western programs to satisfy mere curiosities in 
different cultures and to learn intemationallanguages (Woo-hyun Won, 1993). 
Korean cable channels depend heavily on imported American movies due to 
production cost. About 55% of all cable programs in Korea are imported, among 
which almost 80% come from the West; America (61.2%) and Europe (18.5%) (KBI, 
1996). Indiscriminate transmission of low-quality Western programs with the themes 
of sex and violence is pointed out as a key problem of Korean cable broadcasting 
(Gyu-yeop Lee, 1996). In contrast, the major television networks, KBS1 / KBS2, 
MBC, and SBS, are producing an increasing proportion of their own programs, hence, 
the percentage ofthe domestically-produced programs in the primetime reaches 90% 
(Straubhaar, 1997: 294). However, in the case of movies, these major networks also 
heavily depend on imported movies from America (80%) and Europe (15%) (Tae-
hyun Kim, 1991). 
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Although imported American movies have long established a steady presence 
in Korean television since the early 1960's, this genre has not attracted large 
audiences. Except for the occasional popularity of Hollywood blockbuster movies at 
weekend nights, most imported movies on Korean television rarely record a high 
rating (Tae-hyun Kim, 1991). In the history of Korean television, there is no single 
foreign-produced program that has won an overwhelmingly larger size of audiences 
than indigenous products.24 The consumers 0 f imported Western pro grams, however 
dubbed in the Korean language, are largely limited to young age groups. The majority 
of ordinary Koreans are not familiar with the English language, so the viewers of 
satellite broadcasting or English-speaking cable channels are a small segment of 
audiences, who tend to be the urban, young, higher-educated with higher-income. 
They consume satellite broadcasting or cable channels mainly for foreign movies, and 
the length of their viewing time on average is one hour and 40 minutes daily (KBI, 
1996). However, in terms of the comprehension of the content of English-speaking 
movies, 54.5% of actual viewers ''understand only partly", and 28.6% of actual 
viewers "do not understand the English language but just watch the screen picture" 
(Gang-sik Shin, 1995). This finding means that over 80% of the actual viewers do not 
fully understand English-speaking Western movies. Nonetheless, Western movies -
either dubbed or original- are well received among Korean young women. Questions 
as to why they are attracted to Western movies and what specific meanings they 
derive from their viewing remain unexplored?5 
As I have emphasized in the beginning of this chapter, it is important to 
recognize that any study of the experience of popular media culture must be explored 
in relation to the historically situated social and cultural contexts within which it is 
received and understood. The following chapter will therefore situate my study within 
the historical and sociological context that constitutes the women's experience of 
television in everyday life. 
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Chapter 2 Socio-Economic Position of Women in South Korea 
This chapter attempts to historically chart continuity and change in the SOCIO-
economic position of women in South Korea based on a review of existing literature. 
It surveys the parameters of women's lives in the contexts of traditional 
Confucianism, modern education, work, marriage and family, and sexuality. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a historically informed socio-cultural context for 
a more adequate understanding of my research data. I intend to situate the subjects of 
my research within larger social structures and integrate the analyses of the micro data 
into the macro-political dimensions. As I have argued in the previous chapter, to be a 
valuable cultural analysis - both epistemologically and politically - women's 
accounts on the experience of television in everyday life should not be left to speak 
for themselves, but be grounded in the historical and sociological context within 
which they are embedded. 
Specifically, in this chapter I explore how Korean women's lives have been 
historically influenced and constructed by the determining force of the traditional 
gender roles inscribed in Confucianism. This is to infer the embracing implications of 
the traditional gender performance in the changing lives of women in contemporary 
Korean society. To what extent have the traditional normative values been penetrated, 
materialized, contested and contradicted with modern meanings of womanhood, in 
everyday lives of Korean women embedded in the transitional flux? The overarching 
goal of this exploration is to demystify the perceived reality of women's changing 
position by dissecting both the socio-economic structural changes, which promise to 
provide the improved materialistic condition for women, and the cultural continuity 
and dislocation of the traditional Confucian values in modernized Korea, thereby 
causing a disparity between traditional norms and modern expectations, an identity 
crisis, and assumed subordination of women in the multifaceted intricacies of 
everyday life. 
Among the nations in North-East Asia including China and Japan which have 
been historically under the influence of Confucianism, South Korea is recognized as 
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the nation with the strictest adherence to the Confucian ethical tradition (Palley, 1992: 
787). To borrow Benedict Anderson's (1991) terms, it can be said that the modem 
nation Korea, which proclaims itself homogeneous (e.g. language, lineage, race, 
culture), is an "imagined political community" rooted in the Confucian cultural 
system of the Chosun dynastic realm (1392-1910) and transformed by an engine of 
historically specific processes of modernizing - to adopt Anthony Gidden's (1990: 
139) metaphor, by a powerful "juggernaut in which there is a tensionful, 
contradictory, push-and-pull of different influences". As my literature review 
throughout this chapter will indicate, the current location of Korean society is 
complex and ambiguous in the sense that "traditions have not yet disappeared and 
modernity has not completely arrived" (Canclini, 1995: 1). There is a complex 
interplay and co-existence of tradition and modernity. Precisely, it is this complex 
cultural context of modernization within which my research inquiry on women's 
experience of television is situated. In a broad sense, women's cultural experience of 
globalizing television media in everyday life is embedded within the historical 
specificity of Korean modernization. 
Therefore, my discussion will emphasize the historical specificity to 
differentiate South Korea from other Asian nations. Although there is a fairly strong 
movement for binding Asia into a single massive entity by two camps - anti-Western 
nationalists who want to overcome their dependence on the Western force, and the 
global capitalists who think that endorsing Asian solidarity will help open up new 
markets - Asia, or Asian women, cannot be categorized into a single homogeneous 
unit (Hae-joang Cho, 1997). Western academics, without a proper historical 
understanding, tend to hold universalistic and totalizing assumptions about Asian 
women and subordination. l The assumed homogeneity of Asian women is a deeply 
problematic and inadequate understanding, therefore, the irreducible socio-cultural 
differences and historical specificities within Asia should be recognized and 
confronted for a better understanding of the lived experiences of women today. 
In the following, I start by discussing Confucianism to proceed the 
deconstruction of the historical specificity of Korean society and women's socio-
economic position. As two sets of Western eyes have rightly observed, "In fact, a 
discussion of Korean society would be incomplete without some understanding of the 
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moral code that is associated with Confucianism, and more specifically, an 
understanding of the changing roles and status of women in Korea requires some 
sense of the centrality of this moral code in the evolution of that society" (Gelb and 
Palley, 1994: 3. Italics, my emphasis). In Korean Women Today, a publication of the 
Korean Women's Development Institute, it is critically argued, "Because of the 
wrong socialization process in our society which has continued for too long not only 
men but also women themselves tend to recognize the inferiority of women, at least 
unconsciously. This is what remains as the major obstacle to achieving equality 
between men and women" (Chong-ui Kim, 1988). My literature review problematizes 
the traditional cultural ideologies and patriarchal social structures that have long 
influenced Korean women's lives and identities, and at the same time recognizes such 
consequences as the taken-for-granted assumptions among women themselves. 
Section (1) Confucianism 
Fewer societies have had more rigid restrictions on women's social positions than the 
Chosun Dynasty (Yi Korea: 1392-1910) driven by Confucian male politics for five 
centuries, hence, this period can be called as the "dark ages for women" (Rowe and 
Kim, 1997). Confucianism was adopted not merely as a moral principle but as an 
ideological basis for the political, social and economic formation of the society. It 
stressed a rigid hierarchical order of human relationships based on age, sex, and social 
status, in which men were associated with the notion of heaven (superior) and women 
with earth (inferior). A woman was defined as a semi-adult, and required to learn the 
Confucian ideal of "self-sacrifice".2 With the inventions of metal printing in 1423 and 
of han-gul (the Korean alphabet) in 1446, books for domestic education were widely 
distributed to women (Jeong-shin Han, 1996).3 The key features regulating women's 
everyday lives in Confucian education can be summed up as follows (Yun-shik 
Chang, 1983; Eui-young Yu, 1987; He-sung Koh, 1987; Deuchler, 1992; Kyung-won 
Cho, 1994; Elizabeth Choi, 1994; Jeong-shin Han, 1996; Young-hee Sim, 1998). 
(a) Woman's place in the domestic sphere 
Confucianism constructed a patriarchal gender definition by emphasizing Namnyo-
yubyol (sex-difference) and Nae-Oe-Beob (woman's place in the domestic sphere / 
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man's place in the public sphere). This segregated women from men in their social 
activities throughout the lifetime. Specifically, from the age of seven a girl was not 
allowed to sit with a boy in the same room, and from the age of ten she was not 
allowed to move at will outside the house. Should a girl go outside, she should walk 
on the left side of the road, as a boy walks on the right side. She should not stroll in 
her garden or venture out during the daytime, and outside the house she was required 
to veil her face. Although a woman had a right to manage household finances, her 
influence on public affairs was always transmitted through the male members of her 
family - her father, husband and son. Confucianism strictly limited the legitimacy of 
women's social roles by separating the social domain of women from that ofmen.4 
(b) Marriage and patrilineal family system 
Until the twentieth century women did not have any say in their choice of mate as 
marriage was arranged by their parents. The meaning of marriage was a joining of a 
bride to her husband's family under the patrilineal system, and the three-generation 
family was the Confucian model. The married eldest son and his immediate family 
lived together with his parents and younger siblings until his parents died and his 
siblings married out. The father, and after his death the first-born male, served as a 
legal family head, with absolute power and control over property and family 
members. Individual rights and equality were secondary to values emphasizing the 
primacy of the family.s Although married women often faced inhuman treatment from 
their mothers-in-law, they could not return to their natal families as the society was 
structured under the principle of patrilineality. Women had to endure and survive 
within their husbands' families by directing their lives "through and for their sons". 
( c) Motherhood and son preference 
A woman was regarded as an instrument to bear a son who would continue the 
patrilineal family system, hence, the absence of a son meant the termination of the 
family. A failure to give birth to a son became a sufficient condition for a husband to 
divorce his wife. 6 A woman who could not bear a son was socially categorized as a 
"non-person". Producing a son was a chief means for a woman to achieve social 
status, and the birth of additional sons further enhanced her status. A woman's life-
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goal was to produce as many sons as possible and exercise power mediated through 
her sons. Confucian patriarchy had two paradoxical features - an extreme suppression 
of women, and an extreme idealization of motherhood, "mother power". Only through 
the identity as mother could women be recognized in the society. 
(d) Filial piety and obedience to parents-in-law 
Filial piety was upheld as the foremost ultimate virtue in Confucianism. As one's 
body was seen as originating from one's parents, one did not act on one's own behalf, 
but on behalf of one's parents. A son's loyalty to his parents was expected to 
supercede his loyalty to his wife, hence, the relationship between daughter-in-law and 
mother-in-law was a complicated one between two women to whom one man's 
loyalty concurrently was called upon. A daughter-in-law was always required to obey 
her mother-in-law. Naehun, the first book for domestic education wrote: "Although a 
son falls for his wife, if his parents are displeased with the daughter-in-law, the son 
should abandon her".7 The government made it a policy to reward one's outstanding 
act of filial piety by building an arch or raising a flag before one's house, and giving 
tax exemptions and a raise in one's class status. 
( e) Chastity ideo logy and prohibition on remarriage 
Confucianism stressed chastity and a woman's faithful devotion to one husband as the 
greatest of womanly virtues. Women's adultery was considered as the most 
unforgivable disgrace to their families. 8 Victims of sexual violence were also 
considered as having lost chastity. When a woman confronted a male assailant, she 
was educated to commit suicide with a "silver decorated knife" which she carried .all 
the time. A strict prohibition on remarriage of widows was legalized in the fifteenth 
century to enact the chastity ideology. The government praised chaste widows who 
remained unmarried, by establishing a monument gate, or granting the exemption of 
taxes and the reception of pension. Sons of remarried women were legally barred 
from entering any public officialdom, which meant a permanent loss of the 
opportunity for the family'S class prosperity. In 1894 the prohibition on remarriage 
and the class system were abolished. 
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As indicated so far, traditional Confucianism defmed an ideal woman in terms 
of a filial daughter, faithful wife and dedicated mother, who was expected to sacrifice 
her life to make her three men - father, husband and son - recognized in the public 
sphere. In fact, the notion of "sacrifice" has a remarkably long history. It can be traced 
back to the self-disciplined image of bear-woman in the mythology of the birth of the 
Korean nation: According to this myth, Hwanung, a son of the heavenly lord, 
descended on earth to rule a human world. One day a bear and a tiger were eager to 
become a human and asked Hwanung to realize their dream, so he ordered them to 
live in a dark cave for one hundred days. Only the bear endured and was transformed 
into a human - a woman! This bear-woman married Hwanung and begat Tan'gun, 
who founded the oldest Korean nation (putatively 2333 B.C.). The bear-woman is an 
ideal image of self-sacrifice imposed on Korean women throughout the long history, 
and women themselves have internalized the notion of sacrifice. 9 
Section (2) Education 
Formal education for women started in the early l870s when Chosun Dynasty (1392-
1910) opened its doors to the United States, England and Russia. Many schools were 
established from that time to the early 1900s, and women's education was 
transformed from traditional Confucianism to a modem style. Two factors contributed 
to this transition - the influence of various religions and the editorial argument in a 
major newspaper (Jeong-shin Han, 1996). With the introduction of Western religions, 
including Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, women started to participate in 
religious ceremonies held in the public sphere. lO Women's equal access to education 
was voiced by the editorials of Dok-Rip-Sin-Mun (Independence Press) established in 
1896. Its editorial argument was that if women were not given education, their 
ignorance would jeopardize future generations and national well-being. 
In 1886, the first women's school Ewha Haktang was established by an 
American Christian missionary.11 The schooling for women was perceived to threaten 
traditional Confucian values, so Korean parents did not send their daughters to school. 
Only one student came to Ewha in the first year (Rowe and Kim, 1997: 47), and Ewha 
experienced extreme difficulties in getting women students. Today, the name of the 
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institution has remained Ewha Womans University - "Womans" rather than 
"Women's" - to serve as a historical testimony to the struggle for each individual 
woman to obtain education.12 
Under the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) women's education faced 
another change. As Korean children were forced to become subjects of the Japanese 
emperor, Korean leaders came to believe that education for both boys and girls should 
be the key to emancipation of the nation. More girls were encouraged to enter the 
formal educational system, but they were educated to become a ''wise mother and 
good wife" as a means of saving the nation (Jeong-shin Han, 1996). Since 1945 
traditional structures have been weakened by a series of socio-economic and political 
events; Korea's liberation from Japanese colonization (1945), Korean War (1950-
1953), industrialization and modernization starting from the 1960's. 
It is worth highlighting that education has been a driving motor of Korean 
modernization, a central constituent in the building processes of the nation and 
economy (Myung-hye Kim, 1995). The Korean way of modernity has been developed 
based on the super-education system. In 1961 when the Korean government launched 
The First Five-year Plan for Economic Development as the beginning of a full-scale 
modernization project, top priorities included education. Six-year elementary school 
education has been compulsory since 1953, and illiteracy has been virtually wiped out 
with a literacy rate of 99% (Rowe and Kim, 1997) - among the total population of 
46,430,000; 23,033,000 women and 23,396,000 men. The government's investment in 
education is a marked feature of Korean modernization. 
In 1965, only 33% of females and 51% of males attended middle school (age 
14-16), but today these corresponding rates have increased to 99.9% for females and 
99.9% for males (KWDI, 1998), and enrollment rates in high school (age 17-19) are 
95.3% for females and 95.9% for males. Educational inequality between sexes is 
almost non-existent up to the level of high school education, however, it becomes 
pronounced at the stage of entry into a (two-year) college and a (four-year) university. 
In higher education, male enrollment almost doubles female enrollment. As of 1998, 
55.5% of females and 92% of males enrolled in a college and a university. Although 
this is a significant improvement compared with the rates of 21 % for females and 
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47% for males in 1985, a traditional tendency to educate a male child remains in the 
attainment of higher education. 
Koreans are highly educated people with intense educational zeal, especially 
for university education (Rowe and Kim, 1997). The majority of students think that 
they must go to university. Why? Girls' academic failure is not criticized due to the 
traditional perception that women's lives are dependent on marriage, not on academic 
achievement. Boys in the same situation, however, tend to be socially categorized as a 
"loser/failure".13 Korean parents, regardless of class position, goad their sons to go to 
first-class universities and to succeed in their careers, but do not express such a desire 
for their daughters. The traditional femininity continually exerts a negative influence 
upon the educational aspirations of girls (Kyung-won Cho, 1994). 
Today, traditional Confucian values come into conflict with women's modern 
education and new expectations. In the co-existence of tradition and modernity, 
women experience ambivalence between two powerful contradictory forces - the 
modern philosophy of equality and autonomy, and traditional culture embedded in 
everyday life. Confucianism has taken a central role in the historical development of 
Korean society, and continues to influence the gendered structure of school practices. 
For example, the most emphasized precepts for boys' schools are "creativity", 
"progressive spirit", "independence", whereas those for girls' schools are "chastity", 
"spirit ofpublic service", "humility" (Jeong-shin Han, 1996). School textbooks reflect 
male superiority as they are designed and distributed by the Ministry of Education 
wherein men are predominant policymakers (Kyung-won Cho, 1994). Male politics 
also requires different compulsory courses for boys and girls in high schools: Boys 
must take industrial and technical courses, whereas girls must take home economics 
predicated upon ''women's work" (Jin-joo Chung, 1997). Although the concept of 
equality was written into the 1948 Constitution, the problem of gender inequality in 
education is not in the official policies, but in the traditional culture that is operating 
in the process of education. 
The traditional Confucian culture is more deeply imbedded in working-class 
families, and working-class women's education is substantially determined by gender 
and sibling order (Jin-joo Chung, 1997). When dividing limited economic resources 
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for children's education, the parents' perception about the value of the different sexes 
becomes the most decisive factor. The first son is generally provided with the best 
opportunity for education, but daughters lose out. This is due to the working-class 
parents' belief that any future for the family's upward social mobility would be 
dependent upon their investment in the education of male children (Myung-hye Kim, 
1995). Consequently, 44% of working-class sons have graduated from two-year 
college or four-year university, while only 8% of working-class daughters have the 
same educational level (Jin-joo Chung, 1997). Working-class women's lower 
educational qualifications affect the nature of their work. "Although education alone 
does not detennine women's job prospects, educational levels do limit the nature of 
jobs that women can potentially obtain and hold" (Jin-joo Chung, 1997: 57). It all 
points to how profoundly gender has shaped the history of women's education and 
occupational opportunities. While it is true that educational opportunities for women 
have quantitatively increased over the past decades, the social structures in modern 
Korea founded on the underlying Confucian assumptions reproduce the traditional 
ideology of gender performance. 
Section (3) Work 
South Korea has transformed the nation from a primarily agrarian economy into an 
industrializing urban society since the late 1960's. In contrast to early European 
industrialization, the process of industrialization in South Korea has been intense and 
rapid in only three decades, on the basis of export-oriented industries depending on 
low wage labor. This ''rush-to-industrialization'' necessitated the participation of a 
greater number of workers, including those who were not traditionally considered as 
''workers'' - women. Young working-class women started to migrate to cities and 
participated in the newly emerging export-zones of light consumer manufacturing 
sectors - textile, garment, footwear, toy, electronics industries. They were labeled as 
less skilled, paid poor wages, relegated to the poorest working conditions, and had no 
opportunity for upward mobility (Jin-joo Chung, 1997). They constituted a cheap and 
disciplined labor force, the main competitive advantage of the Korean economy in the 
1970's - precisely what international capitalists were seeking during this period. 
These young women were believed to have greater patience for tedious jobs, docility 
and submissiveness, nimble fingers, and low expectation of rewards. The powerful 
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couplet of the traditional patriarchal system and the international capitalist division of 
labor has intimately affected the position and experiences of women in modern Korea 
(Hagen Koo, 1987). South Korea's economic miracle was achieved in large measure 
because women worked at the poorly paid jobs predicated by the labor-intensive, 
export-led industrialization (Mihye Roh, 1994).14 Korean conglomerates have 
absorbed more and more women into factories, but not welcomed women into 
corporate offices, except as secretaries (Gelb and Palley, 1994). 
As Korea became a newly industrialized nation in the 1980's, women's labor 
force participation rapidly increased. According to the 1986 International Labor 
Organization (ILO) data, 43% of Korean women were economically active, which 
was commensurate with the labor force participation in advanced countries - France 
43.1%, Japan 48.7%, the United States 51.7%. However, since the 1990's Korean 
women's economic activity has not reached the average level, 64%, of advanced 
countries, but remained at the level of 48.7% (Ro et aI, 1998). Two factors can 
explain this. First, as the national economy has transformed its stages of development, 
from light export-driven industries to heavy and high-technology industries, it has 
required different types of labor - men. Women are particularly vulnerable to the 
politics of the labor market. Korean women's participation in the labor force remains 
almost at half the rate for men. Second, despite women's increasing educational 
attainments and new expectations, traditional gender-role practices are still pervasive 
in the Korean labor structure and organizational culture, specifically in terms of (a) 
occupational sex-segregation, (b) differential employment status, and (c) married 
women's labor participation. 
(a) Occupational sex-segregation 
In the corporate sector, women's economic activities are heavily concentrated in 
traditional "women's work", sales and services, low-paid manual labors, while 
women in managerial and professional positions form a small minority (Ro et aI, 
1998). The public sector is more reluctant to incorporate women, especially in the 
field of teaching. Female students make up 60% in teachers' universities (Tae-hong 
Kim, 1996), but the enrolment of female students at teachers' universities has been 
restricted, in response to complaints against women teachers for "feminizing 
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schoolboys". The Ministry of Education has never limited the number of male 
students at teachers' universities when their proportion was predominant. Currently, 
two-thirds of the employees in teaching occupation are male. 
Government employment is the area where women's access is most limited. 
Women hold only 1.5% of all high government positions (Bong-Scuk Sohn, 1994), 
and they are most under-represented in the field of law and politics. The average 
number of women representatives in past legislatures has been, at most, 2%, and the 
number dwindled to 1% in the Fourteenth Congress (1992-1996). In local legislatures, 
women represent 0.9% of the total (KWDI, 1998). Women's low political 
representation is due to the problems of the male-bond political structure combined 
with the socio-cultural characteristics that are unique to Korean society. The rigid 
definition of Confucian gender roles has assigned men to the public sphere and 
women to the domestic sphere, and this gendered performance still flourishes in 
contemporary politics. The prevailing perception of the public is that it is "not 
womanly" to have any interest in and participate in the political processes (Bong -Scuk 
Sohn, 1994: 266). Women tend to regard political women as ''unfeminine'', and often 
exclude themselves from the political world by conceding men the right to rule their 
own life destiny. 
(b) Differential employment status 
Women are often discriminated against since most employers prefer men. For 
example, 38.3% of employment advertisements want only males, 22.8% solicit both 
males and females, and the rest 38.9% offer no sex specification assuming that only 
males need apply (Rowe and Kim, 1997). In the major big companies' annual mass 
recruitment, over 90% of jobs are offered to male university graduates, while 
application forms of female university graduates are usually refused (Pil-wha Chang, 
1994). Employed women are paid an average of 40% of the men's wage for 
equivalent work (Ro et ai, 1998), and female university graduates have a wage 
differential of 68.4% (Mihye Roh, 1994). The wage gap is just ified by traditional sex-
roles: Women are not primarily defmed as breadwinners and women's wages are 
considered as supplementary to men's in the family economy, hence, women are 
passed over for promotions at work (Kim and Chun, 1996). The ratio of males and 
49 
females who hold high managerial positions is 97.4 to 2.6 (Ro et ai, 1998). Male 
employers tend to justify their discrimination against women in terms of "preserving 
and protecting feminine qualities" (Phil-wha Chang, 1994: 25): Women cannot be 
sent to foreign countries for training or superintendence because it is not proper for 
women to be abroad on their own; women cannot be placed in managerial positions 
because they have to work like men until late at night, which is "not feminine". The 
concern to preserve women's femininity is prevalent in the workplace as women are 
primarily identified with domesticity, as ''wise mother and good wife" .15 
The Equal Employment Act was enacted in 1987 with the principles of equal 
recruitment, equal pay and maternity protection, however, it has not been actually 
implemented. "Often, discrimination does not spring from legislation but from 
practices originating in the psychological and cultural environment" (Elizabeth Choi, 
1994: 203). One survey reveals that 82% of major companies ''think'' that they are 
employing many women, although a small proportion of women are employed, and 
when asked why they employ women, 54% answer that ''because there are many 
simple and supplementary tasks" (Tae-hong Kim, 1998). Other studies reveal why 
companies discriminate against women: Women cannot fully discuss labor issues with 
male colleagues because they are more concerned about their children left at home 
(Mi-ha Kim, 1994), and women have difficulties in dealing with work, especially 
drinking with clients (Rowe and Kim, 1997). 
In truth, if one of the cherished truisms of Western feminism is that access to 
education and thus work will improve the position of women, this is not necessarily 
the case in the Korean context. Korean women with higher education do not have 
equal opportunities to hold jobs commensurate with their academic background and 
qualifications. This is evidenced by a study on the graduates of Ewha Womans 
University, the oldest and most prestigious women's higher educational institution in 
Korea (Rowe and Kim, 1997). From 1973 to 1996, an average of 80% of the Ewha 
graduates were employed. This is a remarkable achievement compared with the 
national figure of all female university graduates employed, only 29.8% in 1985. 
However, such a rosy figure is misleading because almost all of the Ewha graduates 
are employed in the area of non-managerial jobs unrelated to their specialties - office 
workers (18.9%), teachers (18.2%), pharmaceutical workers (17%), and the majority 
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of the remaining as receptionists, typists, telephone operators, or other positions 
requiring little or no skills and certainly no university education. This finding echoes 
the inequalities of the sex-segregated labor force, and casts doubt on the universal 
notion that women's education will promise opportunity and improvement in the 
women's socio-economic position. Despite the statistical fact that many Korean 
women have achieved high educational levels, there is an inverse correlation between 
the level of education and employment, as female university graduates have 
difficulties in fmding positions appropriate to their educational qualifications. This is 
further evident in the data that the unemployment rate for all Korean women in 1990 
was 1.8%, while that of female university graduates was 5.3% - an inverse correlation 
between the level of education and employment. It is easier for women high-school 
graduates to find employment than it is for women with university degrees. Although 
educated women are "lucky" to get employed, they become dissatisfied with under-
employment, and leave the job market when other means of financial support and 
status maintenance become available - most accessibly, marriage. 
( c) Married women's labor participation 
Women's employment patterns are largely determined by a series of life events such 
as school graduation, marriage, first childbirth, last childbirth, termination of child-
rearing, and elementary schooling. The "discontinuity" in women's employment due 
to these events shows a typical M-shape pattern (Yo ok-young Mun, 1998; Tae-hong 
Kim, 1997): The women's economic activity rate before marriage is 55.5%, but drops 
to 27.7% right after marriage, showing that more than half of working women leave 
the labor market after marriage. The job involvement rate after the birth of the first 
child is 26.4%, the lowest employment rate in women's life stages. Women's 
economic activities start to increase afterwards, yet there is not much difference until 
the birth of the last child. After the birth of the last child, women's economic activity 
rate increases by 11 %, and reaches 44.2% right after the elementary schooling of the 
last child. Such increase continues until the graduation of the last child from 
elementary school, almost recovering to the rate of 54.3%. In short, the pattern in 
women's economic activities by life stages shows that most working women exit the 
labor market at marriage, and then return to the labor market after the birth of the last 
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child. This M-shape pattern demonstrates the importance of the family, motherhood 
and childcare over women's work. 
Such "discontinuity" in women's employment poses two serious 
disadvantages to women. First, because Korean personnel management systems are 
structured based on the years of "continued" employment it becomes difficult for 
women to be promoted in salary and status (Y ook-young Mun, 1998). The second 
problem is, then what kinds of jobs will be available to returning married women? 
They are limited ,to either part-time, temporary positions, or self-employed and unpaid 
family work. 16 In the unavailability of secure full-time job opportunities, married 
women participate in part-time employment, hoping to earn money for their children's 
education. Increasing educational expenses for children prompt housewives to earn 
money to supplement their husbands' income (Mihye Roh, 1994). 
Discontinuity in women's employment at marriage is the typical work pattern 
in modem Korea. It can be argued that instead of effecting an expansion of women's 
lives in the public economic domain, Korean industrialization has created a 
''temporary and transitional stage" for women between a relatively free and flexible 
life with father and a life with husband where the taste of freedom becomes limited 
due to the role of childcare. The working of traditional Confucianism still prohibits 
modem women from continuing with paid work after marriage. University-educated 
women are not socially expected to work after marriage, and certainly not after 
childbirth, because middle-class gender roles define men as successful breadwinners 
whose status can be publicly demonstrated by their supportive non-working wives. 
This gendered perfonnance is often assumed by wives themselves. 
Section (4) Marriage and Family 
The rising educational opportunity for women, rapid industrialization and women's 
economic participation since the late 1960's have shaken the basic fabric of traditional 
social structures. However, the cultural dislocation of the Confucian ideology comes 
into conflict with women's new aspirations for career achievement and the traditional 
values still permeate in everyday family life. This is indicated in the fact that the 
majority ofwomen-73.4% of women of age 15 and over- get married and 66.1 % of 
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all married women remain full-time housewives for child-rearing (Hyoung Cho, 1994: 
170). According to the 1987 Korea Gallup Polls' comparative report on lifestyles and 
value systems of housewives in six nations (Korea, Japan, USA, the UK, Sweden, 
Germany), Korean housewives show the most traditional, family-centered gender role 
attitudes. As to the survey statement, ''Women should have only a family-oriented 
life, devoting to bringing up their children and supporting their husbands", 83 % of the 
Korean wives agree, and 72% of the Japanese wives agree, while only 10% ofthe UK 
wives and 18% of USA wives agree. As to the statement, "A husband should be a 
breadwinner, and a wife should look after home", 71 % ofthe Korean wives and 71 % 
of the Japanese wives agree, while 26% of the UK wives and 34% of USA wives 
agree. As to the statement, "If one cannot find happiness and satisfaction with one's 
partner, it is better to get divorced", only 24% of the Korean wives agree, and 27% of 
the Japanese wives agree, while 79% of the UK wives and 68% of USA wives agree 
(Byong-suh Kim, 1994). These responses indicate that the traditional sexual division 
of labor continues to confine Korean women to the marriage-bound family, and many 
women still believe that they should be good wives and mothers. 
However, the marriage pattern reveals some change among the young 
generation today. The average marriage age has been pushed upward by an increase in 
the number of years women spend in school education. Women's average age at their 
ftrst marriage increased from 19 years in the 1955-1960 period, to 24.5 years in 1987, 
while men's corresponding age increased from 25.4 years to 27.3 years. As of 1997, 
the average age of Korean women at their fIrst marriage was 25.9 years, and men's 
age was 28.7 years (KWDI, 1998). There emerges a consensual voice among 
educated young women that marriage is an individual choice. The social questioning 
''marriage, a matter of choice, or a must?" was covered in a national newspaper and 
debated in a national TV forum during the summer of 1999, which means that the 
changing socio-economic position of young women today is becoming a heated 
national agenda. On the contesting TV forum among four panelists, when an 
educated, single, professional woman in her early 30s freely expressed the joy of 
leading an independent life, a traditional mother in her 60s associated with a 
housewives' group sarcastically attacked this single woman, "You must be an 
extraordinary queer species" (iTV, August 13, 1999). This anecdote reveals a facet of 
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identity contestation between the old and the young generations of women In 
contemporary Korea. 
The young generation of women desire to pursue an individualized lifestyle, 
which is reflected in a changing view about marriage and an increasing divorce rate. 
The Korean family has traditionally shown a high degree of stability with a low 
divorce rate, but now it is experiencing a rapid increase of divorce, particularly among 
young couples without children. The divorce rate has increased from 5.8% in 1980, to 
11.1% in 1990, and 16.8% in 1995 (KWDI, 1998). Currently, one out of three couples 
is getting divorced (KBS News, July 1, 1999). The increasing divorce rate signals a 
rupture between traditional gender roles and modem expectations. According to one 
survey, 80% of Korean single women state that women do not necessarily need to 
marry (Hanguhre Daily Newspaper, July 26, 1999), and this is predominantly stated 
by women aged under 25 (79%) and by educated professionals (79%), which means 
middle-class singles. However, this seemingly liberating picture may be deceptive if 
one closely examines the survey fmding that such an individualized attitude is 
expressed predominantly by middle-class singles aged under 25. A pressing question 
is, then what happens to single women aged over 25? 
"One of the most crucial social pressures is toward marriage in Korea. Not 
only women but also men are expected to get married at honki (marriageable 
age) in order to settle down and have a baby through women's young and 
healthy bodies. Many unmarried women, especially in university, say that they 
will not get married and will not give birth even in marriage. Nobody takes 
this kind of young women's comment seriously. At honki, women get 
tremendous pressure to get married directly and indirectly, and at the same 
time, many women are afraid of being left out as a single person. Women in 
their twenties usually get married. Others study in graduate schools and work 
in companies and experience unequal treatment with their male colleagues and 
frustration in discriminating working environments. Gradually, these women 
are forced to accept marriage as a proper and safe place. Honki is still 
powerfully working for women to be proper and normal". 
(Eun-shil Kim, 1995: 54. Italics, my emphasis) 
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The young women's desire to pursue an individualized lifestyle may turn out to be 
more a dream than a reality. "Since the family is the basic social unit in Korea, a 
woman has been given social status and honor by her family. A woman, however, as 
an individual or as a member of society often does not possess self-identity beyond a 
family existence" (Hoo-jung Yoon, 1986). Therefore, many women eventually get 
married and struggle to shape their identity through the institution of family. 
The family is a historically created institution. The Confucian legacy has 
constructed Korea as a "family nation", and socio-political instability has further 
reinforced the idea of family life. For example, the experience of The Korean War 
(1950-1953) made an enormous impact on families and the role of women (Ministry 
of Political Affairs II, 1995). Women had major responsibilities to maintain their 
family structure by tending to the care and survival of family members in the absence 
of their husbands during the war. Family values with an emphasis on the role of 
women have continually been used for political stability in modem Korea. It can be 
inferred that when a society is struggling for bare survival, offering little protection to 
its members, people try to survive on their own as tightly consolidated family units. 
The persistent existence of family values throughout the history of Korea can be 
interpreted as an indication of the relative weakness and instability of the politics of 
the public sphere (Hae-joang Cho, 1996). The ideology of family has been further 
reinforced by the rapid industrialization of Korea. The family is subject to the cycles 
and stages of the national economy for the reproduction of collectivistic resources 
(Myung-hye Kim, 1995). The rapid industrialization has been conditioned on a sexual 
division of labor in the nuclear family - a breadwinner husband and a full-time wife 
and mother. 
Today in Korea, 80.5% of households are composed of five or fewer people 
(Myung-hye Kim, 1995). Due to the success of the governmental family planning 
campaign, the total fertility rate has decreased from 6.0 persons in 1960 to 1.48 
persons in 1997 (KWDI, 1998), but small family size has not extinguished the desire 
for sons. The traditional ideology of son-preference reached a peak in infants in their 
first year of life in 1990, when there were 114.7 boys to every 100 girls (KWDI, 
1998). The ratio of male birth has been high as a consequence of women's choosing 
to undergo ultrasonic scans and aborting their female fetuses. 52% of women of 
55 
childbearing age have had at least one abortion, and 63% of women aged thirty-five to 
thirty-nine in the second or the third pregnancy have had abortions (Davis, 1994). The 
government has enforced a ban on pre-natal sex determination, however, such 
enforcement is to protect the rights of males to get married and have offspring 
necessary for continuing the family. As the male child population has grown 
disproportionately, fmding a woman to marry is expected to be a problem when the 
current preschool generation reaches marrying age. 
Given the significance of family values, the changes in the family structure 
may not necessarily promise any positive improvement in women's lives. Despite 
changes in the organization of the family, the traditional Confucian ethics continue to 
influence the gender division of labor and the women's roles within the family. 
Instead of liberating women from the traditional gender roles, cultural shifts that 
affect the modem family system have more rigidly inscribed the traditional cultural 
definitions of womanhood. How are they structurally interwoven in everyday family 
life, in the construction of women's identity? 
In terms of household income, although women's economic activities have 
increased men are primarily expected to support their families. 78.5% of men are 
primary breadwinners, while only 15.5% of men live on women's income (Hyoung 
Cho, 1994). In the case of full-time working couples, the wife's income is no more 
than half of the husband's income (Mi-ha Kim, 1994: 209). The proportion of 
women-headed households has increased, but the income level of major breadwinners 
differs greatly according to gender: The average income of male breadwinners is 
almost three-fold that of female breadwinners (Hyoung Cho, 1994), so women-headed 
households are much worse offthan men-headed households. 
A male breadwinner, however, is not necessarily a manager of the household 
economy in Korea. Women are usually in charge of the management of household 
expenditure. It is worth highlighting that Korean middle-class housewives do not 
necessarily consider themselves as powerless and subordinate. This is found in one 
study on the dual forms of domestic power of middle-class housewives in Korea -
structural disempowerment and constructive empowerment (Hyoung Cho, 1997). 
Full-time housewives are structurally disempowered to have no advantageous power 
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resources vis-a.-vis their husbands, but this does not mean that housewives are 
deprived of power throughout their lives. Certain power resources can be created 
while they perform domestic tasks, for example, in twenty years of married life, they 
would find family's financial management and often their own separate accounts, and 
emotional dependence of their husbands and children. Middle-class women enjoy 
power within the domestic sphere, without challenging the patriarchal ideology in the 
society. One architect has made a similar point that the physical space of 
contemporary Korean housing is "over-dominated" by women, and there is little room 
left for men (Hae-joang Cho, 1997: 137).17 
Another unique feature in the Korean family is that all married women are 
expected to perform housework regardless of their employment status outside. Full-
time housewives spend 8 to 12 hours a day on domestic work, and the worth oftheir 
domestic labor is 22.8% of GNP (Ro et ai, 1998). Surprisingly, working wives spend 
5 hours on domestic work out of a total of 14 working hours a day (Hyoung Cho, 
1994). Yet only 45% of husbands participate in domestic work, 1.3 hours on average 
a day. Then, what kind of domestic work is shared by husbands? Korean husbands 
almost never participate in three types of domestic work - cooking, dishwashing and 
laundry (Hyoung Cho, 1994: 183).18 They only help with childcare, although 
childcare here does not include infant care but helping children with their homework. 
The most frequent parent-child interactions in Korea are watching TV (69%) and 
homework (33%) (Sun-yuel Choe, 1994: 263). 
Working wives want to get paid domestic help, but this is becoming an 
unrealistic solution as service payment amounts to about one half the average 
household income. Also, Korean families make a subtle demand on the ''personal 
touch of wife 1m other" (Hyoung Cho, 1994). The cultural value of the personal touch 
of wife 1m other is perceived as incomparable to goods and services purchasable in the 
modern capitalist market or by paid domestic helpers. Women's ''personal touch" is 
most demanded when it comes to childcare. 79% of Korean mothers take care oftheir 
children without others' help, and the families where the husband takes responsibility 
for childcare are only 2% (Sun-yuel Choe, 1994). 
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Why do Korean men not participate in childcare? Besides the universally 
profound ideology of women's mothering on the reproduction of femininity and 
masculinity (Chodorow, 1978), it can be explained by the unique context of the 
Korean labor market. Since overwork is the rule rather than an exception, Korean 
men's working hours tends to be extremely longer than their Western counterparts', 
thus, male breadwinners usually do not have time to participate in childcare or 
housework. Korean men work 66 hours weekly (Mi-ha Kim, 1994). Employers take 
the best advantage of human resources by increasing the working hours of men to 
make up for any shortage in the labor force. Korean men suffer long working hours, 
which is related to the tragedy that more and more men in their forties and fifties are 
dying from the strain of overwork. The young generation of male writers sarcastically 
reflect this social problem on their popular books titled "You die if you go to the 
company", "Salaried men, do as you like" (Hae-joang Cho, 1997). 
Korean women work 60 hours weekly (Mi-ha Kim, 1994), yet it is solely 
women who are in charge of childcare and housework. A study on full-time working 
couples reveals that: (1) it is usually wives who have to be absent from work to look 
after their sick children, (2) husbands' mothers discourage male participation in 
childcare, (3) as husbands have not obtained skill and knowledge in childcare, 
children themselves come to demand the mother's care rather than the father's, and 
(4) eventually wives distrust the capability of their husbands in childcare, hence, do 
not request their husbands to share childcare (Mi-ha Kim, 1994). Women have moved 
into the public sphere, but men have not moved into the private sphere, therefore, 
Korean women have two jobs - domestic and paid. 
In terms of government policies, recognition of the necessity for child care 
facilities remains at a burgeoning stage and the law-making for such issues has not 
been fully realized. There are 820,000 children who need the care, but there are only 
2,323 day-care centers, accommodating 73,300 children - only 8.7% of those who 
need the care (Mihye Roh, 1994: 251). A great demand for child care facilities is 
registered by working women, however, a fundamental problem is the traditional 
perception that childcare is the responsibility of the mother with her "personal touch". 
It can be claimed that the politics of childcare with an egalitarian role arrangement 
within the family is more crucial than the politics of creating jobs for women in 
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modern Korea. The possibility of women's economic activities in the public sphere is 
preconditioned on the gender-role revolution in the private sphere. 
Korean women's ''personal touch" is further extended to the care of parents-
in-law. The nuclear family in Western societies is based on the assumption that an 
adult male is liberated from the tutelage of his parents and takes on his own 
responsibilities by seeking wage work and supporting his own family. This is not the 
case in the Korean context. Despite the structural shift from the extended family to the 
nuclear family, the care towards the husband's parents remains women's crucial 
duties. Living apart in separate residences, women's commuting time simply becomes 
an added burden. Mothers-in-law are still a dominant power figure and their 
intervention in the social activities of daughters-in-law is a source of everyday 
conflicts. The traditional roles of women remain intact as women's place today is still 
expected to be within the family. 
Insofar as indicated, Korean women's identity is embodied in the family not in 
the individual self Women's self-identity is sought through their existence within the 
institution of family, and women have largely internalized their instrumental position. 
According to the Gallup Polls on the meanings of the family among Korean women, 
the word "family" is most frequently associated with a "blood tie" (48%), followed by 
"cooperation" (23%) and "love" (22%). When asked about what child-rearing means 
to them, 48% of Korean mothers state, "To continue my family lineage" (Sun-yuel 
Choe, 1994).19 Family relationships take precedence over all other social relationships 
in Korea (Byong-suh Kim, 1994). An individual cannot become independent of the 
family, and the collective identity based on the family has been reinforced through 
everyday linguistic expression: Koreans tend to use "our" instead of "my" to describe 
one's belongingness - "our home" instead of "my home", "our wife" (which means 
"our person in the family") instead of "my wife". Married women are expected to 
enhance family honor and solidarity, thereby conforming to the modem ideology of 
"a successful husband and a beloved wife" (Myung-hye Kim, 1995). 
Overall, Korean women's lives and identities have been historically 
constructed through the powerful discourse of marriage-motherhood-family. Korean 
women who resist performing the traditional gender role of mother and wife are 
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socially categorized as a "non-woman"?O The determining force of Confucian 
patriarchal ideology does not legitimize the lives of single or divorced women. It is 
only through the identity as mother and wife, otherwise, women's lives do not have 
legitimacy at a biological and socio-culturallevel. The life experience of an "infertile" 
woman articulates this point. 
"A woman needs a husband and a son even though she is good enough to 
make it on her own. Everyone looks down on a woman who lives alone 
without a dependable man. A woman can't be treated as a whole person if she 
has not given birth. The best thing for a woman is to marry and give birth to a 
child. All other things are secondary for her". (Eun-shil Kim, 1998: 60) 
In terms of feminist politics, the identification of women through the discourse 
of marriage-motherhood-family poses a stumbling block to women's rights 
movements in Korea. For the majority of mothers, it is not motherly to feel oppressed, 
and it is even less so to complain about one's own hardships and to struggle for one's 
own rights. Especially, young women hesitate to join women's movements because 
they feel that they are not yet fully -grown persons until they get married and become 
mothers (Hae-joang Cho, 1996). Korean mothers' power within the family is 
tremendous, but such powerful energy has not formed an identity as an autonomous 
agent. Each individual woman's empowerment within the domestic sphere has not 
been transformed into collective social power to change the patriarchal system, but 
rather resulted in a conservative and defensive "anti-feminist" force (Hyoung Cho, 
1997). In this particular Korean context, social change cannot easily be envisaged. 
Section (5) Sexuality 
Discourses on sexuality in South Korea began to appear in public only from the end 
of 1980's. In 1988 the first sexuality conference was held, organized by the Women's 
Studies Department at Ewha Womans University. Prior to that time it was not 
possible to discuss sexuality openly in a public forum. "Although women are 
becoming emancipated, apparently sex is a taboo topic in many of Korea's homes and 
schools, where it is considered a subject unfit for the well-bred ears of properly raised 
young women until the wedding day" (Hyde, 1988: 242). Nowadays sexuality is 
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discussed on television talk shows, and sex education is offered in primary schools. 
Since the 1990's sexuality has become one of the center fields in humanities and 
social sciences (Joo-Hyun Cho, 1997), and discourses of sexuality including women's 
desire and pleasure have been proliferated in popular culture. However, traditional 
ideologies are still deeply embedded in modern life, which should not be overlooked 
or overshadowed by the current changes. This is especially the case in the realm of 
sexuality where traditional moralities and modern desires are ambivalently 
intertwined. The young generation of women want an individualized lifestyle and 
resent anti-feminist beliefs, yet ambiguously follow a path somewhere between 
imagining a free, independent life and accepting traditional ideologies (Shim, 2000). 
The traditional Confucian ideologies that still powerfully influence women's sexuality 
in modern Korea are the double standard of sexual morality, and the chastity ideology 
forced upon women only. 
Sex in Korea is viewed as a special relation which can be allowed only within 
the boundary of "marriage" (Shim, 1998). The normative sexual relationship means 
sexual relations between married couples for procreation and pleasure, and such 
morality excludes sex outside the marriage system (premarital sex, extramarital sex) 
as socially illegitimate. The "legitimate" sexual practice is limited to legally married 
couples, hence, marriage is publicly acknowledged as the only legitimate site for 
sexual conduct (Pilwha Chang, 1997). Naturally in this context, heterosexuality is 
taken as normal while homosexuality is highly condemned as socially unacceptable. 
Sexuality can be better understood by considering the interplay of two separate, yet 
internally linked sectors wherein sexual relations are actually taking place - the 
formal/legitimate and the informal/illegitimate (Pilwha Chang, 1999). Sexual 
relationship is legitimized only within the formal marriage system, however, the 
informal system operates on the opposite rules of temporary relationships or 
commoditization of sexuality. Here, the double standard of sexual morality implies 
that men may have access to both sectors, but women are pushed into only the 
formal/legitimate sector. Korean men generally identify sexuality with the act of 
sexual intercourse which symbolically means a confirmed possession of a partner 
woman (Pilwha Chang, 1991). Women, as possessed by their men, are required to 
maintain absolute fidelity in the course of married life, while men's sexual freedom 
can be tolerated to some extent. 
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The rate of Korean men's extramarital sex is 63.6% with a significant 
difference by age, which means that older men in their 40s and 50s tend to have 
extramarital affairs more than younger men in their 20s and 30s (Pilwha Chang, 
1991). The dualistic sexual morality is somewhat loose about men's extramarital 
affairs. When a husband is found to have a relationship with another woman, the wife 
usually endures the agony as family members - especially her mother - would advise 
that men's extramarital affair, or Baram (which means wind), will end sooner or later 
(because wind will calm down as time goes by) and men will eventually return to the 
family (Women's Study Group, 1995). 
Interestingly, men's extramarital affairs are often justified by men themselves. 
According to one feminist research on Korean men's sexuality talk, most Korean men 
tend to view that men are "logical" while women are "emotional", and this 
dichotomized view helps men rationalize differences in socially sanctioned sexual 
practices (Elaine Kim, 1998). The majority of Korean men in this research, especially 
educated middle-class men, tend to believe that it is natural for men to seek variety 
and for women to love "only one man". This is because, according to these men's 
explanations, unlike men, women are so emotional that they easily transfer their 
affections from one man to another and are thus more likely to "endanger their 
families" if they engaged in extramarital activities. On the other hand, because men 
are logical, men are able to keep their married lives separate from their "play" by 
drawing a distinction between marriage/family and sex. In this way, Korean men 
rationalize their extramarital relations with the belie±: "A woman can't get pleasure 
from a hundred men the way a man can get pleasure from a hundred women" (Elaine 
Kim, 1998: 73). 
Men's extramarital affairs are socially sanctioned unless they break down the 
family system, while wives' infidelity is never overlooked. If a wife is found to have a 
sexual relationship with another man, it is commonsense knowledge that she will be 
punished immediately - through physical violence by her husband, and divorce. In the 
case of adultery, critical denunciation is always directed against women, but not 
always against men. As one legal case reveals, for women, even sex -related telephone 
talk that does not actually accompany any sexual conduct can be interpreted as a 
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violation of marital integrity and chastity duty as a spouse, therefore, legally it 
becomes a sufficient reason for men's filing for divorce (Women's Study Group, 
1995). This indicates that the Korean judicial system is not free from the dual 
standard of sexual morality. Sexual equality, though formally inscribed in the Korean 
legal system, is not implemented in reality. The existing sexuality-related laws, 
including adultery and domestic violence, are legislated from the male point of view. 
Women are in a disadvantageous position by the dualistic sexual norm of everyday 
power that is deeply saturated in, and determines, the perspective of official power 
(Shim, 1995). 
The marriage system operates as a dominant form of social control over 
women's sexuality by dichotomizing women into two categories - "good women" 
who experience sex within marriage and "bad women" who seek sex outside marriage 
(Pilwha Chang, 1997). The prevalent traditional idea of "wise mother and good wife" 
does not require women to function as an exciting sex partner for their men. On the 
contrary, sexuality is perceived as almost antithetical to motherhood (Elaine Kim, 
1998). Korean men's manliness is not judged by sexiness but by their social status 
with an earning ability, while women are judged by their ability to take care of 
children with an emphasis on children's education. Being a good woman is expected 
to be ignorant of sex, passive in the sexual relationship, and certainly not to talk about 
sex (Women's Study Group, 1995). 
Sex-related talk has traditionally been taboo even between married couples, 
which includes a discussion on contraceptive methods. Although men usually playa 
leading role in marital sex, 73.1% of the men avoid contraceptive practices (Pilwha 
Chang, 1991). Male involvement in contraceptive practices is substantially low, with 
an estimated condom-use rate of 8.7% and a vasectomy rate of 14.3%, compared with 
a female sterilization rate of 48.2% (Davis, 1994). Historically, the Korean family 
planning policy, inaugurated by the government in 1962 and which lasted until 1996, 
was a "female-oriented" strategy that was not concerned with women's welfare but 
with popUlation control (Hyoung Cho, 1997). The idea of contraception was 
introduced and contraceptive services were provided through nationwide networks of 
public health and administrative organizations. Women chose to control fertility in the 
ways expected by the governmental implementation. Therefore, even today the 
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concept of reproduction and fertility control is still taken to be ''women's 
responsibility" rather than women's right. In contrast to Western feminists' 
understanding of birth control as part of the social movement to achieve women's 
reproductive rights and individual freedom, Korean women's reproductive control is 
an effect ofthe state politics ofbio-power which has been incorporated into the larger 
project of modernization and economic development since the early 1960's (Eun-shil 
Kim, 1995). Korean women's bodies have not been controlled by women themselves, 
but regulated politically in this historical context. 
Men's low participation in contraception coupled with women's sexual 
passivity leads to unprepared intercourse, which is a major cause of the high abortion 
rate in Korea. Unlike USA and other Western countries wherein teenage sex and 
pregnancy is high, abortion in Korea is mainly obtained by married women. The 
majority of Korean women who have experienced abortion are married women in 
their thirties (Davis, 1994). For unmarried young women, abortion is being secretly 
practiced because of the social stigma associated with the violation of premarital 
"chastity". Korean traditional values are most persistently displayed in the attitude 
towards chastity. Koreans still highly value women's chastity, while men's chastity 
has seldom been an issue. 
One study reveals that 67.5% of Korean single men would take issue about 
women's premarital chastity, while only 35.1 % think critically of men's premarital 
chastity (Pilwha Chang, 1991). As to sexual practices, 86.5% of men have premarital 
sexual experiences, and 73.2% of them had it for the first time during the 
university/college period. Although teenagers in high school create their own self-
governing space for pseudo-sex culture by consuming romance comics, magazines, 
popular songs, pornography or video rooms, their actual sexual practices are largely 
restrained. This is because high school students are normally caught in the so-called 
"concentration camp" for intensive preparation of their university entrance test, 
therefore, Korean teenagers are mainly identified as a "studying student, sexless 
being" (Cho Han, 1998). Under the harsh educational demands in high school, the 
majority of teenagers do not have time to pursue alternative cultures for sexual 
pleasure, nor can they afford to create any cultural space to discuss their own 
sexuality. Most young people in Korea come to finally have opportunities to 
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experience their first sexual relationship once graduated from high school or entering 
university/co llege. 
Today's Korean young women show mixed attitudes towards premarital 
sexual relationships: "Even if I love him, I will not have sex with him but guard my 
chastity until marriage". "If I love him, I can have sex with him before the wedding". 
44.8% of female university students show a positive attitude towards premarital 
sexual relations, while 26.9% show a strongly negative one (Dong-A Newspaper, 
April 26, 1995). Chastity is still perceived as something divine and particularly 
valuable. Indeed, this is even so by women themselves as women have internalized 
chastity as a "sexual asset" for their successful entry into the formal marriage system 
(Pilwha Chang, 1997). Young women's morality is often judged, by both men and 
women themselves, on the basis oftheir premarital sexual experiences. 
How deeply is the traditional chastity ideology entrenched in modem Korea? 
This is indicated in the problematic reality as to why most women, if sexually 
assaulted, would not report to the police but hide such incident for the rest of their 
life. The rate of actual cases of sexual violence suffered by women is staggering, 222 
times higher than the officially reported rate (Shim, 2000). Forced sex, rape, is 
socially conceived as a violation of chastity, because Korean sex culture is 
characterized as genitally-oriented sexuality (Chung, 1988), wherein the meaning of 
chastity is defined in the bodily concept of virginity rather than faithfulness or mental 
chastity. Therefore, women's reporting of rape is extremely low: Only 1.8% of 
completed rapes are reported (Shim, 1998). The social stigma associated with the 
violation of chastity turns out to be the main reason (88.8%) for not wanting to report. 
The chastity ideology is deeply supported by women victims and their families 
choosing to cover up. This indicates that women in modem Korea have not detached 
from the underlying framework oftraditional Confucian culture. 
In summary, this chapter has drawn up a historical account on the 
contemporary socio-economic position of Korean women hitherto with reference to 
Confucianism, education, work, marriage and family, and sexuality. It is worth 
highlighting that quite apart from law and economy, traditional culture based on 
Confucianism remains so embedded in modern everyday life that it has got a crucial 
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impact on women's lives and identities. The question of how this is further intersected 
with the women's experience of television, the most popular media culture in 
everyday life, is the focus of my study. In this chapter I have attempted to situate my 
study within the social, historical and political contexts, the constitutive macro 
elements that influence the micro processes of women's everyday lives, identities, and 
mediated experience of television. As I have already argued, to be a valuable 
contemporary cultural analysis - both epistemologically and politically - experiential 
accounts of popular media culture should not be left to speak for themselves, but be 
grounded in the historical and sociological contexts within which they are 
constructed. This chapter serves as a socio-historical ground for a fuller understanding 
of the proceeding chapters on Korean women's experience of television in everyday 
life. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
Section (1) An Ethnography of Researching 
Sample design 
In order to explore how television intersects with the everyday lives of Korean 
women of different generations and classes, it was necessary to design the fieldwork 
research to include a varied sample of women in their 50s, 30s, and 20s, of working-
class and of middle-class positions. The age range in each generation was made 
consistent: between 50 and 52, between 30 and 32, and between 20 and 22. I 
constructed six different socioeconomic categories, with seven women in each 
category, which means forty-two women in total. Therefore, my sample design was 
intended to produce six different case studies on the women's experience of television 
in everyday life mediated by generation and class. 
Women in their 50s Women in their 30s Women in their 20s 
(aged 50-52) (aged 30-32) (aged 20-22) 
Working-class 7 7 7 
Middle-class 7 7 7 
Identifying the classes 
How is it possible to identify working-class women, without asking directly about 
their occupation, income or an educational level, hence, without offending their 
feelings in the first encounter? My research was designed to explore six 
socioeconomic categories primarily by means of intensive personal interviews with 
forty-two Korean women living in the metropolitan area of Seoul. In an attempt to 
find twenty-one working-class women and twenty-one middle-class women for the 
research purpose, my initial concern was identifying the classes, particularly the 
working-class position of the women. This concern was based on the assumption that 
exploring their class position in the first encounter would "offend" the possibly 
prospective informants whose cooperation would provide the source material of the 
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research and determine the depths of understanding. Without their participation the 
research simply could not proceed. The label "working-class" is so problematic for 
working-class women, as they rarely speak of class and do not want to be defined as 
working class that is articulated through discourses of economic limitation and 
cultural choice; therefore, how to describe these women can be one of the most 
difficult dilemmas for a researcher (Skeggs, 1995: 199-201). It is recognized in 
feminist research on or with ordinary women that ''being female undoubtedly 
sensitizes us to the discomforts and small humiliations which doing research can 
provoke" (McRobbie, 1991: 133). To identify women's class without exploring 
directly, hence without provoking any discomforts and humiliations, I instead 
solicited the expertise of real estate agencies in the North River area of Seoul and 
located two contrasting apartment-complexes relevant for the research end. Overall, 
the information garnered through three real estate agencies revealed the property size, 
price, geographical location and environment, as well as indicating the residents' 
occupation, income and general level of education. By drawing on those three 
agencies' consensual views and estimates, it was possible to identify Jungwoo 
(pseudonym) apartment-complex as an absolutely distinctive working-class estate, 
and Shinwon (pseudonym) apartment-complex as a characteristic middle-class 
residence. 
Graphically, the appearance of each apartment-complex and its ecology 
surrounding the community signaled different socio-economic conditions. Jungwoo 
working-class apartment-complex consisted of ten five-floor buildings in faded gray, 
with a total of 300 households. This old estate was located near a traditional market 
interlinked with a maze of narrow alleys and traditional residential areas of individual 
homes, and served by clusters of small shops and street vendors selling vegetables and 
fruits. Most of the apartment tenants, especially females, engaged in this type of 
small-scale sales occupation, and males in street cleaning, apartment security 
guarding, part-time manual works in the construction field, or they remained 
unemployed. The overall earnings in the working-class families were less than 1.5 
million Won, monthly (900 BP). All the working-class women in their 20s and 30s 
contacted for my research completed high school education, while some women in 
their 50s did not complete high school education. 
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In contrast to the working-class residential ecology, Shinwon middle-class 
apartment-complex consisted of twenty fifteen-floor buildings in light blue, with a 
total of 1,800 households. This recently built estate lay at the heart of modern 
amenities, including a large department store, closely packed Western food retailers, 
saunas and fitness centers. The overall earnings in the middle-class families were 
between 2.5 - 4 million Won, monthly (1400 - 2300 BP), depending on the age of the 
male breadwinner. Unlike the working-class women's economic activity, in the 
middle-class families men were the predominant economic providers, engaging in 
professional and white-collar occupations in major corporations. All the middle-class 
women in their 20s contacted for my research were currently attending a university, 
and all the women in their 30s had completed university education, while a half of 
women in their 50s had completed university education.1 
Negotiated strategies: "Being there" 
Why would women gIve generously of their time and expenence to a strange 
researcher for intensive personal interviews? What is the ease of access to the field of 
others? What kinds of strategies would actually allow the researcher's "being there" 
(Geertz, 1988: 16), to convince readers not merely that the researcher herself has truly 
"been there" in contact with others, but to enable them to see what she saw, feel what 
she felt, and conclude what she concluded? Being there requires drawing on the 
interpersonal resources, communicative competencies and cultural strategies that we 
all tend to develop in dealing with everyday life. In the same vein, the status of 
research can be viewed as one of the numerous social exchanges and negotiations 
occurring in everyday interactions. In the following, I will describe the ways in which 
my strategies negotiated the initial access, and allowed the subjects of research to be 
known, visited and appropriated for my desire to enter experimental moments to gain 
knowledge. 
To recruit forty-two women in two apartment-complexes selected, an 
advertisement was placed on the notice boards located next to the residents' mail 
boxes at the entrance of the apartment buildings. In designing the advertisement 
content, I dwelled on what to offer in exchange for the arbitrary intrusion into 
women's life. Offering a fair exchange, as an "access bargain" (Butters, 1975: 261), 
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was to negotiate an initial entry into the field, which could lead to a sufficient 
exploration of women in the course of research. Thus, some forms of exchange were 
specified in the advertisement: A session of free English lessons was offered to 
women in their 20s and the children of women in their 50s, and a period of free 
babysitting to women in their 30s. While placing the advertisement I encountered 
several women asking if I could teach their children English, which indicated 
Koreans' keen enthusiasm in English education. However, the idea ofbabysitting was 
an unforeseen problem. Later, the women in their 30s in my research, all of whom 
politely refused the free offer of babysitting, informed me that most Korean mothers 
would not feel secure about leaving their child with others except for with their close 
family members. When visiting the women's homes for the research interviews, I 
brought a basket of seasonal fruit or a gift set of fresh juice as a fair exchange for their 
sharing time and experience. 
But can it be a fair exchange? What am I indeed offering to these women? 
How can this research work to their benefit? To approach and use ordinary women as 
informants in the pursuit of one's academic goals raised ethical questions to me. On 
one hand, I deeply felt obligated and indebted to these women precisely because this 
kind of research was predicated upon dependence on their participation and 
willingness to expose. On the other hand, as the outcome of research would be then 
contingent upon the degree of their participation, it consciously obliged the researcher 
to find diverse ways of negotiation and maneuver strategies in a calculating manner, 
in as many reciprocal contexts as possible, for the encompassing of situations and the 
mobilizing of their participation. The whole activity of research, of trying so hard to 
initiate, find, mobilize and understand, was governed by its "desire for knowledge, 
certainty and mastery", simultaneously, "a will to tell a truth" (Walkerdine, 1986: 
198). 
Initially, only two working-class women and three middle-class women, both 
groups in their 20s, responded to the advertisement. So the rest of the women had to 
be selected through the method of snowball sampling, on the basis of these young 
women's family and friendship networks in the same apartment-complexes. The 
research therefore started with these young women in their 20s, inviting one by one to 
my place to create a comfortable relationship in the felicitous condition. On the first 
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day of meeting, I did not bring up research questions regarding their experience of 
television, but instead shared my personal stories in reciprocity of theirs. Staging this 
kind of interpersonal dialogue was deemed important as a part of managing "first 
impressions" to sustain an extended series of interactions involving the same 
participants, and also because "it is on the basis of this initial information that the 
individual starts to define the situation and starts to build up lines of responsive 
action" (Goffinan, 1969: 9-10. Italics, his emphasis). Such casual encounters between 
two women over refreshments in a relaxed home environment came close to a normal 
visit between friends engaging in everyday conversation. From the second meeting, I 
started to bring up specific research questions about television, and from the third 
meeting, suggested to meet at their home, a natural habitat within which television 
consumption takes place. This was to situate the research enquiry in the context of 
women's everyday life. Most interviews were tape recorded, unless they requested 
otherwise, and each interview lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, with 6-7 follow-up 
interviews on average (along with English lessons) to ensure a maximum flow of 
relevant data. Interviews usually began with a question on the women's favorite 
television programs: "What television programs do you like most, and why?" The 
overall process of the interviews was, however, unstructured and open-ended in the 
sense that they were not asked the same questions but encouraged to talk and develop 
their particular interest and views on the subject. In this way, the direction and 
structure of the interviews was determined freely by the women themselves in their 
own words and rhythms? Overall, the tenor of the interviews with these young 
women in their 20s was so chatty and lively that in most cases it was difficult for me 
to call an end to the meeting. 
Here, it is worth noting the important consequences of the initial relationships 
established with these young women for the subsequent course of the research, in 
terms of opening access to women in their 50s and 30s. Based on the facilitative 
relationships, it was not difficult to get cooperation from their mothers and sisters, 
mothers' friends, sisters' friends, or acquaintances living in the same apartment-
complexes. Commonly, older women in their 50s, especially working-class women, 
tended to perceive academic research as a socially superior investigation with a 
different level oflanguage, hence, indicated a fear of being turned into an object. To 
overcome this problem of initial access to them, I instead asked these young women 
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in their 20s to approach them first and ask easy and general questions on behalf of the 
researcher, so that later I could follow up with detailed interviews by visiting their 
homes. These young women in this sense contributed as research assistants, and this 
voluntary participation in the academic research indicated their overall disposition to 
exploring, experiencing and experimenting the living world. 
The prior relationships with the young women and their intimate knowledge of 
me further helped to familiarize women in their 3 Os with the unmet researcher, and to 
validate my status as safe in the initial entry into the unknown field. Through the 
young women's assistance and their mothers' wider social links within the apartment-
complexes, it became easy to make an appointment to interview the women in their 
30s in their homes at a pre-arranged time. The location of the interviews in the 
women's home environment facilitated a sense of comfort, while allowing for the 
perceiving and monitoring on the spot of the women's everyday life. Although the 
presence of their baby intermittently had a disturbing effect on the flow of interviews, 
the baby's intervention simultaneously acted as a catalyst encouraging a more 
intimate level of conversation regarding the women's key concern - their childcare 
role. My repeated visiting as researcher to this private context, 2-3 times on average 
for follow-up interviews, seemed to offer these young mothers an extraordinarily 
welcoming opportunity for communications with a sympathetic listener. This 
indicated the women's own need and desire to talk and communicate with somebody, 
which was not adequately met by their husbands in day-to-day living. 
Throughout the research interviews with these ordinary women, full-time 
housewives and mothers, I consciously adopted one important strategic position - of 
being a "non-judgmental active listener" - which means showing respect for their 
choice oflife, their different views, ideas and thoughts on their own lives. At the same 
time, this conscious positioning was intended to de-emphasize my status as a highly-
educated researcher and to display a kind of ''professional naivety" (Hobson, quoted 
in Brundson, 2000: 124) - in fact, a professional strategy "to make them feel I don't 
know", thereby keeping them feel more relaxed, interested and in control of their 
speaking before the appreciative listener. By adopting this particular positioning it 
was possible to build a felt degree of trust in the research process. Precisely, this trust 
was built on the "non-violent communication" (Bourdieu, 1999: 608-609), on the 
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conscious effort to reduce, as much as possible, the symbolic violence that could 
possibly be exerted through the asymmetric research relationship. It became apparent 
that the establishment of this kind of trust based on non-judgmental, non-violent 
communication was crucial for these ordinary women in permitting the highly-
educated researcher to enter repeatedly the privacy of their homes, and in receiving 
her not merely as an intrusive investigator but more as a welcome guest, or a friend 
with whom they could willingly discuss and share female concerns. 
A normative ideal: Who could be there? 
'Why are they so nice to me?' This was simply a curious question that was often 
triggered in the course of research, for it was apparent that the women's reception of 
the researcher into their private sphere was welcoming, warm and hospitable and the 
interviews were pleasantly enjoyable. "Whether or not people have knowledge of 
social research, they are often more concerned with what kind of person the 
researcher is than with the research itself' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 78). 
Similarly, the questions of how researchers manage to form relationships when they 
arrive in the field and to what extent close relationships can be constructed must 
depend upon "who they are", and this has profound effects on the encounter with the 
subjects of study (Bell et al., 1993). Precisely, the points quoted here were the case 
with the Korean women contacted for my research. Why did these women welcome 
me into their world? As what kind of person was I perceived to them? What does this 
imply? In questioning my own position in relation to these Korean women of different 
socio-economic categories, I can only reflect and conjecture about how they perceived 
and invested interests in myself, not much as a social researcher but primarily, 
personally as a woman. Given that especially in this case it was woman to woman of 
different age and class, it is necessary to highlight the points of commonalties and 
differences that decisively mediated the exchange between the researcher and the 
researched.3 
"When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to 
acquire information about him or to bring into play information about him 
already possessed. They will be interested in his general socio-economic 
status, his conception of self, his attitude toward them, his competence, his 
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trustworthiness, etc. Information about the individual helps to define the 
situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and 
what they may expect ofhim" (Goffinan, 1969: 1. Italics, my emphasis) 
The presentation of self, as constitutive of everyday life, is also an important element 
of social research about living human subjects. The young women in their 20s, both of 
working-class and of middle-class, seemed able to quickly assess the researcher's 
social status and cultural competencies by delegating the activity of investigatory 
looking to the unacquainted individual's appearance and conduct. To acquire detailed 
information, from the fIrst day of meeting they did not hesitate to raise probing 
questions and invest interests in my personal life, especially about my marriage and 
study in America and England. Such a different life trajectory associated with the 
Western world was a visible acknowledgement of the different socio-economic 
position. For these young women, the interview experience with the individual from 
the outside world seemed interesting and novel, as they characteristically displayed a 
great desire to explore and travel freely, especially among those of working-class 
position who have little social experiences beyond their immediate locality. With a 
pronounced desire for moving and an evolving practice of "modem travel" - by a 
standard definition and through the mediated experience of global television - these 
Korean young women can be viewed as "both natives and travelers" (Clifford, 1992: 
97) living in a regional, national and global nexus and their everyday cultures perhaps 
as "both dwelling and traveling". The presence of the researcher with cosmopolitan 
experiences was actively appropriated by them to accrue travel knowledge, 
undoubtedly triggering in them more questions and curiosities about the different 
world of the West. Precisely, this particular researcher was expected to be an 
authentic storyteller, who could be interpellated to play out their existing fantasy or 
imagination about the West. The different types of cultural competencies, including 
the linguistic capital of English and the attainment of Western education, were 
particularly magnetic features to these young women, thus my different positionality 
with the experience of the West played as a unique asset to facilitate the research 
relationship. 
Unlike the single women in their 20s, the married women in their 30s were not 
particularly interested in the researcher's different socio-economic status or cultural 
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capital. Although my experience of higher education in the West could generate 
enough differences to make us dissimilar, and although I could not place myself in 
their full-time housewifery position, these housewives in their 30s nonetheless 
recognized the researcher with a commonality between the positions we occupied as a 
"married woman". On knowing I was married, they immediately placed the researcher 
as one of them - "just like us" with a normal way of life - and on explaining their 
everyday lives, they usually asked, in reciprocity of their accounts, what my married 
life was like and whether it was similar to theirs. The class status in this context was 
not a decisive issue, but rather our shared structural position as a married woman was 
of central importance to these women in their 30s, both of working-class and of 
middle-class. They strongly identified the researcher as a married woman of the same 
age, a peer, who was naturally expected to understand their everyday lives and family 
relationships, with whom they could safely share intimate experiences. This tendency 
was manifest in their frequent assertions throughout the interviews: "You understand 
what I mean". "As you know Korean husbands". It was primarily the strong 
identification as a married woman of the same generation upon which a free and open 
dialo gue was developed. 
A crucial point here is that the Korean women's identification as a "married" 
woman was strikingly far stronger than commonly assumed. If this is the case a 
possible existence of dichotomy between married and unmarried women deserves a 
further investigation. The idea of marriage is normative, powerfully working for 
Korean women: A married body is a regulatory ideal, or a "normative ideal" (Butler, 
1994: 1), which means that marriage not only functions as a norm, but is part of a 
regulatory practice. To be socially proper and normal, Korean women conform to the 
''unspoken normative requirements" (Butler, 1991: 6) of the society. This unspoken 
normativity surrounding the idea of marriage and family has been recognized in 
Korean feminist scholarship. Since the family is the basic social unit in Korea, a 
woman has been given social status by her family; however, the woman as an 
individual or as a member of society often does not possess self-identity beyond the 
family existence (Hoo-jung Yoon, 1986). The following quote from another empirical 
research on the lives of ordinary Korean women indicates the regulatory working of 
marriage and its consequence, that is, a subtle division between married and 
unmarried women in everyday discursive practices, including ''talking''. 
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"One of the most crucial social pressures is toward marriage in Korea ... 
women get tremendous pressure to get married directly and indirectly, and at 
the same time, many women are afraid of being left out as a single person ... 
Gradually, these women are forced to accept marriage as a proper and safe 
place. .. Unmarried women have difficulties in associating and conversing 
with married women whose lives are centered around husbands and children". 
(Eun-shil Kim, 1995: 54. Italics, my emphasis). 
Precisely, because ofthe assumed sameness based on the status of marriage, I did not 
have difficulties in associating and conversing with these married women whose lives 
were centered around their husbands and children. By the same logic, my identity as a 
married woman - the unspoken normative ideal - further provided an entree into the 
welcome experience with the older generation of women in their 50s. Yet this context 
enacted power relations that were complex and often ambivalent. Although these 
women in their 50s were considerably older than the researcher, hence, a culturally 
specific form of authority determined by seniority could exercise power and control, 
they did not completely treat the researcher as a young woman next door. On one 
hand, they perceived me as a relatively inexperienced young woman who could thus 
be given freely a lengthy sermon on the proper female identity predicated on the 
family and motherhood: "A woman should form a family, that's the proper life", 
commonly emphasized by these older women. As the role of the family and 
motherhood was of pivotal concern, in a very matter-of-fact way they attempted to fit 
the younger generation into their definition of femininity, and forcefully sought to 
place the researcher within their experience. On the other hand, these older women 
tended to hold a great degree of admiration for academic pursuit. Higher education, as 
a hallmark of respect and recognition in Korean society, was visibly valued by this 
older generation of women, both of middle-class and of working-class. Unlike the 
women in their 30s, all of whom did not ask directly about my husband's occupation, 
these older women in their 50s boldly scrutinized the younger outsider with direct 
personal questions. Their key interest was commonly expressed in the detailed inquiry 
about my marriage and husband. That I had to intentionally or unintentionally explain 
myself, in reciprocity of the exposure of their selves, as a woman married to a man in 
a higher educational institution, further impressed these older women, so they less 
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challenged the legitimacy of the research and the credentials of the researcher. This 
particular position as researcher, which was determined and enhanced by the marital 
status, enabled me to negotiate the exchange with the older women, and to be more 
acceptable and accepted into their private realm, to the extent that I was often 
expected to advise on their children's academic and career choices. 
Here, the cases of these married women m their 30s and 50s raIse one 
important question as to the discursive possibility of the researcher for being there. 
Who could be there? To put it in another way: "Which bodies come to matter - and 
why?" (Butler, 1994: xii) "Whose self is more important?" (Probyn, 1993: 67) As 
explained in Chapter 2 Section (4), almost the most significant aspect of being a 
woman in Korea has to do with marital status, therefore, a homosexual, single or 
divorced woman performing against this code tends to be socially categorized and 
excluded as a "non-woman", a category of an anomaly, and such exclusionary 
practices based on the status of one's body are the norm. This question of the body is 
further implicated with a wider question of why a dialogue between feminists 
(particularly, single or divorced women) and ordinary housewives (married women) 
in Korea is so difficult, or at least, there exists between the two some degree of 
unresolved tension or even disrespect which is neither necessarily confronted nor 
explicitly expressed in patterns of social interaction, but nonetheless can not be 
ignored. The fact that one "could be there" is a necessary condition for "being there" 
(Probyn, 1993: 71), and it must be emphasized that research for getting and staying 
''there'' requires a certain type of body. Precisely, I argue that this kind of "person-
specific" ethnographic research on the category of lived experience, or an intimate 
dialogue with ordinary women in Korea, is predicated on the taken-for-granted 
normativity around the culturally constituted desirable body ("married") and its 
operative assumptions about sameness ("just like us"). The working of the 
heterosexual cultural imperative, the normative ideal of the married body and its 
presumed unity is an unwitting regulation that governs and allows for the possibility 
of research. It can be therefore asserted that the extent of research on the lived 
experience of ordinary Korean women is contingent upon "specific dynamics of 
research relationship" (Clifford, 1992: 97), which are spatially bound and operating 
by rules and possibilities within a set of local codes and social conventions - more 
specifically, within a normative set of female bodily defmitions and experiences 
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produced through the matrix of heterosexuality and marriage and its regulatory 
practices. 
Inferring from these Korean women, I intend to ask if it would be the case that 
the unspoken code of normativity in a particular society and the assumed sameness in 
a particular group are subtly yet powerfully working in the context of doing research, 
both enabling and limiting the degree and pattern of exchange between the researcher 
and the researched. I am here drawing attention to politics and epistemologies of the 
body in the context of doing research - whether and how the body constructs and 
restrains the production of knowledge. "Knowledges are bound up with bodies and 
authors with effects" (Probyn, 1993: 71). What if a single or divorced woman 
researched these married women in their 30s and 50s, and how would its effect be 
different from mine? Could a homosexual researcher be there interviewing 
heterosexual married women, and to what extent could their exchange be enacted? 
Would there be significant differences between two researches, one by a middle-class 
woman and the other by a working-class woman, both studying the same subjects of 
working-class women - and if so, in what way? My questioning here is not to suggest 
which one is better than the other, but to pay attention to the sensitive issue - that is, 
the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the researched, or the impact 
of the researcher's positioning within the constraints of its circumstances - and 
recognize the consequences, both the value and the limitations of research. "This is 
intrinsically neither good nor bad, but it does have consequences that must be 
recognized. Failure to recognize the partiality of any account can lead to acrimonious 
disputes over who has got it right" (McRobbie, 1982: reprinted in 1991: 126. Italics, 
my emphasis). Arguably, this important insight gained from feminist scholarship 
leads to a view of research as partial - ''that research is a historically-charged practice; 
that it can never present more than a partial portrait of the phenomenon under study" 
(McRobbie, 1982: reprinted in 1991: 128. Italics, her emphasis); ''that the lives and 
identities being chronicled are necessarily partial, fluid, performed and constituted in 
the context of that particular ethnographic moment" (McRobbie, 1997: 184). 
This important point was recognized long ago and has been seriously taken in 
feminist scholarship, and it is further worth highlighting that current anthropologist 
debates surrounding the notions of partial discursivity and self-reflexivity bear a 
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striking similarity to it. To take prominent examples, there are emphases on ''the 
partiality of cultural and historical truths - rigorous, committed and incomplete" 
(Clifford, 1986: 6-7), and ''the transformation, partly juridical, partly ideological, 
partly real, of the people" (Geertz, 1988: 132). However, these leading male authors 
in reflexive anthropology appear uninterested in the issue of gender and ignorant of 
feminist work. This is clearly demonstrated in an internationally well-known 
collection Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) wherein feminist and non-
Western authors are significantly excluded, yet almost exclusively male perspectives 
and the experience of men are centered. Thus, this collection itself attests to the 
serious partiality 0 f cultural and historical truths. 
Nevertheless, my point here is that the partiality of cultural truths, hence, 
partial knowledge, is a discursive effect of the positioning of researcher. Positioning is 
the key practice grounding knowledge, that is then, "situated knowledge" (Haraway, 
1991: 193). For example, the positioning of a married woman researcher in relation to 
full-time housewives and mothers may exclude a different angle of critical knowledge 
that can be discursively constructed in the positionality between the same women 
subjects and a single or divorced woman researcher, or a homosexual researcher with 
a different perspective of, and focus on, life. And vice versa, the focus of the latter 
situation may discursively exclude a different degree of intimate knowledge that can 
be shared by the focus of the former situation based on the assumed sameness of 
socio-cultural experiences. This exclusion is in any case inevitable, and there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with it. "Every focus excludes; there is no politically 
innocent methodology for intercultural interpretation" (Clifford, 1992: 97). Research 
in this sense can be recognized as more of a "discursive and interpretative activity" 
(Geertz, 1973: 9). 
Data is, then, an effect of discursive practices for understanding the human 
condition and experience of ''ready-made, second-hand worlds, not a world of solid 
fact" (Wright Mills, 1963: 405). The positioning of researcher in relation to the 
researched and the specific context within which the research act takes place 
determines the status of data. Thus, I am not claiming here that my data is purely 
neutral and objective, representative of a whole truth, or a wholly autonomous 
ontological text, but the data is the result of discursive practices of research which 
79 
produces culturally-specific situated knowledge.4 "There is no unmediated 
photograph or passive camera obscura ... there are only highly specific visual 
possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing 
worlds" (Haraway, 1991: 190). My data is a detailed partial claim, with "objectivity 
as positioned rationality" (Haraway, 1991: 196), about the Korean women's everyday 
lives intersected with the experience of television. It is a multi-layered partial 
representation of women's everyday reality mediated by generation and class - with 
no aspiration to lay claim to transcendence and universal application, and with no 
right to be a tribune for the unheard and the unseen. "Feeling of ownership: It is I who 
will describe them, I who will create them - sounds not merely presumptuous, but 
outright comic" (Geertz, 1988: 133). The spoken testimony of these Korean women 
and its representation are "not taken as expressive of a full human being, but rather 
understood as partial, fragmented, articulations of available language codes" 
(McRobbie, 1997: 172). Given that a great many portrayals of cultural truths have 
been reflecting Western domains of White experience, my partial articulation here -
in the available language of English for Western readers - about the non-Western 
Korean women's experience attempts to tell and enlarge the sense of how another 
form of life can go with the accomplishment of television consumption. "I am not 
sure I can tell the truth ... I can only tell what I know" (Clifford, 1986: 8). To 
conclude, however, ''while we may never know the whole truth, and may not have the 
literary means to tell all that we think we know of truth ... shouldn't we nevertheless 
keep trying to tell it?" (Scholte, quoted in Morley, 2000: 24). 
Section (2) TV Talk as a Method 
The unstructured open-ended interviews on the subject of television generated a 
corpus of data, some of which were not directly related to television itself but to the 
women's own lives. In fact, the researcher's continuous attempt to return to, and focus 
more on, the discussion of television was almost in vain. This was especially the case 
with the older generation of women in their 50s. By virtue of the researcher's 
presence with the subject of television, the women themselves voluntarily opened a 
discussion on their lives. Even though the informants were not asked to describe their 
intimate life history, such kind of narrative was naturally disclosed and readily shared 
in the context of interviewing. This pronounced openness, readiness and willingness 
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were of peculiar interest to me. Why do the women talk to a strange researcher about 
their personal lives? What motivates them to talk at such length, even making 
confidential statements? In exploring this question, I want to draw attention to, and 
give special credit to, the unique nature of television, its inseparability from women's 
everyday life: Television is deeply embedded and interwoven into everyday life 
(Silverstone, 1994). Specifically, in this section I will highlight the self-reflexive 
nature of TV talk and recognize its unique advantages as a useful method of 
understanding women's everyday lives. 
Indeed, why would ordinary women talk to a strange researcher about their 
personal lives and experiences? This supposedly would be highly unlikely, unless the 
subjects chosen are friends of the researcher, or the friends' mothers, sisters or 
previous acquaintances, which is often the case in social and cultural research on the 
category of experience. For example, one early work (McCrindle and Rowbotham, 
1977: 1) on the lives of British women reveals that "we chose this group of women 
from amongst our friends, our friends' mothers and contacts we have made through 
the women's movement. They are not supposed to be typical or representative, but 
simply individual women talking about their lives". Another work (McRobbie, 1978) 
on British working-class younger women shows that their typical reactions were 
giggling, shying or shunning away from the academic researcher. A recent French 
research (Bourdieu, 1999: 610) on disadvantaged people also states that ''we left 
investigators free to choose their respondents from among or around people they 
knew or people to whom they could be introduced by people they knew". Given the 
problem of power and talk in asymmetrical society, my attempt here to espouse TV 
talk as a useful method can be particularly adept at recognizing the opportunities 
available in studying otherwise a hidden and muted presence of the powerless, women 
in particular. 
Then, how does TV talk allow for such a useful method? To explain this I will 
frrst highlight the unique nature of television. Television is accessible to all, "it is 
there to be talked about by all" (Scannell, 1989: 155). All talk on television is public 
discourse, is meant to be accessible to the audience, thus this broadcast talk is 
"intentionally communicative" (Scannell, 1991: 1). Television constantly provides 
topical material for everyday conversation and functions as a shared cultural resource. 
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In my research about Korean women, television drama in particular was the most 
talked-about program, almost like a ritual social event. As existing audience research 
strongly supports (Morley, 1988), watching television drama was more or less an 
exclusively gender-specific activity to these Korean women interviewed. "Watching 
television drama is a woman's privilege!", was commonly asserted by the married 
women in their 50s and 30s. One of the key pleasures that women find in television 
drama is the "validation of their own kind of talk" (Brown, 1987: 22). On one hand, 
this validation works neatly because television drama tends to use the same forms of 
talk that women use among themselves in everyday life. On the other hand, the 
subject-matter oftelevision drama is so familiar to women viewers that there can be a 
high level of confidence and pleasure in the free flow of their TV talk. The point 
therefore is that every woman is entitled to have views and opinions about what they 
see and hear on television in the routine contexts of day-to-day life, which is not 
always the case with most other cultural resources in other social circumstances. But 
television is, precisely, "a common resource and a common knowledge that excludes 
none" (Scannell, 1989: 155). By functioning as shared cultural and topical resources 
among the women audiences, by discovering the pleasures of ordinariness, and by 
playing a role to re-articulate the boundaries between the public and private spheres, 
television unobtrusively contributes to the "democratization of everyday life" 
(Scannell, 1989: 136). 
For the Korean women interviewed, regardless of their age and class status, 
talking about television was an easy, interesting, female-relevant activity that did not 
require a high degree of cultural capital. Every woman indeed sounded like an expert 
on television. Television acted for the women as a catalyst to talk as it provided 
palatable topical resources based on a shared cultural identity - most of all, the 
identity of mother and housewife. Therefore, this kind of research on a common 
knowledge oftelevision was perceived by these ordinary women as a less intimidating 
and more welcome experience, in contrast to their lack of opportunities to express 
their own views and opinions in this way in other social circumstances. Although 
most women initially showed a varying degree of anxiety about being interviewed, 
once they began talking about their favorite television programs, there was a 
significant manifestation of interest and fascination. Almost invariably they had a 
surprising amount to talk about on the topic of television, drama in particular, and 
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were able to recall the details of episodes and dialogues. While frequently relating 
those details to their own life circumstances and experiences, the women's TV talk 
unobtrusively expressed their own thoughts, feelings, desires and aspirations. 
Thus, it must be emphasized that the women's reflection upon their self and 
world was the major component of TV talk, of the research process. Most 
significantly, these Korean women seemed to enjoy the process of self-reflection, that 
is, the opportunity to talk about television dramas with particular relevance to their 
own lives and experiences. Reflexivity is a key practice that occurs at the moment of 
researching, registering as an integral process of TV talk upon which the research 
interview proceeds to a partial articulation of self. 5 As the data throughout this thesis 
will demonstrate, arguably, television is taken to be a self-reflexive object, and the 
women's TV talk is reflexively intertwined with their everyday life. In other words, 
TV talk as a dramatic indicator arrives at a composite illustration about the structure 
and substance of everyday life. Precisely, here lies the potentiality of TV talk as a 
method to be considered for the substantive understanding of women's everyday 
lives. For the Korean women interviewed, television is more or less a self-reflexive 
object through which they compare and evaluate their own lives in relation to others 
and a wider world. It is through the window of television that people often understand 
how the world is seen, felt, known and understood, and furthermore, they come to 
reflect upon their own lives, experiences, relationships and moralities, while talking 
about the norms and values lived by others on the television screen (Gillespie, 1995). 
Talking about their favorite, ritualized viewing of television programs in this way 
invites a self-reflexive negotiation of what ought to be both in their real lives and in 
the television world. 
"The banality of the most ritualized talk often takes place over the most 
serious occasions of daily life as the only way of saying the unsayable" (Bourdieu, 
1999: 384). It usually happened that women's TV talk about the ritualized viewing of 
their favorite dramas naturally digressed toward a reflexive articulation of their 
intimate personal lives, surprisingly reaching ''knowledge not prefigured in one's 
starting paradigm" (Willis, 1980: 90). This surprising digression toward saying the 
unsayable took place when there was a forcefully strong point of identification with 
characters and their situations, tensions and moral dilemmas. Precisely, this 
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identification process took the form of "storytelling" (Hobson, 1989: 150): Women 
comment on the stories, assess them for realism, relate the incidents, and move from 
drama to discussing the incidents which are actually happening in their real lives. Re-
telling drama stories in this reflexive manner is possible as the discourse of television 
drama facilitates an access to common knowledge of the characteristically female 
patterns of social interaction and interest - the personal, intimate, emotional, and 
familial relationships - that women viewers can draw upon to make sense of their 
own lives. It provides ''known-in-common cultural referents" (Lull, 1980), or 
''reference points for simile and metaphor in everyday language" (Gillespie, 1995: 
58), through which women can articulate their own forms of life experiences and 
explore cultural identities. The banality of the most ritualized talk about television can 
surprisingly trigger and stimulate thinking: "I never thought about this before, but 
now I come to think ... ", or "Aha! this is ... ". Aha! was an explicit point made 
frequently by these Korean women interviewed. It appeared to be a delightful 
experience for them to come up with an answer at the momentary ground of TV talk 
and realize a fitting interpretation of something they had never thought about before. 
What is the significance of women's TV talk realized in the research context? 
Television, drama in particular, is a medium that draws more strongly on oral than 
literate modes of formal construction, hence, the status of TV talk can be part of a 
materially existing "feminine discourse", which is related to the nature of women's 
oral culture, especially gossip, and to the characteristics of many of women's cultural 
practices, ranging from traditional patchwork-craft skills to intimate storytelling 
techniques, as a set of "motley moments" (Brown, 1990: 183-184). Interconnected 
with the quality and character of the cultural form of gossip in ordinary daily life, TV 
talk in the research context is a self-reflexive tool available for women to articulate 
the conditions of their life and experience, formerly private complaints and 
discontents. It sparks a rare space for the articulation of their muted presence in highly 
specific and detailed terms. In articulating it, they define their self. Women's TV talk 
is a significant form of everyday self-articulation. This unique elaborate feminine 
discourse may be an "art of the weak" (de Certeau, 1984: 37), a tactical element of 
everyday practices, which poaches and creates surprises in the male field of vision. 
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Section (3) Emotion as an Effect 
The unstructured open-ended interview between two women on the subject of 
television, conducted in a relaxed home environment, often came close to a normal 
conversation between friends, or even surprisingly, to a therapy situation. "Is this a 
psychotherapy session?", stated one middle-class young woman while discovering a 
fitting interpretation, Aha! The interview's effect unwittingly produced in this 
felicitous context was the outpouring of emotions in these Korean women. By virtue 
of the researcher's presence with the subject of television, the interview at times gave 
the women a dramatic intensity and an extraordinary emotional force that had the 
effect of a revelation. By and large, the research interview was an emotionally 
charged experience for the women participants. In this final section, I therefore draw 
attention to this emotional dimension of the research practice, and recognize the 
significance of emotion as a source of insight in the construction of knowledge.6 
How is the outpouring of emotions possible in the context of talking about 
television, drama in particular? This is not to suggest that television drama can be a 
therapy genre, but there is a certain quality of therapeutic function in the self-reflexive 
way in which these Korean women talk about characters and circumstances in drama 
with particular relevance to the conditions of their own lives and experiences. 
Especially, when painful emotional issues were identified through television drama 
and re-articulated in the interviewing setting, it closely resembled a therapy situation. 
This was the most pronounced case with the working-class older women in their 50s, 
as they tended to grasp the interviewing situation as an exceptional opportunity 
offered to them to explain themselves and their painful feelings in available language 
codes. Not only with these working-class older women, commonly, the interviews 
with the Korean women across different age and class nearly elicited many affective 
responses - discontent and anger, resentment and frustration, pain and pleasure, 
uncertainty and ambivalence, envy and longing. There was an extraordinary 
expressive intensity and a deep emotional energy in not what women always say. The 
women's outpouring of emotions is a fragmented, partial, expressive mark of self. 
The open-ended interview, with a silent pause at times for thinking and reflecting, 
enabled the women to articulate their affective subjectivity, needs, desires and wishes. 
They took advantage of this condition, or the prompting afforded by TV talk, to vent 
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feelings and experiences usually kept unsaid or repressed. The women's outpouring of 
emotions in this sense might be painful and gratifying, simultaneously. 
On such emotionally charged moments, these Korean women 
"enthusiastically" engaged in a process of self-discovery, and this consequence may 
represent a unique contribution of the research process. By "enthusiastically" I mean 
that far from being simple instruments in the hands of the researcher, the women 
respondents took over the interview themselves and gave the impression of finding a 
sort of accomplishment in a self-analysis, an emotional gratification, "a joy in 
expression" (Bourdieu, 1999: 615). With the unique opportunity afforded by the 
interview on the subject of television, with an extraordinarily expressive intensity at 
times, they carried out a self-reflexive examination on their life and identity. I would 
say that this kind of research can be considered as a self-discovery exercise that can 
prompt and sensitize the women interviewees to reflect on the way in which the 
ordinary circumstances of life are seen, felt, known and understood. The role of social 
research in this light can be seen as a complex, potentially empowering, emotional 
intervention in the articulation of everyday need, desires and feelings discovered 
through this very articulation. 
Precisely, the research interview here helps create ''the conditions for an extra-
ordinary discourse, which might never have been spoken, but which was already 
there, merely awaiting the conditions for its actualization" (Bourdieu, 1999: 614). In 
this particular way the research produces an additional social value. Given that 
ordinary women have almost no, or very little, opportunity to have both access to and 
voice critically over the power, media, and macro-politics within the realm of the 
public sphere, this kind of research interview gives access to the women ''to make the 
private worlds public" (Bourdieu, 1999: 1). It provides access to the inside 
experiences of worlds that we can identify with. This profound effect, the intensive 
emotional self-disclosure, was produced by supportive intimacy and caring, upon 
which the essential part of the felicitous condition for the interview was formed. Such 
caring emotionality is a necessarily occurring, rewarding reciprocity between two 
women, the researcher and the researched. Bearing in mind an existing dichotomy -
We (social scientists) vs. They (ordinary persons) - my position as researcher 
consciously rejects a scientific proclivity to separate the subjects of research from the 
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researcher. My welcoming disposition to the supportive intimacy and caring 
involvement with the women respondents is not necessarily evidence of bias that 
needs to be eliminated in the research process. I would rather argue that this 
welcoming disposition to the supportive intimacy and caring involvement, which 
leads one to make the respondent's problems one's own, the capacity to take and 
understand that person in her distinctive condition, is a manner of "intellectual love" 
(Bourdieu, 1999: 614) which is held to be the supreme form of knowledge. 
Here, although I follow Bourdieu in some important ways, as quoted above, it 
should be also recognized that his approach is not without flaws and my own work 
can be differentiated for these reasons: First, Bourdieu's work on human experience is 
not grounded in historical and sociological context, but uncritically accepts or 
essentializes certain categorizations (e.g. gender, race, class) by leaving aside 
questions about "the constructed nature of experience" (Scott, 1992: 25), about how 
subjects are constituted in the first place and how their vision (e.g. language, 
discourse, history) is structured. Second, because everything is already structured to 
Bourdieu, he rejects the idea that people are able to express politics, or empower 
themselves through subcultural expression (McRobbie, 2002). Finally, Bourdieu 
(1999: 629) seeks to represent the experiential accounts of disadvantaged people as 
the truth about "the social origin of unhappiness" - taking them as ''true fictions", not 
as "partial, fragmented, articulations of available language codes" (McRobbie, 1999: 
77) - so his preoccupation with veracity overlooks its inherent partiality, the 
inevitable "partial truth" (Clifford, 1986) of the research practice. 
Nonetheless, my point here is that the relation to each individual woman of my 
research can be described as "a relation of affection, empathy, and the highest form of 
love: love that allows for intimacy without the annihilation of difference" (Jaggar, 
1992: 162), and that such intellectual love is the essential precondition for 
comprehension and knowledge in this sense draws on "heart as well as hand and 
brain". I assert that to omit the personal and emotional is to omit the central 
intellectual and practical experience of research. It is important to recognize the 
personal and emotional character of social research, and to be able to reach the deep 
and hidden experiences of emotions without giving into sensationalism. It is a kind of 
empirical research that I have engaged with and intend to propose here - the research 
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that can share the life of the subjects under study, however in an obtrusive and partial 
way, invite them to reflect on how they live through and make sense of their own 
lives, and produce an additional social value, precisely by providing them with these 
extraordinary conditions for a clearer understanding of their own circumstances. 
Often, doing research can be ambivalent, caught between two anxieties; "one a 
scientific worry about being insufficiently detached, the other a humanistic worry 
about being insufficiently engaged" (Geertz, 1988: 15). It is useless to attempt to 
negate the social distance that exists between the researcher and the researched, and 
the power asymmetries upon which that encounter rested. But critically bearing all 
these in mind, an involvement of the researcher is expected in order to take and 
understand women under study in their distinctive conditions, and to become part of 
the relational field, "so that we continually do feel with the women we are studying" 
(McRobbie, 1991: 127. Italics, her emphasis). 
The women's outpouring of emotions in my research indicates that women 
experience their lived experience as feeling, and speak of self as feeling. Like 
experience, this emotional structure is, perhaps, constructed socially and culturally as 
norms, familial and relational obligations. The Korean female subjectivity or her 
experience of feeling is something that must be understood differently from a Western 
female subject or a European ego. It may be the case that Korean women operate with 
such emotional categories of experience, conveying internal states of feeling, but they 
take them seriously "in a way that Europeans do not", and their notion of personhood 
and emotional structure is "quite different from the European autonomous ego" 
(Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 47). Significantly in this Korean case, there is an 
interrelationship between experience and feeling. I thus appeal to acknowledge the 
importance of the emotional responses of women, but the issue at stake is the absence 
of the language of emotion. Feeling as experience, or experience as feeling, is not 
recognized as a reliable source of knowledge, but women's emotionally charged 
experience tends to be dismissed or simply labelled "self-indulgent" (Bell, 1993: 3). 
"We don't have the language to begin to talk about the emotionally charged 
moments" (Bell, 1993: 29) in which womenfeel their lives with clarity, only to defy 
description, to be beyond scientific discourse. This absence of the language of 
emotion does not seem totally unrelated to the wider question, why has it been so 
difficult for women to be heard and known? Our task to be followed is to provide a 
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vocabulary in which the women's "felt" experience can be better understood, and to 
develop a system of analysis that can better inform the "felt", along with the "said" of, 
social discourse. 
What is the status of emotional knowledge? There is no doubt that emotion 
plays a key role in doing research, and methodology which is going to think with and 
engage with emotion is inevitably open-ended. My obvious intention here is to 
recognize the emotional dimension of the research practice, and reclaim the devalued 
term "emotion", therefore, the devalued status of emotional knowledge from its 
perishing occasions as central to the articulation of women's lives. I intend to rescue 
emotion from its discarded role in the construction of systematic knowledge, to 
''restore the emotional dimension to the current conception of rationality" (Fonowand 
Cook, 1991: 11). In contrast to the perceived value of reason as the indispensable 
faculty for acquiring knowledge, emotion has been considered as irrational, private, 
potentially distorting and subversive of knowledge; furthermore, while reason has 
been associated with members of dominant political, social, and cultural groups, 
emotion has been associated with members of subordinate groups (Jaggar, 1992: 145-
157). The emotions of subordinate groups, women in this case, should be importantly 
recognized because the emotions of women may enable us to perceive the world 
differently from its portrayal in conventional descriptions. My attention to emotional 
knowledge here is an epistemological strategy "for seeing from the standpoints of the 
subjugated in order to see well" (Haraway, 1991: 192), although the standpoints of the 
subjugated are not innocent positions, nonetheless the subjugated standpoints 
expressed often through their emotions should be acknowledged. It is my argument 
that emotion, as a mark of self, can stimulate new insights and conceptualize 
differently how the world is seen, felt, known and understood by women. 7 
In the following chapters, I attempt to make explicit the emotional, private and 
intimate accounts of Korean women about their everyday lives intersected with the 
experience of television. ''Do not deplore, do not laugh, do not hate - understand" 
(Spinoza, quoted in Bourdieu, 1999: 1). The women's emotionally charged 
experience should not be humiliated or downgraded as unworthy of studying. "Who 
would be interested in Korean women, who will listen to Korean women?" As a 
researcher who has respect in the highest degree for the Korean women studied, I can 
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share the same kind of anxiety found in a Black intellectual who was ridiculed 
amongst the White audience, "What is there to say about black women!" (Hooks, 
1982: acknowledgements). This anxiety arises from the undeniable truth that the 
existence of women of color is violently ignored and excluded. The essential vocation 
of interpretative research is "not to answer our deepest questions, but to make 
available to us answers that others ... have given, and thus to include them in the 
consultable record of what [wo]man has said" (Geertz, 1973: 30. Italics, my 
emphasis). This work has striven to include and to be included. 
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Chapter 4 Korean Working-Class Women in their 50s 
Section (1) Misery of Everyday Life: TV, Gender and Emotion 
In this section I explore the use of television in the homes of Korean working-class 
women in their 50s. Specifically, I focus on the way in which television is used by the 
women in relation to their husbands. What are distinctive features in the women's use 
of television in the intimacy of domestic life in particular relation to their husbands? 
By analyzing the women's TV talk on this subject, I intend to show the way in which 
television is intersected emotionally with the women's domestic life and implicated in 
the nature of gender relations. This section highlights the points of intersection 
between television, gender and emotion. 
All the working-class women in their 50s in my research, except for two 
staying-home housewives, are main breadwinners for their families. These women run 
a small store (e.g. clothing retailer, audio component shop, miscellaneous store) or 
engage in door-to-door sales as their husbands do not have a regular job. Everyday in 
varying degrees, these working-class women face a "double shift of duties", 
(Hochschild, 1989), meaning that once they return home from work late at night 
around 9:00pm, they then take care of housework. They must cook, clean up the 
kitchen and the rest of the house, do the laundry and other chores. Then exhausted, 
they attempt to rest until falling into sleep, by watching their favorite television 
programs, mostly home/family dramas. This is the typical routine of their everyday 
life. There is no particular holiday or weekend leisure for these women. All with 
relatively little or absolutely no help from their husbands, these working-class women 
dutifully and ''unquestioningly'' carry on a harsh ritual of everyday life.! By 
''unquestioningly'' I mean that this generation of working-class women tend to accept 
a note of traditional fatalism, as one woman preCisely expresses: "Woman's life is 
destined from her birth. If you are destined to live a good life, you are destined to 
meet a good husband. Woman's life is dependent upon the husband". Thus, they put 
up with hardships as a fact of life destiny and do not question their problematic 
positions. They continue to resign themselves to the traditional roles instead of 
seeking for change. These women themselves do not expect their husbands to share 
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joint responsibilities in the domestic work, and in many cases they seem to never 
dream of having their husbands' help with household chores: "My husband would 
never cook in the kitchen even if he were hungry to death". Yet they do not complain, 
challenge or harbor a grudge about their husbands' absolute non-participation in the 
domestic work and minimal-contribution to the household finance. Everyday, these 
women continue to perform the culturally expected role of domestic responsibility in 
addition to whatever viewing they can spare at late night. Therefore, their television 
use tends to be fragmented. Fragmentation is one dominant pattern of television use in 
the women's hard lives. 
"I just watch a little bit ofthis, a little bit of that when time allows". 
(Soon-hee, 52) 
"I am not completely absorbed into TV. TV just passes me by". (Na-ju, 50) 
"I cannot sit still watching TV even during the weekend because my husband 
interrupts, "bring this, bring that!"" (Jung-wha, 50) 
"I only watch what 1 like and avoid what 1 don't like. When the first son in 
Rose and Beansprout (prime-time home drama) was about to go bankrupt, got 
into money trouble, 1 stopped watching it. It stifles me. 1 avoid unhappy, dark 
stuff My life is already hard, why bother to watch another hard stuff? When it 
turned funny later, 1 started to watch it again". (Italics, my emphasis) 
(Soon-young, 51) 
As shown above, women's television use is fragmented as interrupted by the endless 
domestic work and the constant care for the family, including the husband's blunt 
order. Television use is further a fragment of a fragment for these working-class 
women as the result of consciously selective viewing. This fragmented pattern of 
television use implies "how difficult it is for most women to construct any leisure 
time space for themselves within the home - any space, that is, in which they can feel 
free of the ongoing demands of family life" (Morley, 1988: 30). Besides the lack of 
material resources, these working-class women basically do not have sufficient time 
to enjoy any cultural activity including television consumption since they fmd rare 
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moments of "declaration of independence" (Radway, 1984) from the endless demands 
of day-to-day lives, both inside and outside home. These women, regardless of their 
full-time work status, are sparsely entitled to any socio-cultural power or leisure 
activity including television viewing. For them, home is not a site of leisure, but 
primarily defined as an extended "site of work", so they can relax and enjoy television 
viewing only in fragmentation. On the contrary, the way their husbands use television 
in the home is completely opposite. 
"My husband sits alone in the room watching TV. When he watches his 
favorites we have to cat-step to not disturb him". (Min-sook, 51) 
"My husband always watches TV alone. Then he shouts, ordering a cup of 
water!" (Byung-soon, 52) 
"While he watches the news from 8:00 until 10:00 in the evening, we go to 
another room and watch the old small set". (Jung-wha, 50) 
Contrary to the women's case, the home is exclusively reserved as a "site ofleisure" 
for the Korean working-class husbands, regardless of their employment status. Home 
is a place they can relax wielding "cultural power" (Morley, 1988), including the 
control of television use, in a more uninterrupted and concentrated manner than their 
working wives do. They can watch television in a fulfilling way because they control 
the conditions and relations of the home. It appears that regardless of work status, the 
position of Korean working-class husbands is uncontested and taken-for-granted by 
these women? If the remote control device is a "highly visible symbol of condensed 
power relations" (Morley, 1988: 36) in the gender relationship, the extreme level of 
master power held by the Korean working-class husbands is evident in the above way 
in which television is dominantly used in the home. 
Naturally, these working-class women complain about their husbands' 
exclusive use of television in the home. However, I want to particularly accentuate 
that they do not simply complain about the fact that their husbands exclusively 
occupy television alone during primetime. In fact, there is another aspect that these 
women more forcefully complain about, which is their husbands' distant demeanor 
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from emotional and intimate life. As demonstrated in the following accounts, the 
women's complaints about their husbands' use of television hinge greatly on the 
substantial absence of emotional intimacy in the domestic life. 
"Oh! He was so dominating with us. Let's say, once he persisted ''this is a 
beansprout" we had to believe this was a beansprout even though it was not. 
Even though my son, daughter and 1 knew that this was not a beansprout, we 
had to obey him by saying, "Yes, this is a beansprout" ... He hardly talks with 
us. Man and wife should discuss with each other, right? 1 am never involved in 
that. He makes all the decisions, all the rules. We have never had something 
called family time. We don't watch TV together. He has never watched dramas 
with us. So, what's the fun in life together?" (Italics, my emphasis) 
(Min-sook, 51) 
"He rarely talks with the family. His mouth inside will get cobwebby. He 
rarely watches TV with us. We don't watch TV together laughing together. 
When 1 watched the drama The Last War, he would simply watch beside me, 
then snore". (Kyung-ja, 50) 
"Husbands of our age are all similar. They are blunt, no fun. We have never 
had a family time together. We have never watched TV together". 
(Soon-hee, 52) 
"Whenever 1 watch a sweet family on TV, 1 really envy that. Some people 
may try to be like that sweet family. But you just can't be a sweet family when 
you have lived this way for so long". (Soon-young, 51) 
''Young women (on TV) get enough love from their husbands. They freely 
express affections for each other. They can hear from their husbands everyday, 
"I am sorry", ''thank you", "I like you", "I love you". We never ever heard that 
kind of expression from our husbands for the entire life! 1 have never heard 
that from my husband!" (Na-ju, 50) 
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The working-class women's complaints above, in a streak of acute pain and 
hopelessness, reflect the "misery of everyday life" (Lefebvre, 1971: 35). One may 
easily assume the sources of misery in the working-class lives in terms of material 
conditions concerning money, poverty, hardships, oppression, and all the possible 
consequences of social structures. However, I would ague that for these Korean 
working-class women in their 50s, there is another significant dimension of misery, 
lived, felt and forever lurking in everyday life. This misery is found in the deprivation 
of emotional intimacy in the gender relationship. The above accounts all suggest that 
emotional intimacy is something substantially deprived of, hence, endlessly wanted 
and desired by these women. This misery marked by the absence of emotional 
intimacy is intensely experienced and most forcefully complained of by these women. 
Their complaints are fraught with the feelings of deprivation, anger, tension, envy and 
longing. In articulating the domestic use of television in relation to their husbands, 
these women actually reveal some degree of antagonism, discontent and unhappiness 
in a more extreme form of misery. 
Generally, the existing scholarship indicates that television brings the family 
ever closer in its capacity as a unifying agent, a household cement (Spige1, 1990: 75), 
and that television makes men and wome n more likely to socialize together as they sit 
around the single television set in the house (Abu-Lughod, 1995: 206). However, 
completely the opposite is the case here. Such emotionally intimate relationship or the 
utopian family situation is far from the day-to-day lives and experiences of these 
Korean working-class women. To them, the domestic use of television produces a 
different cultural meaning which is decisively characterized by the absence of family 
interaction and family TV time. The working-class women's everyday domestic life 
looks rather emotionally hollow: "We don't watch TV together laughing together". 
"We have never had something called family time". The absence of family interaction 
and family TV time is largely attributed to the husbands' emotional remoteness. So 
deprived of their husband's endearment in everyday interaction, these women 
plaintively chastise the absence of intimate emotions in the "hollow man" (Duncombe 
and Marsden, 1998: 220). The women's TV talk appears to suggest that their 
husbands almost choose to live without emotions at all. This point is clearly raised in 
one woman's emphatic assertion: "We never ever heard that kind of (emotional) 
expression from our husbands for the entire life! I have never heard that from my 
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husband!" The women's seemingly unachievable desire for a rich emotional life is 
sharply conflicted with the "men's control of experience through suppressing 
emotions and feelings that might question or disturb self-identity they live out" 
(Seidler, 1998). This different "emotional habitus" (Crossley, 1998: 33) with the 
consequent feeling of misery in everyday life is the most striking complaint in the 
women's TV talk about the domestic use of television. 
But why would these working-class women reveal their intense feeling of 
misery to the strange researcher? Here, I want to particularly emphasize the role of 
television which allows a displacement of internal private talks into the social context 
of research interviewing. Television plays a safe displacing mechanism. This misery 
lurking in the intimate realm of emotion is exuded, consciously or unconsciously, 
through the women's TV talk about their husbands' exclusive use oftelevision in the 
domestic sphere. TV talk crucially plays a surprisingly intrusive role that somehow 
triggers, opens up and articulates the women's deep-seated feeling of misery. In a 
surprisingly intrusive mode, TV talk prompts and mediates these ordinary women to 
express their intimate desire kept deep inside. This deep-seated feeling of misery is 
released through their outpouring TV talk, whose TV talk is in fact simply about the 
"domestic use of television in everyday life". The women's TV talk naturally 
digresses toward the complaints about their emotionally hollow husbands, for it seem s 
"possible to say things in TV talk which would be otherwise difficult or 
embarrassing" (Gillespie, 1995: 23). 
These Korean working-class women show such an intensely emotional 
engagement with television while talking so much about their personal lives in the 
context of discussing the domestic use of television. To these women, television is 
perhaps a powerful emotional medium. At the emotional level, television most 
powerfully intersects with the metonymic microcosm of their personal lives. Their TV 
talk regarding the domestic use of television triggers the fragmented, retrospective 
and biographical accounts of everyday life in an endless chain of TV referentiality 
(Mellencamp, 1990: 242).3 Their TV talk self-reflexively unfolds specific, personal, 
generational accounts of misery. Apparently, the interpersonal life characterized by 
emotional intimacy and family TV time is an absent, unreachable, untenable, yet 
endlessly yearned for element to these women. TV talk subtly yet powerfully exudes 
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the women's deep-seated feeling of misery in the realm of emotion, which would 
otherwise remain in their muted biography. TV talk plays a crucial role to articulate 
the women's unfulfilled desire for the emotionally intimate relationship and their 
consequent feeling of misery in everyday life. 
Section (2) Power of Everyday Life: Son as a Tactic 
"It was only my son who brought flowers to me ". 
(Jung-wha, 50, quoting from a popular drama) 
The previous section has shown that the misery of everyday life is marked 
significantly by the absence 0 f emotional intimacy in the gender relationship, and TV 
talk prompts and mediates the women to articulate their deep-seated feeling of misery. 
I posed an ineluctable question in the course of research: Why do these women 
continue to bear such misery? This was the question, not posed directly to my 
working-class women but lingering inside me. The women's TV talk, however, at 
some point, started to articulate the answer to this unstated question. It was precisely 
in the context of discussing their favorite television program, particularly drama, in 
relation to their own (male) children that they started to articulate that answer.· TV talk 
on drama in this context served as symbolic resources for the reflexive exploration of 
the women's central concern, which was their own (male) children. The goal of this 
section is to present that answer and analyze its underlying implications. In this 
section I will show how the women's everyday life is dealt with within the framework 
of misery. 
All the working-class women in their 50s in my research have sons (one to 
three), except for one woman who has only two daughters. These women have an 
unsatisfying relationship with their emotionally distant husbands and this is one 
significant source of misery felt in everyday life. However, the women's relations to 
their own sons appear rather exceptionally special in varying degrees. The meaning of 
"son" is powerfully and emotionally implicated in the lives of the working-class 
women. To indicate the special mother-son relationship, one woman quotes a 
narration directly from a popular drama: "It was only my son who brought flowers to 
me". It is children, especially sons, that occupy a centrality of the women's TV talk. 
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"We usually talk about our children. Some might watch TV just for fun, but 
we think of our children while watching TV. We watch drama and think of our 
children". (Soon-hee, 52) 
"We watch drama and think of our children". This suggests that Korean drama is 
closely intertwined with the women's central preoccupation that intimately concerns 
their lives. Television triggers and mediates the working-class women to reflect on 
their personal lives in particular relation to their own children. While discussing their 
favorite television programs such as drama and variety-talk shows, these women bring 
up issues concerning children in the context of their life trajectory characterized by 
hardships and misery. The women's TV talk often diverts and gravitates towards their 
primary concern in the real life, which is precisely their children. Here, TV talk has an 
enabling capacity to reveal a self-reflexive narration of the women's personal 
biography. Self-reflexive TV talk provides a crucial forum through which the women 
articulate, rediscover and reinforce a common identity as "self-sacrificing mother". 
Here are examples. 
"I enjoy watching Morning Forum (daily variety-talk show). Every 
Wednesday that program helps people to find their separated families. They 
can reunite with the families separated for 40 years, 50 years. In those old 
days, we were really poor. Some sent their children to orphanages or rich 
families. But I am quite surprised to see that even young people, about the age 
of my children, were also deserted by their parents! While watching those 
young people who have suffered for a long time, I deeply realize that the 
whole sacrifice of my life only for my children must be very worthy. I had a 
really hard time raising my three children on my own ... My husband didn't 
have a job. .. If I were not strong enough to raise and educate my children, 
they would be out on the street by now... I could have divorced hundreds 
times, but I endured because of my children. Children need both parents". 
(Italics, my emphasis) (Soon-hee, 52) 
"It looked like they were going to divorce (in the drama The Last War). Of 
course, they should not divorce. I have endured only because of my children. 
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But young women nowadays are not patient. They easily divorce. That's not a 
right choice if you care about the children's future ... Your son will become a 
trouble maker". (Kyung-ja, 50) 
"Frankly, is there any woman who has never thought about divorce? We have 
endured only for the children". (Soon-young, 51) 
The women's TV talk above reveals a clue to the question as to why they continue to 
bear the misery of everyday life, the unsatisfying married relationship with their 
emotionally distant patriarchal husbands. They put up with the misery of everyday life 
in the fear of the negative effects of divorce on their children. In these women's TV 
talk about children, the notion of self-sacrifice and "against divorce" for the sake of 
children emerges as a consensual theme. For their children's life and education, they 
choose to sacrifice their own life and act against divorce, against the rupture of the 
family security. This generation of women tend to view that marriage is a lifelong 
commitment to children and that divorce can be justified only in an extreme 
circumstance: For example, "If your husband beats you everyday, then you might 
need to divorce. Otherwise you should not divorce for children". A dominant concern 
about the son's life is pronounced in the following TV talk. While this woman 
continually and extensively relates her TV talk to her own son, she reflexively reveals 
an overwhelming concern for her son. 
"Drama makes me think about lots of things. While watching that drama (The 
Last War) I thought, 'Too smart daughter-in-law is definitely NO!' A too 
smart woman tends to be rude. I tell my son, ''Y ou should not bring that kind 
of wife, I wouldn't approve ofthat type''''. (Min-sook, 51) 
(At other point she continues) 
"When my husband was out of work, I felt like the sky was collapsing on me. 
I was so helpless that I even thought about killing myself. I thought, if I died 
quick I wouldn't have to go through this hardship any more ... I couldn't die 
because of my son. My son would have to live forever with the memory, "My 
mom killed herself'. His heart would be hurt forever. 1 will live for my son ... 
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Even at this age I sometimes feel melancholic in my heart to see the sunset. I 
realize I am still alive. Maybe I still have the emotions of my girlhood. When I 
feel low sometimes I have a drink with my son. He is now old enough to drink 
with me. My good son consoles my feelings". (Italics, my emphasis) 
"1 will live for my son ... My good son consoles my feelings". Commonly, these 
working-class women act against divorce, or even against suicide, for their children's 
lives and continue to endure the misery of everyday life. However, the inevitable 
misery within the framework of marriage is felt somewhat mitigated, partly due to the 
lifetime emotional attachment to their sons, who have grown up witnessing the 
emotionally distant and dominating father and sympathizing with the affectionate and 
powerless mother. While discussing favorite television programs in relation to their 
own children, these Korean women refer to their sons more substantially than their 
daughters. In general, their talk concerning sons and daughters-in-law is more 
voluntarily and extensively offered, whereas their talk concerning daughters is 
provided briefly only if prompted by the researcher. Thus, what these women mean 
by "children" here throughout their TV talk tends to imply sons. The interlocking 
mother-son relationship is further reflected in the following TV talk. This woman 
expresses anger at the idiotic portrayal of the son in drama, for such an image is 
seemingly contradictory and immoral to her own belief that "a son cannot be idiotic!" 
"(In an angry tone) How can that educated son be shown as an idiotic, 
(financially) unable man? I am most dissatisfied with that. The drama makes 
up a story to give fun to the audience. How can he be idiotic? I am so 
dissatisfied with that. A son cannot be idiotic!" (Byung-soon, 52) 
"A son cannot be idiotic!" For these working-class women, their sons are expected to 
grow as an alternative source of power, a hope to remove the feeling of misery in 
everyday life. While accepting the traditional fatalism that their hard life is already 
determined by getting married to the same class of males, these women pin their hope 
- perhaps the only hope - on their sons for social mobility and empowerment. In the 
long-term perspective, they hope to appropriate their sons to improve the socio-
economic positions and the micro political conditions of everyday life. This 
underlying hope is explicitly implicated in the following accounts. 
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"When (male) children grow up well and succeed, mothers' every effort can 
be acknowledged". (Soon-young, 51) 
"When (male) children grow up, they will thank us. I don't care about my 
husband now". (Byung-soon, 52) 
"I could never raise a voice to my husband as he was always domineering. 
(Laugh) Now I can dare to say something to my husband. Ifhe still tries to do 
things in his own way, he will not get a bowl of rice until he dies, he will not 
get served by our (male) children". (Italics, my emphasis) (Min-so ok, 51) 
According to Michel de Certeau (1984), the powerless attempt to take some control 
over their lives by employing a silent, transgressive, or poetic ''tactic'' for the very 
activity of "making do" with their disadvantaged social situations in the dominant 
structures of everyday life. A tactic, as determined by the absence of power, is 
appropriated as an art of the weak, and depends on time because it does not have a 
place. By drawing upon de Certeau's notion of tactic, I would argue that in the long-
term perspective these Korean working-class women employ their sons as a tactic in 
the hope to change their disadvantaged conditions. By appropriating their sons, these 
women pin their hope on a "clever utilization oftime, ofthe opportunities it presents" 
(de Certeau, 1984: 39) in a struggle to manage the misery of everyday life. They 
assume that it would be surely mothers with the lives of self-sacrifice that deserve a 
compensatory power and reward from their grown-up sons. There is an indication of 
the powerless woman's triumphant feeling of empowerment through the clever 
utilization of time and opportunities: ''Now I can dare to say something to my 
husband. If he still tries to do things in his own way ... he will not get served by our 
(male) children". The degree of women's empowerment here is conditioned upon the 
emotional and economic support of their grown-up sons. The son-power ideology is 
persistently lurking and springing forth from everyday life. It masquerades behind the 
common sense and beneath the everyday. In the long-term perspective, the son-power 
tactic is appropriated to distort the dominant structure of everyday life. Without 
considering divorce, without leaving the place of misery, these women insinuate 
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themselves into the place with a hope to change the conditions of their lives. This 
change is envisaged through the tactical appropriation of their sons. 4 
The women's TV talk in this section places my previous argument about the 
misery of everyday life onto the other side of a contrasting diptych, which is the 
"power of everyday life". The women's TV talk in relation to their sons reveals a 
complicated "duality of everyday life", both misery and power, as conceived by Henri 
Lefebvre (1971): The first panel represents the misery of everyday life - its repetitive 
tasks, hardships, money, oppression, unachievable desires reflected in the lives of the 
working-class women. On the other hand, the second panel unfolds the power of 
everyday life - the adaptation of time, space, desire, and the ability to create 
something extraordinary from its solids. There lies "a power concealed in everyday 
life's apparent banality, a depth beneath its triviality, something extraordinary in its 
very ordinariness" (Lefebvre, 1971: 37).5 Precisely, I would argue in this Korean case 
that the son as a tactic is a power concealed beneath the misery of everyday life. 
These working-class women in their 50s lack any recognition that some change can, 
or indeed ought to, be made in the general patterns oflife. Rather, they hopelessly feel 
and accept that they cannot do much about the main elements of macro-social 
conditions. Nonetheless, at the micro level they instead "carve a livable life under its 
shadow", like Richard Hoggart's (1958) observation about British working-class life, 
with a tactical attitude, "What can't be mended must be made do with" (Hoggart, 
1958: 92). These Korean working-class women carve a livable life through the 
substitute love and growing power of their sons. Beneath the apparent misery of 
everyday life lies the son, as an extraordinarily profound, opportunistic and powerful 
tactic. This son-power ideology is not a new phenomenon in the present society, but 
the son has always been a source of unique female power, a central part of Korean 
Confucian tradition as described in Chapter 2 Section (1). The significance ofthe son-
power tradition continues to be felt beneath the practices of modem life. These 
Korean working-class women appropriate their sones) as a tactic, as a self-consciously 
political, transgressive and opportunistic source of power, to take some control over 
their lives of misery in the dominant structure of everyday life. 
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Section (3) Reading Against Primetime Feminism 
In the previous section I have argued that the son-power ideology is appropriated by 
the working-class women, out of the perceived misery from their husbands, as a self-
conscious political tactic and it is inextricably intertwined with their lived and 
mediated experiences. The subordinate women produce, through the everyday tactical 
practices, "indirect or errant trajectories obeying their own logic" (de Certeau, 1984: 
xviii). These women in their 50s obey not only their husbands but also their sons. The 
women's son-power tactic, as the opportunistic micro-politics of the everyday, draws 
a paradoxical consequence: The women's desire for the emotional fulfillment and 
empowerment through their sons eventually reproduces the patriarchal gender 
arrangement, and reinforces the women's secondary position to men (sons) and 
consent to willing subordination. The women's maneuvering of the son-power tactic 
remains largely invisible and unquestioned in the naturalized transparency of mother-
son relationship. Nowhere was this clearly articulated. However, the effect of the son-
power tactic permeated into the fabric of everyday life is perceptible here. This is 
clearly articulated in the women's reading against a newly introduced feminist drama 
The Last War. This primetime feminist drama The Last War was often brought up by 
these working-class women throughout the research interviews, and this new type of 
drama promptly opened an interesting debate among them. Therefore, in this section I 
will specifically focus on the women's reception of The Last War. First, I will 
introduce this drama The Last War in the context of the emerging primetime feminism 
in contemporary Korean television. Then, I will move onto discuss in detail the ways 
in which the primetime feminism is fiercely contested and rejected by these working-
class women. Finally, I will show the ways in which the women's collective reading 
against the primetime feminism produces a quasi-ritualized rhetoric of consensualism 
that rather reinforces the women's traditional role and willing subordination to men 
(sons). The women's self-conscious repudiation of feminism in this section will serve 
as a manifestation of the paradoxical consequence of the women's son-power tactic. 
The Last War is a newly introduced feminist drama which recorded the second 
highest rating (30-35%), following Rose and Beansprout (40%), during the period of 
my research in the summer of 1999. This new variation of drama, so-called "mini-
series drama", was shown after the primetime 9:00 News, consisted of twenty 
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episodes and ran for three months. Mini-series drama is popular particularly among a 
younger group of women audiences (Hee-ae Kim, 1992). This is because unlike the 
patriarchal home drama such as Rose and Beansprout centering on the lives of 
housewives, mini-series drama presents a variety of modem themes. It introduces the 
lives of professional working women and addresses women's issues in the private and 
the public spheres. A feminist voice raised by a married young woman in The Last 
War is a good example. The Last War depicts marital conflicts between the man and 
the wife in their early 30s, who were once class mates studying law at a top-notch 
university. The wife has become a successful lawyer, but the husband has remained 
an ordinary salaried man. This drama comically portrays the reversed, uneasy power 
relationship between the smart and capable wife from the affluent family background 
and the naIve and clumsy husband from the working-class family. This 
unconventional context also foregrounds constant conflicts between this middle-class 
daughter-in-law who fights for equal rights in her marital relationship, and the 
working-class mother-in-law who predominantly cares about her son's position. 
Overall, the framework of this drama is based on the triangular conflict between the 
man, the wife, and her mother-in-law. The Korea Times daily newspaper (August 18, 
1999) comments on the secret ofthe skyrocketing popularity of this drama: 
"The Last War, in its 10th episode. The wife comes out of her mother-in-Iaw's 
after being rebuked for her impudent behavior. Then she vents her spite right 
away upon her husband, "IfI knew this before, I should have rather married an 
orphan!" The husband instantly refutes, "You only care about your mother and 
family, have you ever cared about your mother-in-law? Damn it!" The 
audiences, men and wives together watching this drama, would hilariously 
champion each side, "All right! That's the way to go!" Women audiences 
laugh to tears and get cathartic pleasures while watching this drama ... The 
secret of the popularity? The writer (28)'s realistic description about the lives 
of Korean men and wives in their 30s ... In its 6th episode, the man and the 
wife are fighting, wallowing on the bed. Then she suddenly takes off his 
underwear revealing the buttocks! How clever!" (English, my translation) 
The Last War is in line with ''primetime feminism" (Press, 1991; Heide, 1995; Dow, 
1996) capturing some of the most problematic women's issues in modem Korea. The 
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young woman's voice in this drama particularly attacks the so-called "Mama-boy" 
phenomenon interlocked in the triangular relationship between the man, the wife, and 
her mother-in-law. This is one of the most prevalent, naturalized, culturally-specific 
conflicts that complicates the working of gender politics in Korea. The Korean 
mother's identification with her son, or mother-son interdependency, is a mutual 
relationship in which "two selves merge almost perfectly" (Hoffinan, 1995: 113). 
Although the mother is forced to recognize her son's independent status, especially 
after he marries and forms a new family along the lines of the Western idea, she never 
completely asserts her own independence from him. As I have already argued in the 
previous section, a Korean mother has a lifetime desire for the emotional fulfillment 
and power through the appropriation of her son(s) as an opportunistic tactic. As a 
result, the actual reality of Korean marriage often turns out to be a triangular 
relationship between the wife, the husband and his mother. The role of the extended 
family, particularly the intervention of mother-in-law, is still a decisive factor that 
restrains young women's freedom and autonomy, hence, one of the major causes for 
divorce in modem Korea (Women's Study Group, 1995). 
This generational gap and conflict in the perception of marriage, family, and 
gender relations is the key issue raised by The Last War. Primetime television drama 
starts to be a key participant in a cultural dialogue about feminism. Primetime 
feminism The Last War renders a cultural forum in which contesting generational 
themes are subjected to selective readings and discussions by women audiences. This 
primetime feminism emerges within a televisuallandscape that closed off many of the 
explicit feminist concerns, which include questioning traditional female roles and 
fighting for equal rights especially in the private familial sphere. Considering the prior 
silence of television on such issues, this primetime feminist discourse deserves 
particular attention. I would propose that the primetime feminism emerging on the 
Korean television landscape is a transitional symbolic object of modernity. It is a 
''transitional object, potential space" (Silverstone, 1994: 15) to bring the new, the 
modem and replace the old, the traditional. The emerging primetime feminism in the 
modem Korean television promises to create a potential space for change and 
transition. However, I would equally propose that the effect of such potential 
transition in the television text should be also understood in the actual site of audience 
reception. The question to be explored is, how do women audiences actually interpret 
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this transitional symbolic object of modernity? Specifically, how do women of 
different generation and class experience this seemingly progressive transitional 
image of primetime feminism? 
In this section I specifically analyze how these working-class women in their 
50s respond to the primetime feminist discourse The Last War. I would point out that 
''women audiences" in the newspaper article quoted above, who hilariously champion 
the lawyer wife and get pleasure from her feminist talk, might imply "middle-class 
audiences". My research on these working-class women reveals a far different 
response. This is evident in the following extract of the conversation among four 
working-class women friends in their 50s. The working-class women's readings are 
crucially mediated by the predominant concern for their sons, in their everyday 
encounter with the modem young woman on feminist drama. Specifically, woman A 
(having only two sons) becomes most fervently critical of the feminist image of the 
lawyer wife, and woman Band C (having both a son and a daughter) moderately 
agree with her criticism, whereas woman D (not having a son, but only two daughters) 
remains silent throughout the conversation, then fmally intervenes with a defensive 
stance towards the feminist image. As we can see in the flow of this group TV talk, it 
is usually woman A who initiates and leads the conversation in moral condemnation, 
and woman Band C are in a complementary position, whereas woman D remains in 
passive defense. Interestingly, what is subtly implicated in this group TV talk is the 
issue of discursive power in everyday practices. Talking is crucial to aspects of power 
and regulation (Walkerdine, 1986: 181). For these women in their 50s, the discursive 
power in the realm of everyday talking is decisively determined by the micro politics 
of son-power based on whether they have son(s) or not. It appears that these women 
with son( s) are more empowered and confident to talk, on the contrary, the woman 
without a son is less empowered, often silent in the social interaction. The women's 
group TV talk is subtly yet crucially implicated in the discursive power of everyday 
life determined by the micro politics of son-power, in the sense that a woman having a 
son is more empowered to talk than a woman without a son. Overall, through the 
encounter with the feminist text, these working-class women reinvigorate, in their 
self-reflexive terms, "what it means to be a woman", which meaning and purpose are 
decisively mediated by the concern for their son(s). Crucially, the traditional son-
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power ideology shapes and constrains the ways in which these audiences make 
definitions about women and meanings about the primetime feminism The Last War. 6 
A: Why does she (in the drama) always pick a fight with the husband? It's 
disgusting! Why does she defy her husband? She's a lawyer, so what? She is 
not taking good care of the household. Then at least, out of a guilty feeling she 
should try to be much nicer to her husband. 
B: On the news currently, a married couple had a fight, and the husband was 
in fatal despair, so he committed suicide! Poorman! 
A: I am getting worried about how I can marry my sons. Nowadays young 
women are getting cocky, rude. She (in the drama) often calls her husband, 
''you, stupid!" How could she say that? 
B: What if her mother-in-law hears that? 
C: You don't need to have a smart daughter-in-law. That's not necessary in 
marital life. 
A: No matter how much Korean society is changing, there is something that 
should not be changed. Outside the home the husband should be in a higher 
position than his wife. The wife should be in charge ofthe home. 
B: Right. Outside the home the man should be the king, inside the home the 
woman should be the king. If the woman is more active outside the home, it 
can cause domestic discord, sometimes, a divorce. 
A: If the husband (in the drama) is out of work, she should be even willing to 
sell vegetables with her husband. Why divorce? 
C: How about the children? 
A: We have endured for the children. Nowadays young women are different. 
C: When children grow up, they will thank us. I don't care about my husband 
now. 
B: (Laugh) Who would care about the husband at this age? 
C: My husband might be jolly, entertaining outside, but once he comes home 
his lips are sealed tight. He hardly talks to me, except the blunt order, "Bring a 
dinner!" 
B: (Laugh) Then he goes to sleep, snores? 
D: If! were her parent (in the drama), I wouldn't marry my daughter to such a 
stupid man. He is not (financially) able. If the husband is not smarter than his 
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wife, he should rather stay home still. Is there any law that only men should 
work outside? 
Television is of talk of everyday life. The content of its programs, the morality of 
characters, the anxieties around news, provide much of the "currency of everyday 
discourse" (Silverstone et ai, 1992: 26), "conversational resource" (Liebes and Katz, 
1990: 7), with greater or lesser degrees of intensity. Popular drama's narrative is 
directly subjugated to the terms of women's everyday discourse, thus, it is likely to 
induce "active, give-and-take participation from the viewing audiences with 
interpretations of their own" (Press, 1991: 19). As shown in the group TV talk above, 
social tension and anxiety around the gender relation intersects with the women's 
reading of feminist television drama. Here, television is a dramatic space that allows 
the women to clearly articulate the son-power ideology in everyday vocabularies. 
Although the positioning of television in the culture of modernity has created new 
options and possibilities for identities, for these working-class women in their 50s the 
modem television rather provides the spark for the unearthing and elaboration of their 
traditional identity. The modern image of the young woman in The Last War appears 
to prompt fear, tension and worry, which is well grounded on the women's real-life 
concerns for their sons: "I am getting worried about how I can marry my sons". This 
immediately opens up a debate about the younger generation of women, their 
prospective daughters-in-law, and the women's proper role today. 
The women's specific interpretations of the feminist text The Last War are 
decisively dependent upon their son-related psycho-social predisposition, and are the 
ineluctable consequences of their socio-cultural experiences. These working-class 
women invest a great deal of energy in a process of negotiation between the feminist 
text and their lived experiences. They evaluate those meanings differently according 
to their own traditional moral values and son-related predisposition. Their collective 
reading against the feminist text gives rise to self-reflexive talks about the women's 
secondary status and role confined in domesticity. One woman forcefully asserts, ''No 
matter how much Korean society is changing, there is something that should not be 
changed". The unchangeable rules about female roles expressed in their vigorous 
statements can be summed up in three points. First, woman should respect and follow 
her husband in any circumstance. Second, woman's proper place is inside the home. 
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Third, woman should be willing to sacrifice her own life for the family. Overall, the 
self-reflexive TV talk shows a substantial disparity between the primetime feminism 
as a transitional object of modernity and the working-class women's fiercely hostile 
rejection based on the traditional son-power ideology. Although primetime feminism 
The Last War introduces a new perspective in the gender and familial relations, these 
women strongly repudiate the symbolic object of modernity. 
The working-class women in their 50s arrive at their understanding of the 
feminist text by relating the modem image of young woman to the real-life concerns 
for their sons, and by using the "individualized socio-culturallanguage codes at their 
disposal" (Schroder, 1988: 62). The women's language here expressed on the critical 
viewing moment might be repeated unquestioningly in everyday life, expressing a 
traditional assumption of male supremacy and female self-sacrifice. The women's 
group TV talk mediated through the micro politics of son-power produces their own 
"quasi-ritualized rhetoric of consensualism", which forcefully emphasizes a proper 
female role for the family and the women's secondary status and willing 
subordination to men (sons). Their quasi-ritualized rhetoric implicitly calls for their 
daughters-in-Iaw's willing subordination to their sons. This implies that the younger 
generation of women (daughters-in-law) is destined to live with conflicting femininity 
under the unchangeable rules intimately laid down by the older generation of women 
(mothers-in-law). The authority of mothers-in-law can act as a powerful reinforcer of 
the system of patriarchal control. Primetime feminism The Last War effectively 
induces and mobilizes an ethical and emotional "rhetoricization" (Silverstone, 1999: 
31-33) among these women in their 50s, whose rhetoricization adopts a persuasive 
language that reinvigorates the traditional female roles. The women's group TV talk 
converts or displaces television into a kind of public space for a moral discussion 
related to the intensely domestic concerns. Television drama allows a public culture to 
emerge in which a new kind of rhetoric can be generated with particular knowledge 
springing from the women's own experiences and social relations. By and large, the 
working-class women in their 50s are not interested in the new, emerging 
representation of modem woman on primetime television, but instead, persistently 
insist on the tradition of their locality. The female roles and position inscribed in their 
familiar local tradition are recalled, reproduced and amplified in the women's 
collective TV talk against the primetime feminism The Last War. 
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What are the political implications of the women's collective TV talk and 
collusive rhetoric constructed from it? One of the key pleasures that women find in 
dramas is the "validation of their own kind of talk" (Brown, 1987: 22). These 
working-class women derive pleasure in "collaborative readings" (Hobson, 1989), 
"collective constructions" (Seiter et aI, 1989: 233), commenting on the stories, 
relating the incidents to their real lives, and moving from the drama to discussing 
roles of women. They self-reflexively discuss the drama in ways ''relevant'' (Fiske, 
1989a: 3) to their own everyday lives. Their TV talk produces popular pleasure, and 
''popular pleasure is always social and political" (Fiske, 1989a: 2). Some Western 
theorists (Brown, 1990, 1994; Fisk, 1989a) suggest that women's collaborative TV 
talk or women's reading of the popular is subversive to patriarchy and has an 
empowering potential. This particular Korean case, however, poses a question to such 
theory. How can it be empowering, to which groups of women audiences, under what 
circumstances? As evident in this Korean case, women-centered collaborative TV talk 
is active in its own pleasure but not necessarily powerful in a political feminist sense. 
A similar form of collusion or consent to male dominance emerges in these women's 
quasi-ritualized rhetoric that implies to undermine female collectivity and create 
generational divisions. This poses an ineluctable question: Where does women's 
subordination come from? This Korean case suggests that "woman herself' is the 
most significant contradictory obstacle. I am using the word subordination here as 
there seems no other way of expressing it, although I consider "subordination" is a too 
banal, ineffectual word because of its immediately assumed ''universality'', disguised 
general transparency, all-too-obvious connotation and effect, and thus its misleading 
usage, which actually obscures "particularity" of subordination - for example, 
particular origin of subordination, particular way of functioning of subordination, 
particular mode of reproducing the legitimate justification of subordination - all of 
which may be the case with these Korean women. ''Woman herself' is a contradictory 
obstacle, who is reproducing and endorsing subordination in all intimate levels of 
everyday life.7 The women's own quasi-ritualized rhetoric of consensualism 
constructed from their collective TV talk against primetime feminism The Last War is 
a manifestation of this contradiction. 
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Section (4) TV Realism and Identification 
In the previous section I have demonstrated that the working-class women in their 50s 
negatively identify with the transitional object of modernity, the primetime feminism 
of The Last War. The emerging feminist image embodied in the young, educated, 
modern working woman is fiercely contested and opposed by this generation of 
women. If this is the case, on the other hand, what kind of image on primetime 
television do they positively or most closely identify with? If any, what's the meaning 
of such identification to these women viewers? These are the key questions to be 
explored in this section. When juxtaposed to my previous analysis on the women's 
fierce repudiation with the notion of change introduced in primetime feminism, this 
section will then complement a contrasting and comparative diptych of identification. 
It will show television's enabling double capacity to articulate both change/modernity 
and tradition, with its dual effect that permits the degree of repudiation of change and 
confirmation of self-identity among the women viewers. 
During the period of my research in the summer of 1999, two "opposite" 
Korean dramas recorded the highest ratings and were most often talked about by the 
working-class women in their 50s. One is a patriarchal home drama Rose and 
Beansprout, and the other is a newly introduced feminist drama The Last War that I 
have already introduced in the previous section. Rose and Beansprout comically 
features, as typical in Korean primetime drama, everyday happenings of the 
patriarchal extended family; traditional and conservative parents and their sons and 
daughters-in-law all living together under the same roof and all intimately involved in 
one another's personal lives. Why do these working-class women in their 50s most 
enjoy watching this drama? Their source of pleasure comes mainly from TV realism, 
as they all declare, "It's our life!" They perceive the patriarchal home drama as an 
extremely realistic portrayal of their everyday lives. Throughout the discussion on 
television drama, they express consensual exclamations, "It's exactly our life!", "It's 
exactly our reality!" This is because they perceive drama narratives and make moral 
judgements on characters, not only in terms of "empirical realism", the material 
circumstances of working-class life, but also in terms of "emotional realism" (Ang, 
1985: 45), the subjective experiences of the familiar feminine world. For these 
working-class women, being able to imagine the character as a ''real person", the 
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event as a ''real1ife'', forms a necessary precondition for the pleasure of watching 
drama. The "life-like" acting style and appearance ensure that the distance between 
character and audiences is minimalized, and the illusion is created that the audiences 
are involved with a real person, "a person of flesh and blood, one of us" (Ang, 1985: 
30). These women involve in drama from a perspective of "like-us-ness" (Schroder, 
1988: 69), and this experience of like-us-ness is so compelling and pleasurable that 
the line between fiction and reality is simultaneously dissolving in their viewing 
consciousness. 
"I enjoy watching Rose and Beansprout. She's so real. Look at her frizzy 
permed hair. 1 heard that she had that perm in a cheap hair salon not in her 
regular one, to make her look exactly like a real housewife". (Jung-wha, 50) 
"Drama is based on our reality. It's exactly our reality! What happens inside 
the drama is something that is actually happening in our real life". (Na-ju, 50) 
"Drama exactly shows the ordinary life we live. It's exactly our life! So 1 can 
relate to the drama". (Soon -young, 51) 
TV realism is a necessary precondition for pleasurable identification and the 
exquisite pleasure of watching drama for these working-class women. The 
approximate realism of television drama enables them to identify closely with a 
particular character, who is what they term a ''traditional Korean mother". This 
identification occurs as they project themselves so deeply into the character that they 
can "feel the same emotions and experience the same events as the character is 
supposed to be feeling" (Schroder, 1988: 72). As one woman expresses, "I can feel 
myself there". These women relate the character of the traditional Korean mother to 
their own real lives, and this referential reading is "emotionally involving" (Liebes 
and Katz, 1990: 100). This emotional involvement is manifest in the women's 
projection of empathic energy, "She's just like me! 1 see myself in her", or in the 
common positional sympathy, "As a mother, 1 can understand her concern about her 
son". To these working-class women, the traditional Korean mother is identified so 
intensely and sympathetically as their personal biography.s On the viewing moment, 
they bring along their lived personal histories and real-life concern for their sons 
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while establishing a "para-social interaction" (Schroder, 1988: 71) with the character 
of the traditional Korean mother. 
"I enjoy watching Rose and Beansprout, particularly the role of the mother. 
She is a typical type of a traditional Korean mother. While watching it, I can 
feel myself there. I am that actress, I am doing that. Like her, I also lived 
oppressed under the order of my husband. I feel like "she's just like me!" I see 
myself in her". (Italics, her emphasis) (Min-so ok, 51) 
"As a mother, I can understand the son's mother (in The Last War). I can 
understand her concern about her son. She is a typical image of a traditional 
Korean mother". (Kyung-ja, 50) 
Specifically, who is the ''traditional Korean mother" these women so closely identify 
with? She is a symbolic mirror-image of the women's lived experience and self-
identity. She is an ambivalent re-membering of a collective identity marked by self-
sacrifice, whose position and meaning are in conflict with the force of modernity. It is 
"ambivalent" because she releases the ineluctable questioning of self-identity that is 
contradictory, troubled, and sometimes lost in the modem time/place, but 
simultaneously she desires to conjure up the contribution to the family through the 
continuous performance of self-sacrifice, through the cultural reinvigoration of 
traditional womanhood as internalized by these women viewers in their 50s. The 
intimate portrayal of the traditional Korean mother resembles the lived experience of 
these women viewers, which is commonly characterized by their perceived misery 
from the patriarchal husband and appropriation of the son-power tactic with an 
unfaltering belief, "My son is the best!" Yet her desire for empowerment and 
vicarious fulfillment of life through her son faces challenges from her daughters-in-
law, the educated modern generation. These older women viewers, like the traditional 
Korean mother character, come to recognize that power never can be completely 
secure, hence, their desire is unrealizable. This tragic feeling yields an ambivalent 
soliloquy, "How have I raised my son?" 
"Like most traditional moms, she (in Rose and Beansprout) has this mentality, 
"My son is the best!" Also, in The Last War, even though her son is not better 
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than her daughter-in-law, for this mom, "My son is the best!" She has not 
received love from her husband, so she expects everything from her son". 
(Soon-young, 51) 
"Because that mom (in The Last War) has spent her whole life raising and 
educating her son, she expects to be served as well by her daughter-in-law. 
But this doesn't work out because today's young women are different from us. 
When this son does not side with his mom, this mom grieves, "How have I 
raised you? How have I raised my son?" It exactly shows our life. Because it's 
so real, it's fun to watch". (Soon-hee, 52) 
"How have I raised my son?" This internal contestation and unresolved tension 
embodied in the mother-son relationship is identified realistically by these working-
class women. This identification with a recognizable inner conflict is experienced as a 
moment oftruth about their own lives. It is a "tragic structure of feeling" (Ang, 1985: 
21) that allows these women to identify with the crisis of the character, which in turn 
acts as a catharsis of their own tragic feelings. Primetime television drama here 
articulates some truth about the women viewers' real-life experience, the 
temperament of the older generation grappling with a profound sense of ambivalence 
and confusion in relation to their sons. Television drama functions as a cultural 
interpreter and acts to articulate the ebb and flow of popular feelings, "the main lines 
of the cultural consensus about the nature of reality" (Fiske and Hartley, 1987: 602). 
The reason why these working-class women most enjoy watching drama perhaps lies 
in the television's enabling capacity to package unresolved tensions ofthe society into 
the domesticated frame, and to "borrow, transform the energy of social and 
psychological conflict" (Gitlin, 1983: 12). 
The working-class women in their 50s are most sympathetic about the 
character of traditional Korean mother, and a great emotional involvement emerges in 
the moment of identification. They are immediately called upon, acted upon a 
"symbolic mirror of ourselves" (Chaney, 1986). Their viewing experience is not only 
individual, isolated and local, but also collective, connected and national, 
simultaneously forming an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991). This 
extraordinarily emotional "mass ceremony" (Anderson, 1991: 35) of identification 
114 
may be performed in silent privacy, yet the ceremony they perform is being replicated 
simultaneously nationwide, incessantly repeated between this hour and that, 
throughout the calendar. The women's television viewing performs a social ritual. On 
the ritualistic viewing moment, the women's lived experiences and the precisely 
corresponding narration 0 f the traditional Korean mother are fused stirring emotional 
impact. Through the common identification with the traditional Korean mother, the 
women's personal problems and unresolved tensions embedded in the mother-son 
relationship are shared within the national culture. 
Section (5) Reinvigorating Tradition 
This fmal section aims to explore the most salient, recurring and encompassing notion 
that hinges around the lives of working-class women in their 50s. That pivotal notion 
is "tradition", a residual category of modernity, whose relevance and significance 
continue to be felt beneath the practices and structures of everyday life. Continually 
and repeatedly, the women's reflexive TV talk reveals the pervasive existence of 
tradition intertwined with their lived and mediated experiences. Insofar as I have 
indicated in this chapter, some traces of tradition are still deeply embedded in these 
women's lives. Those traces are found, for example, in the women's acceptance of 
misery as a fact of life destiny in Section (1), the tactical appropriation of son-power 
ideology in Section (2), the women's fierce repudiation of modem primetime 
feminism in Section (3), and their close identification with the image of the traditional 
Korean mother in Section (4). In this fmal section, I will therefore conclude by 
focusing more directly on the role of tradition mediated through the women's 
experience of television in everyday life. The analysis of this section breaks 
modernity apart in its particular attention to the specific meanings of tradition among 
the women viewers. I seek to analyze the women's reflexive TV talk which overtly or 
tacitly reinvigorates tradition, and to infer the underlying meanings of tradition in the 
private lives of women. The women's TV talk clearly exemplifies the actual site and 
process of reinvigorating tradition through their ordinary language on the ritualistic 
viewing moment of modem television, popular drama in particular. 
''No matter how smart she (the young lawyer in The Last War) is, she should 
behave according to the Korean custom. Korean women should behave 
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according to the Korean custom! Korean women should belong to the Korean 
home! She is a Korean woman, but what the hell is that? She should respect 
her husband and serve her parents-in-law well". (Min-sook, 51) 
"Is there really a woman like her (in The Last War)? I wouldn't tolerate her. A 
Korean woman should respect her parents-in-law, no matter how crazy this 
world is changing. A Korean woman should respect her husband". 
(Byung-soon, 52) 
"I can see in those dramas what today's young generation thinks about. They 
are the young generation and we are the old generation. They prefer to live 
according to their own convenience". (Na-ju, 50) 
''Nowadays, many young women work outside the home. But I will clearly 
remind my (future) daughter-in-law of the rule that she must respect her 
husband and parents-in-law. I will remind her from the beginning". 
(Italics, my emphasis) (Soon-young, 51) 
It becomes clear that Korean television drama is one of the primary resources that 
these working-class women rely on to help them make sense ofthe familial world and 
of the personal relationships. Television drama holds a distinct place in the lives of 
these women as it provokes them to reflect about their everyday lives in relation to 
their families, their sons and daughters-in-law. It continually presents contemporary 
struggles over gender, generation and family, hence, serves both as a terrain for 
reflection on their lives and as a site of moral contestation. Television's dramatization 
of everyday life and its unflagging continuity of moral dilemma invoke "endless 
unsettling, discussion and resettling of acceptable modes of behavior within the 
sphere of personal relationships" (Brundson, 1997: 16). The women's TV talk above 
shows such unsettling, discussion and resettling. It opens up a dialogic tension 
concerning acceptable modes of female role and behavior within the private familial 
sphere. The readily observable differences marked on modem television drama - for 
example, the young woman's resistance to the willing subordination to her husband 
and parents-in-law - seem to stimulate the inertia of old vocabularies in these women 
in their 50s. ''They are the young generation and we are the old generation". This 
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observation of marked generational differences readily facilitates the old generation of 
women to express and reinvigorate the practices of tradition with its recognized rules 
and order. This is evident, as one woman authoritatively asserts, "I will clearly remind 
my (future) daughter-in-law of the rule that she must respect her husband and parents-
in-law". 
The everyday experience of television drama establishes a significantly 
symbolic ritual function, through which these women of the older generation 
reinvigorate tradition in their own vocabularies. Watching primetime drama is a 
routine social practice that mediates these ordinary women to open up and articulate 
tradition in their everyday language. The constant presence of modern television and 
the way it intersects with the women in their 50s reinvigorate and amplify the 
naturalized yet unspecific and vague notion of tradition, to the extent where it 
becomes more explicit, more identifiable and more securable. "Cultural traditions do 
not derive from or descend upon mute and passive popUlations. Instead, they 
invariably express the identities which historical circumstances have formed, often 
over long periods" (Smith, 1990: 177). In the light of incoming new knowledge about 
the younger generation of women emerging on modem television, this older 
generation of women rather tum back to defend tradition. The new modern 
representation is received by these women with fierce resistance as they draw to a 
large extent upon their own stock of traditional moral capital. It can be argued that 
modern television still provides powerful sources of traditional moral fixity, for these 
women viewers fervently contend against alternative modern visions but reinvigorate 
tradition. This age group of working-class women is not interested in exploring 
different identities or experimenting with new roles projected on modem television. 
By and large, women's identity remains a constricted self as they desire to control the 
pace and temporality of change. For this generation of women, tradition is still taken 
as the integral part of everyday life, as the unchangeable rule for structuring everyday 
practices, "no matter how crazy this world is changing", as one woman stresses it. 9 
For a conceptual clarification, at this stage I would like to explain what I mean 
by ''tradition'' emphasized in this analysis. Here I am drawing upon John Thompson's 
(1995: 184-186) conceptualization on four different aspects of tradition - the 
hermeneutic, the normative, the legitimation, and the identity aspects - which in 
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practice often overlap or merge together. To explain briefly, the hermeneutic aspect 
views tradition as a set of background assumptions that are transmitted from one 
generation to the next and taken for granted in the conduct of everyday life, therefore, 
tradition in this respect is "an interpretative scheme or a framework for understanding 
the world". The normative aspect of tradition means that material handed down from 
the past can serve as "a normative routinized guide", and such routinized practices are 
traditionally grounded or justified by reference to tradition. The legitimation aspect of 
tradition has an overtly political and ideological character, which means that tradition 
serves not only as a normative guide for action but also as "a basis for exercising 
power and authority and for securing obedience to commands". These three aspects 
are all implicated in this Korean case. The appearance of tradition in these older 
women's TV talk calls for younger women's willing subordination to their husbands 
and parents-in-law. First, this patriarchal hierarchy ofthe gender/generation relation is 
a background assumption transmitted from the past to the present that still functions 
as a main interpretative framework for the understanding of the modern life for these 
older women. Second, this tradition reinvigorated through the women's TV talk 
intends to inculcate a set of normative rules by repetition, which automatically imply 
continuity with the past, and are being used, or will be used in future, by these older 
women to routinely guide the everyday practices of younger women, their daughters-
in-law. Third, the women's reinvigoration of tradition has a political agenda or a 
hidden purpose, which is to exercise power and authority as mothers-in-law and 
secure their daughters-in-Iaw's obedience to everyday commands. 
I am inclined to infer that by the use of tradition or ''traditional knowledge", 
these women of the older generation seek to reassert their control and dominance over 
younger women. The women's internal compulsions towards tradition manifest in 
their reflexive TV talk bear such purpose. Their traditional knowledge endorses a 
particular rhetoric of female role and identity, which stresses young women's willing 
subordination to their husbands and parents-in-law. Precisely, this "identity aspect of 
tradition" is the central focus in my analysis. Tradition is relevant to two types of 
identity formation; self-identity and collective/national identity. The sense of oneself 
and the sense of belonging are both shaped by the sets of assumptions, values and 
patterns of behavior handed down from the past, and such traditions provide some of 
the "symbolic" materials for the formation of identity. The process of identity 
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formation both at the individual and at the collective/national level builds on a pre-
existing set of symbolic materials which form the bedrock of identity. This is the 
conjuncture where mass media, particularly television, come into playa crucial role as 
a "central instrument of collective/national identity" (Cardiff and Scannell, 1987), 
which identity continues to invent, as invented by, tradition. Such tradition, embodied 
in a "female identity" in this Korean case, is invented and reinvigorated through the 
women's mundane experience of television in everyday life. The appearance of 
tradition in these women's TV talk, by defmition, means a proper female identity 
within the family. This tradition embodied in the female identity occupies a 
distinctive place and fmds a concrete object, which is the home and family. 
"Women should take care of the family. If a woman cares about her work and 
ignores home (in The Last War), she must not know the true meaning oflife". 
(Kyung-ja, 50) 
"A woman should not neglect her family because of her work. That's the 
woman's role! What's the meaning of your work outside when the home is not 
going well?" (Soon-hee, 52) 
"I am sick of the first daughter-in-law in Rose and Beansprout. She doesn't 
care about enhancing harmony among the family. She only enjoys a selfish, 
individualistic life". (Byung-soon, 52) 
"Familial harmony is most important of all. So, each member of the family 
should sacrifice a little bit of their own interest to bring harmony to the home". 
(Soon-young, 51) 
Television is a "cultural extension of the society" (Lull, 1988: 240), which means that 
the way television is interpreted by the audiences reflects the main cultural themes 
and patterns of the society. The women's TV talk above can be understood as a 
cultural barometer that registers the cultural climate and the current experiences of 
national identity. It characterizes a collective female identity that is grounded on the 
preservation of the home and family at the cost of women's self-sacrifice against any 
individualized identity. The implied notion of tradition embodied in the female 
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identity is constantly emphasized, in teffils of the culturally-specific ideas ofthe home 
and family harmony and self-sacrifice. The audiences do not simply come to the 
television set with a history, but they are part of history, shaped by social, economic 
and cultural forces (Morley, 1980). These Korean women reinvigorate tradition by 
bringing the television reading their lived identity in the historical memory. Tradition 
is bound up with memory and has guardians with a moral and emotional content 
(Giddens, 1994: 63). These women in their 50s stand as the "guardians of the 
tradition" (Smith, 1991: 28), preserving and transmitting the fund of historical 
memories and moral values. They are active defmers of the female identity in the 
modern society of continual change, and articulate the female identity in the deepest 
sense of keeping the home and family harmonious. I would argue that for this 
generation of Korean women, the home and family is the most visible object of 
tradition and the most solid embodiment of female identity. "Home is carved out 
under the shadow of the giant abstractions" (Hoggart, 1958: 104), of the outer forces 
of changes and uncertainties. The significance of tradition concretized through the 
women's persistent adherence to the home and family is not bound to wither away in 
modern life, on the contrary, it is more consciously reinvigorated in their everyday 
symbolic encounter with different modes of female role and identity. 
Why do these women so critically engage in the articulation of identity on the 
viewing moment of modern television, unleashing a high degree of moral and 
emotional energy? I would infer that the women's fervent contestation in their TV 
talk is both an indicator and a symptom of generational conflicts in transitional Korea, 
which might not otherwise be readily recognized or directly expressed in the everyday 
interactions. The women's TV talk here in high moral and emotional intensity is a 
dramatic symbolic evidence. On one hand, this moral contestation attests to the 
identity crisis and conflict among different generations in Korea. On the other hand, 
this is symptomatic of the women's own crisis in identity, hence with their own need 
to define, reinvigorate and re-moor it. Identity becomes a particular issue when it is in 
crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is de-stabilized, on 
the verge of being displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty (Mercer, 
1990: 43). It seems that identity becomes a particular issue to this age group of 
women, for they desire to keep their identity in relation to their families, particularly 
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to their own sons and daughters-in-law, as an unchanging reality amidst the modern 
society which is ceaselessly threatened by changes. 
The women's reinvigoration of tradition, traditional female identity, through 
their everyday language of TV talk may render a significant meaning or purpose to 
them, precisely in the context of "contrast" (Hobsbawm, 1983: 2) between the 
constant changes of the modern society and the women's attempt to structure at least 
some parts of everyday life within it as unchanging and secure. In this context of 
contrast, tradition seems to acquire its modem significance in these women's lives. 
Tradition gains a purpose to secure a familiar identity in the context of marked 
contrast between the old and the young generations. With the assumed continuity of 
tradition being challenged by new cultural confrontations on the modern television, 
the most familiarized sense of tradition still provides this old generation of women 
with a powerful means of defining and locating their selves in everyday life. The 
women's reinvigoration of tradition in their TV talk is a "conscious and deliberate 
social practice". It is through the moral prism of tradition and its shared distinctive 
identity that these women are enabled to define who they are in relation to their 
families. On the moment of television experience in everyday life, they continue to 
engage in the on-going process of re-discovering and re-confrrming themselves, their 
authentic selves moored on the traditional foundation of home and family. Such 
traditional identity, the long-familiar one, may be felt to "satisfy their needs for 
cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security" (Smith, 1995: 159) in the force of 
modernization that disturbs, disrupts and alters the stable patterning of the everyday, 
the sense of knowing who they are. 
This Korean case casts a doubt on the general assumption inherent in the 
Western discourse of (post)modernity that with the development of modem societies 
and the mass media, television in particular, tradition is bound to fade away and 
eventually ceases to playa vital role in (post)modern life. Contrary to the imagined 
obsoleteness of tradition, I have shown in this Korean case of women, television and 
modernity that tradition is an integral part of everyday life, even more consciously 
reinvigorated and concretized under the abstract yet gigantic imperatives of 
modernization and globalization today.l0 This is where television plays a vital role as 
a mediating instrument of tradition. Although television has an enabling capacity to 
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bring change and modernity through its drama, this old generation of women strongly 
rejects it while reinvigorating tradition in their ritualistic contact with television. They 
gravitate to tradition in the attempt to restore their certainty of self-identity in the 
changing society, and bear upon them the traces of tradition. This proves that tradition 
continues to have a pervasive and significant presence in the women's lives, yet it has 
not been adequately recognized in the modem discourse of feminism and media. This 
further implies that the presence of the modem in Korea is partial, incomplete, and 
more complex than imagined. 
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Chapter 5 Korean Working-Class Women in their 30s 
Section (1) TV Rituals, Security and Intimacy 
How is television used by working-class housewives in their 30s in the intimacy of 
domestic life? What kind of domestic object is television in the young housewives' 
everyday life? The emphasis of this section is upon the women's domestic use of 
television in relation to their husbands. My intention here is to see if there is any 
significant difference in the ways in which television is used by different generations 
of women in particular relation to their husbands. The working-class women in their 
50s in the previous chapter have forcefully complained about their husbands' 
emotional distance and the consequent absence of shared television experiences. On 
the contrary, the young women in their 30s reveal a different emotional landscape 
interwoven with the experiences of television. In this section I will elucidate this 
marked difference in two steps. First, I will highlight TV rituals as a key finding, by 
presenting specific cases that illustrate the ways in which the young housewives 
deliberately construct TV rituals as settled features of everyday family life. Second, 
what are the significant meanings of TV rituals in the women's domestic life? This 
question will be explored in terms of security and intimacy in the modern nuclear 
family. 
TV Rituals 
"My family are usually awake around 7:00 but we don't get out of bed 
immediately. My kids (7 and 8 years old) hate to get up early in the morning, 
begging me, "Just a little bit more sleep! Just a little bit more sleep!" They 
frown, tumble, roll with the bedding. (Laugh) These little kids say, "Mom, you 
wouldn't know how honeyed it is". For me, every morning is a war. War 
against three men - my husband and two sons ... Upon waking up every 
morning I tum on the TV loud so that they can get completely awake. Lying 
down half-sleep, half-awake, they watch TV for about 30 minutes. My 
husband and kids like sports programs. Then, they go to wash, eat breakfast. 
Around 8:00 everybody takes off to work and school". (Sun-hae, 32) 
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"As soon as we are awake (in the morning), we start to fumble for the TV 
remote. I turn on the TV first. We don't watch it, but just listen to the sound 
lying down on the bed. My husband sometimes watches the news, but I am in 
half-sleep beside him. It feels good to snuggle together inside the bedding, 
listening to a cheetful sound". (Yeon-sook, 30) 
The above extracts illustrate how television interacts routinely with these working-
class families as they wake up in the morning. These ritualized viewing modes show 
the ways in which the domestic presence of television is integrated into the private 
lives of working-class women in their 30s. More precisely, it is the women 
themselves who attempt to construct and integrate TV rituals into the structure of 
everyday family life. Such integration of television into the rhythms of the everyday is 
something completely familiar, predictable, ritual for these women. This is a routine 
and regularized activity that they carry out as an integral part of domestic life. 
Television in this way becomes a ritualized object on its own, or "another member of 
the family", as the result of its occupation ofthe particular times and spaces of home. 
Television is part of the grain of everyday life (Silverstone, 1994). TV rituals in this 
domestic context reveal some of the most central features of everyday family life, for 
these rituals embody extensions of the normative values, mental orientations, day-to-
day behavior of families, and rules of family interaction and communication (Lull, 
1988: 238). TV rituals created by these women in their 30s can be a manifestation of 
the micro-social family ecology, which is characterized by sharing experiences of 
television and emotionally permissive gender relations. This is in sharp contrast to the 
previous case of the women in their 50s whose family lives are marked by the 
husbands' emotional distance and the absence of family TV time. 
The routine use of television by the women in their 30s plays a significant role 
in the familial relationship, particularly with their husbands. Here, television is an 
integral part of the way the young couples' everyday life is organized and conducted. 
It occupies a spatial and temporal significance in the intimacy of domesticity. 
Television plays a positive role in helping to constitute the routinization of 
contemporary family experiences and day-to-day practices. Television here more 
deeply penetrates the everyday. It is consumed and absorbed by the everyday 
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(Bausinger, 1984: 344). These Korean housewives in their 30s routinely consume this 
unique domestic resource of television to fulfill some desires and objectives. As a 
manager of the domestic world, they purposefully appropriate strategies of meaning 
construction surrounding TV rituals in highly private and consistent ways to advance 
their individual desires and family interests. Then, what are the significant meanings 
of TV rituals, desires and objectives to be fulfilled? Why do they deliberately 
establish TV rituals as settled features of everyday family life? In the following I want 
to explain two meanings implicated here - security and intimacy. 
Security 
One significant meaning of TV rituals is related to the place of television in its spatial 
and temporal significance, wherein TV rituals are expected to provide and sustain a 
sense of security. As part of the routine of getting up in the morning, the women's 
deliberate incorporation of television into the temporal structure of the household 
facilitates "control oftime" (Silverstone et ai., 1992: 24), control of the morning-time 
world. TV rituals created by these housewives and routine activities followed by their 
family members constitute everyday life as familiar and predictable. They organize 
the time-space paths in such a way that certain mediated experiences are planned 
central features of everyday family life. The domestic use of television is habitualized 
and routinized in this specific way, becoming an indispensable component of the 
structure of the everyday perceptions and expectations. The women's ritualistic use of 
television here is a mark of confirmation that the morning-time world is in order, 
stabilized and secured. 
TV rituals, as firmly integrated into the structure of everyday life, function to 
guarantee "ontological security" (Giddens, 1990: 92), a stabilizing sense and a 
structuring function for the continuity and the constancy of the surrounding domestic 
environment. Everyday life is sustained through the ordered continuities of routine, 
habit, the taken for granted but essential structures that sustain the grounds for 
security in daily lives (Silverstone, 1994: 18-19). Ontological security and routine are 
intimately connected via the pervasive influence of habit (Giddens, 1990: 98). 
Ontological security is an emotional rather than a cognitive phenomenon that has to 
be sustained in the routinized activities of daily life. The role of television in this 
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context is significant as it helps to define habitual routines, hence, sustain a sense of 
security. The minutiae of TV rituals in the Korean women's case suggest that the 
feeling of security may well be aroused and maintained on the moment of the 
everyday cozy snuggling in front of television. Television's cheerful sound and image 
- for example, dynamic sports program and morning news - defines its function of 
orienting the family to each and every morning, all combining to produce the sense of 
the meaningfulness, the fullness of days (Scannell, 1996: 149). TV rituals, as 
completely familiar, routine and predictable, playa role of a "contributor to security" 
(Silverstone, 1994: 19) in the visible and hidden ordering of everyday life. These 
Korean housewives deliberately appropriate TV rituals governed by the logic of 
repetition in order to establish the familiar, stabilizing and structuring function in their 
everyday family life, and sustain the sense of security. This sense of ontological 
security is achieved through the women's "fantasy of dominance" (Giddens, 1991: 
194), control oftime and family framework, thereby the domestic world feels as if it 
were fully orchestrated by the housewives themselves. Precisely, TV rituals allow a 
controlling mechanism for them in managing and regulating the micro-social family 
relations in the particular time and space of home. This controlling function for the 
maintenance of security is a unique capacity of TV rituals embedded in everyday life. 
Intimacy 
The second significance of TV rituals can be explained in a landscape of intimacy. In 
contrast to the perceived misery in the married lives of the women in their 50s, these 
young couples' willing participation in TV rituals constructs a series of renewable 
pleasures in everyday life. Routine events, like TV rituals, are part of the often 
"invisible history of everyday life", a history that is not recorded by the people who 
live and experience it (Spigel, 1992: 2). TV rituals constitute such invisible and 
biographically rooted history of everyday life, when integrated into daily family 
routines and accustomed patterns of interaction. Compared with the case of the 
women in their 50s, TV rituals by the women in their 30s reveal a different feature in 
the everyday life situation, that is, an emotionally intimate relationship with their 
husbands. The minutiae of TV rituals throw light upon a repertoire of changes 
occurring in the intimacy of married relationship, wherein television is in closer touch 
with the young couples' day-today existence. The young couples' emotional 
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landscape interwoven with the intimate use of television is sharply contrasted with the 
absence of shared television experiences in the married lives of women in their 50s. 
These young wives orchestrate moments of physical and interpersonal contact in front 
of the television screen to create an "intimacy which needs not be accompanied by 
conversation" (Lull, 1990: 38) - for example, everyday morning snuggle accompanied 
by television sound. Such rituals become emotionally familiar, creating good feelings 
and defining intimate interpersona I relationships between man and wife. "It feels good 
to snuggle together inside the bedding, listening to cheerful sound", as the woman 
above expresses. Television here functions as a third person in the young couples' 
private life and may well produce an aphrodisiac pleasure that is constantly 
constructed anew everyday. By deliberately constructing TV rituals, the young wives 
in their 30s actively attempt to make a more emotionally permissive and intimate 
relationship with their husbands, whereas the older generation of women in their 50s 
give up on their emotionally distant husbands and resign their perceived misery to the 
notion of fatalism. 
The experience of "repeat performances", routines and habits, provides 
security, intimacy and closeness in everyday ordinary lives (Berger, 1997: 162-171). 
In a similar vein, the experience of TV rituals in these ordinary women's everyday 
life can be set into a landscape of intimacy, as the repeated act of television 
consumption entails a consolidation of intimacy baween the couples. Rituals function 
to call up and induce a certain emotional magic (Crossley, 1998: 32). TV rituals in 
this context function to induce and sustain an emotional magic of intimacy, security, 
or family solidarity in the materially constrained, small and dense spaces of the 
working-class homes. The essence of working-class life is the dense and concrete life 
whose main stress is on the intimate, the sensory, and the personal (Hoggart, 1958: 
104). It is worth noting that a television set in these Korean young couples' homes 
tends to be placed in a private bedroom, not in a sitting room. 1 The use of television in 
this private bedroom may be an active attempt on the part of the young wives to save 
some degree of intimacy and togetherness in the married life. Not only the wives but 
also their husbands seem to understand the magical effect of television, thus willingly 
participate in TV rituals. The following example shows an interesting way in which 
television is employed by a husband to create an atmosphere of intimacy in the 
married relationship. 
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"My husband is under my control. (Laugh) Once we fight, it's usually my 
husband who apologizes first. I don't cook, talk until he apologizes. He goes 
to work without a breakfast, gets home without a greeting from his wife. I 
don't sit together and watch TV with him. I don't care if he watches TV alone, 
if he is bored to death rolling alone on the floor ... Entering the door (from 
work) he talks to me naturally as if nothing happened, but I don't look at him. 
He highly praises the dinner dish trying to talk to me. If I go to sleep early, he 
pulls down the bedding, saying, "Watch it! It's so funny!" He lures me to 
watch TV. "It's so funny! Here's your favorite program!" Ifhe keeps luring, I 
start to watch TV. He keeps laughing, talking to me about the program. While 
watching TV together we naturally reconcile, naturally get to talk". 
(Hee-sun, 30) 
The young couple's reconciliation of conflict above, mediated through television, is a 
pronounced example that gets into a deeper level of intimacy hidden behind the 
closed, private realm of everyday life. As an invited arbitrator, television forms a 
dialogical intimacy by intervening in the mundane conflict and facilitating an 
emotional and communicative climate. It functions as a powerful mediator for the 
couple's permissive interpersonal relationship and cultural pleasure. Television has a 
unique capacity to create and sustain, through the ritualized appropriation, the degree 
of intimacy in its own right? Television, as a connection to domestic relations and 
ritualistic practices, is selected and appropriated in such a highly intimate and 
personal way. 
Overall, the minutiae of TV rituals presented in this section signify a changing 
nature of women's everyday life in particular relation to their husbands and the 
television's positive role within it. Compared with the previous case of women in 
their 50s, a significant transition is found in this emotionally intimate gender relation, 
and such transition is articulated in the specific cosmologies of TV rituals. Television 
is integrated, highly personally, intimately and pleasurably, into the structure of 
everyday family life. The young wives in their 30s deliberately integrate TV rituals 
into the everyday rhythm and space to fulfill their emotional priorities, desires for 
intimacy and security. 3 
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There is one sociological point to be made between the emotion of intimacy 
and security and the young housewives' use of TV rituals in the modem nuclear 
family. The younger generation of women are more likely to tum to their husbands 
for intimacy, with the geographical mobility and breakdown of women's support 
networks and communities outside the nuclear family (Easton, 1978: 30; quoted in 
Modleski, 1997: 46). With social and cultural changes resulting from Korean 
modernization - for example, a paring down of the size of the nuclear family, greater 
dependence on the home and an increase in the role of the family for emotional 
interdependence - the younger generation of women, especially the staying-home 
housewives in my research, are more likely to tum to their husbands for the sense of 
ontological security and intimacy. Therefore, it may follow that the women's use of 
TV rituals is not merely an issue of psychological motivations and preferences, but a 
structurally determined consumption which has a unique purpose to fulfil a complex 
set of psycho-social and emotional needs and desires. As the following example 
illustrates, the presence of the husband in an encounter with the evening news creates 
a spatially and temporally bound sense of security for a staying-home housewife 
living in a disorderly modern world. 
"It's scary to watch the news alone. If I hear bad news, I get so afraid that I 
even go to the (apartment) door and check the lock again. Once my husband is 
home, it's OK I feel secure". (Ha-jung, 30) 
Modem television news presents disruptions of the order and security of the public 
world. This is a reason why the Korean housewives in my research tend to avoid 
watching the news, but prefer to watch the familiar, secure and intimate world of 
home drama. Television news, in the conditions of modem society, captures threats, 
risks and fears of "a reality and a real world that has become increasingly dangerous 
and difficult to manage" (Robins, 1994: 466). It poses "ontological insecurity" 
(Giddens, 1990: 105) which is higher in the modem world than in the circumstances 
of traditional social life. Therefore, these housewives deliberately refuse to confront 
the dangerous public world of news, in order not to disturb the private and fragile 
sense of ontological security which is grounded and sought in their intimate 
experiences of familiar and predictable routines, like TV rituals. And the presence of 
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the husband in the modem nuclear family is expected to provide a major source of 
security and intimacy in the women's home-bound lives. 
Section (2) TV and Childcare: "I try not to watch TV because of the child" 
In the previous section I have explored the women's domestic use of television in 
relation to their husband. This section focuses on the women's use of daytime 
television in particular relation to their child. It analyzes the ways in which culturally 
specific rules of child care regulate the women's television experience and pleasure. 
Throughout this section I will show how the general patterns and degrees of women's 
television consumption during the day are strongly influenced by the cultural ideology 
of childcare, more specifically child education, and further discuss its far-reaching 
implications on the working-class women's daily lives. 
In Western television studies it is generally suggested that women everywhere 
use television as a babysitter, extending role responsibilities for managing their 
children and for the simultaneous fulfillment of other domestic roles (Lull, 1988: 
246). Television will be consciously or semi-consciously used by the mother-figure as 
her own replacement while she cooks the dinner or attends, for whatever length of 
time, to something else, somewhere else, because the continuities of television sound 
and image can be easily appropriated as a comfort and a security (Silverstone, 1994: 
15). Many housewives actively appropriate private time to watch their favorite shows 
and derive pleasure from such viewing: ''The woman was serving the evening meal, 
feeding her five-and three-year-old daughters and attempting to watch the program on 
the black and white television situated on top of the freezer opposite to the kitchen 
table" (Hobson, 1982: 112). In short, as one Western interviewee states, ''Ninety-nine 
percent of the women I know stay at home to look after their kids, so the only other 
thing you have to talk about is your housework or the telly" (Morley, 1988: 40). Ifthis 
is the general picture of the daily lives of Western housewives staying home with 
young children, my case on the Korean working-class housewives in their 30s reveals 
a different phenomenology of television experience. As manifest in the following 
examples, these Korean housewives consciously try to distance themselves from 
daytime television due to the concern for its perceived negative effect on child 
education. 
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"Once I was cooking in the kitchen, but suddenly I felt my baby (two years 
old) was very quiet. I turned back to see what she was doing. She was sitting 
in front of television vacantly gazing at the screen. Just like a dull zombie. I 
called her, but she didn't even look back at me. Strangely, I felt afraid. I 
thought, television was contaminating my baby's pure brain, television would 
stop her brain. Since I saw her vacant face, I have been trying not to watch 
television because of my child". (Ha-jung, 30) 
"I do watch TV, but try not to watch because of my daughter (three years 
old) ... Because TV is not good for the child's brain. It lowers the child's 
creativity. I try to read books to her, play with picture puzzles. That's why we 
moms are so tired. She wouldn't just play alone. Sometimes I feel tempted to 
shout, "Please play alone!" She constantly brings something to do together. I 
get to understand why people say, "Once you raise one child, you learn 
patience. If you raise ten children, you will probably become a saint!"" 
(Eun-kyung, 30) 
''Upon hearing my kids come home (from school), I turn off the TV. I tell my 
kids all the time, "Don't watch TV". So I should not watch TV when they are 
around. If I do something against my words, my kids immediately retort, ''But 
why does mom watch TV?"" (Sun-hae, 32) 
These are some specificities of the different phenomenology of television experience 
mediated through the children in the Korean women's everyday life. Television here 
registers in a different way, demanding a particular manner of consumption. The 
above accounts indicate culturally specific rules for the proper way in which 
television consumption is managed and controlled without disturbing the main 
demand placed on women, which is childcare or the primacy of child education. 
Commonly, these Korean women try not to watch television during the day for the 
sake of their children's development and mental health. In the previous section I have 
emphasized the women's deliberate integration of TV rituals into the structure of 
everyday life for ontological security and intimacy. The pleasure of television use, 
however, can be integrated into the women's domestic life, only to the extent it will 
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not disturb or affect the women's central role of childcare, more specifically child 
education in this Korean context. The culturally constructed idea of motherhood 
crucially mediates and regulates the women's experience of television during the day. 
It is argued in a Western television theory that in the ability of the child to 
separate from the mother, television perhaps occupies a potential space released by 
blankets, teddy bears and breasts, and functions cathectically and culturally as a 
transitional object (Silverstone, 1994: 13): However, "that ability is itself conditional 
on the quality of the caring environment provided for it" (Silverstone, 1994: 8-9). 
Precisely, whether or not television can make such a potential transitional object in 
the relationship between Korean mothers and their children is conditional on the 
quality ofthe caring environment of home which is determined by the cultural idea of 
motherhood, thereby the mothers' central concern for child education. The women's 
accounts above reflect a fantasy of maternal perfectability in child-rearing. They 
become an expert on motherhood, informed by popular ideas and some scientific 
knowledge about child-rearing. The cultural ideology of "being a good mother" is 
firmly embedded within the contemporaneous discourses of domesticity. As a 
consequence, the women's experience of popular television, favorite home drama for 
example, tends to entail a guilty pleasure derived from their acute perception of 
neglecting the main responsibility for childcare. To be culturally specific, the 
women's guilty pleasure here does not necessarily arise from neglecting housework. 
As one woman bluntly puts it, "What's the hurry with the housework? It will be done 
somehow during the day". The source of the guilty pleasure precisely lies in their 
"guilt ofless-than-perfect motherhood". And such guilty pleasure tends to accompany 
self-interrogation of maternal identity, "What kind of mom am I?" 
"Once I became a huge fan of the drama See Again and Again. I was so much 
drawn into this drama that my daughter even became a "go-away". I said 
"later, later" whenever she brought her stuff. But after watching this drama, 
this thought always occurred to me, "What kind of mom am I?" I felt guilty 
about neglecting my child. (Laugh) Then I suddenly tried to please her, 
saying, "Bring your video!" I turned on her favorite video and watched it 
together. I must have watched that boring stuff a hundred times. I tried to 
spend more time with her". (Hee-sun, 30) 
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"My husband always stresses to me that the child never grows by herself, so 
mom must invest all her time and effort. He says, 1 should feed the child's 
body and mind. Not just the body but also the mind". (Ha-jung, 30) 
Women's life and power in the public and the private spheres is subject to the rule of 
men - both as individuals and as represented by patriarchy (Nicolson, 1993: 202). The 
culturally specific rules prescribing the women's central role for child education are 
further inoculated and reinforced by their husbands in the everyday discourse. The 
reinforcement of the value of education which pervades the cultural tradition and 
public policy in Korea is concomitant with a tendency towards greater atten tiveness of 
mothers. It belongs to the main domain of mothers, whose role is expected to define a 
moral code of the family and shape a correspondent character and behavior for the 
children. Therefore, the Korean women's main concerns here are all related to 
childcare, child education in particular, and at the root of the childcare issue lies an 
intact sexual division oflabor. The men in their lives are totally left out of the concern 
with child education for the Korean culture tends to define this issue within the 
discourse of motherhood. The pervasive emphasis on the women's devotion to child 
education, as a central feature of the domestic roles, produces a multiple burden for 
women, particularly in the lower socio-economic class. Women's sole responsibility 
for child education in the daily experience of motherhood has far-reaching 
implications in the lives of women. The following accounts reveal some implications 
of the burden of child education on the actual quality of the working-class women's 
everyday life: a complete absence of leisure activities, an extreme level of home-
confined life, and ambivalent emotional conflicts between work outside home as an 
economic means for providing education and childcare inside home as an ontological 
base for providing security for children. 4 
"1 would like to learn how to swim, it would feel good to go swimming in the 
morning. But if 1 can afford to do that, I'd rather spend more money for my 
kids' extra-curricular lessons". (Young-joo, 31) 
"1 don't usually go out. Frankly, it saves money to stay in. Once you go out 
you are supposed to spend money". (Nae-young, 30) 
133 
"I started running a small noodle diner. I thought, I should save money for my 
kids' (higher) education. With my husband's salary alone, that's impossible. 
But I had to close the diner in two months. Because my kids did not listen to 
anybody but mom. They were getting spoiled. What's the use of working 
outside if the kids are getting worse?" (Sun-hae, 32) 
"I can't leave my daughter to others' care. I don't feel secure about that. What 
if she falls? What if she is burnt by a hot thing, or pricked by a sharp thing?" 
(Eun-kyung, 30) 
"My daughter often cried and didn't go to others. What if that affects her 
personality? I was worried. Even now (at the age ofthree), my daughter shows 
her "dislikes" about my going out. If I take out my clothes from the wardrobe, 
she treads on my clothes. If I say, "Don't do that. Mom will wear this today", 
she brings my (housewifery) blue jeans instead. She is afraid that I may go 
out". (Hee-sun, 30) 
Overall, child education in Korea imposes a sole responsibility on mothers, 
which generates a multiple level of material, psychic and emotional burden for the 
women of lower socio-economic class. These working-class women in a sense 
consent to the cultural ideology that mothers are the primary care-givers for the 
family and mothers alone shoulder the burdens and problems concerning the everyday 
upbringing of children. This burden is further aggravated by the women's increasing 
feeling of insecurity about leaving their children to others' care in a modem society.s 
A similar vein of fear is also found in the women's repudiation of daytime television 
which is assumed in a Western theory as a transitional object to playa role of a 
babysitter, a replacement of mother. Television is rather perceived by these Korean 
mothers as a detrimental object for children's mental development. The cultural 
ideology of child education, defined as the women's primary domestic role, is 
critically implicated in the women's conscious distancing from daytime television 
consumption and their guilty pleasure otherwise as a consequence. 
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Section (3) Fantasy of Dominance 
So far I have demonstrated in Section (1) that the women in their 30s deliberately 
construct and integrate TV rituals into the structure of everyday life to fulfill their 
desires for ontological security and intimacy. On the other hand, in Section (2) I have 
also shown that these women consciously distance themselves from daytime 
television to manage their role of childcare, child education in specific. These findings 
imply that the women desire to control their everyday family life, including the 
domestic use of television, from their vantage point. In this section I will further show 
the ways in which these working-class women wrestle for control to assert a fantasy 
of dominance. How does this happen and what are consequences? Specifically, I will 
analyze two cases involving the contestation of power and control in the relation of 
gender and generation, respectively. The first case illustrates a woman's tactical 
appropriation of her child as a negotiating mechanism to assert her control over the 
husband's dominant use of television and regulate him to be more participating in the 
emotional level of everyday life. The second case illustrates a woman's strategic 
appropriation of popular television drama as a controlling mechanism to educate her 
husband about the women's domestic problems, daily conflicts with her mother-in-
law in particular, thereby gain her husband's better support and assert a fantasy of 
dominance over the mother-in-Iaw's authority. 
Case One 
"Whenever my husband comes home for dinner, the first thing he does is to 
tum on the television. He says, he wants to rest absentmindedly lying down in 
front of television, and absorb into television without having to think about 
anything else. I felt a little dissatisfied. Because the dinner time is the only 
chance I can see and talk to my husband. After the dinner, by the time I finish 
washing the dishes and other stuff he is already ready to sleep. He works late, 
gets home late, and then turns on the television first. When he is absorbed into 
television, he doesn't even answer my questions. I feel ignored, angry. But the 
real reason was our child. His total absorption into television seems to neglect 
our baby. Once I exploded, "Do you think this home is a diner, and I am the 
owner of the diner? What do you think our poor baby is?" I suggested to my 
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husband, "Instead of watching television, will you please look at me and the 
baby?" Surprisingly, that worked. If we didn't have the baby, my husband 
might have simply thought I was nagging him out of boredom. Like a staying-
home housewife nagging the husband for nothing, just out of boredom! "I am 
working so hard outside, but what are you doing inside? Just complaining?" 
He might have got angry at me. But he seems to understand me because he 
cares about the baby". (Ha-jung, 30) 
This case enables a close look at the way in which the woman subverts the field of 
tension in everyday life and creates a stage of dominance over the husband. 
Specifically, this woman asserts her control over the husband's absorbent contact with 
television by appropriating her child. The centrality of child in the woman's daily life 
produces a unique opportunity to negotiate rules and practices for watching television 
at home. The child here is one ofthe infinite local tactics that the woman often makes 
use 0 f in order to fulfil her desire for a more emotionally intimate and interactive 
family life. The woman's purpose here is to disrupt traditional patterns of family life 
and women's correspondent lives inscribed in the gender-based domestic labor. The 
child, as a primary mechanism for control, subsidizes a negotiating power in the 
conflictual gender relation, hence, allows the woman to disrupt the normalized living 
condition. It can be inferred that the woman's tactical use of the child and momentary 
fantasy of control over the husband are "evasive pleasure" (Fiske, 1989a: 8) that 
invert the social norms and male power established in the dominant structure of 
everyday life. Apparently, it is common that these Korean housewives in my research 
often appropriate their children as the most effective negotiating mechanism to 
relocate their disadvantageous social positioning. Another housewife in her 30s 
similarly alludes to the micro-political power of the child played out in the minutiae 
of everyday negotiations. 
"Whenever I have something to say to my husband, I make this excuse, "It's 
for the child, it will be good for the child". Then he accepts my words". 
(Nae-young, 30) 
The responsibility for child care in the modem nuclear family weighs heaviest on 
women. However, these Korean women create a bargaining force out of it to assert 
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control over the domestic rules and practices, including the everyday use of television. 
I have already indicated in the previous section that these Korean working-class 
women in their 30s live out everyday life in a multiple level of materia~ psychic and 
emotional burden entailed by the sole responsibility for childcare, child education in 
particular, for the Korean contemporary culture still defines the childcare role only 
within the discourse of motherhood. Motherhood, however, is not always felt 
oppressive or powerless by these Korean women. This is partly because the women's 
inevitable confinement at home for the childcare role and assumed experiences of 
powerlessness within this social structure, naturally and always, leads to the possible 
creation of, what Anthony Giddens terms "a fantasy of dominance" (Giddens, 1991: 
194). In order to achieve a fantasy of dominance, the powerless women appropriate a 
controlling mechanism, or as one Korean woman here calls "a negotiating weapon", 
which emerges on the weight of real problems in the women's everyday life. By 
appropriating forms of ''tactic'' or "strategy" the powerless fantasize to attack, 
transform, or subvert the normal circuit of power in the quotidian, and tum it into 
"opportunities" (de Certeau, 1984: xix). Precisely, this Korean case shows the use of 
the child as an opportunistic tactic that allows the women's fantasy of dominance in 
the gender relation. This case further implies that the powerless women, the full-time 
housewives and mothers, do not simply remain passive in their disadvantageous social 
positioning. The culturally constructed and imposed role of motherhood can be turned 
into opportunities as the powerless women actively seek possible forms of "mastery 
over life circumstances" (Giddens, 1991: 192). This can partly explain why the 
women's everyday life is bearable and sustainable to some extent. 
The Korean housewives in their 30s actively seek possible forms of mastery 
over everyday family life, especially to save the emotionally intimate time and space 
with their husbands. Due to the extremely long working hours in the Korean public 
sphere, their husbands come home normally after 9:00pm, sometimes nearer to 
midnight. As embedded in the different frameworks of everyday life, these men and 
wives can share only a sparse leisure together, unless the wives actively utilize every 
opportunity available for family interactions and communications. For the men, 
switching on television in the evening means relaxing from work tension and 
throwing off the burden of responsibility, while the women can hardly have such a 
possibility of throwing off the burden of responsibility, the endless care-role and 
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domestic work. A large degree of psychological or physical stress in the public world 
of work leads to a greater degree of dependency on leisure activities in the home, and 
television particularly has the task of lowering the level of stress engendered by hard 
work (Rogge and Jensen, 1988: 95). Television absorbs the attention of the Korean 
working-class men returning from hard work, as a consequence, this becomes a major 
obstacle to their staying-home wives' desire for a communicative and intimate 
relationship. The intervention of television every night, when solely occupied by the 
husbands, provides a source of domestic tension. 
In contrast to the older women in their 50s who mainly complain and give up 
on their husbands' dominant sole use of television, the young women in their 30s 
actively attempt to resolve such discontent and tension surrounding television. These 
women attempt to influence control over their husbands' sole preoccupation with 
television during the primetime, and orient them to be more participative in a shared 
family life. The women in their 30s desire to regulate their husbands' sole absorption 
into television viewing, however, at other times these women routinely integrate the 
joint-viewing of television into the structure of everyday life for security and 
intimacy, as described in the previous section on TV rituals. Commonly, it is said by 
these women, "I wouldn't like my husband to watch TV alone, but I do like to watch 
together". The control over the husbands and the general patterns of television use 
indicates that the Korean women interweave television, from their vantage point, into 
the emotional level of everyday life. Primarily, this control is facilitated by the 
women's appropriation of the child, as described above, and the private domestic life 
including television use tends to be under the women's control. 
"A man watching TV looks quite silly. If a man falls for TV, that looks really 
idiotic. He needs to go to a mental hospital. Only the man who has nothing to 
do in life would fall for TV". (Yeon-sook, 30) 
This housewife satirizes men's fascination about domestic television with great 
clarity. The extraordinarily active use of television by men is often ridiculed by these 
Korean housewives. Television, according to these housewives' views, is the 
women's possession, not the men's object, because the cultural location of television 
is in the domestic and the domestic world is orchestrated by the housewives, 
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supposedly the minister of the interior. This view follows a cultural rule about the 
distinctive sexual division oflabor, whereby men belong to the public world, outside 
the home and television. Television consumption in this condition is mainly defined 
as a womanly thing. Television use is a multi-dimensional activity which 
encompasses a range of social interaction, purposes and patterns contingent upon 
culturally-specific conditions (Dahlgren, 1998: 304). In this Korean case, it is often 
the women who define, to a large extent, the circumstances and patterns of television 
use with a view to asserting a fantasy of dominance over the day-to-day family life. 
Overall, the women's fantasy of dominance is implicated in the micro politics 
of everyday life. The women in their 30s actively negotiate the gender relation and the 
television use, whose micro political effect is often contingent upon the tactical 
appropriation of the child. The tactical use of the child is a culturally-specific and 
common phenomenon among the women in their 30s and the women in their 50s. 
However, there is a significant generational difference in that the young women 
directly confront their husbands, attempt to disrupt the man-and-wife power relation 
and replace the traditional pattern of family life with more emotional intimacy. On the 
other hand, the older women maneuver the same tactic of the child to effect some 
degree of power in their perceived misery from their husbands, yet they keep the basic 
frame of gender relation unchanged. The women's tactical use of the child, no matter 
how effective and uplifting temporarily in improving the micro political conditions, 
operates within the limits of existing sexual division of labor and functions to sustain 
the established patriarchal structure. The women probably get something out of 
everyday life by appropriating forms of tactic, such as child and television, but the 
weight is nonetheless on their shoulders; everyday life weighs heaviest on women 
(Lefebvre, 1971: 73). It is a fantasy of dominance through which powerless women 
assert control over the meanings of everyday life, a control that is normally denied in 
the dominant social structure. 
Case Two 
The second way in which the women wrestle for control to assert a fantasy of 
dominance is through the use of popular television drama. Television drama is used 
by the women in their 30s from their vantage point to manage generational conflicts 
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with their powerful mothers-in-law. Whereas women in their 50s complain most 
about their emotionally distant husbands, these young women complain not much 
about their husbands but about their mothers-in-law. Their complaints about the 
mothers-in-law somehow overshadow gender problems, the unequally structured 
labor relations and power between men and wives. The content of their complaints is 
commonly related to the mothers-in-Iaw's "son-superiority" attitude and intervention 
into the young couples' married life. This is the very heart of generational conflicts 
between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law in modem Korea. 
"Just like most mothers-in-law, my mother-in-law only cares about her son. 
Rer son is the king of the world! 1 am a devoted servant. To my mother-in-
law, her son is the heaven and 1 am the earth. She calls me sometimes during 
the day to spy on whether 1 am feeding her son well, whether 1 am taking good 
care of his health during this hot summer, whether 1 am keeping the house 
tidy, whether 1 am going out for shopping or idle chatting. She takes me as a 
servant. I think, frankly, the enemies in the world are mothers-in-law, the same 
women". (Young-joo, 31) 
''Usually, many trivial fights between men and wives are caused by mothers-
in-law. All my friends who have problems in their married life say the same 
thing. Mothers-in-law even say, "Divorce my son!" Mothers-in-law live under 
an illusion as if they were living their son's life". (Yeon-sook, 30) 
"We (young women) wish, please mothers-in-law leave us alone! We want to 
live our own life". (Ree-sun, 30) 
"I wish my husband and 1 alone could live on a remote island, just the two of 
us could live freely (away from the mother-in-law)". (Nae-young, 30) 
These complaints show a culturally-specific repertoire of women's problems based on 
the hierarchic social locations of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in the Korean 
culture. Although the nuclear family as a cultural symbol is now rooted in modem 
Korea, the traditional rule governing the extended family and the powers of mother-
in-law still permeate through everyday practices. This consequently generates latent 
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and patent sources of generational conflicts. The everyday life of the Korean women 
in their 30s presents different experiences and expectations in relation to their 
husband, child, and extended family-in-Iaw. If the Western women viewers of 
television drama, or daytime soap opera in specific, are looking at and perhaps 
longing for a kind of extended family, the direct opposite of their own isolated nuclear 
family, with the fantasy 0 f community (Modleski, 1997: 46), such fantasy is evidently 
not the case with the Korean women viewers. On the contrary, these Korean women 
desire a complete break from the tradition of extended family, especially an escape 
from the authority of the mother-in-law. 
The authority of mothers-in-law laden with the typical attitude of son-
superiority exercises a profound influence on the lives of daughters-in-law, hence, 
such authority is often criticized in the moral education that these women in their 30s 
deliberately use through television drama. In the following I will present one specific 
case that illustrates the way in which a woman uses popular television drama as a 
controlling mechanism to educate her husband about women's domestic conflicts, 
thereby asserting a fantasy of dominance over her powerful mother-in-law. To begin 
with, this woman attempts to initiate her husband's participation in the shared viewing 
of the particular home drama which is intentionally selected by herself. 
"While watching the drama Rose and Beansprout, I get to realize how closely 
she resembles my mother-in-law. She talks just like my mother-in-law! I am 
surprised to see how closely the narratives of that drama resemble our real 
talk. One day, this thought occurred to me, "My husband should watch this 
drama!" Whenever I complain to him about his mother - how unreasonably, 
selfishly she treats me - he doesn't understand. I thought, "Definitely he 
should watch this drama!"" (Hee-sun, 30) 
Then, how does this woman make her husband watch, together, home drama, 
notoriously labeled as women's genre? Everywhere in all cultures, dramas or 
''weepies'' are favorites of women, while men prefer sports, action-oriented programs, 
and news (Hobson, 1980, 1982; Morley 1988; Rogge and Jensen, 1988). Men who 
choose stories that are popular with women are classified as "sissies", and they are 
accused of "going soft", "becoming half woman" if not interested in the male genre 
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such as sports (Gans, 1962: 188; quoted in Lull, 1988: 248). This differential pattern 
of viewing preferences between men and women is not an exception in the Korean 
homes. The above woman in this case also says that her husband usually does not 
watch drama, but prefers sports, (Western) action movies, thrillers, and children's 
cartoons. Nevertheless, this woman actively endeavors to make her husband watch 
women's drama together and grasp a vivid picture of day-to-day subtle conflicts 
between her mother-in-law and herself The following longer extract shows her 
strategic use ofpopular television drama for moral education. 
"Rose and Beansprout is broadcast at 8:00pm (at the weekend), so I try to 
finish the dinner before then, around 7 :OOpm. I don't want to watch it over the 
dinner because we can't focus. In-between time (7:00-8:0Opm) I try to boost 
my husband's mood ... I recommend, "It was very hot today. Why don't you 
take a cool shower?" When he comes out of the shower, I tum the electric fan 
toward him. I bring cool slices of watermelon, or ice cream. In fact, what my 
husband likes most is a very cold beer right out of the refrigerator. With a cold 
beer, he's already in heaven. When he is in a good mood, he does me all the 
favors. We can then watch the drama togethe r". (Hee-sun, 30) 
While watching together, this woman deliberately activates meanings of the television 
drama to advance her own interests. She goes onto say: 
"While watching the drama with my husband, I keep saying about the mother-
in-law character, "She's just like your mother! Your mother says exactly the 
same thing!" That mother-in-law only cares about her son ... While watching 
this drama, my husband laughs a lot. He says, "Korean (old) moms are all the 
same! Unstoppable!" Really, it's fun to watch the drama with my husband. He 
can peek at the trivial yet complicated women's world ... If! find other dramas 
about mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, I want to watch them with my 
husband. But I shouldn't make him watch many dramas. Just one or two are 
enough. (Researcher: Why?) Then he may think, I force him to watch together 
because I want to complain about his mother. I want him to understand how 
we women live everyday at home, why we wage a nerve war. I want him to 
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understand "my life at home". If I make him watch many dramas, he will get 
fed up. Just one or two are enough, like a little homework". (Ree-sun, 30) 
This illustrates the way in which the woman strategically uses popular television 
drama to manage the prolonged tensions and conflicts in the relationship with her 
mother-in-law. With hidden objectives, she intentionally makes her husband watch 
the women's drama with her, like an assigned homework, and uses the realistic 
images and narratives of television drama as a visual tool to educate her husband 
about everyday domestic life, or what she calls ''the trivial yet complicated women's 
world". The mother-in-law character in the drama and its dramatic tension of power 
and morality are appropriated as "known-in-common cultural referents" (Lull, 1990: 
37) to clarify the issues that she intends to discuss in the intimate viewing with her 
husband. She not only identifies with the familiar television discourse, but also 
actively makes use of its meaningful content for her own purposes through a strategic 
application. As the couple's intimate viewing of the drama naturally leads to 
discussion about the woman's daily problems with her mother-in-law, television in 
this context allows her tensions to be ventilated. Television drama is used as a 
controlling mechanism to facilitate the husband to understand a constant nerve war 
between two women and better support the powerless wife's position over his 
powerful mother's. It enables the powerless daughter-in-law to maneuver the micro 
political power over her disadvantageous generational relation. She thus creates a 
fantasy of dominance over the powerful mother-in-law through the deliberate use of 
television combined with the husband's moral support. Such fantasy of dominance 
produces a vicarious and victorious pleasure. 
"She (the young lawyer in The Last War) doesn't hesitate, but speaks out her 
opinions to her mother-in-law. That's cool! I fee11ike she is talking about what 
I am tempted to talk about. She talks on behalf of all daughters-in-law". 
(Yeon-sook, 30) 
The woman's particular way of using popular television is not made in a social 
vacuum, but is the consequence of her particular social positioning in relation to the 
mother-in-law. Television use can be seen as a consequent everyday practice that is 
highly tactical, purposeful yet unpredictable in character, taking place behind the 
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closed door of the private realm. The art of popular television culture is said to be the 
art of making do (Fiske, 1989a: 4). This means that the powerless consume popular 
television for its meanings and pleasures, and involve the struggle to activate 
meanings that are particularly relevant to their everyday lived experiences, with a 
view to advancing the interests of their subordinate conditions. In the same logic, this 
powerless Korean daughter-in-law uses popular television drama as a tactic to assert a 
fantasy of dominance over her powerful mother-in-law. She uses television, among 
domestic objects, precisely because its drama is particularly relevant to her everyday 
experiences.6 Korean television drama, for example Rose and Beansprout or The Last 
War, closely articulates culturally-specific conflicts present in modern life, day-to-day 
generational conflicts between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. Precisely 
because television drama offers identifiable meanings that are particularly relevant to 
the women's lives, it is most enjoyed and talked about by these working-class women. 
As a multifaceted resource in the domestic, television has a unique capacity to allow 
the women to make relevant meanings that serve to fulfil personal desires and create a 
fantasy of dominance over everyday family life. 
Section (4) A-ha! Emotion: Reading the Popular 
The women's experience of television in everyday life pivots on the family and 
personal relationships, which is demonstrated in particular relation to the husband in 
Section (1), the child in Section (2), and the mother-in-law in Section (3). The 
working-class women in their 30s use television to fulfill their personal desires for 
security and intimacy and assert control over everyday family life. In this fmal 
section, I will conclude by focusing on the decisive way in which the centrality of the 
family and personal relationships generate interesting consequences for the women's 
reading of Korean popular drama, in contrast to Western programming. It is 
consistently found in my research that Korean drama evokes tremendous popular 
pleasure among the working-class women in their 30s, while Western programming 
on television is largely disregarded by this category of viewers. Why? I will explain 
this contrasting viewing pattern in terms of what I call "A-hal emotion", an emotional 
resolution and closure in the experience of the relevant and recognizable forms of 
popular culture. 
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Korean drama fascinates as its familiar and recognizable form meets the socio-
psychological needs and desires of the women viewers struggling to make sense of 
the human conditions in modern life. For the Korean working-class housewives in 
their 30s, central human conditions are related to their husband, child, and mother-in-
law, as discussed in the previous sections. Drama, as a "masticator of social realities" 
(Silverstone, 1994: 16), constantly makes strong and identifiable reality claims on the 
relational human conditions, which in turn provides a point of recognition, 
identification and pleasure to its women viewers. Thus, popular pleasure is first and 
foremost a pleasure of "recognition" (Ang, 1985: 20) that is deeply rooted in the 
women's everyday common sense and closely relevant to their everyday reality. 
Richard Hoggart (1958: 120-126) offers one of the most insightful and 
pertinent explanations in this respect. According to his description of the central 
characteristics of working-class popular pleasure in the British context, the first 
pointer to an understanding of working-class popular pleasure is the overriding 
interest in the "close detail of the human conditions", which means that ordinary 
human life is fascinating in itself. What makes cultural forms popular with working-
class people is not something that suggests an escape from ordinary life, but rather 
reflects or articulates the minutiae of everyday life. It has to deal with "recognizable 
human life", a presentation of ''what is known already". Therefore, if the cultural 
presentation is really homely and ordinary, and has a felt sense of the texture of life 
with a considerable accuracy in its particulars, it will be interesting and popular to 
working-class audiences. These characteristics written from the British context are 
equally found in this case of Korean working-class popular culture. 
The content of Korean popular drama provides some ofthe most recognizable 
and relevant material that allows the women viewers to build a felt sense of the self. 
This means that through deep engagement with the meaning of television drama and 
its integration into the everyday, the women viewers can better find the ''means to 
understand their social roles, their relations to others and the possibilities for social 
action" (Dickinson, 1998: 260). The following two extracts precisely show the 
Korean working-class women's tremendous interest in the detailed presentation of 
ordinary human life, through which they can better make sense of the relational 
human conditions in their own lives. 
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"I completely sympathized with this drama (The Last War). While watching it 
I often felt, "It's so real! It's so right!" I can see in this drama, it's the 
positional difference as a daughter and as a daughter-in-law. "Because she is 
my daughter-in-law, I should order her to do lots of things". This is the 
mother-in-law's typical mentality. This is mother-in-law! Mother-in-law 
thinks, because she is a daughter-in-law she should do lots of housework, 
contribute something for the family-in-law, but she is not doing enough! 
Mother-in-law finds faults with her daughter-in- law. Mother-in-law would not 
do that to her own daughter. That's exactly our reality! That's why people 
enjoy watching this drama. It's so real!" (Eun-kyung, 30) 
"How could she (the young lawyer wife in The Last War) despise her 
husband? She is very rude, self-centered. Women should respect their 
husbands. If the husband is not respected at home by his own wife, how can he 
be respected by others outside? In this drama, she's very rude to her husband. I 
don't enjoy watching this drama ... (In a follow-up interview, she however 
expressed great pleasure). It was a great fun. Toward the end of this drama I 
enjoyed watching it. One thing particularly touched my heart. This man and 
wife quarrel cat-and-dog all the usual time. They throw dishes, high-heel 
shoes. (In a deeply moved tone) But when they face a really tough hardship 
they become a support to each other. When they are about to divorce, they 
suddenly miss each other. When the wife gets into a trouble at work, her 
husband tries to help her. While watching this drama, I thought, "A-ha! This is 
man and wife! An inseparable tie". I felt, "A-ha! That's why man and wife 
live together long, even though we quarrel all the time". I felt good to see that 
kind oflove between man and wife. I realized, that's the real love in the man-
and-wife relationship". (Ha-jung, 30) 
"A-ha! This is man and wife!" "This is mother-in-law!" Drama is more popular 
among the working-class audiences because it offers ''more direct, more immediate 
satisfactions" (Bourdieu, 1980: 239). A-ha! emotion is a point of immediate 
recognition of popular drama that is particularly relevant to the women's lived 
experiences. Such recognition with strong emotional claims is a point of meeting the 
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socio-psychological needs of the women viewers trying to make sense of the 
relational human conditions in their own lives. Television drama here reaches not 
only the intimate sphere of day-to-day life, but also the heart of the self. It is a 
significant object with powerful emotional claims in the women's lives. A-ha! 
emotion gives a :firm sense of meaning of reality and human relations; for example, a 
meaning of the man-and-wife relationship as an inseparable tie, or a meaning of 
daughter-in-law to mother-in-law, different from the position of daughter. 
It is suggested that individuals tend to engage in emotion work when they 
experience a clash between their core identity and the contradictory messages they 
receive from different ideologies (Duncombe and Marsden, 1998: 220). For the 
working-class housewives in their 30s, the experience of different ideologies is 
manifest in their critical reading of the feminist drama The Last War, wherein the 
young lawyer wife, contrary to their own lives, shows no respect for the husband and 
disrupts the normalized patterns of family life. The women's reading of the feminist 
drama is critical as they reflexively relate the text to their own world of everyday 
experiences, interpret it from the angle of their own situations, and appropriate it to 
their own emotions. The women's attempt to make sense of the human conditions in 
the encounter with the popular drama evokes specific social patterns that are already 
internalized in their social positioning. In other words, they emotionally invest 
themselves in television drama with particular meanings that are already governed by 
the familiar values, norms and existing orders embedded in their everyday social and 
personal life. Therefore, strong emotional responses in the experience of television -
for example, "A-ha! This is man and wife!" - are the attempt to preserve a sense of 
order and rationality in the situations where the familiar and recognizable order or the 
common sense is challenged. A-ha! emotion provides "a magical reaffirmation of the 
sense ofrational order and a negation of the cause of disruption" (Crossley, 1998: 32). 
A-ha! is a point of emotional resolution and closure that ensures the ontological sense 
of order and control over the meanings of the family and relational human conditions. 
For the Korean working-class women in their 30s, the everyday social and 
personal context for the experience of television is frrst and foremost the family. 
These women's lives and identities are defined closely in terms of the family. Insofar 
as indicated tlrroughout the cases of the Korean working-class women in their 30s and 
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50s, the working-class life may be more home/family-bound, more local, and more 
traditional than the middle-class life. Home/family retains its importance strongly and 
strikingly in the working-class life. The working-class women's experience of 
television in everyday life is so personal, so intimate, so local, and its main themes are 
related to husband, child, and relations with others, which are all deeply embedded in 
the structure of family.7 The women's everyday life pivoting on the family and the 
interest in the ordinary human relations are significantly implicated in their daily 
experience of television. A-hal emotion above indicates that the Korean working-
class women have a deeply-anchored desire for the emotional level of engagement 
with the human content of familiar cultural forms and its integration into their own 
everyday relations. They desire to participate in immediately accessible and familiar 
forms 0 f culture, such as television home dramas, "as if they were real-life events", 
and this symbolic participation in the human content "structures their everyday 
perception of everyday existence" (Bourdieu, 1980: 236, 246). "The desire to enter 
into the game, identifying with the characters' joys and sufferings, worrying about 
their fate, espousing their hopes and ideals, living their life, is based on a form of 
investment" (Bourdieu, 1980: 237). This emotional level of investment in ordinary 
human relations, particularly in the family context, and A-hal resolution as a 
consequence constitute a major source of popular pleasure that continues to hook the 
working-class women to Korean drama. 
"I am a huge fan of Rose and Beansprout. Drama precisely shows the 
complicated family relationships. All the relationships between man and wife, 
between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, etc. 1 can really understand their 
situations. 1 can really sympathize with the characters. It's exactly our life. It's 
about the life of ordinary people. So, 1 watch it again, again, again ... " 
(Young-joo, 31) 
Contrary to the working-class women's enormous delight in watching Korean 
popular drama, their viewing attitudes towards Western programming on television 
are strikingly different - disinterestedness, indifference, detachment, dissatisfaction, 
or even pejorative parody. Western programming is largely disregarded by these 
working-class women in far higher favor of the familiar and recognizable human 
content of Korean drama. Western programming is not received as pleasurable 
148 
because it does not provide A-ha! emotion, a point of immediate recognition and 
identification relevant to their lived experiences. The source of phenomenal pleasure 
from Korean drama comes from its particular relevance to the women's everyday life 
and greater emotional affmity to their everyday experiences. On the contrary, the 
images projected on Western cultural forms are not part of their day-to-day 
experiences. These Korean women see themselves as having no practical relations to 
the Western world, no practical value or interest in it. Naturally, they cannot derive a 
similar degree of pleasure from the culturally and emotionally distant viewing. 
Western images are mainly perceived by these working-class married women as 
different, another world which has nothing to do with their everyday life and 
experience. 
"I used to watch Western movies (on TV) a lot when I was young, single. But 
now, I don't watch them. Because there is not much I can really sympathize 
with. It's a different, another world. It has nothing to do with my life ... 
Maybe, I have become more realistic since I married. Before I married, I was 
not interested in (Korean) dramas. I watched lots of (Western) movies. But 
now, I get to find our dramas more interesting. They are very realistic. They 
show our life. I can really sympathize with their situations. I learn through 
those dramas our life, our complicated relationships in the family". 
(Nae-young, 30) 
"I don't know much about them (Westerners). I am not interested in that kind 
of (Western) stuff. That's their life, that has nothing to do with us". 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Sun-hae, 32) 
These working-class women in my research have not been abroad and rarely 
encountered Western people in their local orbit. Their perceptions about the West are 
mainly formed through foreign movies, dramas and news on television - mostly, 
American. Here, they freely talk about the overall images of the Western world that 
are ingrained in their accumulated memory through the experience of television. 
Consensually, Western images reflected on television are received as a different, 
another world which has nothing to do with their ordinary working-class life. More 
specifically, the West is received as a different, another world for two significant 
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reasons. As the following accounts illustrate, the first reason lies in the relative 
absence of "family" which is, on the other hand, a pivotal framework in these 
working-class women's lives. The second reason is found in the relative absence of 
"security" which is constitutive of central desires in the working-class human 
conditions. 
"Western moms don't seem to care much about their children. They hand over 
little kids to others' care and go off to work. They seem to draw a line, ''This 
is my life, that is your life". In western countries, "I enjoy my life, you enjoy 
your life". I wonder if there exists any strong bond in the family, between 
parents and children... They seem to easily divorce. They don't care much 
about their children once they fall in love with somebody else. It seems like 
"my own life is most important". Even children come next. I don't know, I 
may be wrong, but there are lots of juvenile crimes in Western countries, 
right? I think, that's because children have not grown receiving enough care 
from their parents in the family. Children who have not received enough care 
from the family become trouble makers". (Ha-jung, 30) 
''Their sexual relationship is promiscuous (in Western movies). They seem to 
sleep with anybody. Before marriage, they sleep with anybody. That's maybe 
their free life. It would feel very insecure if people lived in that situation, I 
think. If people just sleep with anybody, how can they trust each other once 
they are married? It would be very insecure. The husband may seduce another 
woman in the office, the wife may seduce another handsome man at a party ... 
(Laugh) That may be their free life, they easily divorce, marry again, divorce 
again ... That's their life, that has nothing to do with us". 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Hee-sun, 30) 
"I wonder if there exists any strong bond in the family". "It would feel very insecure 
ifpeople lived in that situation". The Korean working-class women cannot relate their 
lived experiences to the images of the Western world that are perceived as lacking 
two fundamental elements - family and security. Family and security are central 
features in the working-class women's everyday realities, as demonstrated throughout 
this chapter. Thus, Western images are not visibly part of their local universe and 
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have no experiential bearing on their lives. Western images are evaluated from within, 
and criticized by the powerful everyday realities within which the working-class 
women are embedded.8 In a critical stance, they comment on the lives of others who 
do not belong to the familiar local morality but follow different norms and rules in the 
structure of everyday life and human relations. Western sexual morality is one of the 
most pronounced differences in this regard. Through the critical comparison, these 
Korean women regard the Western people on television not as ''us'', Koreans, and 
repudiate the Western images as ''their'' life, ''their'' world. The women's repudiation 
of the Western images functions to consolidate who they are in the local context of 
the family, and provides a secure sense of reaffirmation and maintenance of the self. 
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Chapter 6 Korean Working-Class Women in their 20s 
Section (1) Work, Marriage, and Feminism 
The previous chapter on the working-class women in their 30s has shown that 
television is an integral part of everyday life. The family and personal relationships 
with husband and child are the central concerns to these housewives, and television, 
as another member of the family, is intimately used by them out of the desire to 
control everyday family life. In contrast to the television's significant role in the day-
to-day lives and experiences of the married women in their 30s and 50s, for the 
working-class single women in their 20s, television is not clearly an important part of 
everyday life. Television is less embedded, playing a less integrative and critical role 
in their lifestyle circumstances in the absence of husband and child. The socio-cultural 
life contexts determine the differential ways in which the different generations of 
women perceive and use television. The single women in their 20s have a range of 
interests separate from television, and engage in their own activities and social 
relationships perceived as more significant than watching television. They are not so 
concerned about television consumption inside the home, but other social interactions 
elsewhere outside the home, such as going to work, having friends and socializing on 
a regular basis, are perceived as more important features of everyday life. In short, 
television is not a central focus. Television is de-centered and de-focused in everyday 
life. Therefore, I will begin this chapter by focusing not on television, but on the 
central interests and concerns in these young women's lives. What do they most 
desire in life? In this section I intend to understand closely the young working-class 
women's thoughts, sensibilities and feelings about their own life politics. It is this 
focus on the young women's interests, concerns, desires or aspirations in everyday 
life that provides the background to the subsequent sections on their experience of 
television. 
"I want to have a career. I don't want to be stuck at home, waiting for the husband 
to come home early, doing the housework all day long, without knowing how old 
I am getting. That's terrible!" (Na-ri, 22) 
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"I am most concerned about how to get a nice, well-paid job. There are lots of 
things I want to do, but I can't figure out yet what I really want to do. I am still 
confused. But definitely, I will not be vegetating at home! I hate staying at home 
all day long, cooking, cleaning, chatting over the phone, picking a trivial quarrel. I 
would like to have a nice job first." (Jung-hyun, 22) 
The young working-class women in my research, aged between 20 and 22 and single, 
are currently in a two-year college or work in the field of sales and services. Although 
confused and uncertain about their job prospects, this young generation of women 
desires to seek personal fulfillment in the world of work. This is a major theme that 
emerged in the interviews - the search for self-fulfillment through a life-long career. 
This is a time of significant changes in the young women's lives, a marked difference 
from the lives of the women in their 30s and 50s. These young women in their 20s do 
not look at their staying-home mothers or married sisters as a role model, but rather 
frrmly declare: "I don't want to live like my mom". "I want to work outside because I 
don't want to live as a housewife". They emphasize "doing my own thing", and are 
determined to move onto more meaningful and well-paid employment. The common 
perception in their life politics is, "A woman looks better and can feel better about 
herself when she has her own work". However, despite the determination for fulfilling 
personal life through a life-long career, this young generation of working-class 
women also demonstrates a strong desire for traditional female roles, such as getting 
married and having children. 
"My mom has never worked outside home, but I want to work and then marry 
a nice man. It would be nice to have children and a family". (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"I want to marry as soon as possible. I am not the only one who is dying to 
marry. All my friends are the same". (Kyung-joo, 22) 
Clearly, marriage is a crucial interest here as the young working-class women tend to 
accept marriage as ''right, normal, ideal". Life of the working-class women is not 
regarded as finally ''real'', because after all, the real element of life is getting married 
and having a family. They tend to have a surprisingly concrete, "age-specific plan" 
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about marriage - for example, they want to get married at the age of around 24 or 25, 
or definitely before 28 or 30. The ultimate message about the marriage by this specific 
age is that it would be difficult to get married if a woman is over thirty. Marriage is 
carefully planned because financially feasible prospects or socially acceptable 
alternative ways of life are rarely available to working-class women. Their 
employment futures are far less secure, hence, dependence through marriage is 
envisaged to offer a potential way of achieving material security. In this calculated 
envisioning on their socio-economic position, they come to accept marriage as the 
best open choice to them, as the most accessible channel for possible social mobility. 
For the working-class women with little life resources of their own, marrying a 
promising man is expected to be a decisive turning point to escape from the hard life 
of working-class reality. The young women's desire to get married before 30 also 
reflects both the wide-spread social fear of limiting the chance to meet a young, 
promising, single man, and the socially desirable conception of marriage as the once-
in-a-lifetime event in Korea. The following accounts sum up this point. 
"I would like to marry at the age of around 28. (Researcher: Why 28?) That feels 
right, normal. That would be ideal. Definitely before 30 I want to marry. After 30 
it may be difficult to find a young, promising, good man, and after 35 you may 
only have a chance to marry a divorced man. I want to marry before it's too late 
and to have children". (Suh-jin, 21) 
"I believe it's good to marry and have children. I want to marry at the age of 
around 24 or 25, have children immediately and then continue my work... If I 
marry at a later age I would probably have to marry a man who has once failed in 
a marriage. I will try to marry at an early age". (Kyung-joo, 22) 
"I know, marriage is not like the most important thing for women. Marriage is an 
individual choice. But I want to marry. I will marry before 30 and have a nice 
family". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
This research on Korean working-class women in their 20s clearly reveals that for 
the most part, the kind of ideal1ife they desire to pursue is self-fulfillment in the 
public sphere of work, but not at the expense of a family role. Here, it should be 
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recognized that these young women wish to work and become mothers, fulfill the 
traditional role for the family. They strongly express aspirations for combining both 
marriage/family life and work outside home. The following examples show the young 
women's strong assertion for marriage and family life. 
''To me, the ideal woman is the one who is happily married with children, and 
at the same time has her own work. I know that would be hard, but that's the 
kind of ideal woman I strive to be". (Suh-jin, 21) 
"Both career and family are important for women, but family is most 
important of all. A successful career woman without a nice family and home 
doesn't look all right to me. I don't honestly respect a successful single career 
woman". (Italics, her emphasis) (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"I don't honestly respect a successful single career woman". A successful, single, 
career woman here connotes a feminist in Korea. These young women's aspirations 
for combining both marriage/family life and work can partly explain the phenomenal 
yet unexplored "anti-feminist" trend in contemporary Korea, especially among the 
young generation of women. These young working-class women in my research do 
not take a successful single career woman as a role model, and even attack, implicitly 
or explicitly, the ideas surrounding feminist/feminism. Why? This is because they do 
not agree with one particular category of feminism and its values particularly against 
marriage and family life. It is widely argued that the conditions of heterosexuality, 
marriage and motherhood are all part of the Western "patriarchal parcel" of rules for 
appropriate sexual relations and behavior between men and women, and entail a form 
of oppression (Nicolson, 1993: 215). Nonetheless, these Korean working-class 
women choose to marry to fulfil their desire for the family in this patriarchal parcel. 
These young women refuse to call themselves feminists or to be associated with any 
of those categories, although their thoughts, sensibilities and beliefs closely echo the 
feminist discourse of equality between men and women. They strongly disagree with 
the strident, rather stereotypical cliche images of what they call "aggressive, manly 
feminists" who particularly lack the capacity for maternal and familial thinking. 
Coming from the American second-wave feminism's primary emphasis on "work-
like-men careerism", Korean, educated, single, feminists are teased by these young 
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women for their ugliness, lack of femininity, and most crucially, lack of maternal 
thinking. They even ridicule the middle-class intellectual feminism for its irrelevance 
to their own life politics and conditions. 1 Furthermore, they tend to repudiate the 
notion of feminism as "a thing of the past", or as one woman puts it, "the old history 
of society". For these young women, feminism is taken as an antique and historical 
phenomenon rather than a current existence. 
"Personally, I don't consider an unmarried woman truly successful, no matter how 
successful her career is. I think, she is incomplete not only as a woman but also as 
a human being. Even though she may be proud of herself and her successful 
career, I wouldn't envy or admire her as my ideal model. Feminist women are like 
that. Aggressive, manly feminists ... If somebody who is married with children 
and has a successful career approaches and talks to me, I would listen to her. 
Because I could really admire her. (Laugh) But that kind of woman wouldn't have 
to come out to the street raising a feminist voice, because she doesn't have any 
problem. She is happy with her life". (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"It seems like they (feminists) gather at a cafe, drink a coffee, and criticize all the 
men in the world. They all look ugly, grumpy, and wear glasses. I wouldn't marry 
any of them either, if I were a man ... They don't make sense to me. How can 
women who are not married, who have not had a child, really understand other 
women's life? They pretend to know everything about women. That's ridiculous. 
They all seem to have a nice, well-paid career. How can they really understand 
poor, uneducated women?" (Na-ri, 22) 
"During the high school days, we had the subject about "feminism" in the reading 
exam. That was the first time I heard about feminism. But, isn't it antique talk? I 
thought that was antique, irrelevant today. When I read it in the exam, I simply 
thought we were studying the old history of society". (Kyung-moon, 22) 
The above critiques suggest that ordinary women's desire for marriage, motherhood 
and family life should be equally recognized and valued, and that some old 
vocabularies of feminism may not be adequate in understanding the actual lives, 
concerns and aspirations of the young women growing up today. 2 However, the young 
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working-class women's desire here is not without its practical limitation. In order for 
the young women to have all they desire, what are the possible strategies for 
combining work and motherhood/family life? A practical issue then is how to 
negotiate and reconcile these two. Whether or not the women can realize such desire 
depends upon fmding suitable men. This point is clearly stated within the young 
women's yearning for the ideal condition of marriage. 
"Whether I can manage work and family depends on the man I will marry; 
how open-minded, modern, considerate he is. I don't want to marry a 
dominating and conservative type of Korean man". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
"My ideal life would be, man and wife go out to work in the morning, come 
home and share the housework together. Men should be considerate of their 
wives". (Soo-mi, 20) 
The young women's yearning here implies that working women's typical problems in 
handling everyday struggles and conflicts - for example, how to cope with work and 
childcare - are largely conditioned upon, and are to be resolved by, choosing the right 
men who can unfailingly understand and support women's desire for work and family 
life. Men's absolute understanding and supportiveness is a necessary precondition for 
women's own career life, which means that married women then cannot make their 
own decisions and succeed independently without the acknowledged approval and 
support of their men in actualizing their desire. Women do not have the same degree 
of freedom to activate their desire to come true as men do. This consequently means 
that until significant structural changes are made in the transformation of men's roles, 
the young women's desire will remain forever as a utopian fantasy. 
Section (2) Representation of Women on Korean Television: 
"It's always killing smart women" 
The previous section has shown a point of significant change in young women's lives, 
a difference from the lives of the women in their 30s and 50s, in that the women in 
their 20s desire to seek self-fulfillment in a life-long career and a family life as well. 
These changes are further articulated through their critical and reflexive engagement 
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with television drama in the privacy of home. Television drama becomes a public 
forum for discussing changes in women's roles and identities. My intention in this 
section is to assess, from the viewpoint of the young women, whether or not 
contemporary Korean television recognizes the changing lives of Korean women and 
responds particularly to the young generation's growing needs and aspirations for 
work in the public world. How do young working-class women perceive television 
drama? What types of programs or characters do they most like or dislike? This 
section analyzes the representation of women on Korean television drama which is 
critically debated by these young women. It shows how reflexive they are in their 
critical relationship with television. 
When asked about programs or characters they like most on television, the 
working-class women in their 20s rather talk more about their "dislikes", manifesting 
a sharply critical and cynical stance towards the stereotypical, impotent images of 
women on prime-time drama. Specifically, what aspects do they most criticize? The 
young women all ridicule and criticize the frequent presentation of the limited world 
of the domestic in what they call "a-zoom-ma" (pejorative term for housewife) 
dramas. On the other hand, they display a great desire to see the life of working 
women outside the confined domestic space which rarely appears on the prime-time 
dramas. This shows that women of different age groups have different types of 
viewing preferences: The older generation of women in their 50s and the younger 
housewives in their 30s delight in watching Korean home drama, extending their age-
based identities according to traditional cultural associations. On the contrary, these 
single women in their 20s prefer to watch the more modem, professional world of 
drama to satisfy their aspirations for a life-long career. The women's real-life desires 
in this context are interwoven into the particular ways in which they experience and 
interpret television dramas. 
"I really dislike a-zoom-ma (housewife) drama. It's so stupid to have to watch 
that in the primetime. It's too commonplace, too limited in characters; 
grandmother, mother, daughters-in-law, puzzling sons in between them. It all 
happens in the home, and people's relationships are so complicated that it 
irritates me. 1 am sick and tired of a-zoom-ma drama. Those housewives are 
stuck at home haggling over trivial stuff wasting their life". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
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"1 don't like tears-squeezing dramas, haggling-fussy housewife dramas. My 
mom is so touched by that stuff, but 1 am tired of them". (Soo-mi, 20) 
On the other hand, these young women desire to experience the public world of work: 
"It would be nice to see different kinds of problems arising not inside the 
home but outside the home, like happenings at the workplace". (Soo-mi, 20) 
"1 would like to see a professional side, not the typical home and family stuff. 
1 find career women interesting. Housewife drama is all too obvious. It's all 
about ordinary families in the same house, haggling, arguing with each other. 1 
like something different. 1 want to see professional women, but they rarely 
appear on the dramas. 1 cannot recall anything particularly". (Yeon-jung, 22) 
Crucially, these young women complain that the images of professionally 
independent working women, when they do appear on Korean dramas, tend to be 
seriously distorted. According to their critical observations, one moral message 
explicitly and implicitly involved in Korean dramas is that married working women 
will always get into "family trouble". The phenomenon of married women entering 
the professional labor force is presented as conflicting with traditional gender 
identities and as always causing inevitable problems in the family. As success in the 
workplace always leads to travails in personal relationships, few professional women 
characters on prime-time dramas have fulfilling personal lives. Although they are 
assumed to be smart, competent, and win professionally in a court, in a male-politics 
office, in a creative public domain, they are nevertheless to lose in the private 
domestic sphere. After all, professionally independent female characters have to pay 
personal costs; for example, breakdown of intimate relationships, divorce, 
disintegration of family, or even criticism from the ordinary viewers. These young 
women commonly point out that working women's resistance to, or neglect of, the 
family role is typically portrayed as "evil-minded and selfish". Moreover, such 
distorted images are always reinforced on prime-time television dramas in a way that 
triggers moral condemnations among the ordinary viewers like housewives. The 
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young women's critical discussions in the following accounts succinctly highlight this 
point. 
''This woman (in a popular drama) is smart, well-educated, confident. She has 
a sophisticated career. But in the end, this smart career woman always ends up 
being a miserable failure. It's always killing smart women. Smart, strong, 
working women tend to be shown evil-minded, selfish. They always tum out 
to be unhappy, losing their love in the dramas, and receiving the complaints 
from the audiences". (Italics, my emphasis) (Jung-hyun, 22) 
"In general, smart, capable women on dramas are purposefully made by the 
(male) producers to be criticized by the audiences. (Researcher: Why?) 
Because people want women to stay home raising children and keeping the 
housework. The television message is, "If you work outside the home you will 
always get into family trouble". I just ignore it. It's just a drama. But my mom 
criticizes, pointing a fmger to those (working) women, saying to me, "Look at 
her! You shouldn't be like her". Then, she starts to sermon to me on what a 
woman should be like". (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"A working woman (in dramas) is always seen fighting with her husband. Her 
professional side at the workplace is hardly seen, instead she is always seen at 
home quarreling, battling with her husband. I bet this drama will, in the end, 
make this strong career wife change into an obedient person for the peace of 
home ... Her job side should be equally emphasized as her husband's. I think, 
it's important to show the good image of working women. Otherwise, working 
women will be criticized by people". (Suh-jin, 21) 
"It's always killing smart women". As one woman here precisely puts it, the above 
criticisms all articulate the contemporary Korean television's inherently conservative, 
tyrannical "symbolic nihilism" (Tuchman, 1978) of married working women. Korean 
television limits women's lives to hearth and family. By reinforcing the bifurcation of 
women into married housewives and single workers, television discourse basically 
offers no place for married working women. It almost implies an impossibility of 
being a married working woman. The narrative frames of work and family life affirm 
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the traditional division of men and women into separate spheres, where women are 
primarily supposed to occupy the private sphere of the family, and men the public 
sphere of work. Working women's family role is normally emphasized, and this rule 
commands a great deal of narrative attention on the family, not on the workplace. 
Women's true happiness is construed as lying in the care role of family life, not in the 
self-fulfillment of work. This rule of narrative frames, if violated, always posits the 
women's choice of work life as itselfthe decisive cause of various tensions, conflicts 
and discords in the family life. Although contemporary Korean television drama 
introduces married working women to the audiences, it eventually puts them back into 
the home, "in a revitalization of traditional family values that melds with a superficial 
acceptance of feminist perspectives concerning women and work" (Press, 1991: 47).3 
By stereotyping the images of married working women as "bad", contemporary 
Korean television actively participates in pushing modem women back into the 
traditional role and identity defined within hearth and family. 
In contrast to the television drama's enormous popularity and identifiable 
relevance to the working-class housewives in their 30s and 50s, for these single young 
women in their 20s Korean television drama is both a completely disappointing frame 
of reference and a fiercely negative point of identification. Although contemporary 
television drama reinforces women's roles and identities within the limited sphere of 
domesticity, these young women respond against the television's dominant ideology. 
As manifest in all comments quoted above, the ordinary women themselves are 
makers of critical meanings, with the abilities to subvert the television's hegemonic 
message with the interpretation of their own: "]t's always killing smart women". 
Television triggers a debate on changes in gender regime, and a kind of popular 
feminism is found in the young women's critical engagement with television drama. 
These young women do not call themselves a feminist, however, they show a 
similarly feminist response to the television's dominant ideology. Although television 
drama is largely reflective of the society's dominant interests, the gaps and spaces are 
also present in the young women's critical reading of television. The young women 
here are cultural producers, "the most sophisticated readers" (Willis, 1990: 30), not 
merely consumers, dupes or victims of television images. Certainly, they are able to 
see and subvert the ideological operations ofthe television's dominant culture. 
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"I once watched the producer talk about his (prime-time) drama. He said, the 
drama is trying to show the (young) audiences the image of a good woman. 
What does he think a good woman is? It looks like he is in his mid 40s or 50s. 
What does he know about us (young women)? He seems to know nothing but 
the old rubbish". (Italics, her emphasis) (Na-ri, 22) 
Overall, the young women's critical reception indicates that contemporary 
Korean television, prime-time popular drama in specific, is totally insensitive to the 
needs and desires of young women today. There is a serious disconnection between 
the young women's expectations and the representation of women on Korean 
television. Contemporary television drama has not caught up with the young 
generation's attitudes and aspirations for the participation in an expansive world 
outside the domestic. Women's roles and identities on television drama, according to 
these young women's critical view, are extremely limited within the domesticity and 
predetermined by immovable traditional definitions of femininity. These young 
women aspire to explore and invest themselves in the maelstrom of new cultural 
forms and various social roles, however, Korean television drama does not offer 
different subject positions or challenging modes of femininity that they can 
symbolically appropriate for the reflection on their life politics. Despite the fact that 
increasing numbers of women today are entering the workforce, contemporary 
Korean television has not yet paralleled actual changes in the society and its extreme 
adherence to the domestic portrayal has overshadowed women's emerging roles and 
new identities in the public sphere. Korean television drama has largely failed to 
recognize changes in women's lives and failed to meet the young women's growing 
desires to explore and experience an expansive wider world outside the limited 
domesticity. 
Section (3) Play in the Global Telecity: "TV is my best friend" 
Insofar as indicated in the previous sections, television is not an integral part of 
everyday life as these single women in their 20s perceive outside social activities, 
social relationships and interactions as more important than staying in and watching 
television. Moreover, Korean television drama, in particular, is fiercely criticized for 
its predominant representation of women within the limited sphere of home and 
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family, and for its failure to meet the young women's desires to explore a more 
expansive wider world outside the domesticity. However, these findings do not mean 
that the young working-class women do not value television. Despite such claims 
about the television's lack of central importance in structuring everyday life, and the 
television drama's absence of relevance in satisfying their desires, they still like to 
watch television whenever staying in the home and they have a playful relationship 
with television. They lively assert, ''TV is my best friend". Why? Specifically, what 
elements of mediated experience make them defme television as the best friend? What 
kind of pleasure do they experience from television? In this section, I explore such 
personal meanings of television as the best friend, particularly by delving into the 
young women's enormous fascination with the symbolic world of the West. This 
section will show the ways in which the young women playfully interact with the 
expansive world of the West on the television screen, and the pleasure gained from 
this is in sharp contrast to their discontent with the confined world of domesticity on 
Korean drama. 
"I like to watch TV very much. TV is my teacher. TV is my best friend. When 
I look around me, I don't find special people who can inspire me personally. 
Everything is just dull, common, all the same". (Kyung-joo, 22) 
"I have a desire to get useful information from television. It may sound like a 
good excuse to watch television, but I really want to learn from television. 
There is nothing much around me that can stimulate my life". (Na-ri, 22) 
"Whenever we are engrossed in watching television, our parents scold at us, 
"you are falling into the idiot box". Then we reply, "television is an 
information box". I can't understand people who say television is an idiot box. 
Why is it an idiot box? It gives me useful information". (Suh-jin, 21) 
Contrary to the generally dismissive perception of television as an idiot box, these 
young women hold a positive and enthusiastic view about television, asserting the 
valuable pleasure of consuming television: ''Television is my best friend". ''Television 
is my teacher". ''Television is an information box". The relationship between the 
young women and their television sets is meaningful. Television is received as a 
163 
leading object for transmodern education, as a trustworthy channel to the world of 
public knowledge, providing the basis for competence in the everyday modern 
culture. They express the close connection between television and their sense of 
modern life: "Without television, I may feel like I am out of this world, I am left out". 
"Without television, I feel alienated, dumb, antique". The enormous pleasure invested 
in the experience of television reflects the young women's desire for more practical 
learning and real-world knowledge. They want television to inform as well as 
entertain, and continue to engage in television with a playful attitude. They actively 
look for some bits and pieces of useful information, experiencing triumphant 
gratification when they succeed. 
"When staying in the home, I keep the TV on. When I go to the bathroom I 
volume up so that I can hear TV while sitting on the toilet. I find TV very 
useful. If I can fmd at least one piece of useful information, I feel rewarded. 
Yes! It was worth watching television for a day!" (Na-ri, 22) 
Information is one patent source of pleasure in watching television, and there 
is a more significant yet less patent source of pleasure. As shown in the previous 
section, this young generation of women is not particularly fond of watching the 
confined world of Korean home dramas, but rather delight in consuming a variety of 
public domain programs, including music, movie, realistic documentary and news. In 
''the media ensemble" (Bausinger, 1984: 349), these young working-class women 
give a special credit to television for its easily graspable presentation of up-to-date 
and real-life stories in the public domain. One woman openly expresses, "I can't 
understand the newspaper, but TV story is so easy to understand". Among the real-life 
stories on television, they display a strong desire to see successful figures - for 
example, interviews with self-made entrepreneurs in a human documentary The 
Success Times, or internationally renowned designers in a talk show - and such 
images seem to bring a powerful impact on triggering their hidden aspirations for 
wealth and success. Thus, a deep emotional impact of television is found here: "I get 
fascinated with the alive visuals and punching lines that strike the right chord of my 
heart". Significantly, these young working-class women get pleasure from their active 
search and discovery of inspiration, which is an unfortunately absent element in their 
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ordinary life. The following extract shows the pleasure of inspiration sought in the 
young woman's reflexive engagement with television. 
"One time a leading Korean fashion designer appeared on a TV talk show. 
When he pioneered the Korean fashion world in the 1960's, he said, nobody 
thought about doing that kind of work, and it was even harder for men as it 
was dismissed as women's work. He has nevertheless made it! When asked 
about how he got ideas in those old days when there was no fashion 
information available, no fashion education offered, he said he got much of 
inspiration from glamorous Western movies. When I heard him talking about 
his inspiration, I thought that's exactly what I am getting from watching TV 
sometimes". (Italics, my emphasis) (Suh-jin, 21) 
The young working-class women commonly view their everyday life as "dull, 
same as usual, nothing particular, uninspiring", and constantly look out for something 
"new, different, inspiring" outside the bounds of ordinary life. The living conditions 
and environment of the working class lead to relative deprivation and do not offer 
meaningful stimuli. This is a significant reason why they enormously delight in 
watching programs about the West - particularly, Western movies and world travel 
shows. In the next section I will analyze in detail the specific meanings of the Western 
images implicated in the young women's lives and identities, but in this section I will 
explore the general significance of entering the symbolic world of the West, or in 
Zygmunt Bauman's (1993: 178) term the global ''telecity''. For these young women, 
television is a window on the expansive world. Television is their best friend, teacher 
and information box for it constantly offers something new and different, the other 
sides of the exciting universe. Making a mediated excursion to other countries 
through television is of particular interest to the young working-class women. This is 
because there are increased opportunities for travel and mobility for young middle-
class women in modem Korea, typically university students, while this is not the case 
for these young working-class women. Through television, the socially and materially 
disadvantaged women get suddenly "plugged in" (Meyrowitz, 1985: 223), and can 
"go" where they could not travel. Television allows the working-class women to see 
the world outside without having to actually travel out there. It enables them to "visit 
far away locations via sound and image without leaving their living rooms, 
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simultaneously staying home and going places" (Moores, 1996: 23). Precisely, 
television is a "mobility multiplier", a form of ''vicarious armchair travel" (Lerner, 
1958: 53) which enables the young women to distance themselves from the immediate 
locales of the day-to-day lives, and to imagine new lifestyles, possibilities and 
opportunities beyond the material restraints of the working-class reality. The 
following accounts express the pleasure of mediated travel to the new, different, 
expansive world. 
"I want something new and different in my life. I feel encouraged by watching 
inspiring programs. That's the most interesting thing about watching foreign 
movies, travel shows. How can I experience that real stuff outside the world, if 
not from television?" (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"Where can we (working-class women) see that kind of stuff other than from 
TV, unless you can afford to travel abroad yourself? TV is exciting and 
useful!" (Na-ri, 22) 
"I find it interesting to watch foreign movies and travel programs like TV 
World Culture Tour. I like to see something new and different. Through 
television I get to experience things that I cannot actually do in the real life. It 
shows a variety of people, different places, different ways of living. I 
especially enjoy watching those programs comparing Korea with other 
countries, their cultures, lifestyles. Television is interesting". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
For these working-class women, the experience of the symbolic world of the 
West on television may be more exhilarating, partly because it is "non-reciprocal" 
(Thompson, 1995: 208), freed from the reciprocal obligations characteristic of a 
capitalist modem society. Television, as the best friend given generously free and 
available anytime, allows the poor working-class women to enjoy some of the 
benefits of companionship without monetary demands typically incurred in the 
context of capitalist day-to-day interaction. Thus, the symbolic world of the West on 
television unfolds before them, purely as the object of materially unrestrainable 
amusement and pleasure. This materially unrestrainable amusement is a significant 
feature of the global telecity that attracts these young working-class women. "In the 
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telecity, the others appear solely as objects of enjoyment, no strings attached; they can 
be zapped out of the screen when they cease to amuse. Offering amusement is their 
only right to exist with each successive switching on" (Bauman, 1993: 178). 
Amusement here needs not be spoiled by fore- or after-thought, and no thought of 
consequences needs to poison the pleasure. The global telecity is a care-free site for 
''play'' in which players can safely leave a real life and engage in a different world, 
"as-if' culture: It is a site for the new pleasures, the challenges of the new within the 
bounds of the familiar (Silverstone, 1999: 63). The global telecity allows these young 
women to enter the playful realm of the imaginary that offers a release from the 
normal constraints of daily life. Through the safe and familiar glass screen of the 
global telecity, they can playfully imagine strangers and distant events, comfortably 
without fear. They can symbolically participate in the "as-if' culture, as if they were 
in the same place experiencing the same events. Such real-experience-like 
imaginative excursions produce an intense pleasure and a mediated quasi-relationship. 
"Television is so much fun. When you read books, you can imagine only in 
words the whole different world, but that's not satisfying for me. When you 
watch television you feel like you can really experience it through the alive 
visuals". (Italics, her emphasis) (Soo-mi, 20) 
"I have not ever met Western people in real life. Only those people I see on 
TV are making relationships with me. I kind of feel close to them because I 
see them often on TV". (Italics, my emphasis) (Kyung-moon, 22) 
This intimate experience of the symbolic Western world can further explain why 
television is taken as the best friend to these young women. As distant events and 
strangers on the television screen routinely visit the intimate sphere of home and enter 
into everyday consciousness, it becomes possible for these young women to establish 
a sense of familiarity or "intimacy at a distance" (Thompson, 1995: 219). The 
everyday experience 0 f the global telecity in this context helps to cloud the distinction 
between people who are "here" and people who are "somewhere else" (Meyrowitz, 
1985, 122). The distant others whom the young women come to know through the 
mediated quasi-interaction become friends who can be slotted into the time-space 
167 
niches of their everyday life. The quasi-friendship can mediate the young women to 
playfully explore the tissue boundary of the self and the other. 
Overall, the young working-class women in their 20s playfully use television 
to journey outwards to the global, the modern, the new and different, the other. 
Television allows for the women, who have limited opportunities for travel and 
mobility in real life, to leave the immediate locales of the day-to-day lives and make 
infinite imaginative excursions to the other side of the new and exciting universe. 
Here, the young women's playful relationship with television reveals a sharp 
generational difference. As shown in the previous chapters, television's relationship to 
the everyday life of the women in their 50s is rather marked by misery, and their use 
oftelevision is to move inwards the traditional, the familiar, the local and the national. 
On the other hand, television's relationship with the housewives in their 30s is formed 
in the fantasy of dominance and negotiation, which means that they tactically use 
television to control the domestic, the familial, the personal and intimate, the husband 
and the child. In contrast to the repudiation ofthe women in their 50s and 30s with the 
modern, unfamiliar and imaginary world, the young women in their 20s playfully 
interact with the new, expansive Western world. It can be inferred that as they become 
increasingly embedded in the symbolic Western world, their horizons of 
understanding may well extend beyond the immediate locales of day-to-day life. Their 
"local knowledge" may increasingly be supplemented by new forms of "non-local 
knowledge" (Thompson, 1995: 207-211), and their formation of the self may become 
more reflexive and open-ended.4 Thus, it may be possible for these young working-
class women to achieve a fluidity of existence, of living, so that "real life needs not 
stagnate in everyday life" (Lefebvre, 1971: 82). Although they continue to live a local 
life, and the constraints of the body ensure that they are contextually situated in the 
limited time and space, their playful interactions with the expansive symbolic world 
may alter what the world of everyday life actually is, without totally destroying the 
connection between self-formation and shared locale. So the phenomenal world of the 
young women's everyday life for the most part is "truly global" (Giddens, 1991: 187). 
168 
Section (4) Representation ofthe West in the Korean Imagination: 
Yearning for Free Choice, Social Mobility and Change 
The prevlOUS section has explored the young working-class women's playful 
relationship with television, particularly in their imaginative excursion to the 
expansive world of the West. This section further analyzes specific meanings derived 
from the women's imaginative experience of the symbolic Western world. 
Specifically, what do they imagine about the West? What are the yearning elements, 
if any, in the Korean women's imagination of the West? What are the consequences 
ofthe imaginative experience of the West on their real life? My underlying intention 
is to show the ways in which the specific meanings of the Western images influence 
the young women's formation of the self, thereby marking a difference from the 
identities of the women in their 50s and 30s. 
"During the high school days I wanted to watch Weekend Movies (dubbed 
Western movies after 10:00pm), but my mom told me to go to sleep or study. 
When something is forbidden you get more tempted to do against, right? I 
came out stealthily late night, sat in the dark and watched those movies. I 
tuned the TV volume as low as possible. Just the screen, sometimes no sound. 
I remember, whenever I was restricted by my parents from watching those 
movies, I wanted to grow quickly to do freely anything I want to do". 
(Kyung-moon, 22) 
"Why can't I do whatever I want to do? I have been told so far in my life, 
"Don't do this, don't do that". I don't feel like I am living my life. I don't 
know if I will ever have my life. That's what I envy most about Western 
people (on TV). They look so free. They can do whatever they want to do". 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Jung-hyun, 22) 
"I most like their free choice. They can do anything freely they want to do. 
They live independently, don't get much interference from their parents". 
(Na-ri, 22) 
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Young working-class women in my research, aged between 20 and 22 and single, are 
fond of watching Western movies on television - mostly, American Hollywood - and 
started watching them since middle school days. Although none of them have actually 
traveled to Western countries, they freely talk about the general images of the West 
garnered through the mediated experience of the imported television programming, 
such as movies, dramas, music, and travel shows. This is their typical response: "I 
have not been abroad and rarely met Western people in real1ife. All I know about, all 
I can say about them are from television". Regarding the distinctive image associated 
with the West or Western people, the young women's immediate, consensual 
imagination lies in the notion of "free choice", or free lifestyle, which is in sharp 
contrast to, thus a yearning element in, their own restricted everyday life. The 
attraction of watching Western programs on television lies much in the opportunity to 
get a sense of how people live differently in other parts of the world, a sense which 
can give them a point of comparative reference to reflect critically on the conditions 
of their own lives and see them in a new light. 
These young women increasingly draw on mediated experience to inform and 
''refashion the project of the self' (Thompson, 1995: 233), and their growing mediated 
experience of the West creates new opportunities for self-experimentation. Such 
experimentation ranges from simply trying out a different fashion style or a different 
hair color to something more profound about life. For example, one woman expresses 
a desire to experiment in her life: "When I watch Western movies, I sometimes feel 
like doing something unusual, exciting. I like to be free of my ordinary, restricted 
life". However, the young women's self-experimentation out of the yearning for free 
choice is not without conflicts. Although they involve a continuous interweaving of 
different forms of mediated experience into the self, the actual life context and its 
moral claims equally continue to exert a powerful influence on their project of self-
formation. In other words, what these young women act and think of themselves 
primarily in relation to the local authority such as parents, and to the others whom 
they encounter in face-to-face interaction, continues to influence their decisions on the 
incorporation of mediated experience into the self. The following examples indicate 
the kind of conflicts they experience between the yearning for free choice and the 
realization of the local authority and social pressure. 
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"I once wanted to color my hair yellow, but I couldn't do that. My mom would 
be shocked, get a heart-attack. People might think I am a trouble maker". 
(Yeon-jung, 22) 
''They (Western people on TV) are so free. They don't seem to care about 
what others think about their weird outfit, strange behavior, different lifestyle. 
In Korea, people's style is very similar. What's similar is not only our 
appearance but also the way we think and act. I have a desire to do different 
things, but feel pressured to follow the social norms". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
More significantly, the young women's yearning for free choice points to 
"freedom of social mobility" in the decisive contexts of education, occupation and 
marriage. Freedom of social mobility is the most yearned for element, the most 
central meaning derived from their experience of the mediated Western world, for it is 
a substantially limited and contrasting feature in their own working-class reality. 
Freedom of upwardly mobile transformation is their class-specific interest and 
priority. This is why the symbolic world of the West, marked by the promise of social 
mobility, is so fascinating to these Korean working-class women. While situated in 
the day-to-day contexts oflocales, they can imagine how life is organized differently 
in the Western world under different codes and cultures than their own. The symbolic 
Western world provides them with a glimpse of alternatives, thereby allowing them to 
reflect critically on the self and the actual conditions of their life. The following self-
reflexive talks clearly demonstrate their yearning for the freedom of social mobility 
mediated through education, occupation, and marriage. 
"As I see the Western world (movie Goodwill Hunting), a toilet cleaner can go 
to a university. They seem open, flexible. In Western countries, it seems 
possible to have a good job even with a high school diploma, but in Korea a 
high school diploma is just a piece of rubbish. It's useless because almost 
everybody has it". (Na-ri, 22) 
"(In the Western culture) lawyer can choose to be a cook if she wants, and 
move onto another job in a different area. But in our Korean culture, once you 
have studied something, you are expected to work only in that field ... After 
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working for a long time you may want to go to a university, but that can't 
easily happen. You may be criticized, "Are you crazy? Why suddenly study in 
your age?" (Suh-jin, 21) 
''This Cinderella movie (Pretty Woman) may come true in Western countries, 
but I don't think that is possible in our country. In our country, nobody would 
approve and support that kind of marriage (between a working-class woman 
and an upper-class man). But in America it seems like it's only you yourself 
who makes all the decision about your life. Western people are so free, 
individualistic". (Soo-mi, 20) 
As shown in the above extracts, the working-class women's expenence of the 
Western movies, such as Goodwill Hunting and Pretty Woman, gives rise to a new 
dynamic in which the immediacy of their lived experience and the moral ftxities of 
Korean tradition are constantly compared, contrasted, and evaluated against the 
backdrop of different claims stemming from the Western representation. The 
symbolic Western world provides a cultural reservoir of alternative visions, 
encouraging the young women to critically question the traditional and normative 
values and yearn for alternative ways of living. Here, their strong envy and yearning 
for the freedom ofupwardly social mobility reflected in the Western images is a "self-
reflexive escape" (Schroder, 1988: 74) that brings along enough of their working-
class identities and real-life concerns - for example, missing out higher education, 
promising occupation and socially upward marriage - to effect a synthesis of thoughts 
and feelings between the two different types of existence; symbolic Western fantasy 
and actual Korean reality. This self-reflexive "fantasy space", interrelated to their 
lived experiences of powerlessness, pain and desire, is a place "for hope and for 
escape from oppression" (Walkerdine, 1986: 195). For these working-class women, 
watching American Hollywood movies is not simply an escape from drudgery into 
dreaming: "It is a place of desperate dreaming, of hope for transformation" 
(Walkerdine, 1986: 196). The women's desperate yearning for transformation, a new 
opportunity and a new life, is further demonstrated in the following self-reflexive 
talks. 
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''Even though this movie (Pretty Woman) did not show their marriage, I can 
imagine they will marry and live happily together. Julia Roberts will become a 
totally new person and lead a new life. She is given a new opportunity. I envy 
that kind of free choice, opportunity. In our country, that would be absolutely 
impossible". (Soo-mi, 20) 
"After one sudden accident, she (in Desperately Seeking Susan) completely 
loses all her memories. She goes completely blank! It would be so good to be 
able to forget the whole past, the whole present, and start allover again a new 
life! Nothing special can happen to ordinary people like me, unless this kind of 
accident happens. Can ordinary people like me get into this kind of accident 
and change the whole thing? It seems so, as in the movie. I consider this kind 
of accident as an opportunity for change in life". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
The freedom of social mobility is further imagined by these Korean working-
class women to give Western people "a new opportunity", ''the second chance", "a 
new life", which could possibly bring significant "change" in the individual and social 
levels. The notion of change here is a desperate dreaming and hope in the working-
class living conditions. These working-class women wish: "It would be so good to 
forget the whole past, the whole present, and start all over again a new life!" "It seems 
like Western people can freely move on and start all over again. I envy that". In 
encountering the symbolic Western world's new opportunities and upwardly mobile 
transformations, these young women are not simply escaping into dreaming and 
consuming the fantasy, but they are exploring possibilities, imagining alternatives, 
and experimenting with the self They enter the realm of the imaginary while 
projecting themselves onto, or identifying with, the fictional characters. They 
establish vicarious relationships with the fictional characters by dissolving the line 
between fiction and reality. For example, one woman quoted above states, ''While 
watching this movie, I constantly imagined, what if I were in that situation, what if I 
did that? I thought of myself as if I were herself'. They find themselves not only to be 
observers of distant others and events, but also to be "lifted out" or "disembedded" 
(Giddens, 1990: 53) from their situatedness in specific localized contexts, to be 
transported to a state of "not-myself'. This state of "not-myself' is a ''psychological 
time-out" (Schroder, 1988: 72) in which they are relatively free to explore the 
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boundaries of the self They are temporarily released from the day-to-day contexts of 
locales and fmd themselves traveling through a new world of opportunity and change. 
The young working-class women here can be termed as a "mobile person with 
empathy" (Lerner, 1958: 49). This means that, in contrast with the women in their 50s 
constricted by the familiar and traditional fatalism, and the women in their 30s 
negotiating by the fantasy of dominance within the intimate domestic, the young 
women in their 20s have a high capacity for moving freely out of the familiar local 
settings, confronting new and different environments, recognizing alternative visions 
and learning new identities. They can identify with new aspects that arise outside of 
their habitual experience, and are willing to incorporate them into the process of self-
formation. While the self of the women in their 50s and 30s is a "constrictive self' 
and a "negotiating self', respectively, the self of the young women in their 20s is a 
''mobile self'. These young women with a considerable degree of playful curiosity 
and imagination locate their self not at some fixed point in an unchanging order of 
things, but at some "moving point of desire" (Lerner, 1958: 134) - for example, the 
desire for freedom, mobility and change. With the increasing experience of symbolic 
Western materials, the self of the young women becomes less constricted and fixed by 
the local contexts of day-do-day life. It becomes less stable, more opening and 
expanding. By willingly opening up the self to the mediated experience of the West, 
they enrich and re-construct their self-identity. They increasingly incorporate Western 
symbolic materials into the everyday process of self-formation, "the coherent and 
continuously revised biographical narrative" (Thompson, 1995: 210). Precisely, their 
formation of the self is a continuously "revised" process, as the mediated biographical 
narratives suggest in the following. 
"I used to think change might be an extremely difficult thing to do, so 1 didn't 
dare to try. 1 thought change might be almost impossible (in Korea). After 
watching this movie (Desperately Seeking Susan), 1 came to think change 
might not be that difficult as 1 imagined. Once one change happens, this can 
lead to another change, to another, to another. Only the first step seems 
difficult". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
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"Whenever I encounter free (Western) images on TV, I feel stimulated. I want 
to change like that. I don't want to restrict my life by old (Korean) thoughts". 
(Kyung-joo, 22) 
Insofar as indicated, the self of the young women is then a ''reflexively 
organized symbolic project" (Thompson, 1995: 233) that they construct creatively out 
of the available symbolic materials. They interweave the new mediated experiences 
into the changing narrative of self-identity. In a similar vein, the self of the young 
women is a ''reflexive achievement" (Giddens, 1991: 215) that is integrated from a 
diversity of mediated experiences, shaped and sustained reflexively in relation to 
changing circumstances of social life on a local and global scale. The profusion of 
symbolic Western materials today deepens and accentuates the reflexive organization 
of the self, continuously providing new possibilities, new openings and new 
imaginations.5 The young women's new experience of the symbolic Western world 
plays a significant role in their reflexive achievement of self-formation. 
Section (5) Rejecting Western Sexuality 
Insofar as demonstrated in the previous sections, the young working-class women are 
routinely subject to new possibilities and choices, different styles and models through 
their imaginative excursion into the expansive world of the West on the television 
screen. However, not all Western images are received as the references for 
appropriate behaviors and values that can provide the possibility of incorporation on 
the part of the "disembedded, lifted-out" (Giddens, 1990: 53) women into their 
reflexive formation of the self While such elements as free choice, social mobility 
and change are positively appreciated and yearned in their playful imagination, 
Western sexual freedom is highly contested and rejected. By highlighting the Korean 
young women's "talking back" (Hannerz, 1997: 13) to the West about the particular 
issue of sexuality, in this final section I intend to show their complex mediated 
relation to the dominant Western values. 
"I do envy their free choice, free lifestyle, but I don't envy their sexual 
freedom. Sexually, they seem too free, too open. If you see Western movies, 
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they meet a person in the morning, have a lunch together, and jump into bed at 
night. If sex is great they decide to marry, then divorce quickly". 
(Kyung-joo, 22) 
''They seem to sleep around with anybody (in movies). It seems promiscuous 
to me. That's what I don't like most about Western people. It all happens so 
quickly, in a day, in a week. They always say "I love you", and go to sleep 
together. Then, break up! divorce!" (Sub-jin, 21) 
"Western people seem to have no restraint in the sexual relationship. While 
watching Western programs I notice, they easily talk to a stranger, laugh 
together, and relationships are immediately formed on the spot. They easily 
make a casual sexual relationship. In Korea, it takes long time to have any 
kind of relationship, whether personal or business. I don't like the easy sexual 
relationship. I don't want to be like them". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
"Western people don't seem to mind anything as long as a woman has a nice 
body. They don't seem to care if she is a dumb, stupid bimbo". (Soo-mi, 20) 
"We are opposed to (Western) free sex. My friends have the same thOUghts. 
No matter how much we are dying to change, rebel to the old (Korean) stuff, 
whether we color hair yellow, we don't want to be an easy sexual slut". 
(Yeon-jung, 22) 
These are some concrete examples of the periphery's talking back to the West in the 
contesting field of sexuality. These Korean young women make considerable use of 
strong language in judging and disapproving Western sexual freedom. Western 
sexuality, as an exceptionally visible point of contestation, is highly criticized and 
rejected by all of them. As shown in the previous section, these young women display 
a high degree of ''reflexive involvement" particularly in the yearning image of 
freedom of social mobility. On the other hand, here they demonstrate "critical 
distantiation" from the Western sexual image in moral condemnation. They suspend 
the close involvement and rather withdraw to a position of "superior distance" 
(Schroder, 1988: 76) expressing a great deal of ridiculing and criticizing. The 
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excessive immorality of Western sexuality, such as promiscuity and frequent display 
of divorce, is perceived as distinctively Western features and conventionalized rules 
of Western human relationships. It is received as incompatible with the prevailing 
local moral codes they live by, hence, hard to enjoy. These young women, however, 
do not resort to moral condemnation simply out of cultural differences or prejudices. 
They often go to some length to supply ''rational explanations" for their strong 
repudiation with Western sexuality, furthermore, they tend to justify their uncertain 
claims by relying on the combined sources of media information. Here are some 
examples. 
"Sexually, Western people involve fast, finish fast without considering what 
will happen to their children. It looks like there are many divorced women, 
single mothers, broken homes, crimes in Western countries (on TV). I think, 
these may be the by-products of their free, promiscuous sex". (Yeon-jung, 22) 
"I am not sure if Western people are really too liberal, sexually. But it seems 
all true when I watch news about their sex scandals, drugs, crimes". 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Kyung-moon, 22) 
"When I watch current affair programs about Western (Hollywood) people, I 
get to know about their real life. I get disappointed with the real stories about 
who is divorcing, who has been divorced how many times, who is having an 
affair. Their sexual life is too free". (Italics, her emphasis) (Na-ri, 22) 
Commonly, the young women's perception of Western sexuality is garnered generally 
from watching Western movies, yet the rationales for their criticism derive mainly 
from composite illustrations of television news and current affair programs, 
supposedly more realistic portrayals of the Western world than movies. These 
separate representations of television movies, news and current affair programs do 
"not add up to a single narrative, but they depend on, and also in some ways express, 
unities of thought and consciousness" (Giddens, 1991: 26). These young women tend 
to clear out questions and uncertainties naturally arising from encountering Western 
movies, by relying on television news in such a manner that this different yet more 
realistic source of information can further confirm their already established images 
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about Western sexuality from movies. The negative perception of Western sexuality is 
forged and reinforced by their selective interweaving of images from different 
television genres. 
These young women reject Western sexuality for it is not of particular interest 
or relevance to their morals, and such rejection is largely determined by the cultural 
specificity of local contexts. Their strong repudiation of Western sexual freedom is 
closely related to the desire to preserve a secure basis of the family. Naturally, a host 
of questions arise regarding the family/home and children within it. They commonly 
wonder, "Then what happens to children, if Western people are sexually too liberal?" 
Although these young working-class women yearn for the Western free choice and 
change in their own life, a certain value of the Korean tradition continues to have an 
enduring significance in their modem life. That enduring traditional value lies in the 
foundation of family. The women's concern for the family is found in all cases of the 
working-class women in their 50s, 30s, and 20s. All these working-class women have 
a common attitude that cherishes, maintains and guards the family as a sacred realm. 
When criticizing Western sexual morality, the young women in their 20s are most 
concerned about the possibly destructive consequence that the sexual freedom may 
unsettle their desire for having a family and children 
''They (Western people) seem promiscuous to me. I don't agree with their 
living together before marriage. That's not good for children. I wouldn't sleep 
with anybody just for fun, or on the spur of a biological impulse. I am against 
Western free sex ... I don't envy their sexual freedom. Our Korean way is 
better!" (Kyung-moon, 22) 
"Sexually, Western people seem to live too liberal. I don't see any image of 
home, family inside TV. That's odd to me. Western people behave like they 
don't have a family. They have a noisy, jolly time with lovers, but rarely with 
their family". (Jung-hyun, 22) 
Overall, the Korean young women's critical talking back to the West shows a 
complex mediated relation, wherein dominant Western values do not necessarily 
encourage a homogenizing reception as they are subject to a process of active 
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negotiation. Western sexual freedom, for example, is highly negotiated and rejected 
by their culturally-specific systems of meaning, despite the Western knowledge's 
modern and liberating potential. The women's talking back produces a 
"heterogeneous dialogue" (Appadurai, 1990) against the homogenizing Western 
cultural discourse. This implies that if the influence of Western images is assumed to 
have a profound and irreversible effect on the periphery, such assumption would be 
extremely Anglo-Eurocentric. Although Western homogenizing forces introduce and 
reinforce certain standardizing values and knowledge in virtually every comer of the 
world, these influences do not enter cultural contexts uniformly as they always 
interact with diverse local conditions (Lull, 1995: 147).6 These Korean young women 
continue to keep some elements of the traditional values such as the family, while 
integrating the new possibilities of the Western free choice yet simultaneously 
rejecting Western sexual freedom. Their experience ofthe Western symbolic world is 
not subject to a passively adapted one-way interaction, but open to negotiation in a 
complex dual force of change and continuity. 7 
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Chapter 7 Korean Middle-Class Women in their 50s 
Section (1) TV, Emotion and Shifting Power: "Now it's women's times!" 
How is television used in the homes of Korean middle-class women in their 50s? Who 
most often controls the selection of television programs in the family? This section 
delineates the domestic space and patterns of television use in the context of changes 
and transitions of middle-class family life. I focus on the way in which Korean 
middle-class women absolutely control the domestic space including the use of 
television in the primetime, which casts a very different light on existing Western 
studies. By highlighting a point of intersection between the female-dominating 
patterns of television use and changing emotional relations between men and wives at 
the later stage of life course, I intend to show a collapse of the male authority 
structure and a shift of power in the private sphere of the contemporary middle-class 
family. This is a marked difference from the previous case of working-class women in 
their 50s with the perceived misery from male-dominating power and the lack of 
emotional intimacy. 
The television remote control device, as a visible symbol of condensed power 
relations, typically represents the power of the father with the breadwinner role in the 
patriarchal society. This is demonstrated in American homes (Lull, 1982) and British 
working-class families (Morley, 1988). Characteristically, the remote control device is 
the symbolic possession of the father that sits "on the arm of Daddy's chair" and is 
used almost exclusively by the father: thus, wives often complain that their husbands 
use the device obsessively, channel-flicking across programs when wives are trying to 
watch something else (Morley, 1988: 36). In a broader sense, the remote control is a 
patriarchal symbol of social relations characterized by male domination over women. 
In the family system it is commonly assumed that such power is held by wage-earning 
husbands not by "staying-home" wives. However, my research on the Korean middle-
class families unveils an opposite power relation. In contrast to the Western family 
viewing patterns, it turns out that it is the women who use the remote control regularly 
in Korean middle-class homes. 
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''Now it's women's times! Women are the king in the home ... If my husband 
and son keep watching their favorite sports, I shout, "I want to watch drama, 
give me the remote control!" Then my son grumbles heading to his room, and 
my husband browses the newspaper again or goes to sleep. I rarely miss my 
favorite drama ... My husband sometimes calls me for a lift late at night at a 
drinking social. I tell him, "Don't call me between 10:00 and 11 :OOpm while I 
am watching drama". Then he calls me later after the drama is fInished". 
(Bong-wha, 52) 
"At least in the home, mother is the king. My children may think I am the 
authoritative fIgure in the home ... Watching drama is women's privilege. I 
watch all I want to watch at night". (Jung-soon, 50) 
''Nobody in my family would dare to switch a channel while I am watching 
drama ... Mothers of my age are powerful in the home. (Laugh) Nowadays 
husbands succumb to wives' power, otherwise, they could not get a spoon of 
rice later. Patriarchy is gone! Now it's women's times!" (Won-ja, 52) 
The above accounts indicate a collapse of the male authority structure and a shift of 
power in the domestic sphere. ''Now it's women's times!" It is interesting to see that 
this claim recurs throughout the interviews with the middle-class housewives in their 
50s, and a facet of their empowerment in the private family life is manifest in their 
use of television. It is commonly suggested in Western feminist research that as the 
home for women is a continued workplace most women fmd it diffIcult to assign a 
comfortable space/time of their own for leisure in the home - including TV watching 
- whereas men and children can relax without interruption. Some book titles 
sarcastically encapsulate the relative absence of women's leisure, All Work and No 
Play? (Deem, 1986), Women's Leisure, What Leisure? (Green et aI., 1990) 
In this Korean case, however, I would rather argue that at least within the 
domestic sphere Korean middle-class women hold a great deal of power, hence, 
experiencing the pleasure of concentrated viewing with guilt-free indulgence - a 
mode of privileged viewing typically associated with male power - is also made 
possible for these women. Women can watch all their favorite programs in the 
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primetime, especially dramas, as nobody in the family dares to switch a channel or 
interrupt their viewing pleasure. The home is an arena of feminine expertise, a place 
of rituals, such as TV viewing, participated in and often controlled by women (Brown, 
1994: 55). If the term ''patriarchy'' means ''the rule 0 f fathers" or refers to any social 
system of male superiority (Rothman, 1994: 140), this term is felt irrelevant to the 
everyday experiences ofthe Korean middle-class women in their 50s. 
''Now it's women's times!" "Patriarchy is gone!" Their bold claims pose 
ineluctable questions. How come these housewives view their position as powerful in 
the domestic sphere? What are their power resources? I will explain these in two fold: 
ftrst, in terms of the structural absence of husbands in the domestic sphere, and 
second, as a consequence, the husbands' greater emotional dependency on their wives 
in the later stage of life. To begin with, consider the following complaints by these 
housewives about the Korean men's typical work life characterized by extremely long 
working hours and often work-related drinking sessions afterward. Korean men work 
the longest hours in the world, 55.1 hours per week, (The New York Times, June 10, 
2001), moreover, drinking after work has been established as a ritualistic male 
tradition between leaders and subordinates in the public world of work. (This is a 
more critical issue in the lives of middle-class younger wives in their 30s, so I will 
explain it further in detail in the next chapter). 
"My husband gets home late, usually after midnight. I once marked on the 
calendar to see how many times he came home early. It was only three times a 
month! When he comes home early, I rather tease him, "What a surprise! How 
come you are home so early today? Tomorrow, the sun will rise from the 
west!" My husband has lots of meetings and drinking socials after work". 
(Go-sun, 50) 
"During the earlier years of marriage, almost everyday I nagged at my 
husband about his coming home late, routine drinking session after work. 
Since a certain point of time I have given up. If you continue to quarrel about 
that, the result is obvious - a big ftght or a divorce". (Gwang-mi, 52) 
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Structurally, the accelerating modernization of the Korean economy and urbanization 
of the family system have produced a middle-class "matriarch" of the nuclear family, 
wherein the father goes off to a managerial position and the mother undertakes home 
management. I emphasize the ''matriarch'' because while most housewives in the 
Western society do not have complete control over their husbands' paychecks or over 
children's education (Hoffman, 1995: 132), these Korean middle-class wives exercise 
an almost absolute control over family affairs, including managing their husbands' 
wages and shaping their children. Korean middle-class men also acknowledge that 
women have enormous power at home (Elaine Kim, 1998). Ironically, the patriarchal 
social structure of a separate division 0 f labor has created the matriarchal family 
wherein women are expected to become active, competent and professional domestic 
managers. This is more so in the middle-class homes due to the fathers' busier and 
longer-hour engagement with the public world ofwork. 
To be culturally specific, the structure of the Korean middle-class family 
operates by a negotiated gender contract, a different settlement of roles between men 
and wives. In this settled arrangement of paternal absence and maternal omnipotence, 
there is simply "too much of mother" (Chodorow, 1978: 185). It may look as if 
Korean women are subservient to their husbands in public, yet there is little feeling by 
the women that the private sphere of domestic life is oppressive (Hoffman, 1995). 
There is little fear of divorce or economic uncertainty on the part of the middle-class 
housewives, for they are aware of the cultural climate that Korean men equally have a 
shared commitment in the maintenance of family life and divorce can be a stigma in 
the men's rise to public prominence. Given the private and public significance of 
family life, these middle-class housewives attempt to renegotiate and shift at the level 
of the family structure the gender-power relations. 
This implies that Korean middle-class housewives are embedded in the 
"dualistic power structure" (Hyoung Cho, 1997): Full-time housewives are 
structurally disempowered in the patriarchal society, but certain power resources can 
be constructively created. For instance, in twenty years of married life, housewives 
would increasingly gain a control over financial management - often including their 
own separate saving accounts - and dependency of husbands and children, which 
become positive power resources. This dualistic power structure is a particularity of 
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the lives of Korean middle-class housewives. By particularity I further want to 
accentuate a largely unexpressed issue of emotion and intimacy in the gender 
relations. While Korean husbands' preoccupation with the economic activities and 
unavailability in the private sphere is a structurally apparent reason for the women's 
domestic empowerment, there is another significant dimension - husbands' greater 
emotional dependency. Consider the following self-reflexive analyses by these 
middle-class women. 
"While watching TV, I realize that now it's women's times. On drama or talk 
shows, I can see that people of my age are getting concerned about "how to 
spend the rest of life well". We women can take care of ourselves, so are not 
afraid of living alone as we get older. But husbands, as they grow older, 
become afraid of being left alone and self -caring, so they become emotionally 
dependent on their wives. They get afraid, 'When I get older and ill, who will 
take care of me beside me?' So husbands become nicer to their wives as they 
grow old together". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"It is true that husbands of our age get concerned, "How can I stick to my 
wife's side until I die?" Without a wife, what can old men do? Men have 
rarely cooked, rarely learned how to take care of themselves. All they have 
done in life is go out and earn money". (Chung-sin, 51) 
"I can see, in TV drama, husbands of our age become nice to their wives, 
"Darling you just sit down here, I will make a dinner tonight. Or shall we go 
out for a dinner tonight? Where do you want to go this weekend?" In our real 
life, that is true. Men are changing as they get older, otherwise, they will not 
be served later by their wife and children". (Go-sun, 50) 
The informal power of the Korean middle-class women is exercised subtly in the way 
they control the emotional and psychological dimension of married life, the basic 
patterns of intimacy and dependency. While living in close proximity, women come 
to recognize their men's emotional anxiety. Women are relatively adept at identifying 
emotions, in themselves and others, in part because their social responsibility for 
caretaking has required them to develop a special acuity in recognizing hidden 
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emotions (Jaggar, 1992: 165). For these women in their 50s, this emotional acumen is, 
by now, sharpened as a skill that allows a special advantage in both understanding the 
mechanisms of domination and envisioning alternative forms of power and freedom 
through the control of emotion and intimacy. Women, like all oppressed groups, may 
have difficulty in imagining the precise contours of an alternative society, but they 
have no trouble at all in invoking alternative sources of power (Scott, 1990). 
Korean middle-class women's lives may not be oppressive because a largely 
unrecognized yet overwhelmingly powerful intimacy transcends the structural gender 
separation, fusing man and wife as "codependent intimates" (Hoffman, 1995: 126). 
As one Western researcher has sharply observed, "Beneath what may be the surface 
appearances of aloofness and distance between husband and wife, there is a certain 
quality of emotional bonding and dependency in Korean marriage that most 
Westerners would fmd overly close or even suffocating" (Hoffman, 1995: 122. Italics, 
my emphasis). Culturally, Korean middle-class women are positioned as an emotional 
center of the home and family, a "spiritual anchor" (Christian, 1994: 96), so their felt-
status may be far higher than that of Western counterparts.1 Korean middle-class 
husbands daily buffeted by the harsh economic structures are overwhelmingly 
dependent upon their wives in the private life, largely attributing their success to the 
wives' emotional "opiate role" (Hewlett, 1986: 326). These middle-class women not 
only recognize the significance of their emotional role, but also use it to advance their 
micro political position in the long-term perspective. Here are examples. 
"On TV drama, I once saw a woman of my age utter to herself, "OK, you will 
see when you get old!" She was angry with her husband and tried to appease 
her anger in revengeful determination. My friends say that they sometimes 
bully their husbands, "OK, you will see!" (Laugh) I tease my husband, "You 
will see when you get old!"" (Italics, her emphasis) (Won-ja, 52) 
"Sometimes my husband suffers a hang-over in the morning due to over-
drinking. If I make Book-uh-gook (special fish soup for a hang-over) in the 
morning, he gets so pleased, fawning on me, "That's why men must have a 
wife! I wonder how men without a wife can live!" But I watch for a chance, 
thinking, 'Don't get too impressed now. I am not going to quarrel with the 
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drunken man now. But you will see tonight when you get sober!' The wife's 
voice pitches higher as we get old together". (Eun-kyung, 52) 
"You will see when you get oldl" This is a "hidden transcript" (Scott, 1990: 136), a 
backstage discourse spoken often behind the back of the dominant. These middle-
class women enjoy freedom and power in their domestic roles, improving their 
position in a calculated manner, by the long-term perspective on their prospects. They 
employ calculated ''tactics'' (De Certeau, 1984) to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities present themselves, and such tactics often involve "spotting the weak 
points" (Fiske, 1989: 19) - in this case, husbands' emotional dependency - to carve 
their own space and maintain their own position within and against the social 
structure dominated by men. Women are both cunning and savvy enough to spot their 
husbands' weak points. "Subordinate groups know more about dominant groups than 
the dominant group knows about them because a large part of their life is spent 
accommodating those in power" (Brown, 1994: 23). Such pragmatic knowledge is 
sometimes tapped through television drama and often shared through the women's 
friendship networks, wherein they heartily talk and laugh about the meanings of small 
elements of domestic rituals. Equipped with their own strategic knowledge, these 
middle-class housewives insinuate and maneuver for a better position within the 
structure of patriarchy. In this way, women escape without leaving the place of 
patriarchy. Within the place of patriarchy, they renegotiate the relationships of power 
and the institutional definition of their roles. They attempt to turn upside down the 
gendered role set out for them by educating their husbands little by little, with an 
occasional feeling of triumph about small changes and transitions in everyday life -
ranging from the husbands' participation in the housework to watching TV together. 
"We cannot be a servant for life, so wives of our generation start to educate 
husbands on simple things - cooking instant meals, warming up left-over food 
in the refrigerator, running the laundry machine. If husbands of our age can't 
cook a simple meal, that's a wife's fault. Ifhusbands in their 50s or 60s still 
dictate wives to do this, do that in the home, they will be deserted alone later". 
(Chung-sin, 51) 
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"My husband sometimes sits next to me while I am watching drama, and 
teases, "It's just a drama, why are you falling for that stuff?" But he tries to 
talk to me, asking about the story, "What happened? Who is that?"" 
(Bong-wha, 52) 
"I sometimes wondered, how come I had been living with this man for so 
long? If I got ill and moaned all night long, he would just sleep snoring loud. 
If he got ill, he would make all the fuss as if he were dying ... Now he has 
changed. We go mountain-hiking together. He sometimes calls me to let me 
join his drinking social". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"Husbands, when young, did not help housework. They went to work and 
came home late. Now, as they get old, they help housework. If I am tired my 
husband would vacuum the house, and upon hearing "ding" (ending signal) of 
the laundry machine, he would take out clothes and hang them on the rack". 
(Go-sun, 50) 
Overall, this section has shown that the position of Korean middle-class 
women in their 50s does not quite resemble the Western ideas of male-female power 
relations. As evidenced in the female-dominating patterns of television use, the 
private sphere of the contemporary Korean middle-class family is constantly shifting. 
The women's status changes radically at the later stage of life while renegotiating and 
redefining the gender-power relations at the level of the family structure. Rather than 
universalizing women's oppression across generation and class, it is therefore 
necessary to accommodate life course analysis to address more adequately the 
question of gender relations. Unlike the tenn life cycle, which implies fixed categories 
in the life of the individual and assumes a stable system, the term life course suggests 
more flexible biographical patterns within a continually changing social system 
(Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991: 386). It thus permits a more dynamic and fluid 
approach to the study of contesting gender relations over the period of life, and 
provides a better understanding of the question of shifting power. 
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Section (2) Middle-Class Leisure and Television 
In the previous section I have argued that the status of the Korean middle-class 
housewives changes radically at the later stage of their life course with a significant 
degree of power and freedom in the domestic sphere, as demonstrated in the female-
dominating patterns of television use in the primetime. This section further reinforces 
my argument by considering the women's life styles subject to change according to 
their stage in the life course. I examine middle-class women's changing life styles in 
the context of everyday leisure and television. How are the women's life styles 
characterized by the changing life course stage? What are the distinctive features of 
their everyday leisure? How is television positioned in middle-class leisure culture? 
My special interest is in how middle-class women perceive daytime television and 
whether television has a role to play in structuring their everyday leisure life. 
"A woman of our age who stays at home all day long and watches TV would 
be either a woman without money, or an idiot. Why stay home when there are 
lots of things to enjoy outside? I get out of home in the morning and go back 
home when the sun falls. I have been rusting at home for nearly 30 years, 
that's quite enough!" (Bong-wha, 52) 
"If you have nothing to do in life you may watch TV during the day. Often in 
the morning, my friends call me, "Let's get out!" Then I say, "Where?" They 
laugh at me, "Why stay at home? Just come out, then we will figure out where 
to go to entertain you". If you stay home, you get fat and old". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"Once you tum on TV, you can't stop watching and your brain stops 
functioning right there. Consciously I try to stay away from TV, instead find 
other things to do. There are lots of other things to do outside, why stay home 
and waste the rest oflife?" (Go-sun, 50) 
The above accounts demonstrate that television is not heavily integrated into the 
daytime routines of the middle-class women in their 50s. The question of whether, 
and how, television takes part in structuring everyday life is inextricably related to the 
question of what "meaning" women give to television (Seiter et aI., 1989), and to the 
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issue that consumption and lifestyle preferences involve discriminatory judgments 
(Bourdieu, 1984). The meaning of daytime television consumption for these middle-
class women is conspicuously dismissive as cheap low-brow forms of cultural 
activities: "A woman of our age who stays at home all day long and watches TV 
would be either a woman without money, or an idiot". Television is part of popular 
"low" culture and daytime program is its "lowest" form (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 
173), the soap opera in particular is the very epitome of the low and waste-of-time 
women's trash. (Allen, 1995: 3). For the middle-class women with some economic 
and cultural capital, the meaning of daytime television with all the evaluative 
weighting is precisely a "low-prestige leisure activity, engaged in thoughtlessly by 
those who do not have the inner resources to do anything else" (Brunsdon, 1989: 
116). In short, television merely occupies a marginal space in middle-class women's 
daytime leisure life. Being perceived as "anti-television" means a sensible middle-
class lifestyle. 
"Consciously I try to stay away from TV, instead find other things to do". The 
middle-class women do not have a close engagement with popular television, 
particularly during the daytime. The middle-class aesthetic is not compatible with the 
popular sensibility characterized by the "desire to enter into the game, identifying 
with the characters' joys and sufferings, worrying about their fate, espousing their 
hopes and ideals, living their lives"; on the contrary, the middle-class aesthetic values 
"detachment, disinterestedness, indifference" (Bourdieu, 1980: 237-239). The middle-
class women's conscious distance from the mundane television, with their 
discriminatory aesthetic judgement and taste, is a way of "defming, fixing and 
legitimating social differences": For taste is one of the important means by which 
social distinctions are maintained and class identities are forged (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Taste on television consumption can be a signifier of social identity. For these middle-
class women, distancing away from the popular cultural goods - television - is a 
manifestation of class status. It is more true for the social status groups among older 
members - like these women in their 50s - that distinctive consumption patterns 
function as a "marker of class", and that such patterns help to define the members of a 
status group to preserve its status-honor, its social and cultural esteem, in its own eyes 
and in the eyes of others (Bocock, 1993: 6). It feels socially relevant for them to 
distance away from television watching, instead engage in proper-status activities. 
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"Why stay home when there are lots of things to enjoy outside?" This is 
commonly stated by these middle-class women in their 50s.2 They show a somewhat 
rebellious attitude towards staying home during the day, and are determined to go out 
and enjoy their life: "I have been rusting at home for nearly 30 years, that's quite 
enough!" Then, what do they do outside home, often until the sunset? 
"The minute I get out of home, all the stress flies away, I feel like whistling! 
With the swimming bag on the shoulder, I feel like skipping! I go for 
swimming, then a sauna on weekdays, and mountain-hiking at the weekends. 
Our friends' meeting place is a sports center. After swimming and sauna, we 
feel hungry, then go out for lunch together. The next course is a singing room. 
Until the sun sets, we never go home. If somebody says, "Let's go home 
now", another retorts, "To do what at home? Still the sun is there!"" 
(Bong-wha, 52) 
"At 9:00am I go to a sports center - fitness for 1 hour, swimming for 30 
minutes, then sauna. While bouncing in the swimming pool or learning aqua-
aerobic with young women, I feel like I am going back to the youth again ... 
Sweating inside the sauna, we get in the mood for lunch, "Hey, why don't we 
go out to lunch, there is a nice live-song restaurant with a mountain view!" We 
hop into a friend's car and chat. .. We don't hurry home to make a dinner. I 
would just call my family, "Buy a dinner! One-time eating out would not 
hurt!" I have served home-made meals for 30 years, then buying a dinner once 
in a while is not a problem for the family". (Gwang-mi, 52) 
"Mothers of my age think about how to enjoy the rest of life. We are so 
determined to enjoy, play hard before getting too old. (Laugh) We are the 
rebel generation ofthe 50s! Just like rebellious teenagers run away from home 
and wander around in a gang, we don't think about going home once we are 
playing outside ... We try out hip styles, the young women's low-waist pants, 
even though that fashion on our big hips and short legs makes us look like 
stupid frogs. Mothers of my age don't care as long as it gives us pleasure". 
(Chung-sin, 51) 
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The middle-class women's leisure patterns are strikingly similar, composed of three 
major activities: body maintenance / singing / consumption. Almost ritually, everyday 
they engage in exercise such as swimming, fitness, mountain hiking, aerobic; cultural-
educational programs including singing, dancing, calligraphy, computer internet, 
English; gourmet eating and shopping. A body of evidence exists to confirm that 
women generally have less time, resources and opportunities for leisure than men, and 
a narrower range of options and where and with whom to spend it (Green et at, 
1990). But this scenario would be highly unlikely for the Korean middle-class women 
in their 50s. Especially, body maintenance is firmly established as a virtuous leisure 
activity among these middle-class women. The body is the materialization of class 
taste (Bourdieu, 1984). The middle-class women's morality assumes an increasing 
self-responsibility for their health, body shape and appearance. They make a constant 
effort on body work and self-consciously monitor their bodily presentation in the 
social space. Their self in this sense is the ''performing self' (Featherstone, 1991: 
187). The increased opportunity to enjoy leisure outside the home and public display 
encourages body work, self-monitoring and self-transformation. The culture of mid-
life can be described as the "modernization of ageing" (Featherstone and Hepworth, 
1991: 385), which involves a distancing from deep old age, chronologically 
determined age. It is resistance to ageing that intersects around the concept of 
youthfulness. Those at the bottom of the social class hierarchy have few resources to 
facilitate the choice of a ''positive'' old age, but for those in the middle class with 
generous income, old age holds out the prospect of a prolongation of the plateau-like 
phase of adult life, with continued relatively high consumption of the pursuit of 
consumer-culture lifestyles, body maintenance and styles of self-presentation 
(Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991: 374). 
The second distinctive feature of the middle-class women's leisure life styles 
is their "female friendship network". The sources of female support and 
companionship are a crucial determinant in maximizing their leisure pleasure. 
"Sociability" is important as women tend to feel that ''real leisure" should offer an 
opportunity for having fun in company outside the home environment, for a lively 
social interaction (Green et al., 1990: 7). Friendship affects willingness to be involved 
in out-of-home activities, and provides the social support to carry out their leisure 
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decisions in practice. Body maintenance / singing / consumption all signal a stepping 
out from the domestic bounds. 
The women's talks quoted above are exuberant of ultimate leisure experience. 
Their out-of-home leisure is youthful and self-reflexively playful with a hint of 
resistance: "Until the sun sets, we never go home ... Still the sun is there!" It is a 
deliberate opposition to the rule of everyday life, which is evidenced in their loose 
notion of meal preparation: "Buy a dinner! One-time eating out would not hurt!" 
Ignoring the preparation of family dinner in pursuit of leisure pleasure is a small act 
of revolt against the grain of patriarchal culture. At this point, I want to reinforce my 
previous argument by stressing that the middle-class women's ultimate experience of 
the out-of-home leisure is a more prominent, public manifestation of the women's 
domestic empowerment, and this is one specific example of significant socio-cultural 
shifts in the middle-class women's life. "I have served home-made meals for 30 years, 
then buying a dinner once in a while is not a problem for the family". Underlying this 
talk emerges a justification for the women's entitlement to leisure. Here, I want to 
further accentuate women's assertion of leisure entitlement. Listen to the following 
claims. 
"Even though I get home late, nobody in my family would dare to criticize me. 
Who can criticize us, mothers, when we have fmished raising and educating 
our children? Impatient women would have already run away from home, but 
we have made sacrifices for the sake of children's future". (Won-ja, 52) 
"I have sacrificed my life, ralsmg children and supporting my husband's 
success. Sometimes I wonder, why have I lived like this? Nobody is going to 
award me the prize of "Good Mother", or "Good Wife". I don't have to make 
sacrifice anymore. From now on, I should enjoy my life". (Eun-kyung, 52) 
"If somebody is about to leave to make a dinner and chill the spirit, we friends 
advise, "Just call your husband and tell him to eat dinner at work! You don't 
have to be nice anymore as nobody is going to award the golden badge of 
"Great Wife" on your shoulder"". (Jung-soon, 50) 
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"Mothers of my age have been rusting at home for 28-30 years. Our 
responsibility inside the home has now finished. Now, we should take care of 
ourselves. Now, we get the feeling of liberation!" (Bong-wha, 52) 
Here, these women in their 50s self-confidently defend and assert their entitlement to 
leisure against the social obligations of day-to-day caring. It is this generation of 
articulate middle-class women that is at the forefront in the elaboration and expression 
of entitlement to leisure in direct opposition to the traditional role requirement. These 
women see themselves as earning the right to leisure in the same way as their working 
husbands, and argue that they deserve it. To enjoy out-of-home leisure, even all day 
long until the sunset, is not felt selfish by them, for leisure time outside home is taken 
as a well-earned moment of compensation for their lifetime caring role and sacrifice. 
Needs are influenced by culture not only in the ways they are formed, but in how they 
are gratified too (Lull, 1995: 99). Sacrifice is a culturally situated social experience 
for Korean women, while leisure is one of the main sources of personal gratification 
sought in the later stage oflife. Leisure pleasure is taken as the most accessible means 
to redress their uncompensated sacrifice and alienation from the public world of work. 
Through a common interest in leisure activities, the friendship webs of middle-class 
women seek to express their otherwise "silenced" identities. By "silenced" they 
commonly mean, ''Nobody is going to award me the prize of "Good Mother", or 
"Good Wife"". It is through the leisure life that this generation of housewives attempt 
to revive the self forgotten and buried in the dust of time. Their search for the 
construction of a new identity and the self-transformation in the later stage of life 
course is played out in one form through an intensive engagement with everyday 
leisure consumption. I would argue that the cultural and psychological significance of 
leisure for this generation of middle-class women is precisely "the end of sacrifice" 
with an exalted feeling of freedom and liberation. Indulging in the pleasure ofleisure 
is their own way of celebrating the ending of self-sacrifice, the bottomless, unspoken 
emotional demand to take care of the other. This is a celebratory ending of the "being-
for", "being responsible-for" (Bauman, 1995: 60-70), and a new beginning of their 
entry into the modem way oftransforming an identity. 
Taken together with the previous section, it becomes clear that the current 
everyday life is not felt so disadvantageous by the middle-class women in their 50s 
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with their enonnous domestic power and ample leisure opportunity. This finding can 
partly answer the question: Why do many ordinary women accept or consent to the 
patriarchal social-economic system that is apparently against their interests in the eyes 
of society? The powerful have a vital interest in keeping up appearances appropriate 
to their fonn of domination; and subordinates, for their part, ordinarily have good 
reasons to help sustain those appearances or, at least, not openly to contradict them 
(Scott, 1990: 70). Because these women increasingly gain control over the private 
sphere, the major arena of their everyday life, coupled with a freedom to engage in 
leisure activities, they have less impetus to challenge the patriarchal social structure. 
In effect, individual women's domestic empowennent under the patriarchal structure 
can result in a strongly defensive "anti-feminist" force of the patriarchal system 
(Hyoung Cho, 1997). The middle-class women both adhere to the home in their 
domestic empowennent and rebel against the home through the intensive engagement 
with the out-of-home leisure. The women's domestic empowennent and leisure life 
styles sustain a patriarchal middle-classness settled on the binary relation - work for 
men and consumption for women. Although the changes in the domestic power and 
leisure opportunities are of special importance for the women, these positive changes 
in the later stage of life course are only limited to the realms of the private and leisure 
life, but do not extend to work with publicly recognizable forms of fonnal power. 
Section (3) TV Reflexivity: Women's Work and Childcare 
In the previous section I have shown the freedom of out-of-home leisure :firmly 
structured in the everyday life of the middle-class women in their 50s. For this 
generation of women, the meaning of out-of-home leisure is the end of sacrifice, the 
most available means to redress their lifetime caring roles inside the home and 
alienation from the public world of work. Their search for the self is limited within 
the realm of leisure against the reality that a proper -status work can not be attainable. 
Leisure then may not be a choice in the sense that these women have no choice but to 
tum to leisure pleasure in their attempt to compensate for the self-sacrificing life. One 
woman precisely puts it, "What kind of decent job can we find at this age when the 
brain has stopped functioning at home for such a long time?" Such reality further 
propels these middle-class housewives more intensely towards the pursuit of leisure 
pleasure.3 This, however, does not mean that they do not have a desire for work. In 
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fact, all of these middle-class women express a desire for work, which is yet 
irreconcilable and unrealizable. Their unfulfilled desire for work is reflected in the 
envious yet complex response towards the images of professional career women on 
television. In this section, I analyze the highly self-reflexive ways in which these 
women question and scrutinize the modem images of working women on television 
from their vantage points as mothers with family roles. This section focuses on the 
middle-class women's reception oftelevision as an object for reflexivity, in particular 
relation to the subject of women's work and childcare. 
"Inside TV I can see many working women nowadays. They look nice to me. It 
would be so nice if I could have my own work. I wish to work outside and earn 
even 1,000 Won (BP SOp) on my own". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"I envy those women who have their own work on TV. They look confident. In 
the alumnae's meeting I fmd working friends usually look 4-5 years younger than 
us, housewives. Their life is on the going and getting, unlike our drooping and 
sinking life. My children have grown up, I wish I could work again". (Go-sun, 50) 
"I tell my daughter, ''Don't live like me. Hang on to the company until you get 
kicked out!" I don't want my daughter to repeat my life". (Gwang-mi, 52) 
All of the middle-class housewives in their 50s express a strong desire to be able to 
work outside the home and earn money on their own, even 1,000 Won (BP SOp). They 
tend to find working women more confident, lively, "going and getting somewhere", 
whereas their housewifery life "drooping and sinking". Commonly, their unfulfilled 
wish for work is projected on their daughters. This strong desire for work is also 
reflected in their envy for the images of professional career women on television. At 
the surface level, these Korean women's envy for the images of career women 
parallels the responses of American older women towards modem working women on 
television (Press, 1991). American older women also respond positively to the images 
of women at work because their own experience in non-traditional careers has been 
limited. They thus enjoy newer television images of women in the workplace, 
expressing feelings of envy and admiration. "Older women are inspired by newer 
representations of working women, images that are far from representing their past or 
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present experience but that fire their imagination" (Press, 1991: 155). American older 
women feel free to fantasize about the lives of working women characters, and such 
feminist images can broaden their horizons. "In this respect, newer television images 
of working women serve as a liberating force for older women, freeing them to 
envision new possibilities for women, possibilities they have never experienced and 
have rarely seen in their own lives" (Press, 1991: 168). However, in the following I 
will demonstrate that the Korean women's envious response to the images of 
professional women on television is more complicated. 
"Once The Success Times (documentary drama) showed a successful woman 
doctor. She has made a big fortune, so established a medical school. Wow! I 
envied her remarkable achievement. .. While TV was showing around her 
house, I got curious about her family, "What kind of husband does she live 
with? How many children does she have?" But her family didn't show up! 
Where is the family? She said, "I didn't have time to marry. I love my work so 
much that I've got married to my work". A-ha! That makes sense to me. 
Women can choose either a nice job or a nice home. We cannot have both. 
That's why most successful women with a nice job do not have a nice home. 
They remain single or get divorced". (Bong-wha, 52) 
"On TV drama, I can see that women of my age work in professional areas. 
They look nice, well-dressed, confident. But I get to wonder, how come they 
have managed work and home? How come?" (Jung-soon, 50) 
"Whenever I see working women with a nice career on TV, I envy them. They 
look sophisticated at work, well-respected by their children and husband in the 
home ... How have they managed to work? They look so glamorous, without 
any trouble in life. How could that be possible? I would really like to know 
their secret method. They all must be superwomen ... Drama only shows the 
surface, not the reality underneath. Drama showing those glamorous working 
women is an unrealistic fake". (Italics, her emphasis) (Go-sun, 50) 
The image of successful career women with glamorous and multi-dimensional lives is 
not simply received with envy and admiration, but this seemingly envious image is 
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critically scrutinized. These Korean middle-class women are extremely analytical in 
this respect. While watching television they engage in the analytic process of 
questioning, reasoning, reflecting, and criticizing. They tend to take rhetorical 
approaches to practical reasoning. Encountering successful career women on 
television, they pose curious questions: "Where is the family?" "How come they have 
managed work and home?" "How could that be possible? I would really like to know 
their secret method". Here, there is much speculation and scrutiny concerning 
working women's "family life". Family life is the central concern for these Korean 
middle-class women, so they are inclined to interpret and question the televised image 
from their vantage points as mothers. Family life is the main interpretative framework 
in their reception of television. Inside television, working women are almost always 
shown in conjunction with their family roles, happily without troubles. Such images 
are taken as unrealistic for these women as they touch upon their respective 
experiences as working women differently. While talking about television, these 
women frequently relate events or characters to their own lives or to their friends' 
lives in a real situation. They constantly judge such representations by making a 
''referential talk" and fusing it with a "critical talk" (Liebes and Katz, 1993). The 
above questions posed by these women spring from a "dialectic" between televised 
representations and actual realities. Their self-reflexive accounts emerge from the 
frequent referential and critical modes of viewing. One feature that I want to 
particularly emphasize here is this "self-reflexive" nature of the women's TV talk. 
The "examination of self' (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 128) is central in the 
women's TV talk, so their accounts tend to be retrospective and autobiographical. As 
televised images trigger a reflection on their particular experiences as working women 
previously, these women criticize the image of professional women, who combine a 
family life with ease, as largely an "unrealistic fake". Then, what was their own 
reality like? The following is a typical experience of working women in real life. 
"In our days most women had to quit work once we had children. One child 
can be managed in a way as we can leave the child with our mother or sister if 
they live nearby. We beg around for childcare. But once we have two children 
we cannot beg anymore. When my children cried, missing mommy, my 
mother got out of control and called me at work, "Take your children! Women 
should take care of children fIrst, what's the use of work?" Should I continue 
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to work or quit? Feeling guilty for children everyday, many women give up at 
this stage. What's the use of my work when my children are not happy? I had 
no choice but to quit my work and stay close to my children". (Go-sun, 50) 
This talk reveals that women's lives are largely conditioned upon, and circumscribed 
by, childcare responsibilities. When career women have children, they most surely 
take on an exhausting double burden, often then, find their career "sabotaged by 
motherhood" (Hewlett, 1986: 15). In the feeling of guilt and ambivalence as a 
working mother, women give up their dreams of career life, realizing that child care is 
the main barrier to their professional achievement. Far from the images of successful 
career mothers on television, these middle-class women point out the difficulties 
inherent in combining childcare responsibilities with professional aspirations. It is this 
realization of the incompatibility of work and family that is central to the women's 
lives. Eventually, almost every working mother "must choose" either family or career 
- either the joy of love and motherhood or the life alone, childless with her work for 
sole consolation. This is the general reality of high-achieving, feminist-oriented 
professional women in Korea. It is unfettered single or divorced women who can 
competitively leap into the mainstream marketplace and work equally like men. On 
the contrary, when given a choice of either a family life or a career life, "normal" 
Korean women are assumed to prioritize the former. Work and family life together is 
considered an impossible set of dreams to ordinary Korean women. In short, "We 
have not yet created a context that allows a woman to reasonably expect that she can 
have both a career and a family" (Hewlett, 1986: 401). Childcare was a major concern 
for these women in their 50s, and even today younger women - their daughters' 
generation - still cannot figure out a way of reconciling motherhood with professional 
aspirations. In the lack of social support systems, women's family-based networks, 
particularly the mother-daughter tie, remain a dominant source of help, although such 
help is reluctantly offered by mothers. The childcare issue is indeed a "moral 
dilemma" and part of everyday talk among the group of older women who have 
working daughters. 
"How can you heartlessly ignore it when your daughter is so eager to work, 
struggling with work and home everyday? I am not happy about child care, but 
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can't ignore it for the pleasure of my own life. But frankly, I really don't want 
to be stuck at home again. That's a dilemma for the women of our age". 
(Gwang-mi, 52) 
"My friend once played with her grandchild. This little boy babbled 
"Teletubbies, Teletubbies", pointing to the TV set. My friend thought, he was 
incorrectly pronouncing ''Television'', so turned on TV. But he kept babbling, 
"No! Teletubbies, Teletubbies", then burst into tears as the grandmother could 
not grasp what he meant. My friend fmally called her daughter and found out 
what he wanted. It was a Teletubbies videotape ... My friend talked about this 
in our meeting, asking us, "Do you know what Teletubbies is?" We said, ''No. 
What is it?" Then she warned, "If you don't know what Teletubbies is, then 
don't dare to think about looking after your grandchildren. We, antique 
generation, cannot catch up with modem kids' demands". (Bong-wha, 52) 
"My daughter has even moved near my apartment to leave her child with me. 
If I move to another apartment, she may follow me again. So what can I do? I 
am her mother. I just cannot callously declare to my daughter, ''You quit your 
work and take care of your own child!"" (Eun-kyung, 52) 
In the course of my research, themes concerning "childcare" have recurred 
consistently as dominant concerns for the Korean women interviewed, therefore, I 
want to direct my fmal focus on feminism's insufficient attention to the issues of 
motherhoodlchildcare.4 Feminism with its central emphasis on equal rights and sexual 
freedom is grounded on the assumption that once women possess the same rights as 
men and achieve control over their own body - including the right to choose not to 
have children - women can achieve a true equality of opportunity and compete for 
economic and political power on the same terms as men. This assumption has led 
modem feminists to ignore the issues of motherhood/childcare. My research data, 
however, reveal that the crux of (Korean) women's problems lies in 
motherhoodlchildcare. Given the lack of alternative visions for child care, the concrete 
realities of women's lives center on reconciling motherhood with professional 
aspirations. Can we afford to ignore any longer women's desire for both motherhood 
and work? 
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Motherhood is the most widely shared experience of the great majority of 
women in Korea, yet this pivotal issue of childcare has been largely ignored. 73.4% of 
all Korean women of age 15 and over get married, and 66.1 % of all married women 
remain full-time housewives/mothers (Hyoung Cho, 1994: 170). If any camp of 
feminism takes anti-marriage, anti-children or anti-motherhood as a short-cut solution 
and continues to devalue the significance of motherhood in the lives of ordinary 
women, this particular "anti" camp must be then making a gigantic mistake: It 
basically fails to recognize the ordinary women's deep desire for motherhood and 
family, fails to incorporate the bearing and rearing of children into the vision of 
liberated life, and fails to reach and connect to the mainstream of women's lives. For 
the ordinary Korean women interviewed in my research, the imminent issue in their 
everyday lives has not much to do with such agendas as equal rights and sexual 
freedom that are mainly voiced by high-achieving, unfettered single or divorced 
career women, the epitome of feminists in modem Korea. What the ordinary women 
need in their everyday reality is a plethora of family support systems and sensible 
public policies concerning childcare in particular; some pragmatic visions that can 
ease women's dual burden in the home and the workforce. In the absence of 
supportive social structures in modem Korea, the problem of childcare largely 
remains individualized, privatized, weighing heaviest on women. There emerges a 
strong urge to take the lead on the childcare issue to allow women to combine a 
family life with a career, as they so wish. 
Section (4) Family, TV and Moral Discourse 
In this final section I attempt to construct a Korean case of television morality in 
particular relation to the notion of family - television as part of family moral 
discourse. I find this task imperative, for the narrative logic in the women's reflexive 
TV talk hinges greatly on the intensity of family values. Throughout the interviews, 
the middle-class women in their 50s emphatically make a lengthy, reflexive and 
forceful rhetoric about family values, generating a clear and consensual meaning of 
the home and family. This was equally true for the working-class women in their 50s 
as proven in Chapter 4. So far in this chapter, I have argued for radical changes in the 
private sphere of the middle-class families, which are demonstrated in the female-
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dominating patterns of television use and the shifting power of the gender relation in 
Section (1), and the women's infinite freedom of out-of-home leisure life structured 
against the grain of the everyday patriarchal rule in Section (2). In Section (3) the 
women have shown an irreconcilable desire for combining a family life with a career. 
Their consensual defmition of modem woman points to the image of a career woman, 
but not at the expense of the woman's traditional role for the family. Although some 
main features inside the family structure are continually changing in the later stage of 
life course towards a more female-dominating modernization, hence, a balance of 
power between men and women, the traditional value of family is nonetheless kept 
intact, unchangeable and irreplaceable. Unlike the working-class women's entire 
embeddedness in the traditional morality of the family system, the middle-class 
women are both modem and traditional, largely conservative but not entirely 
traditional. This concluding section therefore focuses on the ways in which everyday 
television is intersected as a space of moral discussion and constructed as an on-going 
family moral discourse by the middle-class women in their 50s. 
"Even a woman President must take care of her home and family first! 
Woman's work is important, but the home always must be the top priority no 
matter what!" (Won-ja, 52) 
"Without the family, what's the meaning of my life? Even though I have 
sacrificed my whole life for the family, if my family is well and happy my 
sacrifice is worth it". (Bong-wha, 52) 
"What is important in woman's life? I come to think about that nowadays. 
Whenever seeing working women, I envy them and complain, "I am a useless 
antique". But if! had a nice work without a nice home, then I would definitely 
desire a nice home. Having a nice home and family is most precious of all". 
(Jung-soon, 50) 
"I majored in Korean Literature in university, but have not made use of my 
aptitude since getting married and staying home with children. One of my 
classmates has become a famous novelist. I saw her once on TV and found her 
book on the list ofbestsellers. I envied her success. 'What am I?' This thought 
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disturbed me ... But later I have noticed that she doesn't have a husband and 
children. It would be perfect if a woman could have both a nice career and a 
nice family, but that's an almost impossible dream. IfI am to choose between 
a successful career and a family life, I will choose, again, my family life". 
(Go-sun, 50) 
As evident in the above extracts, the kernel of middle-class values lies in the idea of 
home and family. All of the middle-class women here extensively emphasize the 
central role of children and family in women's lives. The home is a space for family 
cohesion and stability, a guarantee that the essence of women's identity can be 
secured. Middle-class women highly value their social status as a powerful, moral 
guardian of the family. It is the women themselves who actively support the idea of 
home and family - perhaps even more so than men. Precisely, in their own family 
discourse, ''women are the bearers of the vision of family, its keepers, its producers" 
(Stivens, 1998: 17). Their idea of modem woman resembles the second wave 
American feminist rhetoric in a way that emphasizes the importance of women's work 
outside home, however, the family is believed to be the top priority in any 
circumstance. Their primary concern is family harmony and stability from which their 
emotional security and meaning of life are derived: "Without the family, what's the 
meaning of my life?" Although all of these middle-class housewives project their 
irreconcilable desire for a career life on their educated daughters, they basically do not 
want social structural changes that may challenge their current stable position as a 
mother, as the emotional and moral backbone of the family. As a consequence, the 
family is constitutive of the middle-class women's everyday conversation, and the 
domestic presence of television intersects intimately with their ongoing discourse of 
family. 
"I like to watch the drama that makes me think about the importance of home 
and family. We mothers like to watch the drama about a happy, harmonious 
family. That's our life. That's the way to live". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"I like to watch a ha-ha-ho-ho happy family. TV drama should show the 
audience happy families living together harmoniously". (Chung-sin, 51) 
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"When drama shows any serious conflict in the home, I just turn off TV. I 
believe drama should not show that kind of unpleasant stuff'. (Eun-kyung, 52) 
The middle-class women's supreme emphasis on family values is reflected in their 
particular preference for a certain genre of television program - home drama - the 
portrayal of "ha-ha-ho-ho happy family" characterized by a subjective sense of 
harmony and cooperation. These women most enjoy watching a typical middle-class 
home drama with its concentration on the "family ensemble structured within 
definitions of gender and the value of home life for family cohesion, the stability of 
the family" (Haralovich, 1992: 111). They selectively watch the home drama 
guaranteed for family union, while holding the expectation that such a normative 
portrayal of the Korean family ought to be the conventional rule of television drama. 
The normative home and family is expected for them to be a central focus 0 f 
television drama and of real life. 
However, the normative space of home and family and the women's moral 
order within it are felt to be challenged and even threatened by television drama's 
newly emerging modem themes, for example, divorce. As the "naturalized normative 
territory" (Allen, 1995) is on the verge of disintegrating, television stirs the women's 
sense of security and stability grounded on the family. This is precisely where a moral 
discourse of family enters. The middle-class women's empathetic rhetoric about 
family values is triggered by the encounter with contesting modem themes, and the 
women's TV talk intensifies the ongoing moral discourse of family. This is 
exemplified in their debates on the prime time daily drama Can't Help Loving you, 
wherein the marriage between a single medical doctor and a divorced woman 
becomes a main concern for the families involved.s This is, in these middle-class 
women's view, a morally problematic event. The anxieties about holding on to the 
idea of family resonate in the women's TV talk about the drama. 
"The marriage between a young doctor and a divorced woman (in the drama) 
is uncommon, unrealistic. Frankly, no mother would like to accept a divorced 
woman as a daughter-in-law unless her son was a total idiot. Ask anybody on 
the street! No matter how smart, pretty, capable she is, no mother in Korea 
would like to accept a divorced woman into the family". (Gwang-mi, 52) 
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"In Can't Help Loving You, a single doctor marries a divorced woman despite 
his mother's fierce disapproval. Nowadays divorce is increasing in Korean 
society, but TV drama should show a normal, happy family. That drama is 
rationalizing a wrong marriage ethic". (Jung-soon, 50) 
"While watching that drama, I can feel what we frequently call the "generation 
gap". To our generation, the family bond and harmony always came first. 
Nowadays the family bond and harmony is loosening. Things are drifting in a 
wrong direction! Young people dare to marry anybody, even driving a nail 
into their parents' hearts. That's very wrong!" (Won-ja, 52) 
There is certainly an air of morality surrounding television vlewmg here. The 
conflictual theme of divorce disrupts the self-evident nature of the family, while 
allowing and opening up a space for moral discussion to enter. It invites a forum in 
which women immerse themselves and discuss the level of ethical imperatives. 
Women's TV talk enters a highly critical moral discourse. On one hand, women's 
criticism above is based on "ethical realism" (Alasuutari, 2000). For example, "Ask 
anybody on the street! No mother in Korea would like to accept a divorced woman 
into the family". This is a particular ethos of Korean ethical realism. Drama content 
contradicts the women's existing ethical positions about what is not right, what should 
not be: "Young people dare to marry anybody, even driving a nail into their parents' 
hearts. That's very wrong!" TV talk here can be seen as a terrain of moral struggle. 
On the other hand, women's fierce criticism comes from a deep fear of disintegration 
of family, with a reflexive imagination of such incident in their own lives: "What if 
that happens to me?" "What should I do if my son or daughter brings a divorced 
person?" The events and subjects covered in the television drama - divorce in this 
case - act as a catalyst for reflection on their family life. The moral messages 
contained in the drama are discussed, interpreted and re -dramatized in the company of 
friends, thereby, the television drama is "thoroUghly realized" (Abercrombie and 
Longhurst, 1998: 110). This particular issue of divorce sets the agenda for women's 
concerns and anecdotally fuels a focus for open conversation. 
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"When we happen to hear divorce news about friends' children, we get 
shocked. That becomes a main subject in our conversation. Recently, my 
friend's daughter got divorced. While this daughter was studying in Paris she 
met a (Korean) man who was working as a tourist guide. Despite the parents' 
opposition, she lived with that man and got pregnant! Reluctantly, my friend 
got her daughter married off. But now, they are divorced even though they 
have one child! Nowadays we are all concerned about the young people's 
loose idea of marriage. We are still the old generation, we are not open to 
accept divorce". (Bong-wha, 52) 
''Nowadays we are all concerned about the young people's loose idea of marriage". 
Distinctively, the middle-class mothers tend to show a stance of elitist and nationalist 
paternalism; accordingly, the way they talk about television is grounded on the 
"cultural" or "national" terms. Their moralistic debates are carried out often adopting 
the notions of "Korean culture", "traditional culture", "virtuous Korean custom". 
Their criticism of television focuses on cultural and national issues. This may be due 
to the cultural positioning of television that is likely to trigger a talk of moral 
condemnation. This may be, also, due to the cultural positioning of middle-class 
mothers in modern Korea. Middle-class mothers are nearly always regarded as an 
"embodiment of the essential virtues of social morality, a repository and teacher of the 
moral and cultural ideals upon which the entire society is structured" (Hoffinan, 1995: 
117). Since the cultural positioning of the mother is recognized as principally 
responsible for the education of children, becoming in this sense the guardian of the 
moral values deemed central to Korean society, she plays a major role in preserving 
and strengthening the society as a whole against the unwelcome incursion of he "low 
morality", such as divorce/remarriage, characteristically associated with modernized 
Western societies. As evidenced in the following extracts, through TV talk these 
middle-class women construct a nationalistic consent on the Korean family morality 
that is essentially organized around principles of paternalism and persuasion. 
"1 am so worried that that kind of drama (Can't Help Loving You) may 
damage our traditional culture, our virtuous Korean custom. Why is TV 
broadcasting such content in the evening time? It's unsuitable for our Korean 
culture! You can marry anybody in the Western world, but not in Korea! We 
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talk about television drama with our friends. Our generation criticizes it. Is 
current drama wholesome? We don't think so. TV should foster Korean family 
values and educate the importance of the family to the young generation". 
(Won-ja, 52) 
"What if young people get badly influenced and think of marriage and divorce 
lightly? What if young people watch that drama and think, 'It's all right to 
marry any kind of woman regardless of my parents' opinions'. It may harm 
our Korean culture that most values family harmony". (Bong-wha, 52) 
"I become concerned, what if that drama fans the flame of liberal thOUght in 
the young generation? Young generation nowadays is too self-centered and 
individualistic. Our traditional culture is breaking down". (Go-sun, 50) 
These are commonly voiced fears toward television, social anxieties about the issues 
of "family" and ''traditional culture". TV drama with a contesting modem theme is 
criticized as one of the cultural changes perceived as destroying Korean culture. 
These middle-class women worry about destructive effects of television on the 
younger generation, whose uncritical involvement is assumed to place national culture 
in danger. In encountering a new, modem and individualized mode of lifestyle on 
television, the moralist middle-class women construct a defensive nationalistic 
discourse: "You can marry anybody in the Western world, but not in Korea!" This is 
an expression of anti-Western modernity with the forceful emphasis on complying 
with the traditional culture of family. "Everyday life is constructed on many levels 
and on many fronts that mainly concern the formation of historically specific cultural 
identities" (Lull, 1995: 173); for these Korean middle-class women, the family is 
taken as the main source of the values essential to the cultural identity. 
Overal~ these middle-class women demonstrate a highly critical and reflexive 
approach towards television, delegating the activity of "investigatory looking" 
(Tulloch, 1990: 254) to the television media. They assess television as a moral force 
by emphasizing the notions of what television "should" or "should not" do. For 
example, ''TV should foster Korean family values and educate the importance of the 
family to the young generation". They criticize and call for the reinforcement of 
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family values and ethics on television. The middle-class women's moral right to 
criticize television reflects the strength that comes from expressing not simply an 
individual opinion but a consensus of the women's friendship network, a consensus 
forged through ongoing debates about the possible effects of television on the young 
generation. It is worth noting that the commonly adopted code in the middle-class 
women's spoken text is "We" rather than "I", and their moral discourse of family and 
television is often collectively produced and intensified in the company of friends. 
Consensually, these women contend that television should be an upright moral force 
orienting the viewers towards the social goal of family harmony and stability. The 
role of television is emphasized as a moral guardian that can "teach" the viewers 
traditional family values and provide ethically sound models of family life. 6 
Insofar as I have attempted to convey a Korean example of television moral 
discourse, arguably Korean television morality is strongly associated with the cultural 
ideology of family. The embodiment of family is the core of Korean culture, tradition, 
and identity of women, and the middle-class women are exceptionally concerned 
about television morality regarding the family. This finding can serve as a barometer 
to gauge the dominant conservative middle-class morality of family intersected with 
modem television. Furthermore, it indicates a complex interplay and co-existence of 
tradition and modernity in Korea. Like the case of the working-class women in 
Chapter 4, middle-class women's forceful emphasis on the traditional idea of family 
reflects a unique feature of Korean culture of modernity. The current triumphalist 
rhetoric about modernity as progress seems tempered by the women's moralistic and 
nationalistic discourse about the family and the Korean-style of modernity. The 
middle-class women's contesting discussion here encapsulates a facet of the 
complexities and ambiguous locations of the current Korean culture ''where traditions 
have not yet disappeared and modernity has not completely arrived" (Canclini, 1995: 
1). It is evident in this Korean case that there are "continuities between the traditional 
and the modern, and neither is cut of a whole cloth" (Giddens, 1990: 4). What is 
subtly implicated in the women's television moral discourse is an invention of 
retraditionalization, wherein the traditional ideal of family is constantly invoked in the 
everyday practices to secure order and stability against the increasingly challenging 
global modernity. Tradition still thrives almost everywhere, "beside, behind, between, 
or beneath the practices and structures of modernity", functioning as ''vessels carrying 
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a certain cargo of spiritual value or moral meaning" (Luke, 1996: 112-116). For the 
Korean middle-class women in their 50s, the traditional ideal of family acts as a lived 
metaphor for their moral, spiritual, and cultural prestige that creates a continuing 
sense of identity and legitimacy in the society of complex modernization. 
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Chapter 8 Korean Middle-Class Women in their 30s 
Section (1) Unavailability of Husband, TV and Childcare 
As already indicated several times, Korean men work the longest hours in the world -
55.1 hours per week - according to a recent world statistics (The New York Times, 
June 10, 2001). This means almost an eleven-hour working day and absolutely no 
chance to have dinner with the family at home, because of drinking socials after work, 
just a glimpse of the family already asleep. No wonder these middle-class women in 
my research complain most about their husbands' coming home late, after 10:00pm, 
even past midnight. For this reason, I want to start this chapter by accentuating 
Korean men's extremely long-hour work culture often followed by drinking and its 
overall implications on the women's domestic lives, with particular relevance to 
television and childcare/mothering. 
"It's only one or two hours that I can see my husband's face at home, and actual 
conversation is just several minutes. My husband comes home late from work, 
then he is already tired". (Sung-mi, 32) 
"We don't have a chance to sit down comfortably and watch TV together. He 
works until late, and when he has meetings and drinking, he comes home near 
12:00pm. At least, a half of the week is late like that. This house is a lodging 
house to my husband". (Mi-ra, 32) 
"We don't have time to watch TV together as my husband usually comes home 
late. Sometimes past midnight, even around 2:00 or 3:00 am. Because it is so 
common for Korean men to come home late, I cannot blame my husband alone. I 
really hate men's culture, any wife would hate it". (Nae-yoon, 31) 
"Why do Korean men have to work so much and come home so late? In the whole 
world, only Korean men might do so. We cannot spend time together". 
(Se-jung, 32) 
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As manifest in the women's complaints, almost every day Korean middle-class 
husbands are not present enough in the domestic sphere. It is a rare luxury that 
husbands and wives together indulge in a leisurely time watching television in the 
evening because husbands normally return home late after long working hours and 
customary work-related drinking socials afterwards. There is simply not enough time 
to ''use television as a means of facilitating positive marital interaction" (Gauntlett 
and Hill, 1999: 21) such as intimacy and caring. Korean middle-class husbands spend 
most of their time outside the home and cannot afford the time to sit in front of the 
television together with the family. In the absence of husbands in the domestic sphere, 
it is thus unlikely to experience tension or conflict surrounding the television remote 
control, or to complain about husbands' sole preoccupation with the television set. In 
these middle-class families, wives are likely to watch television alone in the evening 
after putting young children to sleep. 
As a consequence of men's long working hours and drinking socials 
afterwards, Korean middle-class men and wives have a set of strictly separate 
work/leisure culture. At this point I may need to briefly explain one distinctive feature 
of Korean male/organizational/work culture, "drinking". Drinking is an indispensable 
element in the Korean male culture of the public sphere, just like television in the 
female culture of the private sphere. Drinking permeates all social relationships, in 
particular those between leaders and subordinates in the organization. In order to 
reduce conflict and enhance harmony and cooperation, not for hedonistic sensual 
pleasure, almost ritually drinking socials tend to be arranged and run by a paternalistic 
senior leader in a group, and members of the group are expected to conform to this 
arrangement. By and large, Korean work culture still fo llows a "group model" 
characteristic of a close-knit social organization, which is equally true for Japan 
(Moeran, 1989: 57-73), whereby members are supposed to act within the framework 
of a group and subordinate individual interests to group goals. Under this implicit 
rule, avoiding or saying ''No'' to drinking socials is regarded as individualistic and 
irrelevant in the group model. This type of organizational drinking is practiced until 
late night in a single sex sphere as female employees can normally be excused for 
childcare. In short, drinking has been an essential ethos of the Korean male culture, 
often as a means for male-bonding, in spite of whether an individual man enjoys 
drinking or hates it. Consequently, husbands' coming home late accompanied by 
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drinking becomes a conflictual element in the married life. It threatens to cause 
disputes between spouses, and registers as the main complaint of Korean housewives, 
yet this expression of complaints has an "interesting ambiguity": "Although 
complaints about husbands are common and frequent - drinking too much, not being 
home enough, not helping enough around the home or with the children -
complaining itself is something expected, an almost ritualized way of letting off steam 
that does not mean the WIfe does not love her husband, or that the marriage is weak" 
(Hoffinan, 1995: 120). 
As Korean middle-class husbands find their primary social place in the public 
sphere, they are largely absent in the domestic sphere and rarely involved with 
domestic affairs including childcare; whereas women's primary social location is in 
the domestic sphere because of sole responsibilities for childcare. The normative 
structure of a middle-class nuclear family is an increasingly father-absent, mother-
involved family. In the case of Korean middle-class families, it is the extremely rigid 
dichotomization of public and domestic life that provides the foundation upon which 
the extreme differentiation and segregation of gender roles are established. This 
gendered "habitus" produces a system of acquired dispositions, an organizing 
principle of action and a way of being that are pervasively naturalized in everyday life 
(Bourdieu, 1984). It produces men who put most of their energies into the non-
familial world of work and public life, and women who turn their energies toward 
nurturing and caring for children (Chodorow, 1978: 209). Then, what happens to 
young mothers in this private, invisible, "natural" sphere when their busy husbands 
are absent from the family circle of evening time? 
"When my husband comes home late, I wait for him sitting sti11like a plant in 
the living room. 'Why did I get married?' This thought comes across me in 
late night silence after the baby falls asleep. I cannot call friends late night. 
Then I just turn on the TV". (Nae-yoon, 31) 
"I want my husband to be home-oriented. 'Am I having a happy life? What 
can I do?' When there is nothing particularly to do at night, even nothing 
particularly to watch on TV, I can't help thinking. I feel kind of depressed". 
(Hae-ji, 30) 
211 
"I make a bomb-shell proclamation to my husband, "I want you to become 
either a big shot outside or a home-centered caring husband". While waiting 
for him at night with two kids, 1 come to think, 'Why am 1 living like this?' 
Once 1 threatened him, "If you don't come home right now, 1 will jump from 
the apartment terrace, or leave the kids home alone and get out of this 
house!"" (Se-jung, 32) 
"Staying home alone with the child until late night is like living in a mental 
hospital. 1 sometimes feel like hitting my head against the wall. 1 can 
understand what an insane person is like. Even a normal person can go 
insane". (Eun-sang, 32) 
These are only a part of the women's story. ''The story of shattered life can be told 
only in bits and pieces" (Bauman, 1995: 1). Women wait with impatience for the 
moment when their husbands return from work. The domestic life of middle-class 
women is in line of expectation and waiting, whether for the phone to ring, for the 
baby to sleep, for the husband to come home shortly (Modleski, 1979: 88). Women 
have always been seen as waiting, ''waiting is a female fate" (Rich, 1976: 39). 
Women deal with this waiting, this female fate, by denying every active, powerful 
aspect of themselves - for example, "I wait for him sitting still like a plant in the 
living room" - or by asking silent questions about themselves, 'Am 1 having a happy 
life?' 'Why am 1 living like this?' These young mothers live in the "suffering of 
ambivalence": the murderous alternation between bitter resentment and raw-edged 
nerves, and blissful gratification and tenderness (Rich, 1976: 21). The experience of 
childcare is an interpenetration of pain and pleasure. Living day in and day out with 
young children at home, waiting for husbands to come home, women come to 
experience a chain of complicated feelings; sense of entrapment, emptiness, 
weariness, frustration, depression, incompleteness, resentment, bursts of sudden 
anger. These are private pains as a mother. The hard fact that women alone are 
responsible for the care and nurturance of children twenty-four hours, denies women's 
desires, goals, interests and activities outside the home and the family. These educated 
modern mothers feel their own needs acutely and sometimes express them violently: 
"If you don't come home right now, 1 will jump from the apartment terrace". They 
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suffer a "lonely terror" (Friedan, 1963: 68). While waiting for husbands late at night 
and individually suffering the lonely terror, women turn to television to ease their 
extreme loneliness. Television, as the only company late at night, becomes 
constitutive of the mundane night life. Mediated through television it becomes 
pleasantly surprising for women to realize that they all share the same problem. It is a 
sheer relief to know that they are not alone in this lonely terror. 
"I once watched Beautiful Sex (night talk show). The theme of that night was 
about married couples in their 30s. Wives of my age talked openly about their 
feelings of loneliness, emptiness in the married life. 1 was so surprised! 
Because they were talking exactly about what I am feeling! Many other 
women are also living just like me! 1 realized, this is a common problem 
amongst married couples of my age". (Sung-mi, 32) 
This younger generation of middle-class housewives is not suffering ''the 
problem that has no name" (Friedan, 1963); in a different angle, 1 would rather argue 
that these educated modem housewives precisely know what the problem is, yet find 
no way out in the rigid social structure that deters the possibility of substantial 
change. The problem has been constantly identified and articulated, yet with no 
practical solutions, no realistic alternatives to their role of childcare. Korean women 
are embedded in such a rigid social structure that does not permit flexibility of gender 
role. Surely, these young housewives want something more than their husband and 
children and their home, but Korean culture in this rigid structure does not permit 
women to gratify their basic needs and to grow and fulfil their potentialities as human 
beings. Embedded in the same structure, Korean men also have no choice in life but 
to work long hours every day. Thus, both women and men live by the rigid structure 
in discontent. From the women's discontent and suffering of lonely terror, this same 
question repeatedly springs, "Then, who will look after the children?" The Korean 
women's recognition of discontent with ''the problem that has a name" is frustratingly 
tautological in this sense. These educated middle-class women here demonstrate a 
high degree of self-reflexivity and criticism, yet this does not necessarily mean a 
formula for social change, nor is it taken further outside the private sphere. These 
savvy, at times scheming and manipulative, middle-class housewives precisely 
understand the rigid socio-economic structure and their position and the dynamics of 
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male-female power relations within it. This is indicated in their perception of the 
mothering role, and the territorial place of home and television. Listen to the 
following claims. 
"We young couples are in an equal relationship. Nowadays no husband would 
raise a voice to wives because they earn money outside. We women also 
received the same university education, are able to work and earn money. But 
we have chosen to stay home for childcare. Earning money outside doesn't 
give husbands any privilege". (Eun-young, 32) 
"If husbands sniff at women's childcare work, wives would defy, "If raising 
children looks that easy for you, then you stay home and raise children, and I 
will go out and earn the money!" I gave up my work to look after the children, 
so my husband cannot look down on me". (Se-jung, 32) 
"Home is a woman's territory. We stay home all day long, then inside the 
home, we should do everything in our way. In the home I am the king". 
(Mi-ra, 32) 
"Even though my husband is sitting in front of the TV, I always watch my 
favorite TV program. I say, "Give me the remote control, I have to watch 
drama". Watching drama is women's privilege". (Nae-yoon, 31) 
In effect, Korean middle-class women are enjoying a considerable degree of power 
and freedom in the domestic sphere, and their discontent, anger and antagonism can 
lead to a more determined formula for control over the home and family.! As a 
consequence of the husbands' unavailability in the home, the domestic realm belongs 
to the possession of women - "Home is a woman's territory" - so does all the 
domestic affairs including television viewing - "I always watch my favorite TV 
pro gram". 2 Home is a gendered construct which gains its power, which makes its 
claims through an intense emotional attachment (Silverstone, 1994: 25-26). In the 
Korean middle-class homes, it is normally wives that set the rules, make claims and 
gain power. All the minutiae 0 f everyday life are structured and managed by wives, 
for whom "home is a base, a mental point of reference, a position from which 
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everything else is measured" (Larsen, 1999: 110). Overall, the lived experience of 
Korean middle-class families is far from the dominant feminist critique that views 
family as a primary arena where men exercise their patriarchal power over women's 
labor. It is far from the universal understanding of the private sphere as the site of 
women's oppression. Insofar as the growing body of evidence in my research has 
indicated, the private spheres of Korean middle-class families are constantly shifting, 
redefining, being negotiated by the women on the terms of personal gratification for 
the self-sacrificing role of childcare. 
The middle-class women here do not intend to remain as passive victims of 
the marriage, on the contrary, they act as a negotiator and strategist to improve their 
lot within the marriage. They seek to gain power and control, and maximize personal 
gratification within the home territory by embracing all the territorial resources. 
Within the rigid social structure, they nevertheless attempt to create a fissure for their 
discontent to vent, finding a niche for themselves to advance their own interests. This 
fact links to my final point about the other side of women's mothering. I can argue in 
this particular Korean case that women create subtle power through child rearing 
activities, as the practices of mothering are always invested with mothers' conflictual, 
ambivalent, yet powerful and intentional needs. "Powerless women have always used 
mothering as a channel - narrow but deep - for their own human will to power" 
(Rich, 1976: 38). The following extracts show such implications of mothering on the 
women's sense of power and identity. 
"In the earlier years of marriage, my husband used to occupy the remote 
control. But things have changed since we had the child. With the child, my 
voice has pitched higher, ''Tum it off Give me the remote control. I will 
choose. I will watch this. I will watch that"". (Italics, her emphasis) 
(Nae-yoon, 31) 
"Whenever my husband came home late, it was a war. For the first several 
years of marriage I constantly complained, "What am I? Am I a housemaid in 
this home?" But I now realize, it's better to give up expecting my husband to 
be more caring, more attentive to the wife's needs before consuming all my 
215 
energy and getting more frustrated. Instead I try to focus more on my child. 
My child occupies the center of my life". (Eun-sang, 32) 
Entering a certain stage 0 f married life, these women start to realize the 
pointlessness of anger and discontent towards their husbands, then, try to divert their 
energy to something else. "You can't go back - you have to go on. There must be 
some real way I can go on myself' (Friedan, 1963: 295). To go on themselves in some 
real way, Korean women start to focus on their children in an intensely emotional 
way. As husbands are not sufficiently present in the domestic life, women are likely to 
turn their affection to their children to fulfill emotional desires unmet by their 
husbands. Women come to want and need primary relationships with children, and 
these wants and needs result from wanting intense primary relationships, which men 
tend not to provide both because of their place in the non-familial world of work and 
because of their difficulties with intimacy (Chodorow, 1978: 203). Therefore, these 
Korean women commit themselves to their children, although this may be simply a 
mask for the bewildering and exhausting life, for the feeling of helplessness to find a 
life of their own: "Who am I?" "What am I?" "What do I want?" Identification is 
fought at every level, through the most mundane everyday practices of childcare. 
Mothering is a central element in the construction of women's identity, and it is only 
mothering that can give women a self Being ''just a housewife" - ''the contemporary 
nonperson" (Hewlett, 1986: 253) - is never enough for these educated middle-class 
women. But being a mother is different. "If you are a mother, you're given a valid 
occupation. Motherhood is a socially and culturally acceptable role, and gives you an 
identity. You have an identity in your eyes and in your partner's eyes, and his/her 
family, and the community" (Weeks, 2000: 96). 
Section (2) Child Education and Professionalization of Motherhood 
In the previous section I have emphasized Korean men's extremely long-hour work 
culture in the public sphere as a distinctive feature of modern Korea. In the private 
sphere, on the other hand, women's extreme zeal for child education is a parallel 
distinction that deserves academic attention. Any research into everyday life of 
Korean middle-class housewives makes it imperative to discuss this fervent 
educational phenomenon and to redefine the notion of mothering in a contemporary 
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context. In this section I specifically focus on the middle-class women's pivotal 
concern with child education as the main practices that structure their everyday life. 
The aim of this section is to document and analyze in detail the Korean middle-class 
women's everyday experiences of motherhood, which I define as a 
''professionalization of motherhood", in particular relation to child education and 
daytime television. Overall it explores the differing cultural contexts and material 
conditions under which mothering is carried out. Motherhood is a culturally formed 
structure whose meanings can vary and are subject to change (Segura, 1994: 211 ). Yet 
the existing scholarship on motherhood has been primarily from a Eurocentric 
perspective, as a result, most feminist critiques have not taken into account 
distinctions in the practices and meanings of motherhood for different women in 
different contexts but tended to present a monolithic view of mothering (Christian, 
1994: 96).3 This particular Korean case can hopefully cast a different light on 
mothering, posing a challenge to the universal theory. 
"Without my child (age 7) I would have nothing to do in my life. My everyday 
life is centered on child education ... I don't watch TV during the day. I am too 
busy to sit and watch TV. After sending off my husband and child in the 
morning, I finish the housework, then go swimming. After swimming, my 
whole daytime is tuned into my child's schedule. I pick him up after school, 
then drive him to extra-curricula lessons - computer, English, music, 
swimming. Then it becomes almost time for making dinner. After dinner I 
help him with homework. So busy everyday, I get ill sometimes. I wish I 
could rest for a single day only for myselfl" (Eun-sang, 32) 
"With two children, there is no time to sit down and watch TV during the 
day ... My child (age 5) takes up 3 lessons a day, total 6 different lessons a 
week. Kindergarten from 10:00am until 2:00pm, and then ballet, piano, 
Korean language/English language/Math private lesson. I am so busy sending 
her to the lessons, feeding in the meantime". (Mi-ra, 32) 
"Moms should be sensible in raising children, so restrain from watching TV 
for children's emotional cultivation. Consciously I try not to watch TV during 
the day when my baby (age 1) is awake ... Of course, moms' everyday life is 
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child-centered. We moms are most interested in knowing how to raise children 
well, how to make children brainy". (Hae-ji, 30) 
These descriptions are the typical everyday life of the Korean middle-class mothers in 
their 30s. Child education is clearly the pivot of everyday life. These middle-class 
women play an incredibly busy role as a systematically personalized, educational 
coordinator, managing children's schedules, chauffeuring, feeding, as well as taking 
care of the usual housework. They are investing an extraordinary amount oftime and 
energy into the emotional and cognitive development for children, efforts which go 
well beyond the physical care of the home and family. This suggests that for these 
middle-class mothers, motherhood is not just a physical or emotional relationship with 
their children, but it is also an "intellectual activity, intellectual project": Maternal 
thinking is a unity of reflection, judgement and emotion (Rothman, 1994: 155). As 
engaged with the maternal intellectual project of child education, evidently in this 
context, daytime television viewing has no place in the middle-class women's 
everyday life. Daytime television is not part of their domestic routines, nor does it 
provide an external structure to daily life. This is in contrast to general Western views 
that the textual rhythms and structures of daytime television, soap opera in particular, 
neatly accord with the rhythms of women's daily domestic work (Modleski, 1979), 
and that women audiences incorporate enjoyment of daytime programs into their 
hectic household activities by creating a space to follow the stories (Hobson, 1982). 
Television means very little during the daytime to Korean middle-class women. Here, 
it seems necessary to clarify that although television has a significant role to play in 
easing the women's loneliness during the evening when their husbands are not yet 
home and their children are asleep, television is not a determining factor in the 
planning of activities during the daytime. What constitutes routines for these Korean 
mothers is child education, consequently, mothers' daytime life is structured by, and 
strongly constrained by, the time schedule for their children's education. In other 
words, mothers are "living in the rhythms of other lives" (Rich, 1976: 33). 
This cult of motherhood centering on child education is becoming the standard 
against which women assess all child-rearing practices. In fact, Korean mothers, 
whether poor or rich, have high educational goals for their children. One difference 
between the social strata is that middle-class families are more privileged than 
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working-class families with regard to the quantity and quality of resources which can 
be invested in their children's education. This difference is clearly reflected in the 
extent of and kinds of private tutoring that middle-class families can provide for their 
children: "3-4 lessons are basic for kids". Another difference is that based on financial 
resources, middle-class mothers tend to start education for their children at an early 
age, normally at the age of one or two, for the learning of Korean alphabet, English, 
math, music, etc. Here is an example of teaching the baby at one. 
"My baby (age 1) is now learning Korean alphabet. I purchased a set of 
picture books, and a tutor visits us once a week to give the baby a private 
lesson. I find my baby concentrates better, even for 20 minutes, with the 
expert tutor than with me. This education is necessary for the earlier 
development of the baby's brain". (Nae-yoon, 31) 
The present form of mothering with its emphasis on child education is not a 
new phenomenon, but it has been more intensified and competitive in modem Korea. 
This is hardly a surprising phenomenon in a society that has long been overly 
preoccupied with children's education. Education, as an ethos of Korean culture, has 
been viewed as an important channel for achievement and social mobility in the 
Korean society for several centuries under the influence of Confucianism. Since the 
end of the nineteenth century when modem education was made available to the 
masses, education has been a central constituent in the building processes of the 
nation and economy in Korea (Kim, 1995). In 1961 when the Korean government 
launched The First Five-year Plan for Economic Development as the beginning ofthe 
full-scale modernization project, the list of top priorities included education for the 
next generation. Right from the sixties, the significance of early childhood 
development and education came to be increasingly recognized, with a greater 
emphasis placed on the "mother's role as the planner and manager of her children's 
education" (Lee, 1999). In short, the present form of mothering, centered around child 
education, originated in Korean industrialization and modernization over the last four 
decades.4 Since then child education has been greatly emphasized, resulting in today's 
gigantic commercial industry of private education. This has further prompted a 
professionalization of motherhood. Middle-class mothers pro-actively seek and 
consume a plethora of information, expert advice and commercialized knowledge on 
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child education to keep up with modern demands. Searching for information 
regarding child education has no bounds, in this sense, these educated middle-class 
mothers are active "hunters and gathers in an information age" (Meyrowitz, 1999: 
106). Then, what are their major sources ofprofessional knowledge? 
"We moms are interested in childcare-related programs, but there is not useful 
information on TV. Through TV commercials, I just get to know about newly 
introduced products - children's English study, computer, drawing, cerebral 
development material. In the newspaper I find suitable information for my 
child. I read several magazines, ask around friends what are being used for 
their children". (Eun-sang, 32) 
"I buy 3-4 baby magazines and examine articles and products to see what 
would be best for my baby. I closely read every kind of child-related 
information, even the advertisement fliers slipped through the apartment door 
from the nearby department store". (Hae-ji, 30) 
"Of course, our everyday conversation is about child rearing and education. In 
the children's kindergarten, in the apartment complex, or with friends, moms 
form a network and exchange information". (Se-jung, 32) 
These educated young middle-class mothers, referred to as a "professional mother", 
not only spend a great deal oftime seeking expert advice and educating themselves on 
the latest available knowledge on child development, but also spend large amounts of 
time and money on a daily basis in attempting to apply such knowledge to their 
children. These professional mothers are "not just passive consumers, but proactive 
job performers" (Lee, 1999: 23) carrying out mothering based on their intellectual 
judgement. Information concerning childhood education is regularly sought through 
magazines, newspapers, even advertisement fliers, television as the least useful 
medium, which are all part and parcel of the ever-increasing professionalization of 
child education. Consumption of professional mothering knowledge is further 
exchanged via networks of friends and education-geared middle-class neighbors. 
Apparently, to keep up with modern demands these middle-class mothers feel a need 
for information. This need, however, is not just for information, but it could be a 
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"need for personal security, something that information may be perceived to provide" 
(Lull, 1995: 100). On the psychological front, these mothers are burdened with the 
fearful knowledge that their children may grow falling behind the modern 
competition, if not properly provided with the up to date education by mothers; and 
that if children fail to live up to the modern society, it is very definitely the mothers' 
fault. This "fear of failing" places on mothers the burdens of a greater devotion to 
child education. Korean mothers begin to articulate their ambivalent, new discontents 
about private education for children in modernist terms. "Ambivalent" because they 
are certainly discontented, yet simultaneously creating and living by middle-class 
cultural mandates. 
"While talking with other moms in this apartment complex, I got to notice that 
other kids are already taking several lessons. Only my child (age 4) is not 
taking any lessons. As a mom, I can't help feeling insecure, what if my child 
falls behind later?" (Sung-mi, 32) 
''The Korean reality is that education for children starts from the age of one. 
That's the reality, whether we like it or not. That's why we moms are busy 
everyday, anxious about child education". (Eun-young, 32) 
Loaded with the fear of falling in the competitive modern society, middle-class 
mothers tend to approach the ubiquity of television in the domestic realm from an 
educational point of view, and criticize television for offering a low degree of 
information with few details. Television is taken as the least valuable medium in 
carrying out their modernist mission of mothering. In fact, television during the 
daytime is taken to be incompatible with these women's new modern definition of 
motherhood. 
"Idly watching TV at home is the story of our mothers' generation. My mom 
wonders, "Why are young moms so fussy about child education? I was not 
fussy like you, yet all of you went to good universities". Then I laugh, "Mom, 
that is the story of good old days, now we live in a different generation". 
Nowadays mom has to keep fast pace with information, otherwise children 
would fall behind in this fiercely competitive society". (Eun-young, 32) 
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"Watching TV all day long and doing housework would be such a comfortable 
life for women. Nowadays moms' role is not just meal-making and house-
cleaning, but child education. Child education is moms' main role and moms' 
main burden". (Eun-sang, 32) 
"If mom is lazy, sits down in front of TV all day long, then children will fall 
behind. The modern mom has to be diligent, actively looking for information, 
offering children education as much as is affordable". (Mi-ra, 32) 
Here, the middle-class women talk self-reflexively about how they deal with social 
change in the modern globalizing society of Korea.5 In the fast-moving competitive 
society, idly watching television during the day is felt inappropriate when there is so 
much else of immediacy and importance to attend to, most of all, child education. 
According to the women's new and enlarging role of mothering, a modem mother 
comes closer to a competent professional manager of child education. The actual 
portrayal of Korean mother is "not an example of that much-maligned cultural 
stereotype, the simpleminded housewife who can manage little more than to feed her 
children, iron a few shirts, and watch the afternoon soap operas" (Radway, 1984: 
114). On the contrary, television during the daytime has no place in the women's 
modem defmition of motherhood. To simple-minded outsiders, mothers at home with 
children may not be believed to be doing "serious work" but idly watching television 
all day long. But the actual fact is that mothers are doing serious work. For these 
Korean middle-class mothers, that serious work is child education. 
The more serious child education becomes, the more are middle-class mothers 
able to claim that they have highly skilled occupations at a professional level that 
equally require the analytical, interpretive, intellectual capacities of a professional. 
Precisely, my underlying arguments here are two-fold. First, through the 
professionalization of motherhood, Korean middle-class women are attempting to 
transform their identity of ''just a housewife" to a ''professional mother" that has a 
socially and culturally valued identity. Being a professional mother with skills, 
expertise and education is a legitimate occupation. They thus take child education as 
their most meaningful, unavoidable intellectual project, although this 
222 
time/labor/finance-intensive task drives their everyday life making it discontented and 
burdensome. Focusing intensively on child education is the women's own policing of 
the ongoing construction of a middle-class way of life, in this sense, the women's 
domesticity becomes a crucial site for reproducing middle-classness. They collude to 
the political structure of the gendered role settlement, while fmding their social status 
through the professional management of the family, through the legitimate occupation 
as a professional mother. My second argument is more implicit. The women's 
devotion to child education further suggests that the Korean path to modernity is 
being made within the Korean family and is primarily women's work. Although 
Korean middle-class women are largely inactive in social and economic activities, 
largely limited to the domestic sphere, this does not necessarily mean that they are 
unconnected with the Korean modernization process. As their full-time devotion to 
child education indicates, women are the hidden contribution to Korean modernity. 
Section (3) Escape into Romance: Emotional Fantasy and "Good Feelings" 
In the previous sections I have discussed the unavailability of husbands in domestic 
life and the women's sole responsibility for child care/education with the fear of 
falling in the modern society. These are closely connected to the way in which the 
structure of women's everyday life excludes possibilities of leisure freedom and 
caring for women themselves. All of these young mothers express a common wish: "I 
wish I could rest for a single day only for myself1" "I wish I could be absolutely free 
even for one day!" This shows interesting consequences on their particular preference 
for the late night television program - romance drama. Contrary to the working-class 
women's A-ha! emotion, a great deal of emotional investment in the realistic text of 
ordinary home drama as shown in Chapter 5, these middle-class women find 
unrealistic romance drama more pleasurable and meaningful to their ordinary 
existence. Why? In this final section, I explore the significant ways in which 
television romance drama intersects with everyday needs and desires of the Korean 
middle-class housewives in their 30s. I intend to show a close interrelationship 
between the women's everyday lived experience and the fantasy of romance 
discourse, and particularly argue for the role of emotional fantasy, not sexual fantasy, 
which has a potential to serve as immensely powerful sources of pleasure and is felt 
more meaningful in the Korean women's structure of feeling. My discussions on the 
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women's real-life relationships with their husbands and children in the previous 
sections will then serve as a backdrop for understanding their escape into romance 
drama. 
"I like to watch something totally different from my ordinary routine life. 
Something stimulating, provocative, extraordinary!" (Eun-sang, 32) 
"I like romance drama. 1 know such drama is silly, unrealistic. Despite that, 1 
enjoy watching because it is different from my life". (Hae-ji, 30) 
"Housewives inside the house long for an oasis, something different from this 
ordinary life. 1 like to watch something simplistic yet refreshingly shocking!" 
(Nae-yoon, 31) 
The emphatic comments above demonstrate middle-class women's intense pleasure in 
watching romance drama, so-called a mini-series drama broadcasting at 10:00 in the 
evening. These middle-class housewives are not particularly interested in ordinary 
home drama, a realist genre with a theme closer to their life situation. They rather 
delight in watching "extraordinary", ''unrealistic'' romance drama that is far different 
from their ordinary existence as housewife. This is a class-specific contrast to my 
previous case of the working-class counterparts, who invest a great deal of emotional 
energy in ordinary home drama as such text helps them to understand what is 
happening in their own life. However, these educated middle-class women do not 
show a high degree of pleasure in the exploration of problems in real life, mediated 
through the realistic text of drama. They rather show a cynical stance: "Daily home 
dramas are so boring, the same story all the time, the same problems". "We all know 
about that. So what?" Consensually, these middle-class women assert that it is 
unrealistic romance drama that is pleasurable and meaningful to their real lives, while 
emphasizing that there is nothing wrong with fantasy in their romance viewing. 
"Sometimes 1 want to escape into a different world inside TV, somewhere 
completely different from my routine life. All people live a double life - a real 
life and a fantasy life - don't we?" (Mi-ra, 32) 
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"I know it's just a silly, absurd fantasy. Nobody's perfectly satisfied with their 
own life. There must be something wanting in real life. Everybody has a 
fantasy and lives in a fantasy sometimes". (Eun-young, 32) 
The middle-class women here recognize romance drama as a low-brow culture, so 
they feel obliged to defend and justify their pleasure against the stigmatizing 
moralism which generally views romantic fantasy as "something inadmissible and 
darkly shameful" (Jackson, 1981: 171), or as a "social disease affecting the weaker 
constitution of the female psyche" (Kaplan, 1986: 148). These middle-class women 
know perfectly well that romance drama is a temporary escape, a mere fantasy. 
Equally, they know perfectly well that they nevertheless enjoy it and are willing to 
seek their own pleasure from it. As will be clear throughout this section, these women 
explain pleasure of their fantasies in a remarkably articulate mode with concrete 
examples and episodes. These Korean middle-class women are so intelligent and 
reflexive that they have a full awareness of the meaning and role of fantasy in their 
life. They see nothing wrong in their escape into romantic fantasy, as it is worthwhile 
and meaningful to their real life. "One can escape into a world of imagination and 
come back from it refreshed" (Donald, 1989: 3). They are fully conscious that they 
will return to their real life situations ''refreshed'', after all. Fantasy is taken as a way 
of dealing with real life situations. These young mothers express needs and desires 
that are deeply felt in everyday life, by giving vivid accounts on why they delight in 
romantic fantasy. Precisely, ''the need for fantasy is based on the unfulfilled desires 
set up in the construction of women's lives" (Geraghty, 1991: 109). The following 
comments indicate a correlation between the young mothers' unfulfilled desire for the 
freedom of out-of-home leisure and the vicarious effects of romance watching. 
"While watching the drama, 1 imagine a different life. Mental freedom and 
physical freedom from this routine life. Now 1 can't go out anywhere because 
of the baby. Sometimes 1 want to meet university classmates, drink a beer, 
chat for long. When 1 first got pregnant, 1 was so excited and called a friend, 
"Let's go out and drink to celebrate!" That friend sighed, "Go out with two 
kids? With nappies and milk bottles?" Over the phone we reminisced, 
"Weren't those university days so nice? We could play all night long, didn't 
we?'''' (N ae-yoon, 31) 
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"Watching young people's free life on drama triggers memones of my 
university days. Young university students freely walk down the campus, 
make fun and laugh. I envy them. It stirs my feeling. When my feeling arises 
so intensely, it's painful to watch. My mind is still young like a teenager, but 
my body is heavy as a rock as run down from everyday routine life". 
(Sung-mi, 32) 
"At least through the romance drama, we can be tem porarily liberated from all 
obligations. It mentally liberates us! We can be totally free from the 
responsibility of childcare". (Italics, her emphasis) (Eun-sang, 32) 
Explicitly, these middle-class women with young children express their intense 
yearning for freedom, guiltless and self-indulgent time and space within which they 
can be entirely on their own, pursuing their individual pleasure in leisure. Even for 
one day, these mothers wish to escape from the sole responsibility for childcare, from 
the ''psychologically demanding and emotionally draining task of attending to the 
physical and affective needs of their families" (Radway, 1984: 92). In the regular 
absence of husbands in their domestic life, Korean wives are often drained by 
domestic caring duties with a particular emphasis on child care/education: "My mind 
is still young like a teenager, but my body is heavy as a rock as run down from 
everyday routine life". In the everyday hectic routines with young children, watching 
romance drama in late night solitude becomes a rare splendid time and space for self -
indulgence. Romance fantasy is a "self-indulgent desire to move away from reality 
and to retreat into another world created by the fiction" (Geraghty, 1991: 107). It is an 
imaginary escape from the confining habitual existence into a different free world 
with a desire to lose the self within it. Temporarily in the viewing moment, they feel 
lifted out of the strained domestic obligations: "It mentally liberates us!" Precisely, 
romance viewing creates feelings of freedom and liberation from the seemingly 
endless role as a care-giver. It functions as a form of ''psychic power" (Kaplan, 1986: 
164) producing emotional sustenance that enables the women to better cope with their 
routine life. In this sense women's experience of romance drama is "compensatory" 
(Radway, 1984: 211) as it permits them to carve out a solitary time and space wherein 
their self-interest can be pursued and met, albeit temporarily. 
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For these educated middle-class women, the fantasy of romance drama often 
evokes the memory and nostalgia of the university period during which everyday life 
was totally free only for themselves without the burden of caring roles or any 
obligation. Romance watching is then a figurative journey to a utopian state of 
complete freedom. Freedom was something they normally took for granted as a 
quality which was "always there", but now stuck at home with young children these 
women seek for freedom in the state of desperate desire, most intensely and painfully 
felt at the moment. Their desperate desire for freedom comes from the experience of 
constraint in motherhood, from the intense feeling that they cannot do what they 
would wish to do. Without practical solutions or realistic alternatives to their role of 
childcare, complete freedom can only be imagined, though not practiced, by their full 
solitude in romance watching in the privacy of their homes. "Complete freedom is a 
mental experiment rather than a practical experience - intermittent, confined to special 
places" (Bauman, 1988: 51). 
Overall, the women's escape into the romance watching indicates a corollary 
consequence of their mothering situations - the absence ofleisure freedom and caring 
for themselves. It is the corollary consequence of the social redity that "no one within 
the patriarchal family is charged with their care" (Radway, 1984: 12). Then, how 
about their most intimate other, their husband? Interestingly, these middle-class 
women's exuberant talk about the pleasures of watching romance drama intersects 
closely with complaints about their husbands, with observations about other husbands 
in real life. Women's romantic TV talk reflexively slips in and out of their private 
relationships with husbands. Listen to their intimate stories here. 
"Of course, I am not satisfied with my husband. He comes home late, doesn't 
help with anything in the house. He's too tired from work outside to pay 
attention to me. I cannot follow him around the house, like a little puppy, 
appealing, "Please pay attention to me!" ... While watching romance drama, I 
search for an ideal man, like the hero in All About Eve. He's so caring, and 
always considers the woman he loves. Besides, he's smashingly handsome! 
There would be nothing else I would wish for in life, if living with such a 
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handsome, unselfish, caring man. Every night after watching the drama, I 
dream ofhim in sleep". (Sung-mi, 32) 
"My friend's husband is short and not good-looking, frankly. When my friend 
met this man on a blind date in the university days, she didn't like him at all. 
My friend told me seriously, "He is a really nice guy, worships me like a 
queen. But he is too short and not good-looking at all!" (Laugh) My friend 
confessed to me at that time, while dating him at night, she just wanted him to 
drive a car and talk to her in the dark, so she wouldn't have to look at his face! 
She didn't want to sit down with him right across the table in a restaurant or a 
cafe ... Yes, they are married now. He is very home-oriented, comes home 
early and spends most of time with the family. He even changes the baby's 
nappy and cleans the house. (Laugh) Now my friend says, her husband is very 
good-looking. Sitting across the kitchen table, she finds her husband very 
good-looking! I can understand why she finds her husband more attractive 
now. Married women of our age don't care about men's appearance. In 
university days, we fell for men who were smashingly good-looking, well-
dressed, splendid money-spenders. But married life is a reality. All married 
women would like most is a caring, home-oriented husband". (Mi-ra, 32) 
Evidently, the theme of "caring" is essential in the (married) women's fantas1. These 
middle-class women repeatedly stress that the best attraction of their favorite romance 
heroes is the quality of caring. Simultaneously, it all points to the centrality of the fact 
that these Korean women are not content with their husbands, all of whom typically 
come home late and rarely help with the housework or childcare. The women's 
comments above demonstrate their intense need to be focused and cared for, yet their 
need is not being met adequately by their husbands in day-to-day living. Immersing 
themselves in romantic fantasies is fundamentally grounded in the women's 
dissatisfaction with their husbands in real life, and the women's imaginary search for 
an ideal man is an attempt to fulfill, vicariously, their longing for being cared for. 
They engage in a fantasy world of romance drama that bears little resemblance to the 
one they actually inhabit. Romance drama makes women engage in an "interplay 
between experience and wish" (Maltby and Craven, 1995: 22). It consists of an 
"amalgam of fantasy and reality" (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 102). I want to 
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argue that the Korean women's escape into the fantasy of romance drama is 
intimately linked to the real-life experience which they fmd so frustrating sometimes. 
The women's fantasy of being cared for is preconditioned on a "disparity between 
socially constructed experienced need and socially prescribed and actually available 
means of satisfaction" (Levitas, 1984: 26). The Korean women's needs remain largely 
unmet in day-to-day existence as the result of the regular absence of husbands in the 
domestic life and the women's sole duty for child care/education. Therefore, the way 
they select, interpret and use romance drama is profoundly influenced by their needs 
and desires in everyday conditions, domestic relationships in particular. Their 
romantic fantasy does not exist independently of the real, it does not escape the real. 
Fantasy exists in a "parasitical or symbiotic relation to the real", hence, fantasy can be 
understood by ''relationality'', by its positioning in relation to the real (Jackson, 1981: 
20). Here is another example to suggest that the pleasure of romance watching is 
emotionally linked with the real life of a muted presence. 
"In the young people's romance drama, I see exactly what I went through in 
the university days. Emotionally, I can identify with their repertoire of play, 
childish love games - going to a dance club with women friends, acting 
haughty to approaching men, making male students pay through the nose. We 
went out on many blind dates and were treated like queens by male students. 
We made a naIve male student wait holding a big bouquet of roses in front of a 
women's university, then stood him up ... I don't get that special treat from my 
husband any more. My position has been demoted from a queen to a servant. 
Of course, before marriage, my husband often brought flowers with nice gifts, 
took me to nice places to impress, persistently waited in front of my house. 
Now, it would be fortunate if he could remember to bring a gift on my 
birthday or wedding anniversary. I wouldn't complain if he tried even 1/100 
(1 %) of what he had tried before. Now, rather my husband wants to receive 
special care from me". (Nae-yoon, 31) 
Underlying this statement is the implicit assertion that the woman has lost faith in her 
husband. Overall, the Korean women's expressions of discontent, frustration and 
desire are all, at a deeper level, based on the broken faith in their husbands: ''Now, it 
would be fortunate if he could remember to bring a gift on my birthday or wedding 
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anniversary". "My position has been demoted from a queen to a servant". More 
significantly, not receiving husbands' care and attention consistently anymore as they 
did before marriage, the women have also lost faith in their sense of self -
metaphorically, from the sense of an always-demanding queen to a care-glvmg 
servant. The fantasy of romance watching in this context is, then, an emotional 
compensation that the women provide for themselves at the level of imagination, "for 
what they have lost at the level of faith" (Jackson, 1981: 20). As will be evident in the 
following comments, through identifying with a beloved heroine, these women get 
vicarious pleasure by ensuring their lost sense of self as being truly worthy of care 
and attention. The lost faith in their husbands has an interesting connection with the 
characteristic quality of a caring hero that these women find most impressive. For a 
specific discussion 1 will quote two comments from the women's intimate experience 
of the romance drama All About Eve, which ranked the highest rating during the 
summer of 2000 in Korea. 
"He's so perfect! He is this kind of man - "/ will be always there for you". 
That kind of man, although it's just a drama, would be all women's ideal man. 
1 reach orgasm fantasizing about him. He's young, good-looking, competent, 
most of all, a caring guard. Women want to be loved and cared. Although he 
never says cheaply, "1 love you", his deep eyes show that he truly cares. He 
always watches over the woman he loves, and helps when she's in trouble ... 
When she fainted at work, he immediately turned the car and ran down to a 
hospital holding her in his arm. He's always there for her. It would feel so nice 
if someone always cares about you, particularly when you are ill". 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Eun-sang, 32) 
"He once bought an anklet for her birthday gift. It was so romantic when he 
knelt down and put the gift on her ankle, saying the meaning of the gift, "Love 
lasting for 1,000 years, destiny to meet again in the next world". Kneeling 
down and putting the meaningful gift on the ankle! That's unselfish, ready-to-
give, true love. The woman who lives with such a caring and romantic man, if 
such a man exists, would be so happy. Such a man might also change once 
married, but 1 don't think this man in the drama would change. It feels good to 
see such true love". (Italics, her emphasis) (Nae-yoon, 31) 
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"I will be always there for you". The ideal hero for these Korean women 
viewers is, of course, handsome, masculine and capable, but most of all, a man with 
the quality of attentive concern and caring, who is "always there for you", who mak es 
you feel like the center of total attention. Male caring and attention is an important 
element in the women's fantasy. The woman quoted above is most impressed at the 
moment when the hero, just like a faithful bodyguard, enfolds his beloved in his 
protective arms and runs down to the hospital. The woman desires to be the object of 
his concern, the recipient of his care, and woman's fantasy is to "lose control with 
someone who really cares for her" (Radway, 1984: 75). Escaping into the romantic 
fantasy is therefore a ritual wish to be loved and cared for: "I wish I had a caring 
husband just like him". Women, in particular mothers sacrificing their own interests 
for the family, have an intense need to be cared for. "Mothers also need men who can 
mother because we ourselves need that mothering - women are tired of mothering the 
whole world" (Rothman, 1994: 155). Women are tired of being the peace-makers and 
soothers at home, dispensing comfortable feelings, affection and warmth, and 
nowadays women increasingly want to be the ''recipients of such feelings" (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 88). Through the vicarious experience in romance watching, 
these Korean women become the recipients of attentive caring, temporarily reviving 
their deeply felt need. 
"Kneeling down and putting the meaningful gift on the ankle!" What 
significance does this image of the romance make in the woman's experience of 
pleasure? The romance exactly visualizes women's dissatisfactions with the 
asymmetric rules in male-female relationships, and the pleasure is created in the 
fantasy world that "departs from the rules of everyday reality" (Donald, 1989: 10). 
The romance gives pleasure, precisely because the satisfactions which it offers 
"contrast so dramatically" with the lack 0 f fulfillment in the women's emotional lives 
(Geraghty, 1991: 111). Women derive pleasure by fantasizing about a utopian world 
with a new kind of male-female relationship, whereby a man equally cares for a 
woman as she cares for him. The women's fantasy here has to do with violating 
dominant assumptions and overturning rules and conventions taken to be normative in 
patriarchal gender relations. It inverts elements of this world, re-combining its 
constitutive features in new male-female relations to produce something new and 
231 
different (Jackson, 1981: 8). In this utopian realm of romance, these Korean middle-
class women get pleasure by witnessing the imaginative transfonnation of female 
position - metaphorically, from a servant to a queen - and by fmding that their lost 
faith in their sense of self is being vicariously redressed as the object truly worthy of 
care and respect by an unselfish, ready-to-give, true lover. In this romantic fantasy 
these women feel the deepening of ''true love" which they find is a rare quality in 
real-life gender relations. Here is another example of true love embodied in a caring 
hero. 
"I wonder if such true love (in romance drama Legend of Love) still exists 
these days in this selfish world. His unchanging, sublime love towards only 
one woman is touching. This tall, handsome, successful lawyer could have 
pursued another woman. Yet for long years his heart has been only towards 
this first lover he met in university days. Although she is now married to 
another man, his love doesn't change. He has moved near her house hoping to 
catch sight of her, but never intends to disturb her married life. Because he 
cares about her so much and what he wishes for is her happiness. Although 
it's just a drama, such unchanging love feels more precious to me in this world 
where everything changes so easily". (Italics, her emphasis) (Se-jung, 32) 
The perfect romantic fantasy that these Korean women are searching for in 
their escape into romance watching is what they frequently call "true love" - true love 
by an unselfish man who cares about "her happiness". Ultimately, what these women 
fmd pleasurable about the experience of romance drama is the "good feelings" they 
get by rediscovering their cherished meaning of true love in this heartless unreliable 
world of asymmetric gender relations. For example, "It would feel so nice if someone 
always cares about you". "It feels good to see such true love". "Although it's just a 
drama, such unchanging love feels more precious to me in this world where 
everything changes so easily". All the women in my research willingly acknowledge 
that romance drama is absurd and unreal, hence dismiss it by often saying, "It's just a 
drama". Yet significantly, they nevertheless do not want to dismiss the "good 
feelings" they personally construct from such absurd and unreal fantasy. Precisely, 
''while the fantasy is unreal, the good feelings it gives us about ourselves and our 
future are real, and these good feelings are what we need to sustain us" (Radway, 
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1984: 100). The fantasy world of romance drama creates an illusion which is "known 
to be false but felt to be true" (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 103). Despite the 
romance's lack of resemblance to their real world, the women's ritualistic, imaginary 
journey into romantic fantasy creates and maintains "good feelings" that are rarely 
experienced in the course of their demanding social condition of mothering and 
habitual existence in relation to their unavailable husbands. Although women's 
fantasy has a "short-lived compensatory therapeutic value" (Radway, 1984: 85) at the 
moment of romance viewing, "good feelings" it evokes deep inside their emotions 
may last longer sustaining the true pleasure of the experience of romance drama. At 
large, it seems that television (romance drama) works through "feelings", 
"sentiments" rather than through thoughts, reasons (Noble, 1983: 102-107), arousing 
deep emotions and reverberating in women's hearts. 
Overall, the Korean women's constant emphasis on the quality of "caring" and 
''true love", and the experience of "good feelings" derived from it, all appear to 
suggest that the women's romantic fantasy is more emotionally-oriented than 
sexually-oriented. In this final conclusion, I am tempted to argue that it is more of 
"emotional fantasy", not sexual fantasy, that the Korean women in my research are 
truly engaged with in their imaginary escape into the romance text. It is a 
predominantly recurring characteristic throughout their discussion on romantic 
fantasy that the women's emphasis is more on the "emotional" quality of true love 
than physical sensations. Interestingly, this point partly explains, furthermore, why 
these Korean middle-class women cannot derive the same degree of pleasure from 
watching Western romance texts wherein explicit sexual conduct and carnal passion, 
including promiscuous bed-hopping, are prevalently noticed. The Western idea of 
love does not correspond to the Korean women's dominant social character and 
"structure of feeling" (Williams, 1961: 64-80), their affective elements of 
consciousness and relationships in emotional and social involvement. As the 
following comments manifest, the Korean women's exquisite pleasure in the 
emotional/spiritual quality of love, or "essential bonding and intimacy of absolute 
oneness" (Hoffman, 1995: 130) formed by such quality, is found to be relatively 
absent in the Western cultural forms oriented more toward carnal desire and sexual 
arousal. For these Korean middle-class women, "emotion" rather than sensation has 
the potential to serve as immensely powerful sources of pleasure. Their state of high 
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emotional arousal and intense pleasure from it can be a form of "modern hedonism" 
(Campbell, 1987: 69) characterized by the intensity of emotional experience 
exceeding sensory experience. 
"Fantasize a Western man? No. No matter how handsome and romantic a 
Western man is (in a movie), I am not interested. They have different 
emotions and different ways of loving, perhaps. I can't imagine that Western 
men would be sincerely loving. I can't think: of any Western movie about a 
caring and devoted man. That doesn't seem like Western culture". 
(Sung-mi, 32) 
"While watching a Western movie (on TV), I could say, "This man is very 
handsome, that man looks very sexy, has a sexy body". That's all. They don't 
attract a deep interest beyond that. They hardly arouse my emotion deep 
down". (Bun-young, 32) 
"In All About Eve (Korean romance drama) he has rarely said "I love you" to 
the woman he truly loves, only kissed her finally at the end of the drama. Of 
course, not sleeping together hastily. Yet that love is felt so precious and 
sincere. While watching the drama we can feel that this man truly loves and 
cares about her ... That kind of love and deep emotion cannot be found in a 
Western movie. Western men always say "I love you" and jump into bed, then 
someday may dump the lover once losing interest sexually". (Bun-sang, 32) 
"I can't imagine that Western man or woman would be in love with one 
person for life. Look at the lawyer man in Legend of Love (Korean romance 
drama). He has loved one woman for life. That kind of eternal love doesn't 
seem to exist in the Western society. Western people seem more physically, 
sexually oriented than emotional. They are different from us. It's hard to 
imagine an emotionally strong bond in the Western society". (Se-jung, 32) 
The importance of emotions emphasized above may be a unique particularity of the 
Korean women. Or is it a universal fact that women, in contrast to men, focus much 
more on the emotional side? In the complex functionally divided society, the "need 
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for friendly warmth" which only intimate groups or couples can offer is possibly 
stronger than even before (Bauman, 1988: 49). In interpreting the romance text, these 
Korean middle-class women mainly stress the aspect of "emotional bonding", sharing 
feelings and being close, the existence of faith and intimacy between a hero and a 
heroine, which all implies that they most desire to be loved and cared for emotionally 
by one significant other. Emotional bonding is the women's main concern, proper 
way of loving and being loved, and desirable substance in their real-life relationships 
with men. In a way, Korean romance drama closely fits in the women's lived 
experience and structure of feeling, both of which are not adequately recognized and 
met in the everyday patriarchal ethos. By immersing in the romance watching, these 
women fmd a "validation and celebration of those interests and concerns which are 
seen as properly theirs within the social world they inhabit" (Lovell, 1980: 51). The 
Korean middle-class women experience quite unique pleasure in the realm of 
emotional fantasy, not in physical sensation or sexual excitement, but in their endless 
search for intimacy and emotional love tenderly cared and eternally united in oneness. 
This is the women's deep desire. The emotional fantasy and the experience of good 
feelings derived from it are immensely powerful sources of pleasure to the hearts of 
the Korean middle-class housewives in their 30s. The discourse of Korean popular 
romance precisely understands the meaning of love and intimacy embodied in female 
emotions, which serves as the essential ingredient of its commercial success. 
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Chapter 9 Korean Middle-Class Women in their 20s 
Section (1) Employment and Uncertainty: Whose Individualization? 
Like the case of the working-class young women in Chapter 6, the middle-class young 
women in their 20s, single university students, do not find television as an integral 
part of everyday life. The structure of university life activities - such as studying for 
exams, preparing for employment, as well as meeting friends and socializing on a 
regular basis - ensures that these young women do not have much leisure time for 
television consumption at home. Their engagement with the out-of-home social 
activities and other media, including cinema, magazines and newspapers, is also 
perceived as an important source of entertainment and information in planning their 
own life politics. Unlike the case of the married women in their 30s and 50s, everyday 
life of the single women is focused on issues, activities and relationships elsewhere 
outside the domestic. Therefore, in this opening section I direct a focus toward the 
young women's life and identity. I aim to understand closely what issues concern 
Korean educated young women today, by surveying their overall thoughts, 
sensibilities, feelings and reactions. What do they want in life? What are their major 
concerns? As educated young women are in the vanguard of change, my data here 
will reflect the voices of the modern liberated generation in contemporary Korea. 
Throughout the section, I will specifically focus on three decisive issues that emerged 
from the women's free discussion; employment, sexual discrimination, and marriage. 
The data substantially verify the existence of Western individualization in the young 
women's intense quest for an independent life through a career choice. However, by 
problematizing the conditions of the contemporary Korean labor market, I will argue 
that the regime of individualization does not include Korean women. Whose 
individualization? I intend to demonstrate that Western individualization is unlikely to 
be implemented, but only played out at the level of imagination, within the Korean 
young women's imaginative self-reflexivity compounded with the feelings of 
uncertainty, insecurity and anxiety. This unresolved identity of individualization will 
serve as a necessary context within which I further explore the role of TV media in 
the subsequent sections. 
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"Moms' generation might have attended university to get married well, a 
university degree was a means to a good marriage. We have different 
thoughts. If intending to be stuck at home doing housework, why would we go 
to university? I want to get a nice job and live a free wonderful life". 
(Moon-sun, 22) 
"I have lots of thoughts and worries everyday. Would getting a job within this 
year be possible as I plan? Can the job measure up to my expectation? What 
should I aim for in life? I come to think more and more about my life. I want 
to find a secure job and live an independent life". (Sung-won, 22) 
"I hate the :xx automobile (TV) commercial. It's so stupid - "My husband 
wanted to remodel the kitchen for me, but I wanted to get him a new car 
instead. For my husband's confidence". Then, the husband drives a car and the 
wife happily leans on his shoulder. I hate that commercial. I would earn 
money on my own, change the kitchen on my own and drive my own car!" 
(Italics, her emphasis) (Bo-ra, 21) 
One dominant theme throughout the young women's discussion of the concerns in 
their life is the pursuit of personal freedom and independence. 1 "I want to have a free 
independent life". This is a particularly common narrative of self-identity among the 
educated young middle-class women. Yearning for the sense of personal freedom and 
independent quality of life, these women desire to take total charge of their own life 
and constitute themselves as an "actor, designer, juggler and stage director of their 
own biography and identity" (Beck, 1994: 13). They want to plan, produce, stage and 
cobble together their own biography for a more self-responsible, self-determined, new 
mode of life that is no longer obligatory and embedded in the traditional gender roles. 
It appears that they are struggling to break free from the fixities 0 f traditional norms 
to discover a true self By choosing different ways of living and being in the world, 
they are struggling to ally themselves with new modes of "life politics" (Giddens, 
1991: 214), a politics of self-actualization in a reflexively ordered environment. This 
is a pioneering expedition into a new territory, a quest for "individualization" (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). The strong desire for individualization is empirically 
verified in the young women's ongoing self-observation and questioning in everyday 
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life. "What do I want in life?" "What should I aim for life?" In heightened awareness 
of thoughts and feelings, at each moment oflife these women engage themselves with 
self-interrogation. It signals a great deal of intensified "self-reflexivity", self-
monitoring and reflection on life: "We are, not what we are, but what we make of 
ourselves" (Giddens, 1991: 75). Here, the women's self is not taken as a pre-
constituted category, but as a responsible, reflexive ''project and venture to be 
performatively produced through the discourses of choice" (Cronin, 2000: 276). 
"I want to get a nice job and live a free wonderful life". "I want to find a 
secure job and live an independent life". All of the educated middle-class women here 
envisage a free, independent, individualized way of life through the participation in 
work. They demand the right to control and build up a life of their own through a 
career choice. This means that the women's do-it-yourself biography IS 
preconditioned on the labor market, and that the women's reflexive idea of 
individualization is in this sense "occupational reflexivity" (Lash, 1994). 
Consensually, the most pivotal concern to these young women is therefore 
"employment". Employment turns out the most urgent, recurring issue throughout the 
interviews, as education and professional careers are taken as central to the women's 
life politics. The middle-class young women clearly demonstrate intense aspirations 
for work, believing that it is only through work that they can ultimately invent a life 
of their own. Work is regarded as a "motor of individualization" (Beck, 1992: 92). 
Practically, the creation of their own biography is dependent upon the attainment of 
work in the labor market. It is a work biography. However, for Korean men the work 
biography is taken for granted, but for Korean women, especially these well-educated 
women, it is ironically contesting and problematic. The following comments reflect 
the reality of the Korean labor market. 
''The biggest worry is employment. Approaching the 4th year, I am afraid of 
graduating. We nowadays say, "Graduation equals unemployment". No matter 
how smart women are, most companies prefer to hire men". (Eun-soo, 22) 
"Employment is as difficult as catching a star in the sky, more difficult for 
women. Whether you are an elementary school graduate or a university 
graduate, it wouldn't make a big difference in finding ajob". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
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In the following I argue that the current Korean labor market does not promise 
women the feasibility of individualization. In the Western societies, education and 
career opportunities are generally regarded as the driving force behind the 
individualization of people's lives and social mobility. It is argued that labor market 
positions now are constituted less by determinants such as gender and class location 
and more by self-design, self-creation and individual performances: ''The educated 
person becomes the producer of his or her own labor situation, and in this way, of his 
or her social biography" (Beck, 1992: 93). However, the rosy Western theory that 
education encourages labor market freedom and individualization is illusory for 
educated Korean women. This is my contention in this particular Korean context with 
its pronounced enthusiasm for education. In contemporary Korea there certainly has 
been an impressive increase in educational attainment for women. In terms of higher 
education alone, 56% of females are now enrolling in a two-year college or a four-
year university (KWDI, 1999). Although this is almost a half of male enrolment 
(92%), still this is a significant improvement compared with the rate of 21 % for 
females in 1985. Despite the fact that Korean women have attained as much education 
as their male counterparts, women's higher education does not necessarily lead to a 
better job prospect, an individualized career path in the labor market. 2 
To be specific, first, despite the women's high educational level, there is an 
inverse correlation between the level of education and employment, as female 
university graduates have a difficulty in fmding positions commensurate with their 
educational qualifications (Rowe and Kim, 1997). Only 46.7% of female university 
graduates are now employed, but most of them are in a secretarial position that has 
nothing to do with their educational degree (MBC News, July 22, 2001). In Korea 
today, it is rather easier for female high-school graduates to find employment than it 
is for women with university degrees. Second, in terms of economic security, 
compared with the male wage, female university graduates have a wage differential of 
68.4%, and this is largely a function ofunderemployment and resistance of employers 
to hire better-educated women (Ro et aI, 1998). Third, educated women's economic 
activities are heavily concentrated in a ''traditional female track", non-managerial 
work unrelated to their specialties - e.g. receptionist, typist, telephone operator, other 
positions requiring little or no skills and certainly no university education (Rowe and 
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Kim, 1997). A substantial portion of women's economic activity is found in small 
companies, not in large companies with knowledge/information-intensive forms of 
work. In this context, Korean educated women are ''reflexivity losers" (Lash, 1994: 
133) as they are excluded from the new labor spaces of reflexive production in large 
companies. Basically, this is because female university graduates are systematically 
discriminated in the recruitment process, particularly by large major companies in 
Korea. In the large companies' annual mass recruitment, over 90% of jobs are usually 
offered to male university graduates (Chang, 1994: 22). This links to my final point 
here. As a matter of fact, these young women in my research vividly experience 
institutionalized gender inequality and ethical injustice in their everyday life ''within 
universities", which further has significant implications on the women's career 
opportunities. Listen to the following complaints. 
"In society, at least universities would be the most self-conscious and fairest 
places, the so-called intelligentsia, but sexual discrimination is common here. I 
find professors conservative and discriminating against female students. When 
receiving employment references from large companies, professors normally 
recommend male students and do not recommend female students". 
(Eun-soo, 22) 
"In the case of employment or special benefits, female students are not treated 
as equally as male students. In our department I was a top student. But when 
the opportunity for a project in America was offered, three male students were 
selected! I was very disheartened. I have realized that, in order to get 
recognized and succeed in Korea, a woman has to be 10 times more 
outstanding and smarter than a man". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
"One time in a Business class, a male professor explained about investment 
and stock options. He explained it directly towards male students, in contrast, 
he joked with female students who were listening in the front row, ''This will 
be helpful when you marry and keep a household diary, so don't forget it". 
That kind of joke was unpleasant sexual discrimination. Professors don't take 
female students' academic enthusiasm seriously, because professors think we 
will eventually get married and be stuck at home". (Yoon-kyung, 22) 
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Rising female education produces a critical mass of educated women, who begin to 
articulate their discontent in modernist terms that their employment futures are far less 
secure than for their male counterparts. The educated young women's discontent 
clearly illustrates sexual discrimination and gendered experiences in Korean 
university education that have negative effects on their career opportunities. The 
faculty's traditional views on sex-roles and the patriarchal characteristics of 
knowledge in higher education provide gendered experiences, putting women at 
significant educational and professional disadvantage. Overall it signals that 
university education does not properly fit with their needs, and does not truly 
encourage them to prepare for active participation in the labor market. Sexual 
discrimination is prevalent inside Korean higher education, yet hidden and 
undisclosed to the wider public outside. According to one survey, more than 60% of 
female students believe that knowledge taught in university classrooms is constructed 
from a male/patriarchal perspective, and 74% of female students feel that regardless 
of gender, most faculty have stereotypical traditional views about women (Ro et aI, 
1998: 135). Consciously or unconsciously, the classroom and campus climate in 
Korean universities tends to ignore or alienate women. Korean universities are still 
under the strong influences of patriarchal culture and do not take seriously women's 
academic enthusiasm and professional aspirations. One woman precisely puts it, 
"Professors think we will eventually get married and be stuck at home". 
In short, both the ethical injustice in higher education and the systematic 
discrimination in the labor market exclude Korean educated women from the 
implementation of Western individualization. It would be illusory for Korean 
educated women to believe that independence and freedom can be found in the 
economic domain. I would thus call into question: Whose individualization? 
Examining closely in the contemporary Korean context, I would argue that Western 
individualization is not readily available to Korean women as it is unlikely to be 
implemented in reality. The Western idea of individualization is only feasible within 
the Korean women's imaginative self-reflexivity. It is wishful thinking played out at 
the level of imagination. It is still an unresolved individualization. These well-
educated women are all eager to carve a free and independent life, but without 
occupation, without earning power, how would that be possible? Women's will-power 
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and education alone cannot be an effective transformative force in the identity politics 
of individualization. These Korean young women need more than "just education", 
more than "just imagination" if they are to actualize an individualized quality of life. 
Crucially, what Korean women need are equal opportunities in the job market, not in 
the way it is inscribed within the state legal system, but in the way its manifest law is 
actually practiced in reality. In fact, it is their high attainment in education that drives 
more and more educated women to imagine an individualized way of life, but without 
occupation they suffer an identity crisis, not to mention economic insecurity. As a 
consequence, the mood of uncertainty and anxiety about their identity permeates here. 
"Once graduated I would belong nowhere unless I find a job. As long as we 
stay within the school, we have the status of student. When asked, "What do 
you do?", saying "I am a student" covers everything. But once outside the 
school, without ajob I will be nothing. Without ajob I will have no identity. It 
may be quicker to find a man and marry. Employment is not simply to earn 
money. It is a statement of identity that can show who I am". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
The feelings of uncertainty about employment, and anxiety about self-identity 
are manifest in the young women's comments. All ofthese young women are anxious 
about the possible loss of career opportunity and earning power, feeling that they have 
so little opportunity for getting ajob after graduation. Unfortunately, when it comes to 
the issue of employment, these vibrant young women feel close to a failure. In the 
uncertain realm of employment and individualization, they fear that they will suffer 
the consequences of being a failure - no identity. "One thinks of identity whenever 
one is not sure of where one belongs. Identity is a name given to the sought escape 
from that uncertainty" (Bauman, 1995: 82). Once graduating the women's guaranteed 
protective status as a student will become out of date and no longer socially validated. 
The middle-class women here are engaging in a status struggle. "It may be quicker to 
find a man and marry". Realistically, without a job women have no alternatives to 
marriage, if they want decent status-proper lives for themselves. Dependence through 
marriage could offer a potential way of achieving material security in the 
contemporary Korean labor market where employment is far less secure for educated 
women. As a consequence, rather than becoming self-responsible and self-
determining agents in the new space of reflexive economies, educated young women 
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are likely to be trapped in the existing structures and the re-traditionalizing socialities, 
just like their mothers' generation. The systematic exclusion of women from the labor 
market is likely to re-embed the young women desiring individualization back into the 
institutions of traditional norms and expectations - most accessibly, marriage. Then 
actually, what are the middle-class young women's views about marriage? The 
dramatically changing idea of marriage is another distinctive feature in the young 
women's life. 
"My motto is, don't be obsessed with love! Love or marriage is not an 
important parameter in life. If marriage severely affects my work, I will 
discard marriage. My work and success is more important". (Hyo-jung, 21) 
"Marriage binds women's life so much. If given either marriage or work, I 
will choose my work and success". (Bun -soo, 22) 
"Once I saw on TV a professional career woman lecture on being a new 
modern woman of the 21 st century. She called it "the third woman". The first 
woman sought happiness within the home, and the second woman only at 
work. Now the third woman should keep balance between home and work. 
She emphasized, the third way of being a modern woman is to become a 
professional career woman, but at the same time to harmoniously combine 
work and home life. Of course, that sounds nice! But I found that lecture 
simply idealistic, not realistic. She must be lucky enough to have a supportive 
husband and in-laws. In fact, such a lucky woman would be extremely rare in 
Korean society. Who wouldn't like to marry if that is possible?" 
(Yoon-kyung, 22) 
Love is becoming more contested and more important than ever and "equally 
impossible" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 2). The above comments illustrate a 
clear transition from love/marriage to work. The middle-class young women's 
dramatically shifting idea of marriage is a critical differentiation here, in contrast to 
the strong desire for marriage held by the working-class young women in Chapter 6. 
Marriage is discarded because 0 f its gratuitous demands and incompatibility with the 
fulfillment of work. These young women never feel that they could fulfill a successful 
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career and a rich personal familial life. These highly reflexive women are fully 
conscious of the reality that they cannot have it all - career success, marriage, 
children, and harmonious family - although they wish to have it all, ideally. It is 
worth highlighting that the feeling of "impossibility of having it all" has been a 
consensual theme across all Korean middle-class women in their 50s, 30s, and 20s in 
my research. Eventually, women are driven to choose either work/individualization or 
marriage/family.3 "If given either marriage or work, I will choose my work and 
success". This is the general sentiment of the Korean middle-class young women. 
This means that women need to pursue a career and individualized life of their own, 
often at the cost of the joys in the family, love and intimate relationships. The 
women's choice of work/individualization renders their commitments to marriage and 
other relations fragile and vulnerable. The notions of marriage/family are being more 
open, flexible, and understood less in terms of obligations but more in terms of 
"negotiated" commitments. As I sense from these Korean yo ung women, "negotiation 
and calculability" constitute the young generation's structure of feeling. One young 
woman clearly puts it: "Moms' generation might have married in the blind name of 
love, but when it comes to marriage I would meticulously calculate all the 
conditions". The young women's life politics is planned around an insurance-based, 
equality-oriented, and highly calculable mode of thinking about potentially negative 
outcomes or effects of life decisions. Through negotiation, contract and calculation of 
interests, these young women attempt to organize and control their encompassing life 
circumstances. In other words, their day-to-day life becomes increasingly reflexive 
and calculable to "colonize the future with some degree of success" (Giddens, 1991: 
202). Hence, they are on the search for a right way to live together, hoping to try out 
"contractual marriage" or "cohabitation". It is a desire for new modes oflife, breaking 
free from traditional gender roles. 
"Only if the man can cook, wash dishes, do the housework, then I will marry. I 
want to consider contractual marriage to know in advance whether he is 
patriarchal or not... Then people may criticize me for being abnormal and 
crazy, my parents would go mad, "What the hell is contractual marriage? Is 
marriage business?" As long as I live in Korea I may never be allowed to 
make a contractual marriage". (Bo-ra, 21) 
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"Living together before marriage is more sensible. But people would perceive 
me as abnormal. Contract marriage makes sense in the head, but cannot be 
acceptable in the heart emotionally". (Eun-soo, 22) 
The discussion on contractual marriage indicates that the Korean young women 
strongly desire to be unleashed from traditional norms and expectations, and to create 
a self-determining identity of their own. Yet the freely-chosen game of identity is 
played out only within the women's imagination, as they are simultaneously 
concerned about the recognition and validation of their identity by others: "Then 
people may criticize me for being abnormal and crazy, my parents would go mad". 
This common concern signals that female individualization is perceived much more 
problematic and deviant in the eyes of the society. The modem Korean society still 
shows fear and resistance towards Western individualization. Consequently, these 
young women are not certain about how to place a freely-chosen identity in the 
society, how to make sure that people around them accept this new placement as right 
and proper. Identity is now said to become more mobile, free-floating, multiple and 
personal, according to the contemporary (Western) discourse of identity and 
(po st)mo dernity. In this Korean context, however, I want to emphasize that identity is 
also a "social, other-related, mutual recognition" (Kellner, 1992: 141-142), which 
means that one's identity is dependent upon recognition from others combined with 
self-validation ofthis recognition. In the society of modernity, there is still a structure 
of interaction with socially defined and available roles, norms and expectations, 
among which one must choose and appropriate in order to gain identity in a complex 
process of mutual recognition. My point therefore is that the Korean young women's 
identity/lifestyle politics pivoting on Western individualization is still circumscribed 
and limited by the boundaries of possible identities based on socially mutual 
recognition, although their yearning for a new identity and a new mode of life is 
continually expanding in the modem globalizing society. In this sense, the issue of 
identity for the Korean young women is largely unresolved. 
In conclusion, the underlying assumption of Western individualization that 
one can freely choose, make and remake one's identity as fashion is problematic to 
Korean women. Korean educated young women intensely desire to cobble together 
their own self-determining identity that is no longer obligatory in the prescriptions of 
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traditional gender roles. However, this new quest for individualization is likely to end 
up only in the women's self-reflexive imagination, as impeded by the systematic 
exclusion in the labor market. The women's constant struggle for individualization 
can end up fantasizing about a seemingly unachievable dream. Without equal 
opportunities in the economic domain, the women's occupational individualization is 
practically in question. The women's identity politics is in uncertainty. On the surface 
level, it appears that young women today have more choices and opportunities in life, 
in terms of education, work and marriage, but in effect they are often "crummy 
choices" (Hewlett, 1986: 401). In the uncertain realm of individualization, women are 
expected to master ''risky opportunities" (Beck, 1994: 8), meticulously calculating 
and negotiating all the possible consequences. As a consequence, for women, the 
feelings of uncertainty, insecurity and anxiety become constituent experiences in the 
choice 0 f individualization. 
''Nothing is certain about job, marriage, anything in life. After graduation I 
will step into society and experience a real social life. But nothing is certain. 
Only uncertain, opaque life is awaiting ahead". (Moon -sun, 22) 
Section (2) A Return to Pleasure: Entertainment and Feminist Utopia 
In the previous section I have argued that the educated young women desire 
occupational individualization, yet the systematic sexual discrimination in the Korean 
labor market is unlikely to allow them to implement such desire. The gloomy and 
unhappy job prospects are the most dominant concern in their everyday self-
reflexivity, constituting an unresolved identity and life politics. In this section I intend 
to show a close relationship between the young women's unresolved on-going 
struggle of identity and their particular pattern of television consumption: "Only 
entertainment!" "Just pleasure!" The Korean young women here experience enormous 
pleasure from television entertainment forms - most preferably, unrealistic comedy 
drama - yet they rarely wonder why it is pleasurable to them. The notion of pleasure 
is taken as so self-evident that they do not have to think about it in everyday life, 
unless triggered by the research interviews. It is "just pleasure". Then, what can we 
say about the apparently simple fact of pleasure - even the enormous pleasure located 
in anti-realism in this Korean case - or is pleasure, as common sense suggests, beyond 
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analysis? (Bennett et at., 1981: 197). Premised on the assumption that there is no 
universal form of pleasure valid in all social contexts, this section aims to explore 
specific forms of pleasure in a particular social context; pleasure derived by the 
Korean middle-class young women from their most favored entertainment text of 
comedy drama. What is the social, cultural and political meaning of the specific forms 
of pleasure? Based on the research data, I intend to analyze television entertainment, 
as a pleasure and as a specific meaning. Entertainment is part of leisure (Dyer, 1992: 
13), and pleasure is an essential objective pursued in entertainment and leisure. Yet 
unlike leisure, pleasure has attracted no sociology (Mercer, 1983: 88), but largely 
remained under the rubric of psychoanalysis. Drawing on the young women's 
concrete experience of the everyday, I will examine the specific meaning of pleasure 
in their leisurely encounter with television entertainment. In other words, I will 
approach "a return to pleasure in the terrain of lived experience" (McRobbie, 1994: 
39-40) for a deeper understanding of television consumption in everyday life: "Each 
of us has an enormous capacity for pleasure, leisure and enjoyment. For the left and 
for cultural intellectuals in the past this was a source of guilt, a private, stolen 
experience in an otherwise gloomy and unhappy world" (McRobbie, 1994: 40). 
Throughout this section I will illustrate the ways in which the Korean middle-class 
young women draw entertainment texts close to the realm of lived experience and 
how the meaning is produced subtly through their experience of unequal power 
relations in the patriarchal society. I argue for the utopian function of entertainment, 
especially feminist utopia, which will then explain why television entertainment 
works particularly for women in an otherwise gloomy and unhappy world. 
''The only thing I want from TV is pleasure. Just pleasure! For that viewing 
moment I don't want to think about anything else - worries about 
employment, uncertain future life, all the headachy problems". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
''There are lots of things to think about in real life, but at least while watching 
TV I want to stop thinking completely. Just go blank in the head! Be as 
simplistic as possible!" (Sung-won, 22) 
''The only thing I want from TV is entertainment and laughter. Only 
entertainment! Nothing serious". (Hyo-jung, 21) 
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"What's TV? TV is for relaxing, having fun, escaping from the complicated 
life. Just pleasure. That's it!" (Eun-soo, 22) 
"Only entertainment!" It appears that through television entertainment, the 
middle-class young women actively seek distraction, an escape from the pressurized 
mundane world, "all the headachy problems" of employment and uncertain futures. 
They find television as a sense of escape to remove themselves from tension, worry, 
uncertainty and bewilderment that surround all aspects of modern living. Television 
entertainment is mainly "escapist" (Brown et aI., 1978: 419). The young women here 
heartily welcome the television's ability to ''be there to entertain" (Gauntlett and Hill, 
1999: 91). Television entertainment requires no attention, and its audiences exist only 
to be entertained. It is a welcome distraction, and this is why these young women 
delight in television entertainment. It demands nothing of the spectator. ''The masses 
seek distraction whereas art demands concentration from the spectator" (Benjamin, 
197: 241). Television entertainment, as opposed to serious art, is a distraction, a way 
of "not thinking" the everyday. "Entertainment offers us pleasure, and makes no 
demands on us, except that it asks us not to think about it" (Maltby and Craven, 1995: 
19). Entertainment precisely gives the audiences what they want: "I want to stop 
thinking completely. Just go blank in the head! Be as simplistic as possible!" To be 
more precise, it is the audience that seeks distraction. The audience is an "examiner, 
but an absent-minded one" (Benjamin, 1973: 234). With television entertainment, the 
young women here no longer have to think or wonder, unless they want to. All they 
want from the viewing moment is just pleasure. "Just pleasure. That's it!" Women 
usually function in the patriarchal society "as givers, not takers, of pleasure", hence 
taking pleasure means claiming one's space (Brown, 1994: 131). The young women's 
pleasure taken from entertainment is, 1 suggest, a serious pleasure. As one woman 
below puts it, ''Truth is hidden inside the laughter". 
"If 1 laugh my head off watching Soon-Poong Obstetrics (prime-time comedy 
drama) my parents say, "Why are you watching trash?" People think 
entertainment programs are meaningless trash, but 1 find them meaningful. 
Truth is hidden inside the laughter". (Yoon-kyung, 22) 
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"People tend to think entertainment programs are bad, rubbish. I like 
entertainment programs. What's wrong with laughing and enjoying? I don't 
become an idiot by laughing and enjoying... I enjoy French films as well. 
French films make me think about life. Funny entertainment programs also 
make me think about life - How come they can live such a simple and easy 
life? Why can't I live like that?" (Eun-soo, 22) 
Speaking as a fan of a favored entertainment text (e.g. Soon-Poong Obstetrics) is to 
recognize an identity constantly belittled and criticized by institutional authorities, yet 
simultaneously to resist such criticism and defend their own pleasure by "standing as 
the most direct and vocal affront to the legitimacy of traditional cultural hierarchies" 
(Jenkins, 1992:23). Although these educated middle-class young women, currently 
attending university, do not feel ashamed or guilty about indulging in entertainment, 
upon taking a defensive position they start to articulate the reasons for enjoyment. The 
opening remark in their articulation of pleasure is often a defensive argument: 
"What's wrong with laughing and enjoying? I don't become an idiot by laughing and 
enjoying". Entertainment is generally assumed by "high art" critics to lack moral 
seriousness, fill the mind with a vulgar, philistine sensibility. Here these women 
forcefully defend their pleasure as fully aware of such moral condemnation, the 
widely-taken perception of entertainment as a "vast wasteland" (Kellner, 1992: 146) -
trash, rubbish, junk, etc. Rather, for these educated young women, there seems to be 
no difference in the raising of emotions felt, and thoughts evoked, while viewing the 
"high art" of French film or the ''popular culture" of television entertainment. In the 
actual experience of contemporary cultural forms, the dichotomy between mass 
culture and high art may be then a falsely created one: "We suspend our real lives and 
our immediate practical preoccupations just as completely when we watch The 
Godfather as when we read The Wings of the Dove or hear a Beethoven sonata" 
(Jameson, 1979: 131). My point here is that much of the discussion around 
entertainment, such as fans of favored entertainment and pleasure derived from 
popular entertainment, has essentially "pathologized" (Harris, 1998: 5) it without 
leading to a closer understanding of specific meanings. The authentic voices of 
pleasure seekers are muted, rarely heard. In the following, I will let the young women 
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speak for themselves about their own pleasure; for example, why they truly enjoy the 
prime-time comedy drama, or so-called sitcom, Soon-Poong Obstetrics. 
"Basically, it is not a realistic drama. The male characters have uncommon, 
silly sense and do not behave nonnally. Yet I just love their abnonnality!" 
(Joo-hyun, 22) 
''The pleasure ofwatching drama is to ridicule. Sitting comfortably in the sofa, 
I enjoy ridiculing silly people. I like to watch silly and abnonnal people in 
Soon-Poong Obstetrics". (Eun-soo, 22) 
''There is no strong man in this drama. Men are all weak and silly there. The 
typical example is the male nurse. He is very timid and passive, on the 
contrary, his wife is very masculine and can do Ssang-jul-bong (martial art). If 
the wife bullies, he cannot say a word. (Laugh) When friends suggest 
something, he steps back, "I have to ask my wife first". He always listens to 
his wife". (Bo-ra, 21) 
"In general, Korean fathers in their 50s or 60s are quite authoritative. But this 
doctor (main character) is not that typical image of a Korean man. H e always 
makes silly mistakes that make the family laugh ... One time he was fascinated 
by young people's performance of a cocktail show and was determined to 
learn it. (Laugh) While practicing hard, he almost burnt his hair". 
(Moon-sun, 22) 
"A normal man would not try such silly things to save his face inside the 
house. While watching TV he was amazed by the craftsmanship of engraving 
words on a rice grain. So he tried it day and night. (Laugh) Wondering about 
what to engrave for his first work, he engraved his wife's name on a tiny grain 
and proudly displayed it on a velvet cloth". (Y oon -kyung, 22) 
"I just love their abnormality!" Implicitly and explicitly, the comments here relate to 
sexual politics. The young women delight in the male characters' "ideal" deviancy 
and absurdity that is so far from what they see in their real life, real male-female 
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dynamics and real family relations. Sitcoms question the normalcy of social 
typifications, and ''pull deviance" into the universal problems of family, marking 
boundaries between common sense, normality and the unspeakable: And such 
deviancy or abnormality is recognized and found amusing (Tulloch, 1990: 253). 
Precisely, one source of pleasure for these young women springs from the comedy's 
pulling of deviance into the problems of gender. The characters' roles are reversed 
and de-sexualized within a sexist patriarchal culture. It is amply supplied with "weak 
and silly men", as opposed to strong female characters, so the women's pleasure is 
derived from laughing with the status reversal between men and women, the unruly 
reverse of the patriarchal order. Such entertainment offers an unruly delight. In this 
unruly world there is a sense of pleasure that transgresses boundaries, which 
transgression is vividly expressed by laughter. 
I want to particularly emphasize the young women's frequent laughing 
throughout their TV talk - because the laughter demonstrates clearly how much 
pleasure they experience from viewing the reversed world fraught with weak and silly 
men and absurd happenings. Such exaggerations have the capacity to provoke the 
rule-breaking "carnivalesque laughter" (Bakhtin, 1968: 101): Carnival involves a role 
reversal in which the established hierarchies of power are temporarily ignored, 
everyday law and order is ritually suspended, official culture is turned upside down. 
Like a carnivalesque world, the comedy drama is viewed by the young women as "life 
turned upside down". It is ordered disorder whereby the everyday law of gender is 
completely turned upside down for the pleasure and laughter of spectators who indeed 
wish so. 
Entertainment like Soon-Poong Obstetrics is an imaginary site for 
constructing an alternative culture. In that viewing moment, it seems to provide the 
young women with an "enclaved, in-between liminal space" (Turner, 1977) in which 
they are neither in nor out of social structures, and their seemingly frustrating hope for 
gender equality could be imagined. Watching entertainment constitutes such a space, 
"one defined by its refusal of mundane values and practices, its celebration of 
passionately embraced pleasures" (Jenkins, 1992: 283). The women's pleasure of 
ridiculing and laughing is an active mode of reading that is subversive and "poaching" 
(de Certeau, 1984: 174): In a sense the women readers here are travelers, they move 
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across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields 
to enjoy it themselves. The women ridicule and attack sexual inequality of real life, 
and make the absent ideal present in their imagination through the encounter with 
entertainment. This is possible because entertainment offers a utopian image of 
something better than the realm of women's everyday experience. The following 
extracts point toward the utopian dimension of entertainment. 
"Men in this drama (Soon-Poong Obstetrics) are emotionally soft. They are 
nice to women, don't look down on women. They include women in the social 
and play, ask women for opinions. They are different from the men I know. I 
am angry at the male-female relationship. Men around me - my brother and 
classmates - regard women as trivial, "Women are nothing". Sitting all 
together at night, if I mention my future plan to my parents, my brother pokes 
in, "Cut it all out! Get married!" Even to prove I am far more capable than 
him, I wouldn't want to marry but only succeed". (Eun-soo, 22) 
''The relationship between men and women in this drama is equal. Women 
speak all they want to say and do all they want to do because men are not 
authoritative. They are rather like close friends... Once coming home this 
doctor (in his 50s) calls his wife's name following around her. They live like 
elementary school classmates. That's something different from other Korean 
couples of that age. Normally, daddies ofthat age don't call their wives' name. 
Once married women are called "XX's mom". I haven't ever heard my daddy 
call my mom's name". (Moon-sun, 22) 
''The relationship between men and women m this drama is equal". The young 
women here demonstrate a high degree ofreflexivity in the consumption of television. 
Popular entertainment such as comedy drama stems from the gap between the socially 
ideal and the socially typical (Tulloch, 1990: 255). It evokes and manages social, 
cultural and political anxieties and fantasies. For the young women, this entertainment 
reflexively evokes a fantasy of feminist utopia - for example, the young women's 
fantasy of an equal relationship wherein men are emotionally soft, nice to women, 
include women, ask women for opinions, do not look down on women. They often 
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display a close attention to the particularity of entertainment narrative or image, and 
this allows them to draw upon reflexively their everyday experience of gender 
relationships. The ideal image of entertainment is felt far different from the real life 
perception ofwomen, "Women are nothing", "Cut it all out! Get married!" The young 
women fmd their everyday experience falls far short of the ideal image projected on 
entertainment. In this way, the utopian picture of entertainment serves as a mirror for 
society, a mirror in which the audience can see more clearly the society's "defects" 
(Morrison, 1984: 145). Utopian constructions take the form of a picture of an 
unrealizably ideal social order criticizing an existing order (Alexander and Gill, 1984: 
xi). Thus, utopian ideals are shaped under the double pressure of the feeling of 
deprivation and the squeeze of stubborn realities (Bauman, 1995). Through the 
consumption of entertainment, the women express hidden wishes, hopes, or self-
determined, equally stubborn oppositions to the realities of the dominated: "Even to 
prove I am far more capable than him, I wouldn't want to marry but only succeed". 
"In this drama, women speak all they want to say and do all they want to do 
because men are not authoritative. They are rather like close friends". Certainly, 
entertainment vocally says and physically presents something that triggers in the 
young women's anticipating consciousness the "not-yet-become" (Bloch, 1986: 32, 
1989), the daydream-like presentiments of what they lack, what they need, what they 
want, and what they hope to find in life. Entertainment's appeal to the young women 
here is found in its ability to offer symbolic solutions to real world problems and felt 
needs, and touch the women's emotions - for example, the feeling of "friendliness" in 
the male-female relationship. Entertainment partly gratifies because it holds open the 
imagined possibility of satisfying the women's actual lack in, and desire for, 
"friendliness, closeness and emotional intimacy". In this context, I want to 
particularly refer the notion of utopia to a more ''personal locus" (Levitas, 2000: 198) 
to accentuate the women's constant quest for an emotionally intimate human 
relationship. Precisely, this is why entertainment works. It works because the utopian 
function of entertainment is responding to the women's ''real needs created by real 
inadequacies of society" (Dyer, 1992: 25). Significantly, it works at the level of 
sensibility, offering the feelings of "friendliness, closeness and emotional intimacy" 
that the women want deeply, yet are not readily provided with in their day-to-day 
lives. "Entertainment does not present models of utopian worlds. Rather, the 
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utopianism is contained in the feelings it embodies. It presents what utopia would feel 
like rather than how it would be organized" (Dyer, 1992: 18. Italics, my emphasis). 
Utopian sensibility is taken off from the real experiences of the women, the real 
desires innate in the women, the real problems of patriarchal society. Thus, the 
women's specific reading of entertainment can serve as temporary answers to the 
inadequacies of society, and their pleasurable feelings derived can anticipate a 
potential for the new and better. Entertainment has a potential to provide a way to 
make the world be perfect without figuratively speaking, exploring the world and 
without letting it apocalyptically vanish (Bloch, 1989: 146). 
In conclusion, I argue that enjoying television entertainment for the Korean 
young women is a self-reflexive and imaginative social practice for hope and utopia 
towards gender equality, not a simple escape from a dreary unsatisfying reality to a 
mere fantasy world.4 It is "no longer an opium for the masses whose real work is 
elsewhere, no longer elite pastime thus irrelevant to the lives of ordinary people" 
(Appadurai, 1993: 274). Throughout this section the young women demonstrate 
highly self-reflexive, articulate, rich and elaborate reading skills, asserting their 
mastery over the favored entertainment text. Within the realm of popular culture, 
readers of their fascination are the ''true experts" (Jenkins, 1992: 86). What 
entertainment truly offers, from the perspective of these women experts' heightened 
sensibility, is something not of false consciousness, pure exploitation or manipulation. 
On the contrary, it is felt to offer a glimpse of utopia and hope, albeit far distant and 
faint in the women's everyday reality. This fmding may then confirm that all works of 
art, regardless of high or low, have a utopian potential and a utopian gratification, if 
readers wish to seek. "All contemporary works of art have as their underlying impulse 
our deepest fantasies about the nature of social life, both as we live it now, and as we 
feel in our bones it ought rather to be lived" (Jameson, 1979: 147). Yet current 
analyses in social/media theory do not move nearly far enough from a pro-capitalist 
ideological position: ''They are too cautious, insufficiently utopian" (Levitas, 2000: 
198). I argue in this Korean case that the ideology of entertainment should no longer 
be dismissed as false consciousness, but should be understood in close connection to 
the women's lived experience and lived relationship. Women know, rationally and 
politically, the commercial forms of domination by the entertainment culture industry, 
but nevertheless, emotionally and personally, enjoy and derive enormous pleasure 
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from them (Mercer, 1983: 84). The utopian function of entertainment should be 
recognized only against the backdrop of women's everyday life. "Concrete utopia 
stands at the horizon of everyday reality" (Bloch, 1989: 153). 
Section (3) Talking Back to The West: But Who Will Listen? 
In the previous sections I have accentuated employment as the most crucial yet 
unresolved issue in the young women's identity/life politics pivoting on Western 
occupational individualization. One decisive factor in the modern Korean job market 
is the English language, and this compels more and more young women to travel 
abroad, learn and speak English in everyday life. Learning English and involving 
themselves with a wider Western culture through travel and television consumption is 
a distinctive characteristic of the contemporary lives of the middle-class young 
women. This marks a dramatic generational difference from the previous cases of the 
women in their 50s and 30s. Then, what are consequences of the overwhelmingly 
increasing experience of the Western language and culture? There is a hierarchy of 
dominance established around the status of the English language, and the issue of 
language dominance opens out to the broader issue of cultural imperialism 
(Tomlinson, 1999: 78-79). But does it necessarily shape one world, one culture? What 
actually happens in a specific cultural context? In this final section, I deal with the 
specific experience of Western cultural forms by the Korean middle-class young 
women in their 20s. My intention here is to challenge the monolithic colonizing force 
implied by the Western imperialistic thesis. By focusing closely on a dialectical 
aspect of cultural interpretation, I will illustrate the way in which the Korean young 
women critically contest and boldly negotiate the Western symbolic world. While 
highlighting the peripheral women's talking back to the central West, particularly 
about Western sexual morality, I will argue on the problems of "listening" and 
unequal power shaped around the English language and monopolistic Western 
knowledge. Throughout this section my data will present the everyday language and 
the stock phrases the young women often use when talking about Western culture, 
experienced and imagined through travel and television. 
"English is a must for employment (in Korea). I withdrew from the university 
for one year and went to Australia for an English course. To brush up English 
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now, I keep TV on and listen to foreign programs - AFKN (American 
channel), CNN, drama, movies. To learn English I purposefully contact 
foreign programs. Who would find CNN news interesting? But it's good for 
listening practice. I don't find American drama interesting, but drama shows 
their living life, so it's best for learning everyday spoken English. If our 
country were economically powerful or Korean were a global language, we 
wouldn't have to spend so much time on learning headachy English". 
(Eun-soo, 22) 
''The completion of an English course abroad is a boost on the employment 
resume. So many university students around me travel to America, Canada, 
Europe, Australia, etc. In this globalizing society it may sound strange if you 
have not been abroad. You have to travel abroad at least once to join the 
conversation". (Yoon-kyung, 22) 
To be a tourist is one of the characteristics of the modern experience, travel is a 
marker of status in modern societies (Urry, 1991: 4). This seems so true for the 
Korean middle-class young women in my research. Other than for pleasure, the main 
motive for such travel lies in the learning of the English language, as this is a 
compulsory requirement in any employment recruitment targeting for university 
graduates in modern Korea. Thus, transnational culture today tends to be tied to the 
job market, it is more or less "occupational culture" (Hannerz, 1990: 243). The 
compulsory requirement of English in the contemporary job market means that 
English, as a language of modernity and a means of making living (Choi, 2000), is 
becoming a crucial precondition for the women's attainment of work and quest for 
economic independence - individualization. As a consequence, these Korean middle-
class young women go on learning and speaking English, whether they like it or hate 
it. English has emerged as a new form of "cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1984) in 
globalizing modem Korea. Therefore, all the middle-class young women in their 20s 
have been to English-speaking Western countries, and their openness toward new 
cultural experiences through travel and television consumption is a marked 
generational difference, compared with the previous chapters on the women in their 
50s and 30s. The following quotes point toward the young women's increasingly 
cosmopolitan experience today. 
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"I like foreign movies, watch lots of foreign movies (on TV). Good movies 
make me think about myself, my life. Am I also living like that? How should I 
live? I compare myself with them. 'Life is short, I want to live like that!' It 
stimulates me". (Sung-won, 22) 
''Traveling to other (Western) countries is always exciting. While walking 
down the street, popping into a store, eating a meal outside, queuing in a line, I 
always turn around and observe people. It's interesting to see if they are 
different from us, and how they are different". (Hyo-jung, 21) 
"Since traveling to foreign countries I have become more interested in TV 
showing those foreign cultures, ''Yes, I too have been there!" ... Before 
traveling? They were just different people living in other world. But since 
traveling I have become a little critical when watching TV. If they behaved 
differently from us (on TV), I used to just ignore it. But now, I come to think, 
'Why do they do that?' I come to compare that with our experience, and 
criticize them in the same way of criticizing our Koreans". (Bo-ra, 21) 
The Korean middle-class young women can be said to be "cosmopolitan", in terms of 
"a willingness to engage with the Other, an intellectual and aesthetic stance of 
openness toward divergent cultural experiences" (Hannerz's, 1990: 239). They are 
sensation-seekers and collectors of experiences, perceiving the world as "a food for 
sensibility, a matrix of possible experiences" (Bauman, 1998: 94). In anticipation of 
new and different experiences, they expect to treat the world as a series of spectacles 
to which they pay attention. The tourist gaze is intrinsically part of contemporary 
experience, and such gaze is sustained and reinforced by non-tourist practices, such as 
television consumption (Urry, 1990: 3). As the "implosive power of media" 
(McLuhan, 1964), television in particular, makes everybody today more or less 
cosmopolitan, mundane cosmopolitanism is becoming part of ordinary experience: "If 
we don't choose to go and visit other cultures, they come and visit us as images and 
information on TV" (Hebdige, 1990: 20). Mediated knowledge is not just about 
recognition of the familiar, but more about the discovery of the new and different for 
these young women audiences. They are in a sense "diffused audiences" 
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(Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 76) as both local in actual performance and 
global in imagination. Among large and complex repertoires of images supplied by 
television, the young women construct cultural narratives of the Other and incorporate 
desirable features into their invention of meaningful ways of living: "Am I also living 
like that? I want to live like that!" It evokes envying, yearning, desiring. The mediated 
experience invites ''the intrusion of distant events into everyday consciousness" 
(Giddens, 1991: 27) that often triggers not only envying and yearning, but also 
questioning, criticism, and talking back: "Why do they do that?" 
The young women's cosmopolitan experience is characterized more by their 
inquisitive search for "differences" rather than universalities. Thus, their imaginative 
voyage into the new territories of a global melange proceeds with interesting 
discoveries of differences that sharply contrast with culture back home. Then, what 
are differences that matter to these Korean young women? What is the most yearning 
feature of difference, and what is the most contestable feature of difference? Before 
moving onto my focal discussion on the latter, ''Western sexuality", I will first present 
the former, "free lifestyle". Throughout the interviews, it is typically stated: "I most 
envy their free lifestyle". "I like their passion for I, myself'. To be specific, the 
following extracts illustrate what these young women mean by free lifestyle. 
"In Friends (American sitcom), they often get together in the coffee shop and 
chat sitting comfortably on the sofa. None ofthem seem to worry about life or 
work. Everyday life is just ha-ha-ho-ho happy and simple. They don't seem to 
have a nice job, yet life is jolly. The long blond works in the coffee shop as a 
waitress. The tall stupid woman sings stupid songs. Did they go to university? 
Probably they did, they don't look smart though. In Korean society, if we are a 
university graduate and work in a coffee shop, people will think of us as a total 
loser. Not to mention parents' fury, "Have I sent you to university to see you 
work in a coffee shop?" None of their parents seem to compel, "Quit fooling 
around, get married and settle down!" In their culture it seems OK to fool 
around and enjoy a life. It's OK to be a loser. Because nobody meddles in 
their life. I like such free social atmosphere". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
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"I like their free individualistic life. They are making their own life, while we 
are making life for others". (Eun -soo, 22) 
In a context of global cosmopolitanism, Korean ways of life and traditional norms are 
routinely subject to interrogation and active critique. These middle-class young 
women criticize Korean gender models and appropriate forms of behavior prescribed 
by the patriarchal order, middle-class family values, parents' intervention: "Quit 
fooling around, get married and settle down!" On the other hand, they derive new 
interpretations about life through the Western image of a free lifestyle: "It seems OK 
to fool around and enjoy a life". The young women's identity is subject to new 
possibilities, new openings and alternatives. Their yearning for a Western free 
lifestyle, precisely, points to the idea of individualization that I have already 
emphasized in the previous section. ''They are making their own life, while we are 
making life for others", envies one woman above. Western individualization turns out 
to be the most appealing feature that fuels yearning, imagination and self-reflexivity 
in these educated young women. In fact, individualization and globalization are two 
sides ofthe same process of reflexive modernization (Beck, 1994: 14). 
However, not all elements of Western cultures reflected on television are 
instantly taken in as fuel for the women's imagination. While the young women 
certainly envy and incorporate some features of alien cultures into their repertoire of 
identity, they refuse others. They do not relate to all the vast repertoire of mediated 
experiences, but selectively do so, in terms of the ''perceived relevance" of mediated 
experiences to the ongoing constitution of the self (Thompson, 1995: 229). In other 
words, they fIrst fIlter other cultures through their already established view of the 
social world, and then pick and fuse only those pieces which suit themselves. In their 
own fIltering process, some elements are contested and discarded - most distinctively 
of all, Western sexuality.5 
"When it comes to sex, they are totally different people. The striking 
difference between them and us is sexual morality". (Moon-sun, 22) 
"Sexually, they are too free. Their sexual ethics is questionable. For example, 
in Dawson's Creek, a male student and a female teacher have a love scandal 
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that implies a sexual relationship. I also can't understand Friends. How can 
they be still friends after sleeping together? As if having sex with a friend 
doesn't matter at all? They have sex with anybody if they like. In Alley 
McBeal, even the old judge sleeps with a married woman, and the young 
president sexually pats a married woman. While watching TV, I wonder, do 
Western audiences not criticize it? Do they think that is normal and 
acceptable? I wonder how general people respond to it. Are they numb to it as 
such sexual conduct prevails in their culture? If our Korean broadcasting had 
produced such contents, they would have received a spate ofprotest calls from 
the audiences". (Eun-soo, 22) 
"In Western society, even strangers have a sexual relationship on their first 
meeting (on TV). Even though they don't know each other well, after having 
sex, probably great sex, they call it love. "I love you". No matter how great 
that sex is, that doesn't look like love to me, that's just sex. I am curious, what 
is love to them? I don't understand their notion of love. They are very 
different from us. Because they have a different notion of love, the way they 
understand and accept sex seems different from us. For them, sex equals love, 
love equals sex. Because their human relationship is initiated from the animal-
like sexual impulse, it seems hard for them to keep a long-term relationship. 
Isn't it the reason for their high divorce rate?" (Sung-won, 22) 
Here, the Korean middle-class young women are engaging in a thorough process of 
interrogating the West as projected on television. They question, reflect, and criticize 
the most pronounced difference, "Western sexuality", according to their moral 
framework and ethics of everyday life. The educated middle-class women exercise a 
high degree of moral agency, centrally focussing on the questions of sexual morality. 
The situations of distant others are brought to them mainly as "moral and emotional" 
concerns to be explored and questioned: "Do Western audiences not criticize it? Do 
they think that is normal and acceptable?" "What is love to them?" They engage with 
global symbolic material through problematizing, questioning, intuiting and 
reflecting. While contacting Western television programs, they constantly judge and 
evaluate the distant events and characters, and compare it with what Koreans might 
have done in the same situation. This is an existential condition of global modernity in 
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a sense that more moral and emotional efforts are implicitly made on ordinary people 
than ever before (Tomlinson, 1999:177). Western sexuality turns out the most 
contesting theme for these Korean middle-class young women, all of whom have 
traveled to Western countries. Regarding sexuality, here are more concrete criticisms 
derived from their actual experiences in the Western contexts. 
"We often cooked together and had dinner together with (Asian) students 
attending the same language institute (in America). One Japanese friend once 
brought an American friend she had met in a social. While sitting around the 
table and talking about various subjects in awkward English, this American 
woman talked about her boyfriends. Lots of boyfriends, before and present. It 
was nearly bragging. We showed a lukewarm response, one of us said, "I am 
not much interested in men". In a smug smile this American woman then 
retorted, "Umm ... You don't know (the pleasure)", and continued to lecture. 
This smug woman treated us like naive and ignorant girls. We thought, she is a 
cheap slut. Only if fluent in English, we would have lectured on why we don't 
want to sleep with many men. If wanting to sleep with many men is a choice, 
not wanting to do so is also a choice. She doesn't understand or respect our 
choice". (Italics, her emphasis) (Bo-ra, 21) 
"Western women seem to think that we don't know the pleasure of free sex, so 
we should wake up to their idea of free sex. They have this superior mentality, 
'We go ahead, so the rest should follow us'. It's ridiculous of them to think 
that we may be a sponge absorbing everything. We don't simply accept 
everything flooding in from the West, TV images. We are not idiots". 
(Hyo-jung, 21) 
"As far as I sensed (while learning English in Australia), Western people tend 
to think that they are far more advanced than us, more modem and better-off 
than us, so they have something to teach us. Such an arrogant thought. They 
know nothing about our long history and profound culture. We, Asian students 
were there in the Western country to learn English, but Western people tend to 
misunderstand that we came to their country because we envy their culture so 
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much and want to accept everything oftheir culture. Even our English teachers 
seemed to think so". (Italics, her emphasis) (Eun-soo, 22) 
"Oilly if fluent in English, we would have lectured ... " Embraced in the young 
women's talk are subtle nuances of conflict and antagonism against the built-in 
privilege of the Western language and its blind arrogance. The field of global mass 
culture is centered in the language of the West, and "it always speaks English" as an 
international language (Hall, 1991: 28). Through this particular example of Western 
sexuality, the Korean young women attack, in general, the preposterous assumptions 
posed by Western knowledge that the Western ways of life is installed, via 
globalization, as a universal cultural model for all women around the world, and that 
the rest of the world will therefore follow a trajectory close to the Western model and 
thinking as an ideal pattern of modernization: "Western people tend to think that they 
are far more advanced than us, more modem and better-off than us, so they have 
something to teach us". By assuming non-Western women as unable to act as social 
subjects in their own right, Western discourse in the Western language frequently 
erases and muffles the specificities of non-Western experiences. 
The margin is a space of weak power, but it is a space of power, nonetheless 
(Hall, 1991: 34), it is a space of power that is not oilly made of victims, but also made 
of actors producing their own meanings - e.g. "It's ridiculous ofthem to think that we 
may be a sponge absorbing everything. We don't simply accept everything flooding 
in from the West, TV images. We are not idiots". These are specific responses of the 
margin to globalization, taking the form of stressing particularism. These imply that 
today's globalization or "globality" is mere ubiquity (Bauman, 1995: 24) that does not 
necessarily entail significant influences anticipated by globalist eulogists. Just as 
global television does not tum the Korean young women into a mindless passive 
imitator like a sponge, the power transmitted by the dominant language of English 
does not stimulate automatic conformity or submission. ''The local is no longer the 
end of the road, the final and lowly destination of messages emanating from a lofty 
center" (Dayan, 1999: 19). Yet the very language of globalization, English, often fails 
to recognize that their imaginary receivers involve forms of resistance rather than 
adoption. Overall, central to the Korean women's comments above are bold 
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counterchallenges from the periphery, which talk back to the monopolizing Western 
colonialism, "Western parochialism" (Curran and Park, 2000: 1). 
''To what extent the peripheries indeed talk back?" (Hannerz, 1997: 13). In 
effect, the extent to which the Korean young women talk back to the Western 
hegemony is substantially circumscribed by the linguistic force of English as an 
internationally dominant language. Given the difficulties in speaking the language of 
the Center, even these highly analytical educated women at the margin cannot take 
hearty pleasure out of speaking for themselves and talking back. They cannot contend 
openly due to their limited command of the English language. Considering this fatal 
linguistic limitation, it is not then possible for the Other to be a "co-equal speaker" 
capable of describing "equal exchange" in a world of unequal exchanges (Abou-EI-
Raj, 1991: 144). It is furthermore not possible to escape the dominating frameworks 
and pitfalls of Euro-American knowledge. Certainly, in these highly expressive non-
English speakers, there arises anxiety and frustration about speaking, as they 
recognize subtle asymmetrical power relations formed around fluent English speakers. 
"Only if fluent in English, we would have lectured on why we don't want to sleep 
with many men". This resentment clearly indicates non-Western women's "frustration 
with (dis)articulation of the subject" (Shohat and Starn, 1994: 345) in the linguistic 
force of the Western arena. 
The voices of non-Western women are largely silenced, not only structurally 
but also linguistically, within the sphere of global knowledge production. Their 
silencing is not a result of their lack of agency, but of the failure to articulate in the 
dominant language of the West, hence, the failure to be heard adequately. Even if 
awkward in the English language, some attempt to speak, dare to talk back to the 
Western hegemony. But who will listen? Who will listen seriously to understand and 
respect non-Western women's experiences or choices? The pressing issue is, who will 
listen seriously when the peripheries are brought to the academic table on the heated 
subject of globalization to speak about their alien villages? Who will listen with 
genuine interest when non-Western ordinary women speak for themselves over dinner 
table about their experiences? Does the Western hegemony of thought and language 
permit counter discourses? Are the dominating voices of listeners particularly 
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interested? Or are they indifferent to listening, but rather imagining and merely 
alluding to universalism? 
"For me, the question 'Who should speak?' is less crucial than 'Who will 
listen?' 'I will speak for myself as a Third World person' is an important 
position for political mobilization today. But the real demand is that, when I 
speak from that position, I should be listened to seriously; not with that kind of 
benevolent imperialism, really, which simply says that because I happen to be 
an Indian or whatever" (Spivak, 1993: 194). 
Who wi11listen? Tackling this question requires different forms of learning to 
admit and respect different women's voices. Western discourse, feminism for 
example, needs to pay attention to the differences and antagonisms if they are to 
engage in a more adequate dialogue and fruitful exchange. In order to ''unlearn the 
violence of universalism" (Ahmed, 1998: 57), Western feminists need to sense, hear 
the resisting voices of different women, whose experiences would become otherwise 
too alien to comprehend. This particular case of Korean young women can hopefully 
serve as indicative of such differences that matter; ineluctable anxieties arising from 
the asymmetrical linguistic power relations; and challenges talking back to the 
Western hegemonic orthodoxy, albeit not guaranteed for being listened to. "Feminism 
is in trouble if these challenges are ignored, as they do provide grounds for contesting 
the validity of feminist knowledge" (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2000: 208). And the 
West will have to develop much more ''tolerance'' for the world views of the Rest, the 
Other, no matter how "offensive" it finds them (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 135). However 
offensive, the authentic voices of the Rest may create a necessary distortion to the 
grand contour that the dominant language of the West attempts to draw of global 
culture and feminism. So finally I present the Korean young women's offensive yet 
true stock phrases that are commonly expressed in their everyday language. 6 
"Body exposure in Western movies and advertising is too excessive, "Eat me 
please!" Women become more easily a sexual object for men. I don't think 
Western women are liberated. Sexually, they are more subordinated". 
(Sung-won, 22) 
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"Western society voices loud women's liberation. But I can't imagine that 
Western women are more liberated, happier than us. They misunderstand 
sexual freedom as women's liberation. If so, Las Vegas prostitutes should feel 
most liberated". (Joo-hyun, 22) 
"Men are simple and animal-like. Men can easily feel happy as long as 
supplied with tons of sex. But we women are different. We want more than 
just sex. Does free sex make women happy? Are Western women happy?" 
(Yoon-kyung, 22) 
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
(1) Reflexivity at Work 
This study has explored how Korean women deal with social change and make sense 
of their lives and identities through the cultural experience of television in everyday 
life as it is mediated by generation and class. This empirical work basically attests to 
the familiar argument that television is constitutive of everyday life (Silverstone, 
1994), but furthermore argues for reflexivity at work: Reflexivity is constitutive of the 
experience of modem television. The practice of reflexivity is a defining characteristic 
of the experience of television, and television culture today comes to be a critical 
condition for reflexivity. The thesis overall demonstrates the reflexive workings of 
popular television culture in its multifold manifestations. It reveals how critical 
ordinary women are in their engagement with television and how reflexivity actually 
operates in the variegated settings of their everyday lives. It is expressive ofreflexive 
modernization in a broad sense. This kind of reflexivity is already becoming 
"operative in the critique or the discourses of non-intellectual lay public groups at an 
informal and pre-political level", as suggested in the Western notion of reflexive 
modernization (Beck, 1992, 1994). The ordinary Korean women in this study, 
regardless of their age and class position, engage in a process of self-analysis in their 
contact with television, and their on-going self-discovery exercise is enthusiastically 
carried out in the unique opportunity afforded by the research interview. As I have 
argued in the methodology chapter, the specific dynamics ofthe research relationship 
- the normative ideal of Korean female subjectivity, the capacity of TV talk combined 
with the unleashing of emotions - help create the conditions for an extraordinary 
discourse, which was already there awaiting the conditions for its actualization. 
In this conclusion I will highlight three features central to reflexivity at work, 
and clarify the triangular relationship between reflexivity, television, and self-
identity. 1 It should be noted that so far there has been little sustained attempt to grasp 
the notion of "reflexivity" (e.g. Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994) as socio-cultural 
phenomena in relation to media, gender or culture; in other words, the contours and 
significance of reflexivity in media, gender or cultural studies are barely developed 
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(McRobbie, forthcoming). What underpins reflexivity? What I mean by reflexivity in 
this study is reflexivity as an everyday practice in the sense of "self-analysis, self-
confrontation" (Beck, 1994: 5), or the ''reflexive monitoring of action and its 
contexts" (Giddens, 1990: 36) to keep in touch with the grounds of everyday life. 
Arguably, reflexivity penetrates to the core of everyday life. The women in this study 
are able to reflect critically on their lives and monitor the actual circumstances of their 
activities as a discursive feature of day-to-day lives. Such reflexivity can operate more 
intensively "not in a situation of greater and greater certainty, but in one of 
methodological doubt" (Giddens, 1991: 84), in the "ambivalence of modernity" 
(Bauman, 1991). The conduct of self-analysis is essentially a way of coping with 
ambivalent social change and defining how to act in an evolving modem world. 
Korean women demonstrate the capacity to define reflexively their private social 
world, which is articulated through their own vernacular, such as TV talk. This kind 
of engagement is a form of "private reflexivity" (Beck, 1992: 7), whose reflexivity 
comes from an occasionally evident awareness of their own position with respect to 
the overweening power and hubris of dominant institutions and discourses. It is a 
significant fonn of ''reflexive learning" (Beck, 1992: 6), for the women's practice of 
reflexivity in the daily contact with television involves learning to deal with their 
present conditions in a new light, thereby attempting to expand the sense of self-
fulfillment. 
What is the medium of reflexivity? This relates to the second feature to be 
emphasized, which is the significant role of television in the reflexive process of self-
formation. Reflexivity is said to require resources for it to operate successfully (Beck, 
1992). I would argue that television, in "the media ensemble" (Bausinger, 1984: 349), 
may be the most powerful resource, acting as a nucleus of reflexivity. The domestic 
presence of television for ordinary women is not simply a means of escaping from 
boredom or deriving pleasure, but it also serves as a tool for the reflexive exploration 
of their lives, for the expression of the reflexivity of the self. While offering images 
and themes with "visually illustrated talk" (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 109) 
that evoke powerful forms of identification, television places new demands on the self 
and opens up a rare space where women can redefine and restructure the meanings, 
rules and resources of their life conditions. By opening up the self to the reflexive 
learning about forms of life and identity, the experience of television potentially 
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nourishes and enriches the formation of the self. Especially, the experience of the 
profusion of symbolic Western materials, with new possibilities, new openings and 
new imaginations, promises to deepen and accentuate the ''reflexive achievement of 
self-formation" (Giddens, 1991: 215). 
What is the role or consequence ofreflexivity? This links to the final feature to 
be highlighted, the changing nature of self-identity. Self-identity can then be defmed 
as a ''reflexively organized symbolic project" (Thompson, 1995: 209-210). The self is 
the most viable object of reflexivity. I would argue that reflexivity penetrates to the 
core of the self and its deepest emotions. Or to put it in another way, television 
penetrates into not only the sphere of everyday life but into the heart ofthe self. 'Who 
am I?' 'What do I want?' 'Am I happy?' The women's existential questions concern 
precisely the self and its emotional state. The reflexive awareness of the present state 
of the self enables them to incorporate the mediated experience of television into the 
process of self-formation, which necessarily involves "self-dissolution" (Beck, 1994: 
175). Women struggle to inform and refashion the project of the selfto renegotiate a 
coherent identity for themselves. It is an on-going project that is being routinely 
monitored, created and sustained as part of a broader process of connecting personal 
and social change. Such a labor-intensive project produces a particular biographical 
narrative of who they are, a sense of self-identity. Self-identity is precisely a symbolic 
project as reflexively interpreted and understood by women themselves. The practice 
of reflexivity takes a distinctively individual form in the creation of self-identity, 
while simultaneously signifying historically collective patterns of culture within 
which the formation and continuity of the selfis embedded. 
(2) Class, Generation, and Reflexivity 
This Korean study reveals that the distinctive forms of reflexivity and the social 
dynamics surrounding the experience of television culture are influenced more by age 
than class. In other words, the ''reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations" 
(Giddens, 1990: 17) in the light of continual inputs of mediated knowledge can be 
more adequately understood by the relations of generation than those of class. The 
dimension of generation is not usually considered to be important in Western 
sociology, (British) cultural studies, and feminist media studies.2 These Western 
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theorists tend to recognize class as the crucial axis of domination-subordination and 
analyze the close interconnections between class and culture. This particular Korean 
case, however, shows many overlapping areas and striking similarities between 
different classes in the cultural experience of television, which means that the 
dimension of social class is less deterministic than is assumed in the Western 
paradigm. 
It might sound paradoxical as I have constructed class as a category of 
analysis in the study, but "class analysis does not imply a commitment to the thesis 
that all social phenomena can be explained primarily in terms of class, or even that 
class is always an important determinant" (Wright, 1997: 1). In reality, this thesis 
inherits and inhabits the class determination of so many Western media studies with 
some degree of ambivalence. Of course, to an extent, class provides this considerable 
body of work with its crucial axis for analysis, and with this in place many of the most 
significant studies emerge which have shaped our understanding of media and 
everyday life, often with gender relations developing from and building upon that 
core of class as a key variable. But coming to this work as a Korean student, I am both 
indebted to it for helping to frame my own study here in a way which current Korean 
scholarship does not allow, but also frustrated by it. This frustration arises from my 
own sense that such a paradigm for understanding social inequities cannot be easily 
transposed into Korean society. Consequently I work with this tradition, it allows me 
to shape and give flesh to this current project and I also seek to claim some degree of 
distance from it. However, this is not to suggest that class does not matter. Although a 
''relative importance of generation and class" in Korea is different from that in 
Western societies and social identities (especially, class) are not always "in evidence" 
(Aronowitz, 1992: ix), any class differences should be carefully recognized. 
Therefore, in the following I will highlight the points of class differences in the 
Korean women's everyday life intersected with television. 
Class appears significant to the life trajectories ofthe old generation of women 
in their 50s. Class is primarily about inequality, exploitation and powerlessness; 
"class is a hidden injury" (Skeggs, 1997: 75). Misery of everyday life analyzed in 
Chapter 4 Section (1) clearly brings out how inequality and exploitation are 
consolidated and lived on a daily basis, as a hidden injury, in the working-class 
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women's lives. It indicates the emotional politics of class, which means that class is 
structural but the way class is significantly experienced for these Korean women (as a 
form of misery) is through affective aspects associated with repressed desires for 
emotional intimacy and the endlessness of want - not simply through the material 
conditions of everyday life concerning money, bare necessities, repetitive tasks, 
hardship and survival. Class here operates at an intimate and emotional level. These 
working-class women have long gone underground with their emotional needs and 
desires, while unquestioningly accepting the frustrating and exhausting situation in a 
notion of fatalism. The structures of inequality circumscribe the women's power, 
freedom and maneuvering in everyday social space, resigning them to "backstage 
performances"; their self still exists for others in the family. This is in polar contrast 
to "onstage performances" of middle-class women with a significant degree of power 
and freedom, as described in Chapter 7 Section (1) and (2). The everyday life of 
Korean middle-class housewives in their 50s is different from that often assumed in 
(Western) feminist cultural theory. A great deal of the women's time is taken up with 
healthy out-of-home leisure and enjoyment of life, which deliberately demonstrates 
the end of self-sacrifice, of being responsible for others. This age group of privileged 
women attempts to re-shape their self as being "individual", however limited within 
the family and the domain of leisure, body work in particular. The body is the 
materialization of class taste (Bourdieu, 1984). In the increasing self-responsibility for 
health and bodily presentation in the expanded social space, television merely 
occupies a marginal space in the middle-class leisure life. 
Young mothers in their 30s, both of working-class and middle-class, lead 
often claustrophobic lives, centered around child rearing and education, in an almost 
complete absence of leisure activities for themselves. The everyday life of working-
class women with limited material resources is perhaps more claustrophobic, as 
revealed in Chapter 5 Section (2): "it saves money to stay in", "if I can afford to do 
that [swimming], I'd rather spend more money for my kids' extra-curricular lessons". 
Particularly, I want to point out that mothering, as a practice and an experience, has 
different implications on power and identity for the women of different classes. 
Professionalization of motherhood discussed in Chapter 8 Section (2) is a case in 
point. Within the constraints of being a staying-home housewife, educated middle-
class women (unlike their working-class counterparts) deploy strategic plans to 
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generate a sense of self with the status, significance and recognition - not just a 
housewife but a "professional mother". This alternative modern self is constantly at 
work, and in this way the women actively refuse to be positioned without power and 
identity. Furthermore, they deliberately engage in a translation of their self as a 
desirous, free and autonomous individual in the realm of fantasy, as indicated in 
Section (3). Ensuring their lost sense of self as being truly worthy of care and 
attention in the consumption of romance drama is a form of "self-justifying 
individualism" (Jhally and Lewis, 1998: 57); a compensatory return for these 
educated women, who give up their individual aspiration for the conflicting demands 
of caring roles, hence, much yearn for their lost freedom. Their reflexive self emerges 
in this yearning for freedom and search for an individual sense of who they are. On 
the other hand, for working-class women in their 30s, ontological security and identity 
are sought not in being an individual but in close relations with others (e.g. the family, 
husband, child, mother-in-law). A-ha! emotion highlighted in Chapter 5 Section (4) 
demonstrates this point: "A-ha! This is man and wife!" ''This is mother-in-law!" Their 
reflexivity occurs through others, and their self is embodied in close connections with 
others. Precisely, the main themes of working-class life are, among the great themes 
of existence, marriage, children, ''relations with others" (Hoggart, 1958: 105). The 
construction of self for working-class women is not part of a discourse of 
individualism but of a "discourse of dialogism and connection" (Skeggs, 1997). I am 
therefore suggesting a subtle difference in which being "individual" is a class-specific 
project of identity operating at the women's lived and mediated experiences. 
Individualism is a reflexively organized project primarily pertaining to middle-class 
women. 
Substantially, individualization is a marked feature of the identity politics of 
young middle-class women in their 20s. Their intense yeaming for an independent life 
through a career choice signals a resistance to be fixed by historically defined social 
positioning, while assuming new gender roles and identities. However, the yeaming 
for individualization is unlikely to be implemented in the problematic conditions of 
the contemporary Korean labor market, as I have argued in Chapter 9 Section (1). It is 
played out within the young women's imaginative self-reflexivity compounded with 
feelings of uncertainty, insecurity and anxiety - hence, an unresolved identity of 
individualization. Against the constraints of the practical contexts, the Western notion 
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of "individualization" (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991) continues to fuel yearnmg, 
imagination and reflexivity in the young middle-class women's increasingly 
cosmopolitan experience through travel and television consumption, as discussed in 
Section (3). Similarly, young working-class women in their 20s also desire to seek 
personal fulfillment in the world of work, however, not at the expense of a family 
role. Marriage is a crucial interest, as revealed in their "age-specific plan" about 
marriage in Chapter 6 Section (1). This is in contrast to the relatively less important 
idea of marriage for their middle-class counterparts (e.g. "If given either marriage or 
work, I will choose my work and success"). For the working-class women with a 
limited range of choices, marriage is posed as the one most open and desirable to 
them in identity politics, as a possible means of gaining material security, social 
mobility and acceptance. A woman who remains ''unmarried'' (e.g. single or divorced 
feminist) is perceived by them as a precarious self of fear - not only as a bodily 
evidence of social "stigma" but also as the "disgrace" itself (Goffman, 1963: 11), a 
signifier with lowly status lacking social acceptance and ''respectability'' (Skeggs, 
1997). This fear is enveloped in these working-class women's repudiation of 
feminism. Their structural positioning usually closes down access to economic capital 
and an improvement in social status, whereas symbolic and cultural ways to escape 
the working class are open up to them in their deliberately playful and imaginative 
journey outwards to the global telecity, as illustrated in Section (3) and (4). Their 
desperate yearning for the freedom of upwardly mobile transformation in the infinite 
imaginative journey is a self-reflexive, class-specific hope. 
Overall, it can be suggested that class is still significant as a means of social 
differentiation among the older generation of women in their 50s, whereas the 
significance of class has declined among the younger generation of women in their 
20s with common reflexive orientations towards the global, the modem and new. 
Individualization takes place in reflexive modernization and globalization, thereby, 
blurring class identity. "Class identity is re-cast in terms of individualization" 
(McRobbie, forthcoming), in a varying degree, among the young women of different 
classes. On the other hand, the forms of reflexivity are significantly dissimilar 
between different generations, which signifies that each generation of women is 
oriented in different directions and their constitutive culture is travelling along 
different roads in pursuit of different ends. The reflexivity at work shows a different 
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set of cultural tendencies aroused by historically-specific problems and conflicts that 
confront each generation. In short, generational differences clash more sharply in this 
study, revealing more distinctive generational cultures than class cultures. 
Why are class cultures less distinctive in the women's consumption of 
television? For possible explanations I infer two historically-specific cultural factors. 
One is the evident fact of the remarkably high level of education in Korea, as already 
emphasized in Chapter 2. Education has been a motor of Korean modernization: The 
literacy rate is nearly 99% (Rowe and Kim, 1997); 95.3% of females and 95.9% of 
males enroll in high school; 55.5% of females and 92% of males enroll in a four-year 
university or a two-year college course (KWDI, 1998). This high level of mass 
education, coupled to the phenomenal rise of economic power, can ''remove people 
from class culture and move beyond class society" (Beck, 1992: 91-105), although the 
notion of a class society still remains because there is not yet any suitable alternative. 
Such tendency is further tied to the mediation of mass media at the level of culture. 
Social class is not a fundamental dynamic shaping the life of ''the mass person" 
(Martin-Barbero, 1993: 30-35), for the mass person does not pertain to any specific 
class and the way of consuming mass culture is not related to the division of social 
classes. Often the poor are the most productive consumers of popular culture as their 
creativity is not determined by the cost (Fiske, 1989b: 35). The high level of mass 
education can make it more possible for the productivity of consumption to be 
detached from class. Therefore, it is simplistic to assume that middle-class groups are 
always more critical or reflexive than working-class groups. I would rather argue that 
Korean working-class women, like their middle-class counterparts, equally 
demonstrate critical and creative modes of engagement with popular television 
culture. 
The second, yet more fundamental reason can be explained by the unique 
nature ofthe nation. The social and political characteristics of Korea have historically 
constructed the collective ideology of "one family nation" in terms of language, 
lineage, race, ethnicity, culture, and so on, thereby imposing cross-class social unity, 
not social segregation. The modem nation Korea is an "imagined political 
community" (Anderson, 1991) structured and sustained by the powerful 
homogenizing forces, so there is generally internalized experience ofliving within the 
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imposed forms of the single unity - including the unique singularity and normativity 
of female subjectivity, as emphasized in the methodology chapter. Modem Korea is 
different from polyethnic Western societies, whose cultures and narratives of national 
identity are becoming increasingly hybridized in a current (post)modern order. The 
historical and cultural specificity of the nation Korea is in sharp contrast to the 
pronounced tendency of class-ridden society, especially Britain, where its national 
institutions feature prominently both as reflections and causes of class segregation -
from the public schools to the National Health Service, the monarchy to the political 
parties (Adonis and Pollard, 1997) - therefore, class is internalized in the social 
process (Willis, 1978) and psychologically entrenched across lifestyle including 
leisure activities, consumption and other aspects of behavior in everyday life (Argyle, 
1994). Class then becomes a more fundamental explanatory category for cultural 
criticism in this kind of Western society than in Korea where the homogenizing 
cultural characteristics have partly superseded social divisions. 
This study therefore brings out more distinctive patterns of generation culture 
than of class culture. The patterns of generation culture show both the social dynamics 
between different orientations of each generation with an individual historical 
problem, and the intertwined meanings of television as reflexively interpreted and 
understood. Here I want to emphasize that the patterns of generation culture do not 
lend themselves profitably to generalizations, but these should be understood as 
''possible configurations of living cultures" (Benedict, 1935: 34), or imagined as an 
"arc" (Benedict, 1935: 17) on which are ranged the possible interpretations provided 
by each generation, by its own historical shape, its own common purposes, its own 
deep personal meanings. A culture is a whole way of life, a product of a human's 
whole committed personal and social experience, with two significant aspects -
meanings and directions (Williams, 1989: 4-8). It can be inferred that to make 
meanings in a culture is to find directions. Precisely, the meaning-making in the 
experience of television culture by Korean women can be viewed as a creative 
process to discover directions unknown in advance. The following configurations will 
lead to a better appreciation of different meanings and directions of cultures as 
discovered, created and lived by each generation of women in their relationships with 
television, which are characteristically marked by reflexivity. 
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(3) Tradition I Morality I Family I Nation 
(Women in their 50s) 
The most salient form of reflexivity in the cultural experience of television by women 
in their 50s is generally directed toward a discursive defense of tradition. For this 
older generation, reflexivity is largely limited to the reinterpretation, reconstruction 
and reinvigoration of tradition, such that the side of past is more heavily weighed 
down than that of future. Tradition is a means of handling time and space to cope with 
the changing demands of modern and social conditions. It is a reflexive way of 
organizing future, a mode of integrating the reflexive monitoring of action, which is 
inserted into and structured by everyday social practices. The reflexivity of TV talk by 
this generation of women is precisely one of the everyday social practices, which 
serves as clear evidence of the spoken language of tradition, of the traditional forces 
and features enduring in modern consciousness. Tradition is called to consciousness, 
actively reinvigorated and registered on the basis of reflexivity. A ritualized social 
practice, such as watching television drama everyday, is a practically organized 
medium for ensuring the preservation of tradition. Tradition does not disappear in 
women's everyday life, but rather a specific world for tradition is discursively 
articulated in their own terms through the engagement with television, defended as 
having moral value against competing modern ideas, flourishing against a world of 
radical change and doubt. However, it should be noted that in contemporary 
scholarship - including feminism, television media studies, sociology and cultural 
studies - there are endless discussions of modernization and what it means to be 
modern, but few indeed about tradition and its significant role in modem life, since 
tradition is merely assumed as the shadow side of modernity, an implausible construct 
that can be easily brushed aside (Giddens, 1999: 38).3 The tradition-directed 
reflexivity in the Korean women's experience of contemporary television makes it 
clear that tradition thrives almost everywhere, "beside, behind, between, or beneath 
the practices and structures of modernity" (Luke, 1996: 112), functioning as a lived 
metaphor for moral meanings, as a vision for moral directions. 
Precisely, television is reflexively understood and appropriated by the older 
generation as a moral force of tradition, a means of moral fixity in day-to-day life. It 
powerfully intervenes in the women's everyday lives in a style that provokes and 
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conveys the deepest moral certitudes of tradition. The driven quality of their 
reflexivity urges television to teach tradition to the young. Older women stand the 
essential mediators or the "guardians of the tradition" (Smith, 1991: 28) who supply 
interpretations and meanings of tradition. Meanings interpreted through the 
engagement with television involve the implicit and explicit morality of female 
subjectivity and conduct, for example, ''what it means to be a woman", "how a 
woman should behave", ''what is normal and acceptable". Within a normative horizon 
''the question of acceptance arises and with it anew the old question: how do we wish 
to live?" (Beck, 1992: 28. Italics, his emphasis). How people from all walks of life 
come to know their social worlds and engage the contours and contingencies of 
everyday life is based in ''rules'' that explain, prescribe and constitute social reality in 
certain preferred ways (Lull, 1995: 45). For the older generation of women, such rules 
are constructed, deliberately or unquestioningly, from the local knowledge of 
traditional morality, while accomplishing an important role. The traditional morality 
has a motivational urgency, which means that it is appropriated as a "means of 
power" (Hobsbawm, 1983) to legitimize their rules over younger women, especially 
daughters-in-law, who are increasingly becoming educated and modernized in the 
light of new experience of changing social conditions. Traditional knowledge 
provides a framework for action that can go largely unquestioned. What is subtly 
intended in the older women's reflexive return to the traditional morality is to 
prescribe and impose the ''unquestioning acceptance" of their rules - their preferred 
ways of life and female subjectivity - on the younger generations of women. It 
intends for a "deliberate refusal of dialogue" (Giddens, 1994: 65) on the basis of 
enforced and legitimized power of tradition. Power and knowledge embedded in 
tradition are largely naturalized, so they have the capacity to issue and enact binding 
commands to the young, which bind past to future for the control of time. 
Specifically, the binding commands of reflexivity de facto define what the 
tradition actually is and where the traditional morality is actually embodied. It is 
precisely a site of the family. The family is essentially a moral and emotional content 
of the tradition, representing a traditional moral truth, or a "formulaic notion of truth" 
(Giddens, 1994: 63). There are ordinarily deep moral and emotional investments in 
tradition among the older generation of women, for the moral character of the 
tradition embodied in the family has an emotional drive to ontological security to 
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those who adhere to it. Tradition fuses morality and emotion. The family is a 
stabilizing moral framework of tradition that provides emotional supports and 
integrates them into a coherent identity. Tradition is a medium of identity, hence 
threats to the integrity of tradition embodied in the family can be experienced by 
women as ''threats to the integrity of the self' (Giddens, 1994: 80). The domestic 
presence of television at this juncture is reflexively interpreted and understood as part 
of an on-going family moral discourse, in which ''women are the bearers of the vision 
of family, its keepers, its producers" (Stivens, 1998: 17). In the engagement with 
television, the older generation of women actively produces and reproduces a 
formulaic notion ofthe family and the women's role of sacrifice for the sake of their 
family. This indicates their desire to stay in time and place which remains untouched 
by the buffeting of change around it. Tradition exists in this privileged space of the 
family, claiming a privileged view ofthe family. Filtered through the moral prism of 
the family in their own centers, incoming modem knowledge of different ways of life 
and identity on a television screen is perceived to have an alien and contradictory 
quality against tradition. The family, the smallest social entity, becomes a prime site 
for the struggles between tradition and modernity, a "bulwark against the social cost 
of modernity and the dangers of fragmenting national and personal identities" 
(Stivens, 1998: 17). 
The older generation's moral investment in tradition extends from the smallest 
social entity, within the family, to the available largest, in the nation. The reflexive 
forms of the nation are neither backward nor primitive but contemporarily effective 
and deliberate forms with ''placeable feelings and bonding" (Williams, 1983: 180-
182), which are of fundamental human importance, and such feelings of wanting to 
belong to the nation in effect complete a national identity. The nation with its 
placeable identity provides women with a large-scale yet realistic socio-cultural 
framework for a modem world order, for it is felt to satisfy their "needs for cultural 
fulfillment, rootedness and security" (Smith, 1995:159) against the disruptive effects 
of massive social change. Precisely, the nation is experienced "emotionally" and has a 
discursive presence as a symbolic cultural resource of extraordinary importance (Lull, 
2001: 153). The power of the nation and the enduring appeal of national identity are 
rooted in a micro-level of modem life, expressed and articulated through the symbolic 
rituals of everyday life such as television consumption, thereby consciously fostering 
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and reinvigorating cultural identity. National cultural identity is a constitutive part of 
the meanings and directions that the lives of the older women choose to take in the 
wake of the disembedding revolution of modernity. It is an "inevitable product of a 
dialectic of global modernization" (Smith, 1995: 3), yet a more familiar, secure and 
preferred meaning, by which the direction of future settles for the older generation of 
women in their 50s. 
(4) Transition / Negotiation / Intimacy / Emotion 
(Women in their 30s) 
The distinctive form of reflexivity in the experience of television by women in their 
30s is one marked by an evident transition from tradition to modernity. The transition 
is demonstrated by the reworking of gender relations within the family structure, 
changes in the relative social position and power of men and wives. Contemporary 
private spheres are constantly shifting, being negotiated and redefined by economic, 
political and ideological forces of modernity, while signaling a collaboration between 
modernity and tradition. The accelerating process of Korean modernization has 
systematically been a gendered one, as pronounced in the segmentation between the 
public and private domains: Korean men as breadwinners work the longest hours in 
the world, 55.1 hours per week (The New York Times, June 10, 2001), which 
inevitably makes them unavailable in domesticity, whereas women as domestic 
managers turn their energies toward childcare, child education in particular. Under 
this socio-economic segmentation women present a solid front of the family, and their 
husbands are outsiders. The nuclear family with the embedded standard biographies 
of men and women, built around the traditional characteristics of gender roles, still 
remains as a cultural nonn, and importantly, younger wives' identities are still defined 
closely in terms of home and the family. But it should be emphasized that this modem 
form of feudalism is in effect an actively modified "negotiated family" (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 2) with new arrangements by changing gender status and 
power. This is arranged by a ''transactional negotiation" (Giddens, 1992: 3) that 
provides a distinct and extraordinarily powerful status for women as ''wives and 
mothers" with the control of the private sphere - ranging from the control of their 
husbands and children, to the use of television. Korean housewives and mothers are 
not subordinated or oppressed in the private sphere as Western feminism would 
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universally assume, nor do they suffer ''the problem that has no name" (Friedan, 
1963). Rather they actively negotiate their position and power within private 
domesticity in their own modernist terms. Precisely, such negotiation is 
preconditioned on, and permitted by, the successful realization of the reflexive project 
of self, the reflexive understanding of the contours and contingencies of everyday life. 
Reflexive forms of negotiation operate in its multifold manifestations in the 
variegated contexts of everyday life. The mechanisms by which the negotiation occurs 
are the range of tactical and strategic actions, which will lead to possible forms of 
active mastery and feelings of secure control over day-to-day life circumstances, or 
even the creation of a "fantasy of dominance" (Giddens, 1991: 194). The women's 
negotiation is operating at a micro level by a new politics - combining both a 
"confrontational tactical plan of operation" (de Certeau, 1984), and a plan of action 
characterized more by strategy, which is similar to "Plan X" (Williams, 1983: 243-
248): It is indeed a politics that draws on certain kinds of high operative intelligence, 
such as reflexivity, and a well-assessed planning, in that its objective is unknown "X", 
in which the only defining factor is competitive advantage. This micro-politics is not 
meant to be a lasting solution, but the gaining of edge and advantage for what is 
accepted. Ordinary housewives and mothers do not believe that there are possible 
political ways to completely change the conditions of their life. Thus their chosen 
policy is for phased advantage, an effective even if temporary edge, which intends to 
continually weaken and reduce the power of their men, thereby keeping themselves at 
least one step ahead in the major domain of their phenomenal world - home and the 
family. Such an orientation is a limited but powerful way of controlling the space and 
any changes of direction of future, through the control of the immediately potential 
resources of domesticity. Most women take the resources that are ready made in their 
domestic life: For example, they tend to use their child, mothering, as a "channel-
narrow but deep - for their own human will to power" (Rich, 1976: 38), and use 
television as a structuring medium of everyday life and a regulative mechanism of 
family relationships. They have the capacity to transform the routine resources of 
domesticity into adequate opportunities which would otherwise be absent in their 
surrounding social circumstances. With their own micro-politics, women are 
practically accepting and living in, yet simultaneously negotiating and restructuring 
the private sphere. 
279 
Crucially, the women's negotiating and restructuring of the private sphere is 
bound up with a transitional phenomenon of intimacy. With social and cultural 
changes resulting from Korean modernization - for example, a paring down of the 
size of the nuclear family, geographical mobility and breakdown of women's support 
networks and communities outside the nuclear family - the younger generation of 
wives are more likely to turn to their husbands for intimacy. Intimacy comes to be of 
integral element for the reflexive project of the self Intimacy is taken as a reflexive 
project to be worked at, a process of self-fulfillment on the part of the women. 
Reflexivity is the inner-directed, turned inwards the personal relationship in marital 
life. Intimacy, or the quest for intimacy, is at the heart of modem fonns of established 
sexual relationships (Giddens, 1991: 94). Living in the harsh soc io-economic realities 
of the gendered "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1984), women realize the difficulties of 
maintaining a satisfying close relationship with their often unavailable husbands, 
therefore, struggle to find a way for a restructuring and controlling of intimate life 
behind which stands the whole weight of changes of the world outside. It may follow 
that for women, "intimacy is an orientation to the control of future time", whereas for 
men, controlling the future is anticipated by an economic activity, and intimacy or 
love remains closer to amour passion (Giddens, 1992: 57). The women's search for 
intimacy and struggle to secure a meaningful life in the familiar private sphere are 
closely intertwined with the particular way in which television is used. TV rituals, the 
women's deliberate use of television as a routine, are intended for a certain degree of 
binding force simply by virtue of regular repetition. Television lends its unique 
capacity to women to fulfil personal and emotional desires. 
The women's quest for intimacy is to deliver enough "emotional" satisfaction, 
in large measure. A reflexive questioning of emotional satisfaction is a core object of 
the reflexive project of the self. In other words, the selfs emotions occupy a central 
place in reflexivity. 'Am I happy?' The self-examination of emotional state, 
experiences and feelings in relation to men, is central to the women's quest for 
intimacy. In the modern "normal chaos called love" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
1995), women concentrate on emotionally fulfilling relationships and complete 
closeness, with their own ideal of love or the so-called pure relationship that "there is 
only one person in the world with whom one can unite at all levels" (Giddens, 1990: 
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121). Their focus on the dimension of emotion is clearly expressed in the way they 
experience television. "A-hal emotion" and "emotionally-oriented fantasy" argued in 
the previous chapters are expressive of this phenomenon. In making meanings from 
modern television culture, women seek to gain pleasure which is oriented for 
emotional satisfaction, "good feelings", more than sexual sensation. It follows that 
modern hedonism is founded in emotion rather than sensation (Campbell, 1987: 69-
77). Pleasure is sought via emotional and not merely sensory stimulation. Emotions 
have the potential to serve as immensely powerful sources of pleasure. The 
emotionally-oriented fantasy is distinctively modem pleasure based on a reflexive 
ability to create an illusion which is known to be false but felt to be true. Emotional 
satisfaction is the commodity of which women feel deprived, and that consequently is 
sought through the consumption of symbolic cultural resources, such as television 
romance drama. The reflexivity of the married women in their 30s is the inner-
directed towards the meanings of personal relationships, wherein intimacy with its 
emotional satisfaction is a focal orientation for the reflexively organized symbolic 
project of the self 
(5) Openness / Play / Imagination / Freedom 
(Women in their 20s) 
The distinctive feature of reflexivity in the experience of television by young single 
women in their early 20s is one marked by openness, an embracing of the new, the 
modern and global, the other. This openness consists in the fact that traditional social 
practices are reflexively questioned, examined, altered and undermined in the light of 
incoming non-local knowledge. Young women are oriented outward towards a 
broader world, thereby dissolving the structural boundaries oftradition and loosening 
the connection between the self and tradition. Their reflexivity indicates the very 
comprehensiveness of the dissolution of tradition, a more compelling mark of 
transition from tradition to modernity, or the so-called reflexive modernization which 
is "abolishing its own ordering categories" (Beck, 1994: 33). This kind of reflexivity 
corresponds to processes of "intentional change" (Giddens, 1994: 57) with the 
consequential problematization of tradition and open dialogue with other alternative 
modes of life. By opening up the self to new forms of mediated symbolic Western 
materials, they create new arenas for "experimenting with the project of the self' 
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(Thompson, 1995: 233), therefore, new possibilities for self-formation. It can be said 
that young women are reflexively more open, fluid and contingent to change, while 
living in indefmite time-space extension full of experimental ways of being, acting, 
and playing.4 
Play is a key aspect of the young women's opening out to the broader world, 
the mediated symbolic West. The West on the television screen is not taken as a world 
of strangers, but of friends, with whom a certain degree of familiarity is sustained 
through everyday routine contact. They playfully make a mediated excursion to the 
expansive world of the West, the new and different, the other. Play depends on a 
unique condition of "mobile privatization" (Williams, 1983: 188): What is 
pleasurably experienced inside the television screen - like the inside windowed shell 
of a modem car - is relatively unhindered movement, open choice of direction, and 
the pursuit of self-determined private purposes, with people they want to be with, 
going where they want to go. This mobile privatization enables them to journey 
outwards to the global ''telecity'' (Bauman, 1993: 178) where the others appear solely 
as objects of enjoyment and offering amusement is their only right to exist. The new 
experiences of private mobility "disembed" or "lift out" (Giddens, 1990: 21) the 
players from the immediate locales of day-to-day lives and ordinary experiences. To 
move into a space and a time to play is to leave something behind - one kind of order 
- and the ordinariness of everyday life; to explore tissue boundaries between the real 
and the fantastic, between the inside and the outside, between the self and the other; 
and to engage in an activity of "as-if' culture that is meaningful (Silverstone, 1999: 
59-64). Play in this way involves continuous movement across boundaries and 
thresholds between the real and the imagined. 
Young women use an indefinite range of imagination out of play. The playful 
experience of crossing boundaries and opening out to the broader world is achieved 
through the power of the imagination. Boundaries, to those who have experienced 
crossing them, become a matter of play, and the element of play opens possibilities 
for freeing the imagination (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 11). It seems comparatively 
easy for the young women to employ a skillful use of the faculty of imagination to 
construct or conjure up ideal images of reality. They can be called a modem 
imaginative hedonist, much more an "artist of the imagination" (Campbell, 1987: 77), 
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who takes images from existing global symbolic materials, and reflexively 
reorganizes them in their mind in such an intended way that they become distinctively 
pleasing. The imagination is a means by which to conceptualize, structure, and 
schematize mental representations in service of the imaginers' intentions (Lull, 1995: 
109) - in both emotional and rational ways that make them feel secure, happy, and 
"intrigued with life" in the realm of the cultural imagination (Lull, 2001: 158). The 
imagination is a reflexively organized field of social practices, "a form of work and a 
form of negotiation between sites of agency and globally defined fields of possibility" 
(Appadurai, 1993: 274). For these Korean young women, Western film is the center 
of gravity of the imagination, the "living, social mediation" (Martin-Barbero, 1993: 
166) that constitutes new cultural experiences and identities. The presence of the 
other, the West in the Korean gaze, comes to be a critical condition for the 
imagination to operate fully. Identity is therefore experimented and reworked both in 
imagination and in everyday life. The imagination occupies a central place in the 
reflexively organized symbolic project of self-identity. 
The imagination is closely intertwined with yearning, which is precisely 
yearning for "freedom" in this case. Imagination generates new forms of yearning, or 
the capacity to gain pleasure from an imaginative cultural practice becomes 
immediately connected with the already existing yearning. The importance of 
imagination lies in its relationship to yearning, longing, desire and, ultimately, 
consumption (Campbell, 1987: 78). The young women's yeaming for freedom is an 
inevitable consequence of both the growing awareness of dissatisfaction in the 
exigencies of Korean reality and the imaginative practice of consuming the symbolic 
Western world. Freedom is not a given characteristic of the human individual, but 
derives from the acquisition of an ontological understanding of external reality and 
personal identity (Kierkegaard. quoted in Giddens, 1991: 47). The reflexive 
exploration ofthe boundaries between the inside and the outside, between the self and 
the other, enables them to imagine the possibility of freedom. More specifically, it is 
freedom of "lifestyle", openness to the multiple choices of how to live and who to be. 
Their project of self-identity pursues an "emancipatory life politics" (Giddens, 1994: 
156), the possibility of a self-fulfilling and satisfying life liberated from inequality. 
The young women's imagination is open towards the more individualized form of 
freedom, and directed far away from the traditional morality of sacrifice as lived by 
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the older generation of women in their 50s. Tradition loosens its hold yet without 
being destroyed completely. Still the imagination is not an independent, hermeneutic 
force existing outside social influence, but is subject to the pervasive structuring 
ability of the main concept taken up in social rules (Lull, 1995: 110). Precisely, the 
young women's imaginative practice of freedom is still subject to, and bounded by, 
the pervasive main concept governed by social rules - sexual morality. Not every 
Western image of freedom is randomly taken in as fuel for the imagination, but a 
particular imagined world is socially constructed, in which Western sexuality is ruled 
out. This means that the young women's dialogue with the West is a dialectical 
complex process, and that everyday life in the realm of the imagination is ipso facto 
not an amalgam of free choices. Everyday life is made and remade through the 
dialectical negotiation between the locally governed rules and the globally defined 
fields of possibility. 
(6) The Tradition- / The Inner- / The Other-Directed Culture of Everyday Life 
This study has shown the social dynamics of different forms of reflexivity with which 
to organize the project of self-identity, and the significant role of television as a 
resource for reflexivity. Reflexivity is organized around the axis of generation 
oriented toward different directions. The possible configurations are the tradition-
directed (women in their 50s), the inner-directed (women in their 30s), and the other-
directed (women in their 20s). The dialectical nature inherent in the reflexivity of each 
generation is a push-and-pull of different tendencies towards modernity, "a tensionful, 
contradictory, push-and-pull of different influences" (Giddens, 1990: 139). Tradition 
in everyday life is now under threat, beginning to dissolve by the experience of 
modernity, "experience of space and time, ofthe self and others, of life's possibilities 
and perils" (Berman, 1983: 15). As a consequence, the reflexive organization of the 
self becomes an inevitable unfmishable project to be worked at, and television, as 
historically-situated cultural experience, is integrated into the project of the self in 
everyday life. 
Each generation of Korean women, with its own historically-situated 
reflexive organization of the self, proves both the capacity to define their everyday 
life situation and the energy to negotiate its unwanted influences and interventions 
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"from above" to construct their own space of living cultures. They make do with what 
they have, demonstrating "the art of being in between" (de Certeau, 1984: 30), of 
constructing their space within and against their place. They create for themselves an 
"expansive discursive cultural matrix" (Lull, 2001: 132-133) which helps them to find 
a way and increase control over their lives in a world where the stabilizing influence 
of culture is all being in transition. The women's reflexivity operating in television 
culture with the ability to create the terms of everyday life is hidden, marginalized and 
without official expression in a dominant discourse, however, this unique cultural 
space of unofficial biographies shapes the other face of everyday life, ''the power of 
everyday life" (Lefebvre, 1971: 35). This means that we should not simplify or 
dismiss women's experience, the everyday negotiations of the mundane. The seeming 
disappearance of the "category of experience" in the field of media and cultural 
studies (McRobbie, 2002) should be re-visited to explore how subjects are constituted 
as different, how they operate differently, how they contest the workings of given 
ideological systems; in other words, to critically and politically re-work the ''project 
of making experience visible" (Scott, 1992). "We are all the unofficial biographers of 
ourselves, for it is only by constructing a story, however loosely strung together, that 
we are able to form a sense of who we are and of what our future may be" 
(Thompson, 1995: 210). In the forces of confusing, bewildering, unsettling social 
change ofmodernity, Korean women struggle to negotiate the culture of everyday life 
in their own dynamic energies and capacities towards a deliberately encouraging, 
intended and hopeful movement, gathering their own ''resources for a journey of 
hope" (Williams, 1983: 268). Television is an important resource for reflexivity in 
modern everyday life, which stimulates ordinary women to research their own lives 
and identities for a journey of hope. 5 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
Working-class women in their 50s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Children Spouse's 
(pseudonym) status occupation 
Byung-soon 52 Married Service Less than Three sons Cleaning 
(noodle diner) high 
school 
Min-sook 51 Married Housewife High One son/ Construction 
school One manual work 
graduate daughter 
Soon-hee 52 Married Sales Less than One son/ Unemployed 
(vegetables) high Two 
school daughters 
Kyung-ja 50 Married Sales Less than One son/ Unemployed 
(miscellaneous) high One 
school daughter 
Soon-young 51 Married Sales Less than Two sons/ Unemployed 
(audio high One 
components) school daughter 
Na-ju 50 Married Sales High Two Unemployed 
(clothing) school daughters 
graduate 
Jung-wha 50 Married Housewife High One son/ Apartment 
school One security 
graduate daughter guard 
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Working-class women in their 30s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Children Spouse's 
(Pseudonym) status occupation 
Ha-jung 30 Married Housewife High school One Electrician 
graduate daughter 
Eun-kyung 30 Married Housewife High school One Clerk 
graduate daughter (computer 
institute) 
Sun-hae 32 Married Housewife High school Two sons Porter 
graduate (hospital) 
Yeon-sook 30 Married Housewife Highschool One son Chef 
graduate 
Nae-young 30 Married Housewife High school One son Service 
graduate (food diner) 
Hee-sun 30 Married Housewife Highschool One Bank clerk 
graduate daughter 
Young-joo 31 Married Housewife High school One son! Sales 
graduate One ( convenience 
daughter store) 
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Working-class women in their 20s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Father's Mother's 
(Pseudonym) status occupation occupation 
Jung-hyun 22 Single Student 3rd year, Distributor Housewife 
university (steel! al. ) 
Na-ri 22 Single Sales High Unemployed Sales 
(fashion school (clothing) 
accessories) graduate 
Yeon-jung 22 Single Student 2nd year, Carpenter Housewife 
college (furniture) 
Soo-mi 20 Single Household High Family Family 
helper school business business 
graduate (food diner) (food diner) 
Suh-jin 21 Single Waitress High Unemployed Sales 
school (kitchenette) 
graduate 
Kyung-joo 22 Single Sales clerk High Unemployed Sales 
(superstore) school (miscellaneous) 
graduate 
Kyung-moon 22 Single Nurse High Dealer Housewife 
trainee school (auto 
graduate accessories) 
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Middle-class women in their 50s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Children Spouse's 
(Pseudonym) status occupation 
Bong-wha 52 Married Housewife High Two sons I Business 
school One (manufacturing) 
graduate daughter 
Wo n-j a 52 Married Housewife University One son I Partnership 
graduate One (language 
daughter institute) 
Go-sun 50 Married Housewife University One son I Executive 
graduate One (trade company) 
daughter 
Jung-soon 50 Married Housewife University One son I Manager 
graduate One (bank) 
daughter 
Chung-sin 51 Married Housewife High One son I Government 
school One clerk 
graduate daughter 
Eun-kyung 52 Married Housewife High Two sons I Architect 
school One 
graduate daughter 
Gwang-mi 52 Married Housewife High One son I Early retired 
school One (major corp.) 
graduate daughter 
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Middle-class women in their 30s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Children Spouse's 
(Pseudonym) status occupation 
Hae-ji 30 Married Housewife University One Auto dealer 
graduate daughter (major corp.) 
Nae-yoon 31 Married Housewife University One son Manager 
graduate (finance firm) 
Eun-sang 32 Married Housewife University One son Stock broker 
graduate (major corp.) 
Mi-ra 32 Married Housewife University One son/ Administrator 
graduate One (major corp.) 
daughter 
Se-jung 32 Married Housewife University Two Engineer 
graduate daughters (major corp.) 
Eun-young 32 Married Housewife University One Chemist 
graduate daughter 
Sung-mi 32 Married Housewife University One son/ Government 
graduate One officer 
daughter 
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Middle-class women in their 20s 
Name Age Marital Occupation Education Father's Mother's 
(Pseudonym) status occupation occupation 
Sung-won 22 Single Student 3rd year, Manager Housewife 
university (bank) 
Hyo-jung 21 Single Student 2nd year, Restaurant Housewife 
university owner 
Joo-hyun 22 Single Student 3rd year, Head teacher Housewife 
university 
Bo-ra 21 Single Student 2nd year, Writer Teacher 
university 
Eun-soo 22 Single Student 3rd year, Executive Housewife 
university (trade company) 
Yoon-kyung 22 Single Student 3rd year, Business Housewife 
university (food chains) 
Moon-sun 22 Single Student 3rd year, Sales Housewife 
university (Electronics) 
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Appendix 2: Example of Interview Transcription 
This appendix reproduces the transcription of the interview with Soon-hee, a 52-year 
old working-class woman with one single son and two married daughters. Parts of this 
transcription have been subject to detailed analysis in Chapter 4, and all passages 
quoted there are printed in bold. The inclusion of this lengthy transcription intends to 
provide the context of how my research subject told her story, while also showing the 
reflexive nature of TV talk as discussed in the methodology chapter. 
Researcher Do you often watch TV? Do you like watching TV? 
Soon-hee I don't sit down still in front of TV and watch it from the beginning to 
the end. I sometimes watch dramas but don't particularly wait for a 
drama to come on. I just watch a little bit of this, a little bit of that 
when time allows. I have not watched any drama from the beginning 
to the end. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Can you still understand the story? 
Oh, yes. It doesn't matter whether I watch it from the beginning to the 
end, or watch bits somewhere in the middle. It's just a drama! It's so 
obvious. 
Is there any program you enj oy watching? 
I didn't watch the early part of Rose and Beansprout (weekend prime 
time drama), but toward the latter part I enjoyed. 
What do you particularly enjoy about it? 
It's our life! 
Our life? 
It exactly shows our life. It's fun to watch because it shows the way we 
live. 
Researcher What about, specifically? 
Soon-hee The family, children, parents-in-law, all those problems. 
Researcher Who do you like most, or dislike in this drama? 
Soon-hee I don't really like the eldest son and the eldest daughter-in-law in this 
drama. They are disgusting. I really dislike them. 
Researcher Why? 
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Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
They don't properly serve their elderly parents (husband's parents). 
Their attitude is so wrong. That eldest son is married to a rich family 
and lives under his mother-in-Iaw's house. That happens in Korea now, 
but I wouldn't approve of that. He does not consider his own parents. 
That's so wrong. The eldest son should care about his parents, first of 
all. The eldest daughter-in-law should behave accordingly as she is 
married to the family of the eldest son. The eldest son doesn't 
necessarily have to live with his parents. This is becoming a trend (in 
Korea). Nowadays, there is no obligation for an eldest son to live 
together with his parents and siblings under the same roof But the 
eldest son, though living separately, should serve his elderly parents, 
ftrst of all. He should try to maintain the harmony among his brothers, 
so that their wives can all get along without conflicts in the (extended) 
family. That's the eldest son's responsibility, no matter how far away 
he lives from his parents ... (Soon-hee continues to emphasize the 
proper role of the eldest son and the eldest daughter-in-law). 
Is there anybody you like in this drama Rose and Beansprout? 
I like the second daughter-in-law (in her 20s). She is trying hard to 
create the domestic harmony. She, is the real woman! I like her type. 
She tries hard to be nice to her parents-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-
in-law, busily maintaining the whole household. She is nice to her 
husband as well. 
Researcher So she is an ideal young woman to you? 
Soon-hee Yes. She is not a stupid bear. She quickly senses the characteristics of 
each family member. She is skilful and nimble in managing all the 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
family relationships. That looks nice to me. The whole family should 
get along with each other. Family harmony is most important. But her 
mother-in-law, Kim Hae-ja, is not wise. 
What is she like? 
She is too talkative. I don't like that type. As an elderly person in the 
home, a mother-in-law should be quiet and oversee the behavior of 
young people, daughters-in-law. Otherwise, a talkative woman in the 
family will always cause domestic discord and fights even among men 
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in the family. Women should not talk much for the sake of the family 
harmony. But it's fun to see her in this drama. 
Researcher What is fun about her? 
Soon-hee She is very intimidated by her stem husband, but always says what she 
wants to say, in a silly and talkative way. While watching her, I come 
to realize how our talk can sound like petty nagging to our husbands. 
She is understandable to us, mothers. She is a typical Korean mother. 
She has lived an oppressed life by her stem husband, so expects much 
out of her four sons and daughters-in-law. While watching this drama, 
I think it would be nice to have a daughter-in-law like this second 
daughter-in-law. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
For your son? How many sons do you have? 
I have one son approaching a marriageable age. This second daughter-
in-law may be the one that most mothers would like to have as their 
daughter-in-law. While watching the drama I think of my future 
daughter-in-law. I would never have a daughter-in-law like this first 
daughter-in-law (in the drama). She is too selfish and doesn't care 
about the harmony among the family. A daughter-in-law doesn't 
necessarily have to be educated or smart as long as she can take good 
care of the family harmony. She should be attentive to her husband, 
parents-in-law and other family members. 
Researcher Is that what you would want from your future daughter-in-law? 
Soon-hee When I marry my son, I would check, most of all, if my daughter-in-
law is able to handle the family harmony among her husband, parents-
in-law, sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law. If! take a daughter-in-law, I 
would treat her like my own daughters. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Do you have married daughters? 
I have two daughters, both married. 
Do they all get along with their family-in-Iaw? 
Many people, in fact, treat their own daughters preciously, but treat 
their daughters-in-law like a house servant. People around me treat 
their sons preciously but find every tiny fault with their daughters-in-
law. I don't like that attitude. I have raised my daughters preciously, 
why should I let them be treated badly by others (mothers-in-law)? 
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While watching dramas, I often [md obnoxious mothers-in-law who 
treat their daughters-in-law badly. Children are all precious to their 
own parents ... (Soon-hee goes on to criticize some of her friends who 
[md faults with their daughters-in-law). 
Researcher While watching TV, are you most interested in children? 
Soon-hee Right. We mothers watch children (on TV). Sons, daughters-in-law, 
parents-in-law, how they live, whether they get along with their 
parents-in-law. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Are you not interested in husbands or anything else? 
We are not interested in husbands or anything else at this age. 
Why not? 
Because children are most important. We don't really care about 
husbands at this age. We usually talk about our children. Some 
might watch TV just for fun, but we think of our children while 
watching TV. We watch drama and think of our children. 
Only think of children? 
Of course! We watch TV and think of our children. I enjoy watching 
Morning Forum (daily variety-talk show). Every Wednesday that 
program helps people to fmd their separated families. They can 
reunite with the families separated for 40 years, 50 years. In those 
old days, we were really poor. Some sent their children to 
orphanages or rich families. But I am quite surprised to see that 
even young people, about the age of my children, were also 
deserted by their parents! While watching those young people who 
have suffered for a long time, I deeply realize that the whole 
sacrifice of my life only for my children must be very worthy. I had 
a really hard time raising my three children on my own. 
Researcher What about your husband? 
Soon-hee My husband didn't have a job. 
Researcher How have you made a living? 
Soon-hee I had to raise my three children, selling stuff, food, cosmetics, clothes, 
and so on. I have raised my children and educated them as much as I 
could. If I were not strong enough to raise and educate my 
children, they would be out on the street by now. 
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Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Do you not resent your husband? 
I could have divorced hundreds times, but I endured because of 
my children. Children need both parents. I will take a daughter-in-
law who has both parents. 
Why? 
How she has been raised and educated at home is very important. A 
woman from a single parent tends to be ill-mannered and could easily 
divorce. Mothers need to be strong, capable of raising their children 
well in case fathers are unable to do so. That's the important role of 
mothers. 
Is that the important role of women? 
Of course. Women should be strong and able to raise their children 
well in any difficult situations. I would like my daughter-in-law to be 
strong and able to raise her children well. It doesn't mean that she 
needs to go out everyday and earn money. But just in case her husband 
is not (financially) able, she should be able to cope with (financial) 
difficulties. She should raise her children well. Even in those hard old 
times, I raised my three children on my own ... (Soon-hee repeatedly 
talks about her hardships). 
Researcher Then, you might like a strong and able woman, for example, a young 
lawyer wife in a drama The Last War? Do you watch The Last War? 
Soon-hee Yes. People seem to criticize her, but I don't think she is too bad. 
While watching that drama, my friends get angry at her, raising their 
blood pressure, even swearing, "How could she do that? She's crazy! 
She's so wrong!" Mothers who have only sons criticize "her" for not 
respecting her husband, and mothers who have only daughters criticize 
"her husband" for not being (financially) able for the family. I think, 
her husband is to be blamed. He is (financially) totally unable. Of 
course, it's just a drama, there are some exaggerations. Because he is 
not (financially) able, his wife handles every matter on behalf of him. 
If a man is unable, his wife needs to be strong and able. Without this 
strong and able woman, this family will be a total mess. Thanks to this 
strong and able woman, this family will be all right. 
Researcher Then, she would be an ideal daughter-in-law to you? 
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Soon-hee Not really. 
Researcher Why not? 
Soon-hee She puts forward only her opinions. She is exactly the image oftoday's 
young women. She is smart and educated. She speaks well because she 
is a lawyer. No matter what, she should respect her husband and 
elderly parents-in-law. She yells at her husband, kicks her husband off 
the bed. A woman should not ignore or discourage her husband. No 
matter how stupid and (financially) unable he is, he is the husband. It's 
not good to have a daughter-in-law who is smart and rich. A wife 
should not be better than her husband for the peace of home. She is 
from a rich family, but her husband is not. The husband's mother sells 
vegetables (in a traditional market). No matter what, she should respect 
her husband and parents-in-law. That's the principle. 
Researcher Do you also teach your daughters that a woman should always respect 
her husband and parents-in-law? 
Soon-hee Of course! That's the proper behavior of Korean women! Korean 
women should behave according to the Korean tradition! In fact, if I 
were that husband, I wouldn't live as such. It can happen nowadays 
that a young man wears an apron and cooks in the kitchen to please his 
wife and his mother-in-law. Of course, if the man's mother finds that 
out, she would go mad! This man is an eldest son. As an eldest son, he 
should serve and think of his parents first. As a mother with a son, I 
can understand that son's mother (in the drama). 
Researcher What can you understand? 
Soon-hee As a mother with a son, I can understand her. But she is being 
nonsensical sometimes. If her son is (fmancially) unable, she couldn't 
really hold her face up to her daughter-in-law. She should feel 
ashamed. I would feel ashamed if my son is (financially) unable. But 
this mother is being rather brassy. She fmds faults with her daughter-
in-law and blames her on every matter. As a mother, I can 
understand her concern about her son. If I were in her position, I 
would probably do the same. While watching the drama, I sometimes 
sympathize, ''Umm ... that's understandable. I might do the same". 
Researcher What is understandable, for example? 
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Soon-hee Because that mom (in The Last War) has spent her whole life 
raising and educating her son, she expects to be served as well by 
her daughter-in-law. But this doesn't work out because today's 
young women are different from us. When this son does not side 
with his mom, this mom grieves, "How have I raised you? How 
have I raised my son?" It exactly shows our life. Because it's so 
real, it's fun to watch. This poor son is trapped between his wife and 
his mom. He can't side with his wife because then his mom will be 
disappointed. He can't side with his mom because then it will bring 
constant discord with his wife. While watching this drama, I thought, I 
would try to negotiate with my daughter-in-law for the harmony of the 
whole family. 
Researcher How would you negotiate? 
Soon-hee Mothers of our generation are strongly attached to their sons even after 
the sons are married. While watching the drama, I think, that seems 
useless now. "How have I raised my son?" Frankly, we mothers have 
this strong attachment to our eldest sons. But it doesn't fit into a reality 
now. Young people nowadays are very different from us. We may 
need to let go of our sons once they are married and form a new home 
with their wives. This is a very difficult thing to do. I have one son. 
Frankly, I will feel very disappointed if my son marries someday and 
sides with his wife. 
Researcher Really? 
Soon-hee Really. All Korean moms do have the strong desire to live with their 
married sons. 
Researcher Why? 
Soon-hee Why? Well ... Old moms have not received love from their husbands. 
So they want to expect everything from their sons. While watching 
together Rose and Beansprout, a friend of mine once said, "if I get 
older and become just like her (the mother character with four sons), 
please remember to criticize me". While watching the drama, we say 
that we should empty our greedy minds. We should not expect much 
out of our sons. "How have I raised you? How could you do this to 
me?" That's a mom's greed. I think, conflicts in the family are caused 
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by our greedy minds. Young women should be more considerate of 
older people, and we mothers should be less attached to our sons, 
although it's very hard. It should be done for the harmony ofthe whole 
family. As in a Buddhist saying, ''we are borne into this world with 
empty hands and die into another world with empty hands". I come to 
think, what's the use of living greedily? I will try to be nice to my 
daughter-in-law in the hope that my daughters will be treated well by 
their mothers-in-law. The other day my son brought one woman ... 
(Soon-hee talks about her impression about the young woman 
introduced by her son). 
Researcher The relationship between a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law is 
such a complicated and difficult one, isn't it? 
Soon-hee Mothers-in-law tend to be mellow on their sons, especially eldest sons, 
but harsh on their daughters-in-law. In a drama See Again and Again, I 
saw an obnoxious mother-in-law. She always found faults with her 
eldest daughter-in-law! Before getting married this eldest daughter-in-
law learned cooking and did everything to please her mother-in-law. 
She is good at everything, cooking, everything really. She is the real 
woman! But this mother-in-law is not pleased at all. She always finds 
faults. In fact, most mothers-in-law (in Korea) are like her. 
Researcher Why? 
Soon-hee I can't understand those mothers-in-law. Daughters-in-law are all 
precious daughters to their own parents. Mothers-in-law should 
understand that their own daughters could be treated in that way once 
they are married to other families. Usually, mothers who don't have 
daughters but have only sons tend to be so harsh on their daughters-in-
law. 
Researcher Why? 
Soon-hee Because they don't understand! They don't understand what it is like 
raising daughters. They haven't experienced raising daughters. Only a 
monk can understand other monks' minds, and only a thief can 
understand other thieves' minds. Only a mother with daughters can 
understand other mothers with daughters. There should be at least one 
daughter in the family, otherwise, Korean mothers-in-law can't get 
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Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
better ... (Soon-hee reveals her married daughter's complaints about her 
mother-in-law who has only two sons). 
Is there any program you don't like on TV? 
I only watch what I like. 
What do you not like? 
I don't like unhappy dark stuff. I only watch things that give me 
laughter and enjoyment. 
Researcher You like Rose and Beansprout, The Last War, Morning Forum. Is 
there any other program you like? 
Soon-hee On Sunday morning I enjoy watching Studio of Luck (marriage-
oriented, blind-date show) 
Researcher Isn't it a love-matching show for young people? 
Soon-hee I am so surprised to see how bold and brave young women are 
nowadays. 
Researcher Bold and brave? 
Soon-hee They bravely come out on television! They speak well, sing well, 
dance well! They are not shy. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
Researcher 
Soon-hee 
You could never imagine that? 
Of course not! In our days we could never imagine that. Indeed, time 
has changed a lot. 
How do you feel about watching those young women? 
Things have changed so much, so fast. 
Are you pleasantly surprised, or offended by their boldness? 
They look OK to me. They are all educated and have a nice job. They 
are pretty, tall, confident. Whenever asked by the Me about any 
questions, they all speak smartly and spontaneously. They sing and 
dance well just like professionals. 
Are you interested in this show because of your single son? 
Of course! I am concerned about my son's marriage. It's interesting to 
see young people on TV. I want to see what they are like. Through TV, 
I see what is changing among young women nowadays. In Studio of 
Luck I can see that. Young women are so bold. 
Researcher You learn through television what is changing among young people? 
300 
Soon-hee If you watch young people's programs, you can see what they do, what 
they say, what they like. (Laughing) Once 1 learned this word "Wang-
tta" (youth slang for "an excluded person"). That word seems very 
popular among young people. While watching TV with my son 1 once 
uttered this word. He was surprised looking back at me, "mom, where 
did you learn that? Wow! Our mom is so modem!" 
Researcher You felt good about that? 
Soon-hee We laughed. Of course. Who would want to be an old-fashioned 
crone? 
Researcher Do you usually talk with your son and watch television together? 
Soon-hee He doesn't have time to sit down and talk. But we sometimes talk 
when watching television together. 
Researcher Do you usually talk with your husband and watch television together? 
Soon-hee He doesn't listen to me. He rarely talks to me. My son says to me, 
"Mom, you should live your own life. You should have a good time 
with friends". Husbands of our age are all similar. They are blunt, 
no fun. We have never had a family time together. We have never 
watched TV together. 
Researcher Your husband doesn't watch TV together? 
Soon-hee He watches TV alone. Husbands of our age are not nice to their wives. 
They are not like young people nowadays. Surprisingly, one day my 
husband came home with something to eat in his hand, and threw it in 
front of me, bluntly saying, ''try it". 1 thought, this could happen to me 
in my life! 
Researcher You were impressed? 
Soon-hee Yes! He had never brought anything to me. 1 thought, 1 should live 
longer to see it happen again! 1 really wonder how 1 have lived with 
this stock-stone-like man for a long time. We never sit down close and 
talk friendly ... (Soon-hee complains about her husband's lack of 
affection). 
Researcher When you watch television with your son, what do you talk about? 
Soon-hee When we watch Studio of Luck, my son sometimes points to a woman 
(on the screen), commenting, "I like this type", "I like that type". Then 
1 can see his favorite type. Nowadays, young women are very different 
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from us. They have grown up in an affluent environment. They are 
more educated, more confident. They want to go outside, work outside, 
play outside. They bravely come out on TV! While watching the 
program, I said to my son that I wouldn't want a daughter-in-law like 
those young women (in Studio of Luck). 
Researcher Why not? 
Soon-hee I wouldn't mind if my daughter-in-law wants to work outside. It's 
good for a woman to have her own work. That's better than staying at 
home all day long. It's true, staying-home housewives grow 
dissatisfied with their husbands, because husbands don't talk to their 
wives at home. Nowadays, I can see many young couples work 
outside. That looks nice to me. But there is a rule to keep. A woman 
should take good care of her home and family first. I wouldn't mind as 
long as my daughter-in-law takes good care of her home and family. 
Researcher Home and family is more important than work? 
Soon-hee Of course! Work is important, but it's most important to raise her 
children well and devote herself to her husband's success. A woman 
should not neglect her family because of her work. That's the 
woman's role! What's the meaning of your work outside when the 
home is not going well? Once happiness inside the home is achieved, 
then you can enjoy your own life outside, then you can demand 
anything you want because happiness of the home is your 
achievement ... (Soon-hee continues to emphasize the importance of 
the home and family). 
Researcher Rose and Beansprout, The Last War, Morning Forum, Studio of Luck. 
Is there anything else you enj oy watching? 
Soon-hee Housewife Song Contest. I remember it's broadcast either on Saturday 
or Sunday morning. I don't know exactly when. At the weekend in the 
morning I ask my son what time it is broadcast. 
Researcher What do you like about this show? 
Soon-hee Those housewives sing very well. Some housewives sing much better 
than real singers. I wonder when they learned singing. 
Researcher Are they young housewives? 
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Soon-hee Most of them are young housewives. They sing very well. I wonder 
where they learned singing. Nowadays women are different. They are 
not shy. They sing well, dance well. They bravely appear on television. 
Researcher Do you envy them? 
Soon-hee They look nice to me. They are well-dressed and well-made up. Most 
of them are young housewives, but even old housewives don't have 
many wrinkles on their face. Their skin is firm. They must have a nice 
life. They must be married to a nice husband. Sometimes their 
husbands and children, or mothers come along on the show to 
encourage their singing. They look happy. 
Researcher Do you like singing? 
Soon-hee I am not good at it. I sometimes feel like learning singing though. 
Nowadays women sing well. 
Researcher Do you have a chance to sing outside? 
Soon-hee Occasionally in a socia1. It looks better if you sing well in a social. 
Researcher 
Soon-hee: 
Those who step back, saying, "I can't sing", look stupid. Some women 
go to a singing room (karaoke) or learn singing at a culture center. A 
passive and shy woman is the virtue of old times. Nowadays a woman 
should be able to do everything well ... (Soon-hee then talks about how 
young women nowadays are different from her generation). 
Why don't you go to a singing room or learn singing? 
That's not my life. That's for comfortable women who have nothing 
much to worry about life. After sending off their husbands to work, 
they can drive a car, meet friends, have a lunch outside. Those women 
singing on television might lead such a life. What's a worry when they 
have nice husbands? It's important for a woman to marry a nice, 
(financially) able man. A woman's life is dependent upon the husband. 
Researcher Is that so? 
Soon-hee Life cannot be the same for every woman. It's a destiny. 
Researcher How is it a destiny? 
Soon-hee You see, some women meet nice husbands, some don't. Some women 
lead a comfortable life, some don't. It's in the (Korean) old saying: A 
woman's life is destined from her birth. If you are destined to live 
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a good life, you are destined to meet a good husband. A woman's 
life is dependent upon the husband. 
Researcher Do you feel bitter? 
Soon-hee I am all right. My children are all grown up, they will thank me. I have 
the home to go back to after work. I have a husband, he's not much fun 
though. 
Researcher Do you still think it's better to have a husband? 
Soon-hee Of course! It's better to have a husband and children. No matter how 
much they pester you, it's better to have a husband and children. You 
will realize it as you grow older and weak. Happiness is not just given 
to us. We have to seek it, like the TV title Seeking Happiness 
(weekend morning variety-talk show). Ifwe can feel happy with even 
tiny things, that's our happiness. The home and family is most precious 
of all ... (Soon-hee, again forcefully, emphasizes the importance of the 
home and family). 
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Notes 
Chapter 1 
1. This study was initially prompted by my encounters with Korean divorced women 
of my age (under 28 at that time) in America (1993-1998). This led me to look 
into the statistics of the rising Korean divorce rates and reflect: Why do young 
women divorce? What are their real conflicts? Are they caused by female 
assertion of autonomy? How do young women struggle to negotiate? This 
generated a research agenda on Korean women's changing lives and identities, the 
meanings of contradictions and tensions between the traditional and the modem or 
the global. 
2. I was first drawn to the strikingly changing images of Korean advertising (e.g. 
images of free and independent young women), but advertising was not the media 
that ordinary women routinely consumed. Then I considered women's magazines, 
but their circulation and readership were limited to small segmentations (e.g. 
university students, young middle-class housewives). Radio in Korea functions 
primarily as a transmitter of music (e.g. Western/domestic pops) for teenagers. On 
the other hand, television is the most widely popular media, occupying a high 
proportion of Koreans' everyday leisure life. See Chapter 1 Section (2). Therefore, 
I have chosen television as an object of study. 
3. A relative importance of age and class in Korea is different from that in Western 
societies. Korean contemporary scholarship has paid attention to socio-cultural 
dynamics surrounding the relations of generation, whereas relationships between 
"class" and "culture" remain under-researched. Thus, it is my intention to consider 
the dimension of social class in this study to examine whether, and how, women's 
different class positions distinctively influence their cultural experiences of 
television. 
4. I am aware of using Western feminism theory as a conceptual reference and 
comparator, despite its Euro-centricism and irrelevance (in some cases) to Korean 
women's lived experiences. 
5. When was the subject ''woman'' emerged in relation to the mass media? As early 
as 1960's Betty Friedan (1963) in The Feminine Mystique criticized the American 
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mass media, and Gaye Tuchman et al. (1978) compiled research on the effect of 
media sex-role stereotypes upon American girls and women. 
6. For critiques of ideology, see Stuart Hall (1996) and Elizabeth Frazer (1987). For 
critiques of the ideology of gender identity, see Teresa de Lauretis (1994), and len 
Ang and Joke Hermes (1996). For the purpose of my study, I find John 
Thompson's (1990) reformulation of ideology most useful. As Thompson argues, 
what is required in the study of ideology is the everyday appropriation of 
symbolic forms in specific social contexts: "If we are interested in the way in 
which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination, then we 
must examine how the meaning mobilized by mass-mediated symbolic forms is 
understood and appraised by the individuals who, in the course of their everyday 
routines, receive media messages and incorporate them into their lives" 
(Thompson, 1990: 24). 
7. Also see Marjorie Ferguson (1978) and Rosalind Coward (1984). 
8. I find, paradoxically, feminist psychoanalytic analysis inherently, physically, (and 
maybe politically) rationalizes women's oppression under patriarchy. Or speaking 
of feminist politics, can it be rather viewed that psychoanalysis thus holds a 
political significance for it speaks about feminine subjectivity "as a problem", as 
argued by Jacqueline Ross (1986)? 
9. Given the problematic category of ''woman'' how can we more effectively, more 
politically account for diversities and differences in that category, without 
embracing the all-victimized-femininity theory of ideology, without reproducing 
the ethnocentric and universal claims of semiological reductionism, and without 
falling into the trap of biological psychoanalytic essentialism? Jackie Stacey 
(1987) and Ruby Rich (1978) in film studies provide different insights. 
10. Sonia Livingstone (1996) investigates the history of media effects research and 
reveals that the findings of the field are in many ways inconclusive. How should 
the question of media effects (ideology) be reformulated? The future of media 
effects research should direct to audience interpretations and develop links with 
media effects, argues Livingstone. 
11. Here is an example (Hobson, 1982: 112-113): ''The woman with whom I had gone 
to watch the program was serving the evening meal, feeding her five-and three-
year-old daughters and attempting to watch the program on the black and white 
television situated on top of the freezer opposite to the kitchen table ..... Clearly, 
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even though she cannot give the program her full attention," the fact is that she 
can still enjoy Crossroads. 
12. Budd, Entman and Steinman (1990) argue that subcultures can be reactionary or 
accept most elements of the status quo. 
13. To put it in Michel de Certeau's (1984) terms, the powerless (women) take some 
control over their lives by employing silent, transgressive, ironic or poetic 
"tactics" (reading activity) to "make" or "do" with their social situations. 
14. See the critique of Roger Silverstone (1994: 146): ''there is no evidence of how 
that [reading] activity feeds into other parts of their lives or indeed of how other 
parts oftheir lives feed into that activity". 
15. Similarly, see len Ang's (1991: 10) criticism: "Our understanding of television 
audiencehood has been thoroughly colonized by the institutional point of view". 
16. Ang (1985: 136) views popular pleasure and fantasy as a relatively separate 
dimension from feminist politics and her standpoint is that "the personal may be 
political, but the personal and the political do not always go hand in hand". Brown 
(1990, 1994) argues that feminine discourse can be potentially empowering and 
politically progressive since women resist and make fun of dominant ideology in 
their own safe spaces of soap opera gossip networks. Radway (1984: 17) poses a 
seemingly romantic question as to "how romance writers and readers as well as 
feminist intellectuals might contribute to the rewriting of the romance in an effort 
to articulate its founding fantasy to a more relevant politics". Modleski (1979: 
104) proposes that rather than starting from nothing feminists can look for clues to 
women's pleasure already present in existing forms, and not only challenge this 
pleasure but also incorporate it into feminist strategies. 
17. As David Morley (1989: 39) argues, "it is this kind of detailed empirical attention 
to the varieties of subject positioning and to what actually happens in particular 
situations which we need to pursue". John Fiske (1989: 75-76) discusses the links 
between semiotic power/resistance/pleasure, the role of television and social 
change, yet the gap is obvious in his hope that "what I would like to see is the 
methodologically daunting project of tracing actual instances of these links being 
made, of these processes being actualized". 
18. For audience research on women of color, see Lee and Cho's (1990) work on 
Korean women fans of soap operas in the US, and Mankekar's (1993) work on 
Indian women audiences. 
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19. Ironically, Ellen Seiter (1989: 225) makes a self-contradictory statement in her 
empirical work: ''we judge our failure to contact any women or men of color for 
the interviews, however, as a serious limitation of the study". 
20. Professional stability of women in the Korean media industry is substantially low, 
partly because of the "lack of professional consciousness" in women themselves 
(e.g. women's work outside is secondary to their domestic roles). 
21. Although women appear more often than men as primary visual characters in 
prime time television commercials (56% to 44%, respectively), there is a 
significant difference in the gender-role portrayal in their level of employment 
(Leung, 1995). 
22. Women on television drama are now changing slowly - asserting more power at 
home, strongly expressing their opinions and having a professional job. The Last 
War is a case in point. See Chapter 4 Section (3). 
23. Why is romance drama (e.g. All About Eve, Legend of Love) enormously popular? 
See Chapter 8 Section (3). 
24. When local productions are abundant and dominant, foreign productions with 
perceived low quality are less likely to be selected and favored by local audiences. 
In general, Asian viewers do not like sex, vulgarity, violence and crime in 
Western programs, nor do they see Western media as corrupting their cultures 
because indigenous cultures and values are strong enough to withstand any 
foreign influence (Goonasekera, 1995). 
25. For detailed analyses, see Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. 
Chapter 2 
1. Note, however, that it is even difficult for Asian academics to understand the long 
colonial history of "other" Asian nations, and even difficult for Koreans situated 
in the proximate Asian terrain to understand multi-racial and multi-cultural 
conditions of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, etc. 
2. Confucianism required three obediences of women: Before marriage, a woman 
had to obey her father's orders; when married, those of her husband; when 
widowed, those of her son. Women's life cycle was continuously dependent on 
the males, and this was subordination 0 f the inner sphere to the outer sphere 
(Deuchler, 1992: 231). 
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3. Women were totally excluded from formal education. Throughout the Chosun 
period, formal educational systems such as Sung-Kyun-Kwan (national academy), 
Hyang-Kyo (local schools) and Seo-Dang (elementary schools) provided 
education for males only (Jeong-shin Han, 1996). 
4. On the contrary, it is interesting to note that during the Silla (4th century A.D -
918) and the Koryo (918 - 1392) periods preceding the Chosun dynasty (1392-
1910), when Buddhism with its egalitarian and humanistic ideals was 
predominant, women enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom and status 
interacting with men outside the house relatively freely in non-family contexts. 
About 70% of Koryo poetry and songs were works of women vividly portraying 
their emotions and thoughts in the free and active everyday life (Kyung-won Cho, 
1994). However, seen in Confucian moral perspectives, Koryo women were far 
from the ideal. The problem of women's ethics emerged as an urgent political 
issue, and the Chosun dynasty came to limit the legitimacy of women's social 
roles (Yun-shik Chang, 1983). 
5. In the process of propagating the Confucian patrilineal family system, ancestor 
worship was given a great emphasis, and this necessitated the eldest son of the 
family to be the one in charge of offering rites for ancestors (Jeung-seun Yi, 
1996). 
6. As the reproduction of sons was most important for a family, a husband and his 
wife slept together only on certain days which were usually arranged by the 
husband's mother. Sexuality in the formal marital relationship was explicitly for 
procreation and there was no room for sexuality for pleasure (Young-hee Shim, 
1998). 
7. Naehun advised women to obey their husband's parents: "Always follow what the 
parents-in-law ordered ... If the parents-in-law call you, answer promptly and 
obediently" (Kyung-won Cho, 1994). 
8. Adultery was severely punished: An upper-class woman who committed adultery 
was decapitated in 1423, and her lover was banished (Deuchler, 1992: 259). 
9. Women themselves have internalized the Confucian notion of sacrifice and their 
inferior status. This trace is manifest in ethnographic research on yangban (upper-
class)-descendant women living in contemporary Korea of the 1990s (Hae-joang 
Cho, 1996). Despite the reception of modem education, a woman explained that 
chastity was required only for women because earth cannot have two heavens. To 
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the researcher's question, "Why are men superior to women? Aren't both earth 
and heaven indispensable?" she responded, ''The earth cannot step on heaven, can 
it?" 
10. Although religious movements stirred women's self-consciousness, they were not 
substantial enough to bring change at a societal level due to severe suppression by 
the male-dominated ruling class. The reason for the suppression was Western 
religions' objection to Confucian ancestor worship rites. 
11. Protestant missionaries, who observed the earlier failure of Catholic missionaries 
to disseminate Catholicism in Korea, adopted indirect methods of promulgating 
Christianity by establishing schools and hospitals as well as churches. 
12. Until 1892 at Ewha Womans University, men lectured to women students from 
behind a screen so that the presence of women would not distract them (Gelb and 
Palley, 1994: 4). 
13. The number oftwo-year college students in Korea have greatly increased since the 
early 1980s. This is partly due to the implementation of the legislation (No. 3054) 
which prompted the growth in the number of two-year college enrollments to 
solve the serious social problems of the increasing number of frustrated jae-soo-
saeng; high school graduates who fail in the competitive four-year university 
entrance test (Tae-hong Kim, 1996). The majority of these repeaters are "male" 
students and they take the test every year to avoid being categorized as a 
"10 serf failure". 
14. It is not my intention to explicate Korea's economic miracle. Refer to George 
Hyde (1988), Seung-kyung Kim (1997), and Hagen Koo (2001). 
15. An ''unmarried mature" female worker (e.g. aged over 30) showing a high degree 
of work concentration, achievement and competitiveness for promotion tends to 
be frowned upon as being "unfeminine". 
16. The compulsory or customary retirement of women at marriage is often the case, 
which helps to preserve a male-dominated bastion (Pil-wha Chang, 1994). 
Although the 1987 Equal Employment Act specifies these practices as illegal, 
habitual custom and culturally reinforced gender roles still operate. 
17. While it may be true that the physical space of contemporary Korean housing is 
"over-dominated" by women, this does not necessarily lead to the creation of their 
own room to be independent, as in Virginia Woolfs (1929) liberating sense of a 
room of one's own. 
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18. In general, from childhood Korean men have been educated by their mothers not 
to enter one area in the house which is perceived exclusively as a woman's 
domain - kitchen. 
19. This explains why over 90% of Korean women prefer sons to daughters: A male 
child is essential for providing a successor for the family lineage, for maintaining 
status in the family and securing economic and emotional support in old age (Eun-
shil Kim, 1995). 
20. If "gender is performance", as argued by Judith Butler (1990), a Korean woman 
who refuses to perform her traditional role is to be socially excluded as a "non-
woman". 
Chapter 3 
1. For details of interviewees, see Appendix 1. 
2. For an example of interview transcription, see Appendix 2. 
3. Note, however, that there is currently a lack of reflexive space and critical debate 
concerning methodological issues in this field. Existing audience studies have 
rarely illuminated their experiences of conducting research, rarely deconstructed 
the complexities of the research process. Little attempt has been made to reflect 
critically on the research process itself: issues of access and acceptance, multiple 
roles of the researcher, the relationship between the researcher and the researched, 
and the possible impact of this relationship on the nature of the research data and 
knowledge produced. These issues are left largely undiscussed. Therefore, I seek 
to provide methodological reflections in an attempt to trigger a whole range of 
issues arising from the research process that need to be fully addressed in media 
audience studies. 
4. My argument here IS that knowledge is socially situated, affected by the 
researcher's embodied performance in a particular ethnographic moment. Data 
does not simply exist ''there'' waiting to be revealed as wholly autonomous and 
representative of a whole truth, but the data is a product of discursive practices of 
research, which is mediated by the researcher's bodily presentation of self. The 
researcher's body, the normative ideal, plays a crucial role in the research process. 
5. Reflexivity is now increasingly understood to be central to the constitution of 
contemporary subjects and self-identities (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992, 1994); 
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however, ordinary women as reflexive subjects and their capacity of self-
reflection, or their TV talk as a critical form of reflexivity have not been fully 
recognized in media audience studies. 
6. The category of emotion is very recent sociological work, and there is a growing 
body of work on emotion: For example, Giddens (1991, 1992) on intimacy and 
security; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) on love and relationships; Abu-
Lughod and Lutz (1990) on emotion, discourse and the politics of everyday life. It 
is my intention to recognize emotion as an enabling category of analysis and a 
social descriptor. The notion of love and emotion runs through the research 
chapters along the axis of tradition/change/modernity. 
7. There is no doubt that emotion plays a key role in doing research. My argument 
therefore is to think with and engage with emotion in the research process, and to 
strategically deal with the fact of emotion for theoretical and intellectual purposes. 
Chapter 4 
1. Unquestioningly, these women carryon a harsh self-forgetful ritual of everyday 
life and "make their toil a badge of dreadful honor" (Hoggart, 1958: 50) devoted 
to the family. I am aware of my use of Richard Hoggart throughout since his 
insightful analysis of British working-class life and popular culture has some 
parallel and relevant points to mine. See Section (2) and (5) in this chapter, and 
especially, Chapter 5 Section (4). 
2. Regardless of their unemployment status, the position of the Korean working-
class husband is a "master in his own house" (Hoggart, 1958: 54). 
3. By and large, this fmding demonstrates that television is intimately interwoven 
into the fabric of everyday life (Silverstone, 1994), and that women's talk on the 
experience of television represents "everyday family life" (Rogge, 1989), a world 
whose framework is often taken for granted and unquestioningly accepted as 
normal. 
4. Some might raise a question, why do these women not find a hope in their 
daughters? In a Confucian patrilineal society as explained in Chapter 2 Section 
(1), sons remain with the family forever, whereas daughters leave after marriage. 
That's why a majority of Korean women want to bear sons, and as long as 
mothers are pleased more with sons, gender arrangement will reproduce. 
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5. This is less clear and more questionable in relation to "family life", argues 
Lefebvre (1991: 94-95). It is in everyday life that the ideology becomes natura1. 
6. For a parallel argument, see Harindranath (1998). 
7. Why do women "collude" in what might be seen as anti-women or anti-feminist? 
Why are they drawn into the parameters of patriarchal power? Why do they 
willingly enact its principles? These questions remain unresolved to me. 
8. Similarly, the moral frame of drama is that of "personal life" (Brunsdon, 1997: 
15). The emotions that become the subject of drama are grounded within the 
"family" (Glaessner, 1990: 126). 
9. What is happening on the women's viewing moment may be ''retraditionalization'' 
(Abu-Lughod, 1998: 25), with the implicit assertion of Korean counter-modernity 
or anti-modernity. 
10. This empirical case attests to John Thompson's (1995) discussion on the media 
and tradition and Anthony Smith's (1990, 1991, 1995) persistent argument for 
national identity. 
Chapter 5 
1. On the other hand, a television set in the homes of older women in their 50s tends 
to be placed in a sitting room and used exclusively by their (often unemployed) 
husbands. 
2. In this ritualized appropriation, television becomes "almost another member of the 
family" (Gunter and Svennevig, 1987: 4), forming a "dialogical relationship" 
(Spigel, 1992: 3). 
3. Here TV rituals signify a process of "detraditionalization" (Giddens, 1991). 
Although the young wives' desire for the continuation of family life is similar to 
that of older women in their 50s, what seems different is "detraditionalization" in 
terms of more egalitarian and emotionally intimate relationships with their 
husbands. 
4. The "money issue" implicated in this context reveals a wealth of data about the 
quality of working-class housewives' lives and why they are more likely to be 
home-confined than middle-class housewives. 
5. Young women (presumably, middle-class) are said to face fundamental conflicts 
regarding political and moral choices between work and family/childcare: They 
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fmd themselves in the position of having to choose what kind of life and what 
gender roles they want to adopt, and this ability to choose is experienced as a 
psychic and emotional burden attended by a great deal of pain and confusion 
(Heide, 1995: 3). However, this kind of pain and confusion seems rather easily 
resolved for these Korean working-class women. First, this is basically because 
there is "no such a choice" worthy of consideration for them. Their wage is simply 
too low to choose, as one woman asserts: ''There seemed no choice for me. I 
earned just a little bit of money and all my wage would go directly to my 
babysitter. Then, it would be better to stay in and raise my child on my own". 
Second, this situation is further aggravated by the women's increasing feeling of 
insecurity about leaving their child in an other's care in a modem society. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, I offered these mothers a period of free 
babysitting in the appreciation for their long hours of interviews, but all of them 
politely rejected my offer. The women's desire for the provision of "security" is 
another reason for quitting their jobs. And they tend to find possibilities for 
gaining a satisfying sense of self-identity through their child. Another woman 
clearly puts it: "Sitting in this room I sometimes think about my life. There seems 
nothing much I can see as my life. The child seen in my eyes everyday is 
something I can feel as my life, something I can feel as mine" (Italics, her 
emphasis). As individuals become increasingly powerless in conflict, they develop 
a paradoxical ideology of self-control and self-creation (Craib, 1999: 107). The 
agent for that self-control and self-creation for these Korean women is their child. 
See Chapter 4 Section (2), and Chapter 8 Section (1) and (2). 
6. "Relevance" is central to popular culture, for it minimizes the difference between 
text and life (Fiske, 1989a: 6). Relevance can be produced only by the viewers, for 
only they can know which texts enable them to make the meanings that will 
function in their everyday lives. 
7. Similarly, this point is illustrated by Richard Hoggart (1958: 105) on British 
working-class life: Its main themes are marriage, children, relations with others. 
8. Note that "audiences discriminate and tend to prefer home-produced television, 
rather than slavishly pursuing imported programs" (Tracey, 1997: 355), and that 
locally produced dramas compete well with imported Western forms despite vast 
difference in production costs (Tracey, 1985, 1988). As shown in this Korean 
case, the women's enormous interest and pleasure in the domestic programs is due 
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to their particular ''relevance'' to the audiences' everyday life and greater 
"emotional affmity" to the audiences' everyday experience. 
Chapter 6 
1. These working-class women are poor and relatively uneducated, but ''uneducated'' 
here means "high school graduates" in an extremely education-geared society like 
Korea. Refer to Chapter 2 Section (2). 
2. It is interesting to see that these Korean young women's critiques seem to espouse 
what may be termed as "post-feminism" (Friedan, 1981; Hewlett, 1986); a kind of 
self-critique of earlier feminism for ignoring women's desires to fulfil their roles 
for the family. Betty Friedan (1981) argues that the primary emphasis of second-
wave American feminism (in the 1970s) on women and work, although initially 
necessary to eradicate the "feminine mystique" that served as a barrier to women's 
achievement of equality, has now been replaced by an equally pernicious 
"feminist mystique" that tends to ignore altogether women's needs for 
motherhood and family life. In a similar vein, Sylvia Hewlett (1986) claims that 
the second-wave feminism has little connection to the mainstream of (American) 
women's lives since it fails to account for women's desire to bear and raise 
children. 
3. I do not intend to use the term ''post-feminist family television" (Press, 1991; 
Heide, 1995; Dow, 1996) in this context, since Korean television has not yet even 
experienced a full-bloomed "feminist" era. However, their critiques seem relevant 
to understand the ideological functions of contemporary Korean television: For 
example, conflicts for married career women are often "avoided" by showing 
them mainly occupied with family rather than work-related tasks. By avoiding 
conflicts, television tends to "simplify" the complex issues of women's work and 
family life. Through the simplification, television discourse "closes off' the ways 
in which the pressing social issues could be thought about. Television in this way 
functions to provide simplified "fantasy-level solutions". 
4. The young women's everyday life and its sources of information from 
contemporary television are infested with psychologism (e.g. "discover who you 
are", "learn to know yourself') and "do-it-yourself' cultures. 
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5. The tremendous expansion of symbolic Western materials has "disembedded" 
young women and played a part in a process of "detraditionalization" (Giddens, 
1991). 
6. For parallel arguments, see Tamar and Katz (1990), Ang (1996), Tracey (1997), 
and Robins (1997). 
7. The broad aim of this section is to understand the complexity of how global 
television is actually absorbed in a non-Western culture. I have demonstrated 
complicated relationships between glo bal television and local meanings, 
dialectical aspects of cultural interpretation, and wider implications in the issues 
of globalization. Also, see Chapter 9 Section (3). 
Chapter 7 
1. Even Korean husbands tend to acknowledge the centrality of women in everyday 
family life, as one man expresses it (quoted in Hoffman, 1995: 119): "The man is 
the head, but the woman is the center. The family can function without the head, 
but it falls apart if there is no center". 
2. In fact, this age group of middle-class women was most inaccessible for the 
research interviews during the day as they were not at home. 
3. Adrienne Rich (1976) says: "Once having been mothers, what are we, if not 
always mothers? . .it is not enough to let our children go; we need selves of our 
own to return to" (p. 37). I agree with Rich. But the question for these Korean 
mothers is, where and how to return when decent work opportunities are not 
available to them? 
4. Feminism in Korea largely echoes the American second-wave feminism with its 
primary emphasis on ''work-like-men careerism" lacking a capacity for maternal 
and familial thinking. Refer to Chapter 6 Section (1). 
5. The prime time daily drama Can't Help Loving you was often brought up by these 
middle-class women throughout the research interviews, and opened heated 
debates on its family morality. 
6. For these middle-class mothers, the quality of television is often defined as 
"good" when it brings normative middle-brow "family values". 
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Chapter 8 
1. This point about middle-class women's domestic power and freedom was also 
discussed in Chapter 7 Section (1) and (2). 
2. Men's long hour culture of work is a block on more flexible gender-role 
arrangements, while it more or less makes men tired and disengaged in family life. 
It also makes television a women's thing simply by virtue of the unavailability of 
men. 
3. Note the argmnent of Linda Nicholson (1994: 82): A major problem with feminist 
uses of categories such as mothering, sexuality, and reproduction is that such uses 
project the meanings these activities hold for contemporary "Western, white, 
middle-class women" onto the lives of women of different classes, cultural 
backgrounds, and historical periods. 
4. For details, refer to Chapter 2 Section (2). 
5. These Korean women actually talk about how they deal with social change, and 
engage with a process of "reflexive modernization" (Beck, 1992, 1994). 
6. I am not here drawn strictly to a psychological definition of female fantasy or 
endorse universality of female fantasy. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight 
the notion of "caring" (from significant others) as the essence of (married) 
women's desire and fantasy. Interestingly, however, there are some similarities, 
shared meanings and vocabularies between my research data and Western feminist 
work (e.g. Radway, 1984; Geraghty, 1991): Caring is a high point of disparity 
between women's real-life experience and wish, hence, the fantasy of caring is an 
equivalent dream for something better than the women's everyday experience. 
Chapter 9 
1. Overall, there was a pronounced degree of exuberance and vibrancy in the 
research interviews with young middle-class women (as well as young working-
class women). This suggests a great deal of interest in the topics I presented to 
them. 
2. For details on education and work, refer to Chapter 2 Section (2) and (3). 
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3. This, again, echoes the argument of American economist Sylvia Hewlett (1986: 
401), as mentioned earlier in Chapter 7 Section (3): "We have not yet created a 
context that allows a woman to reasonably expect that she can have both a career 
and a family". 
4. Consuming television entertainment demands no attention and its audiences exist 
only to be entertained. Yet the specific meanings constructed from the 
entertainment text are rather more complex and sophisticated than the alleged 
elitist criticism of "mass deception" (e.g. Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979). 
5. Friends and Alley McBeal were the most watched and often discussed Western 
television serials among these young middle-class women. 
6. At this point, I want to raise a question: Is there a need to "de-westernize" media 
and communications studies? I am aware of a growing sense among the (Western) 
academic community about the need to go beyond the traditional "Eurocentric" 
view of transnational media and communications and to broaden the terms of 
research agendas in the era of globalization. But how might this be done, 
particularly given the problem of listening? 
Chapter 10 
1. Here my intention is to show how the notion of "reflexivity" (Giddens, 1990, 
1991; Beck, 1992, 1994) is integrated into the everyday consumption of 
"television media" and the creation of "self-identity" (Thompson, 1995). 
2. In the field of feminism, apparently, Sylvia Walby (1997) in Gender 
Transformations takes up the theme of generation differences between women 
being a major structure of difference. 
3. Some have focused on tradition/nation, for example, John Thompson (1995), 
Anthony Smith (1990, 1991, 1995), David Chaney (2002), to name a few. 
4. In fact, young women's everyday life includes all the use of technology 
(especially, computer information/entertainment), which allows for fully 
experimental ways of being, acting, and playing. Young women are more 
immersed and connected to a technological "media ensemble" environment, and 
such an expanded world is part oftheir everyday life and ofbeing Other-oriented. 
318 
5. I deliberately use the tenn ''research'' in this context because, in a reflexive way, 
''we are all researchers of our own lives" (quoted from a friend in a personal 
conversation) . 
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